

THE UNIVERSITY OF GLASGOW
FACULTY OF EDUCATION
DEPARTMENT OF ADULT AND CONTINUING EDUCATION

JOHN WILLIAM DYCE

'MENNESKE FØRST OG CHRISTEN SAA'
'First a human being, then a Christian':
A contribution from a 'grundtvigian' perspective
towards the development of
a more 'folk' adult lay theological education
in Scotland

DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

VOLUME ONE

October 2006

I hereby declare that this thesis constitutes my own research and writing and has not been submitted in any previous application for a degree. All quotations have been distinguished and the sources of information acknowledged.

John William Dyce

31 October 2006

ABSTRACT

CONTENTS

SECTIONS

Chapter	Title	Page
	Declaration	2
	Abstract	3
	Contents	4
	Acknowledgements	6
	PART ONE: INTRODUCTION	7
1	Problem, purpose and pattern	8
2	Personal statement	27
3	'We meet Grundtvig at the border'	37
4	'The interpretation of Grundtvig is a hard task'	52
5	Literature and language note	66
	PART TWO: A FOUR-LEAFED CLOVER	70
6	<i>Oplysning</i> : enlightenment and education	71
7	<i>Menneske først</i> : first a human	106
8	<i>Folkelighed</i>	128
9	<i>Det levende ord</i> : the Living Word	225
	PART THREE: VEKSELVIRKNING	255
10	<i>Efterklang</i> : reception or resonance?	256
11	Interaction in civil society	294
12	Socratic Dialogue	350
13	<i>Fortælling</i> : Story, story-making and story-telling	403
14	Conclusion	512
	BIBLIOGRAPHY	518

TABLES

<i>Number</i>	<i>Title</i>	<i>Page</i>
1	Continuums in lay theological education	9
2	Grundtvig: a biographical timeline	39
3	Territories ceded by Denmark	141
4	Attitudes of primary 7 school children	149
5	National identity expressed by respondents in Scotland	162
6	Feeling European v National Identity	171
7	There is a European cultural identity shared by all Europeans	172
8	Scottish population by ethnic group - all people	202
9	Racial prejudice in Scotland	203
10	Terminology of transfer	258
11	Models of transfer	263
12	Transfer of content	264
13	Phillips and Ochs' models of borrowing	271
14	Turnout at UK General Elections 1945-97	305
15	Major political parties' members numbers 1980-2004	306
16	Theological reflection as conversation	337
17	Criteria for selection of an experience	355
18	Ground rules for a Socratic dialogue	360
19	Dialogue and discussion	400

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Dr Tom Steele, my supervisor, for his patience, his strength of conviction and his willingness to come with me into less familiar territory

Liselotte Larsen, Librarian at Grundtvig-Biblioteket at Vartov in Copenhagen for her support and guidance

Professor KE Bugge for stimulating and extending my interest in Grundtvig's educational thinking and for meeting me, extending hospitality and allowing me to have conversation with him

The Revd Dr Anne L Tomlinson of the Scottish Episcopal Church who helped to awaken me to the importance of imagination within theological education

The officers of the Scottish United Reformed and Congregational College for sponsoring my studies

Keith Hammond of the Department of Adult and Continuing Education at Glasgow University for first introducing me to the area of philosophical inquiry and for conversation around the use of Socratic dialogue

Dorrit Røtting, curator of the Grundtvig Mindestue at Udby for bringing the life of NFS Grundtvig alive in a particular way

Dr Donald Smith, Director of the Scottish Storytelling Centre for his encouragement of my interest in storytelling

My students at the Scottish United Reformed and Congregational College and my colleagues in the United Reformed Church for suffering, over many years, endless references to Grundtvig.

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

Chapter 1

PROBLEM, PURPOSE AND PATTERN

PROBLEM AND PURPOSE

(They) read almost nothing but books on religious subjects [...] To discourage this unhappy propensity [...] seems an object worthy of a clergyman.' (Cooke¹ 2006:21)

The quotation carried, across two centuries, a familiarity to me as a minister of religion, serving in theological education, but with a background in community-based adult education. By no means have most members of congregations in which I have served been busying themselves in religious reading, but those in adult theological education were (it seemed to me) rather wedded to biblical and theological texts and conversations. This impression was a little reinforced by the (still anecdotal) observation of an educationist: 'One of the things that I have frequently noticed in churches is that when ministers and clergy are asked to recommend to their congregations books to read, they invariably choose devotional or biblical ones'. (Jarvis 2002:14)

Perhaps this is not so surprising. Religious people understandably will be attracted to religious questions and will read theological material and engage in religious conversations. It does seem, to a degree, self-evident. Yet, this focus of, or balance in,

¹ quoting the First (Old) Statistical Account of Scotland for the country of Dumfriesshire, where the original author is referring to the 'vulgar' people of the parish.

theological education with lay people in the Church is a core issue in my thesis.

'There are two distinct stances evident in the Church: one is turned outward towards the world and society, the other turned inward toward the various structures of the Church.' (Boff 1985:47)

When Goodbourn undertook an overview of church-related adult education, he suggested that three principal continuums were apparent:

Table 1: Continuums in lay theological education

Whole society (W)	_____	Church (C)
Experiential (E)	_____	Intellectual (I)
Faith development (F)	_____	Human development (H)

and concluded that 'I know that our work in Scotland was nearer C than W, nearer E than I, nearer F than H.' (Goodbourn 2001:46)

The church-orientation of much adult lay theological education, in the form of and under the description 'lay training', arises partly from a functionalist perspective. Positively, it is recognition that the responsibilities undertaken by lay people draw upon knowledge and skill and that the institution should devote resources to enabling and equipping these people as readily as it does to training clergy and others in

'professional' roles. In a more negative form, it takes on a narrow, managerialist hue with a focus primarily on skills competences, sometimes in a broader context of faith understanding, but more rarely emphasising the participant as a Christian who lives within and relates to a wider reality.

It reflects a prioritisation that sees working within the life of the Church as being more truly 'discipleship', allied with institutional greed in using people's time and energy. Yet, this strong association of the service of God with service primarily within the Church is a dangerous one. 'Since God has become man, humanity, every man, history is the living temple of God. The Church is called to be a 'church without walls'. (Church of Scotland 2001) If we take, as I believe Grundtvig does, a view of theology that is seriously 'incarnational', then the business of theology is concerned as much with the clarification of human life as it is with abstract theology.²

Theological education with lay people has struggled to escape from under its somewhat better resourced sibling³, theological education with clergy. Even though policy statements appear to set a wider agenda, eg

² I do not want to create a gulf between the earthly and the transcendent, as my belief and my understanding of Grundtvig is that the Incarnation is not an earthly focus but a suffusion of the earthly with the divine.

³ Grundtvig reflects a similar evaluation of 19thC Denmark: 'In all probability, we have too many rather than too few, and too large rather than too small, institutions for the education of pastors and professors.' (Nielsen 1976: 154, translating Skolen for Livet 1838)

Although candidates for ordination may reasonably be expected to possess a particular expertise in theology, the **foundations of this expertise lie in the common faith of the people of God⁴** and should be developed as part of the whole Church's commitment to learning and being equipped for service. (Church of England 2003:27),

lay education more obviously draws from ministerial education than ministerial education from the life of the laity. Patterns of theological education have long reflected the 'academic disciplines' divisions⁵ and have drawn on those perspectives, living within what Farley has termed the 'clerical Paradigm'.

(Farley 1983:127). This categorisation of the work by 'discipline' is not merely organisational, for it shapes significantly the values and assumptions, language and tools of these elements. 'The capacity to impose and maintain a particular structuring of some domain or another' can be a powerful instrument.

(Fairclough 1989:13)

The understanding that lay theological education is about equipping people to 'do theology' has significant truth, but much depends upon what we are meaning.

Macquarrie observes that 'Not all God-talk would qualify as theology - for we reserve this name for the more sophisticated and reflective ways of talking about God.' (1967:11) This is the kind of talk considered more 'appropriate to a minority of Christians, usually seen as an intellectual elite' (Sykes 1983:566-7), who then trickle it down⁶ for the consumption of the laity. There is a risk that lay education, to qualify for the

⁴ my emphasis

⁵ Old Testament, New Testament, Systematic Theology, Church History and Practical Theology

⁶ (possibly in a diluted form)

inclusion of the adjective 'theological', requires participants' absorption into the patterns of thought and language of those whom we call 'theologians'.

Many of the tools on offer have been developed in particular intellectual contexts (the academic and the clerical) and so come with values and perspectives as part of their composition. It is theology usually expressed in a language that is validated by professors and priests. We have yet to take seriously for the church bible study or discussion group the need 'to avoid install(ing) the language of the professionals as the only valuable idiom in the classroom'. (Freire and Shor 1987:23) The common expression 'doing theology' can convey to learners a sense of them being schooled in a more religiously significant, and implicitly superior, form of interpreting and knowing. In 'equipping' the laity with a particular apparatus for interpretation of experience, this can lead to a loss of confidence in their own way of knowing, to them to 'applying too quickly the usual theological categories to interpret (experience)'. (Patton 1990:41) The 'primacy of the everyday' in shaping our thinking is thus set aside. (Clack 1999:22)

The potential of ordinary people within the Church to do theology, to bring their own experience of the world into interaction with scripture, tradition and theological teaching, is weakened and marginalised. It is fundamental that both narratives, lived experience and the Christian story, are taken seriously. Yet, the 'old assumption that without the controlling influence of academic 'disciplines' and church authorities, the thought of ordinary people must be disorderly,

superstitious and lacking in serious intellectual interest' in some measure still prevails. (Cupitt 1999:ix) In that form, theological education would be in danger of becoming an 'education for domestication'. (Freire 1973:79)

An alternative perspective on this theology-doing⁷ is a form of theology that 'is secular in the sense of being grounded in our exercise of everyday roles of ordinary life, perceived as being at the centre of the good life. It is religious as a form of theology that keeps close to the religious impulses and especially to the spirituality that drives people ...'. (Astley 2002:27)

The special vocation or orientation of the laity is towards life in the world, to 'everyday life'. 'My assumption is that all Christians are inevitably engaged everyday in existential responses to the world.' (Farley 1998:113) A 'whole society' focus in Goodbourn's terms⁸ echoes the affirmation: 'The laity are not the helpers of the clergy, so that they can do their job. The clergy are the helpers of the laity so that they can be the Church **in the world.**'⁹ The primary vocation and context of lay people is life in the world¹⁰.

⁷ It is perhaps significant that, in academic language, the formation of clergy was often referred to as including **reading** theology.

⁸ Table 1

⁹ My emphasis.

The quotation is attributed variously to Bishop John Robinson (eg http://www.readers.cofe.anglican.org/news_item.php?18, a webpage of the Church of England) and to Dr Hans Ruedi Weber of the World Council of Churches (eg <http://www.cpsajoburg.org.za/bishsynetc/bishjhb34.html>, a web page of the (Anglican) Church of the Province of South Africa).

¹⁰ In saying this, I am not seeking to undermine the role of the laity **within** the Church.

The calling of the Church is essentially missiological¹¹; its vocation is to go to, be in and engage with the world¹². Mission is 'more than and different from recruitment to our brand of religion; it is alerting people to the universal reign of God.' (Bosch 1995:33) '(It) takes place where the church, in its total involvement with the world, bears its testimony in the form of a servant, with reference to unbelief, exploitation, discrimination and violence, but also with reference to salvation, healing, liberation, reconciliation and righteousness.' (Bosch 1986:11) Mission takes many forms¹³: There is the narrowly evangelistical, reflected in the marketing of 'our brand of religion'. There is readiness to meet the challenge envisaged in the New Testament epistle of 1 Peter: 'Should anyone ask you the reason for this hope of yours, be ever ready to reply, but speak gently and respectfully.'¹⁴ There is service to those in need, whether in individual charitable deed or through charitable organizations.¹⁵

My interest here is in that form of mission which is more disinterested, the way of openness to dialogue with others, a going out not to convert or persuade but

¹¹ 'Mission was, in the early stages, more than a mere function; it was a fundamental expression of the life of the church. The beginnings of a missionary theology are therefore also the beginnings of Christian theology as such.' (Kasting: 1969:127, translated in Bosch 1991:16)

¹² New Testament: Matthew 28:29-30

¹³ Grundtvig takes a positive view of evangelism, in the form of the then overseas missions, but he is critical of some of the assumptions and practices that were followed, not least the lack of respect for the folk traditions and insights of the people being evangelised, the lack of freedom of response and issues of teaching in other than the mother tongue. (Bugge 2001:299ff)

¹⁴ 1 Peter 3:15-16

¹⁵ I am not suggesting that this is an exhaustive list, but I offer it as an indicator of the breadth of focus and form.

to share, to find commonality and difference and to enter into living and lively interaction.

A key resource for our study here is the life and work of NFS Grundtvig and the thesis title is taken from one of his phrases, 'First a human being, then a Christian'. It is premature here to explore in detail its meaning,¹⁶ but it reflects an understanding that people are first of all human beings. 'We are humans and only then we become Christians.'¹⁷ (Lindhart 1951:93) If we do not have a sense of our humanity¹⁸ and what that means for life, we cannot respond authentically to the message of salvation and what it means for eternal life.¹⁹

My focus, then, is more 'whole society' oriented.

Whether or not there is truth in the 'clash of civilisations'²⁰ hypothesis²¹, it may be more positive

¹⁶ See below, particularly in my chapter 7, '*Menneske først*: first a human'

¹⁷ In that light, it is interesting to recall Goodbourn's evaluation (2001:46) that lay theological education in his experience was more focused on 'faith development' than 'human development'.

¹⁸ As today, we encounter both positive and negative religious and philosophical views of our humanness. As we shall see further in chapter 7, Grundtvig (while not doubting the issue of 'sinfulness' and the need for salvation) took a more positive, affirming view of humanity. Human beings were made in the image of God and retained this quality despite 'The Fall'. They had capacity of hear and know the truth and to be open to the Spirit and to other people of spirit.

¹⁹ Though my focus is not on equipping the laity to engage in evangelism, my belief, following Grundtvig's ideas, is that evangelism does have to be concerned first of all with engaging, honestly and unconditionally, with people's humanity and doing this contextually, that is engaging seriously with the shared life of the people, their values, their experiences, their ways of living, their forms of speaking, their hopes and aspirations.

²⁰ Huntington has argued for this hypothesis 'that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world

and surer ground to assert that, in a globalised world and in national and local communities of cultural diversity, there is a strong moral, social, political and educational need to foster and facilitate an engagement across cultural differences and to find shared ground upon which different perspectives can be offered and explored.

I believe that that 'meeting point' for engagement is our common humanity, around exploring what it is to be human and to be in community with one another. 'Rather than abandoning the search for truth and the good life, this would be a shared pursuit where many groups and perspectives are invited to participate.' (Mortensen 2003:35)

If Christian people are to share in this collaborative civic task, it is not tenable, in my view, to proceed on any basis other than by recognising a plurality of beliefs in society. Nor can it legitimately be on an evangelistic basis²². Though there is room in the public space for robust inter-religious dialogue and

affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations. The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics. The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.' (Huntingdon 1993:22)

²¹ The theory is open to serious criticism, not least for his tendencies to exaggerate the degree of internal homogeneity within such civilizations and to underestimate the level of internal difference and division; to ignore the role of 'ethnic' loyalties within the so-called civilisations; and to emphasise the oppositional rather than the dialogical aspects of the meeting of cultures). Like many 'theories' which purport to have explanatory or analytical properties, it also (more dangerously) has the potential to contribute to its own realization.

²² One of the principles that we shall utilise throughout this study is that of *vekselvirkning* or reciprocal interaction. Though I do not doubt that it can be possible to engage in respectful and even dialogical evangelism, an interaction whose purpose is one-way in the form of seeking conversion lacks the necessary degree of mutuality.

therefore for shared theological conversation, wider dialogue within the community has to be on rather different terms.

My contention is that this requires the drawing of a distinction between those aspects of Christian belief that are 'specifically Christian' (and which are the matter of religious faith, belief and practice) and those which are 'human'²³ (and which can enter meaningfully and usefully into the shared territory of all who interact in the public space), an 'attempt to give a definition in strictly human terms of the relationship to the other person which is contained in the religious proclamation of Jesus of Nazareth'. (Løgstrup 1956, quoted/translated in MacIntyre and Fink 1997:1)

In contrast to more stringently secularist views, I wish to affirm a place for religious believers as such²⁴ within debates in the public space. I am, however, with the sentiments of Habermas that religious people can engage profitably in that dialogue with and by others who are not co-religionists only if some priority is given to secular reason and language.

The implication of this 'post-metaphysical' stance (as Habermas terms it), in which faith and knowledge are firmly distinguished, is that religious arguments need to be 'translated' into 'generally accessible' terms to count in the political public sphere. Religious bodies must acknowledge the need for 'translation' as this gives them 'the chance to be taken up

²³ The distinction is one proposed by KE Løgstrup in his *Kunst og etik* (Art and Ethics) (Løgstrup 1961)

²⁴ By 'as such', I affirm that I do not believe that members of faith communities have to leave outside (in the private space) their beliefs and values. I think that that requires either a kind of dual identity or dishonesty through concealment.

in the agendas and negotiations within political bodies.

(Schlesinger and Foret 2006:63)

Grundtvig himself drew a distinction between faith and life-philosophy.²⁵

Faith is thoughts or expectations that in a Christian view are closely bound up with Christ's person and calling. Life-philosophy, on the other hand, is a view of life and mankind that Christians may have in common with people whom Grundtvig calls 'Naturalists'. By this expression he means people who are not bound by a narrow biological, mechanistic view of man²⁶ but who constructively believe that 'spirit' is an important and determining factor in being a person. On this point Grundtvig believes that the Christian is fundamentally in agreement with every person who has a 'glimmer of spirit and a spark of truthfulness'. (Bugge 1983: 213)

The distinction is important in terms of fostering a purposeful dialogue in society, for it is a difference between 'that which is universal (in Christianity)... and that which is specifically Christian'²⁷ (in Christianity)... where the difference is exactly that the content of the former is accessible to all humans and thus can be the subject of a phenomenological treatment and philosophical investigation, where this does not apply to the content of the latter, which are

²⁵ In his introduction to *Nordens Mytologi* 1832

²⁶ For this and other uses within quotations of false universalisation of the word 'man' and similar, I refer to my comment in chapter 5.

²⁷ I acknowledge the role of 'ecclesial theology' (a term of D'Costa 2005) in lay theological education, but I do not share his apparent commitment to 'desirable sectarianism' and believe that even ecclesial theology is the better for being exposed to dialogical study in which other faith and non-faith perspectives are in play. I concur with Markham (2003:12-13) that to use the acceptability test of 'Is this in conformity with the Church's teaching and insights?' in judging others' views has very little of dialogical engagement in it.

truths of proclamation to be believed (in Christian faith) or rejected'. (Jensen 2003:3)

This is not to ask Christian people to abandon or set aside their religious beliefs. It is to invite them, for the sake of our shared humanity and life in community with one another, to find within their beliefs and convictions the core that is 'human'.

(We) would want to abstract from the Christian story a more philosophically identifiable set of principles and procedures that could be used in public debates over the common good. The Christian story would still inform and enrich these principles and procedures, but they would be stated and defended to people in our pluralistic society who do not necessarily begin with Christian presuppositions. (Browning 1984:134)

This is not to argue (as D'Costa 2005 asserts) that it is to surrender to a wholly secular framework²⁸, for the Christian contribution remains Christian but in a publically consumable and shareable form.

As Astley²⁹ suggests, we may even be able to 'recognize a religious dimension to human language and living *outside* the Christian framework, as embodying a vision of the human condition that is "more substantial and even more *formidable* than we have supposed"'. (2002:32)

I do not doubt that there is resistance to this perspective and proposal. There will be some who would

²⁸ D'Costa regards secularization as simply another form of sectarianism.

²⁹ The internal quotation is from Don Cupitt (Cupitt 1999:103)

consider that their engagement with the secular ought to be on evangelistic terms alone and that it diminishes the tenets of the faith to 'translate' them into secular language and modes of thought. I would not deny the right of religions to proselytise,³⁰ but it does require to be distinguished from dialogue in the public sphere.

The charge is made also that this secularization of the public space confines religion and religious modes to a private space, whereas it has historically had a clear role within the public space. (Kalinowski 2003:7; Weiler 2004:44) While not doubting this at European³¹, British or Scottish levels, it is clear that these contexts are now significantly pluralist and dominance of a particular religious perspective is not capable of rational or equitable justification³². The assertion also ignores the extent to which this religious influence upon and partnership with civil authorities has been the subject of both reciprocity and contest. (Schlesinger and Foret 2006:72)

³⁰ and some would regard this form of mission as a religious duty

³¹ Delanty (1995) demonstrates the extent to which there has been recourse to 'Christianity' as a source of European definition and delimitation. A recurrent focus of this religious/ cultural criterion is the issue of the possible admission of Turkey to the European Union. Though the formal discussion has been in terms of Turkey achieving political, human rights and economic targets, it is possible to glimpse other concerns at play: Helmut Schmidt (former Chancellor of West Germany) observed that Turkish accession 'would open the door for similarly plausible full membership of **other Muslim nations** in Africa and in the Middle East' (my emphasis).

³² Taking a more ethno-culturalist view of nations, it does not seem to me that to attempt to eliminate the historical legacy of the 'majority' religion in a society is realistic or desirable. Literature, architecture, music, patterns of speech and much more have developed within a context of religious life, though not in a uniform way. How we chose to interact with that tradition is open. I do not believe that the historical-cultural legacy can be a trump card that entitles a continuing cultural (and political) hegemony.

Pragmatically, as faith language ceases to be a common currency within modern societies, it is likely that dialogue in which some partners insist on using its concepts, assumptions and perspectives will be lacking as dialogue and unlikely to be effective. The probability must be that in order to be recognised and taken seriously within the political sphere, people of faith communities must engage in translation³³ of their ideas into the linguistic currency of the political world. (Habermas 2005)

Similarly, Forst argues for a duty on the religious participant in public dialogue 'to make a (gradual) translation of his/her arguments into reasons that are acceptable on the basis of the values and principles of public reason' (Forst 1994:158) and Rawls that 'The ideal of citizenship imposes a moral, not a legal, duty - the duty of civility - to be able to explain to one another on those fundamental questions how the principles and policies they advocate and vote for can be supported by the values of public reason' (Rawls 1993:217). I am not wholly persuaded by Forst's view³⁴ that it amounts to a civic '**duty**'³⁵ to engage in this translation. I wholly recognize the value of grounding the conversation in a sharedness, but there are difficulties in an over-restrictive position. A liberal society will not, I believe, want unnecessarily to exclude any voice from the public discourse, nor might it find such an exclusion in its interests, as it thereby excludes that voice from or marginalizes it within civic society. It has to acknowledge too that

³³ By 'translation', I do not mean merely a finding of secular synonyms. It involves more deeply an exploration of what lies, humanly, at the heart of the belief.

³⁴ (shared by Rawls 1997 and Audi and Wolterstoff 1997)

³⁵ my emphasis

the process of translation is not a straightforward one and a voice should not be unheard because it has not (yet) found an expression in secular terms. Nor should it be assumed that religious expression is always so alien to other hearers that it cannot be comprehended and even resonate. Habermas does not propose an over-rigorous exclusion of religious linguistic imagery. The expression that humankind is made 'in the image of God' may be something at the level of intuition which is meaningful to those outwith religious belief and language. (Habermas 2001)

My assertion is, more simply and practically and (as a religious 'insider'), that in a pluralistic society it is self-disabling for religious people not to engage in the dialogue on the basis of a set of common public forms of reasoning. Religious arguments, arguments based on appeal to Scriptures, appeals to divine authority simply do not have currency in the wider sphere. Indeed, such appeals have potential for alienation rather than inviting into dialogue.

This is not to suggest that religious people ought to hide their religious understanding or motivation. That would not be thought by some to be consistent with their religious convictions and it would take a significant degree of transparency out of the dialogue. This clarity of fundamental motivations and values is not always reciprocal. 'Much if not most of the time we will be able to spot religious reasons from a mile away [...] Typically, however, comprehensive secular perspectives go undetected'. (Audi and Wolterstoff 1997:105)

Discussion of the contribution of religious people to discussion in the public space tends to focus on the role of religious institutions, religious leaders. My thesis is concerned more with a more folk involvement, a more democratic participation in which ordinary believers are enabled to engage in the dialogue in the public space, drawing on their religious and other beliefs and values. It ought not to be assumed that this act of translation is one that is easily accomplished. (Habermas 2006) I believe that it cannot be accomplished by only a 'switching' of language between 'religious' and 'secular' discussion spaces, a 'bilingual' competence. It demands that, in the religious conversation, the reasoning and language of the wider world is acknowledged and drawn upon.

If my first focus is on the laity and their relationship to wider society, my second is on that wider society.

Theology is not a 'value- and culture-free objectivity'. (Bevans 1992:2) Rather, 'contextualization [...] is the *sine qua non* of all genuine theological thought, and always has been'. (Hall 1989:21) It will become apparent from the chapter 8 on *Folkelighed* that I believe the nation, certainly as a cultural and social space, to be a primary setting for our doing theology, for our exploration of what it is to be human and for some of the most critical interactions in our living.

Storrar quotes the words of Fr Anthony Ross OP: 'Before deciding what it is to be Scottish we need to re-examine our ideas as to what it is to be human, and to

be Christian...' (Storrar 1990:xi) I am less than confident about Ross's 'before', but I am with him in acknowledging the interconnectivity (from a Christian perspective) of these three dimensions which interact with one another continually to shape our sense of identity and our way of being together (and sometimes apart) in community.

My purpose in this thesis is not then to embrace the whole of what might constitute adult lay theological education. I am not at all arguing that that education should cease to engage in biblical criticism or to explore theological concepts or to learn of the tradition's history. I assume its continuing contribution. I address a distinct component, the capacity of lay people to engage meaningfully and creatively out there/ out here in the world.

For long there have been two emphases: 'The 'theoretical' aspect of theology had to do almost exclusively with the reality of the divine revelation or with assent in the act of faith which students had to imbibe; the 'practical' component concentrated on the idea of ministry as service to the institutional church.' (Bosch 1991:490)

My concern is a further emphasis: to call and enable Christian people, bringing their faith with them but in a spirit of openness and with a 'currency' that makes dialogue possible and purposeful, to take seriously their calling to live out their humanity in community, to explore its meanings and shape its present and future.

PATTERN OF THE THESIS

I have made mention already of the figure of NFS Grundtvig, a largely 19thC Danish theologian, thinker and inspirer of the folk high school movement in Scandinavia and beyond³⁶. In chapters 3 and 4 and indeed throughout the thesis, I seek to introduce the reader to Grundtvig, in his context and as a contributor to present thinking.

Part Two explores four key ideas in Grundtvig's work:

- *Oplysning* - enlightenment or education³⁷ - the end
- *Menneskelighed* - humanity and humankind - the underpinning value
- *Folkelighed* - a term for which it is difficult to find some appropriate English equivalence, but which is concerned with whatever is of the people and builds their community - the key context
- *Det levende ord* - the living word - the principal pedagogical tool.

As this is a study which is inspired by the work of Grundtvig and draws upon this as a major resource but is not in the narrow sense 'a Grundtvig study', I use these main ideas as a springboard for a wider and more contemporary reflection on some aspects of adult learning for participation in community.

In Part Three, after considering some of the issues involved in the 'reception' of Grundtvig's ideas and

³⁶ It will become evident from chapters 3 and 4 in particular that these are but some aspects of Grundtvig's work and influence.

³⁷ To assist any non-Danish reading reader, I offer an English equivalent, while acknowledging that these are, and can be only barely adequate. In the four chapters concerned, however, the breadth of their meaning is explored.

subsequent developments, I examine three areas of contemporary learning interaction, in the context of the grundtvigian³⁸ thinking:

- Dialogue in the public or civic space
- Socratic dialogue
- Fortælling - storytelling.

There is not, as yet, a Part Four, for it lies beyond the immediate work of this thesis but it is intimately connected to it. In this present study, I have endeavoured to invite the reader into some thinking. It perhaps forms something of a manifesto, a challenge. As I consider myself to be 'educator' more than 'educationist', my interest ultimately is the development of adult learning. It is important, then, that this more theoretically and ideas-oriented study should be followed by another in which the application of its thinking in the form of curriculum design and delivery is taken forward. Part Three is a bridge, for it looks beyond the primarily conceptual to how these contribute in three areas of adult community engagement and learning.

³⁸ Concerning my decision in most cases to use a small 'g', see chapter 5

Chapter Two

A PERSONAL NARRATIVE

'Clara Bolton's forceful personality and philosophy of life wrought a dramatic change in Grundtvig's view of human existence and Christianity. From now on he saw the purpose of Christianity in a completely different light.'

(Testrup Højeskole, nd)

Reading biographies of NFS Grundtvig is likely to evoke a realisation that his life was in some measure a series of 'epiphanies', of moments of awakening. He said that 'he wrote himself to clarity' and this is undoubtedly true, as we trace the trajectory of his thinking through his writings, but it is also true that he found new clarity through life experiences. His love affair at Egeløkke, the legal case resulting in the imposition of censorship, his journeying to England, his periods of depression: these and other events influenced strongly the development of his thinking. These were moments of 'breakthrough' (eg Michelsen 1983:44; Thyssen 1983:275)

I believe that there is some parallel in the lives of others of us. Life experiences change us, they bring opportunities for fresh understanding. We are not shaped by events, but our interaction with life experience brings us to points of discovery, though we may not recognise them at the time.

Concerning methodology, my belief is that the demands of research more and more require researchers to be, as far as they are able, 'up-front' about where we are 'coming from', what are the experiences that have informed our turning to the research question, what drives our motivation, what evokes emotional responses within us, what 'political' commitment we bring and what we understand of our own preconceptions and prejudices (while recognising that there is a truth that 'We do not know what our prejudices are' (Lessing 1990 quoted in Barr 1999:99)). I believe that an autobiographical statement, though inevitably partial and even with the potential for being self-delusional, is nonetheless an 'in-good-faith' attempt to be honest with the reader of the thesis and indeed with myself about the elements of my experience which are informing my research activity.

In seeking to be more transparent in this way, I am not at all suggesting that I have thereby avoided the problems of author subjectivity, still less achieved a higher degree of objectivity.

The link is commonly made between the use of the third person and the setting out of scholarly and therefore more reliable knowledge. Yet, life experience (in the personal but also in a collective sense) and the dimensions of class, gender, sexuality and other forms of identity and experience significantly fashion our knowing. I have undertaken this study, not **in spite of** my subjectivity, my interests, my experiences and my construction of them, my professed values, my priorities, but largely **because** of them and under their

influence. In and with this, I am not abandoning a proper sense of rigour.

At the same time, I do believe that some forms of self-concealment and objectivity, ostensibly vouched for by writing in the third person, and a degree of personal anonymity, obscure (and perhaps even seek to hide) the presence of author subjectivity. The use of more impersonal forms would be less true to a thesis in which humanity and humanness is the focus and therefore the humanness of the researcher not to be excluded. For these reasons and others, I have chosen to write in the first person singular (the 'I' form) and it seems to be necessary then to offer some account, however personal and lacking in reliability or external validity, of who that 'I' is.

I acknowledge the risk that this may be viewed as individualistic. Rather, however, I am seeking to be explicit about my 'standpoint' and where this is located within the spectrum of epistemological positions (Barr 1999:79), not denying but affirming my understanding that knowledge is 'socially situated' and that there is a capacity in 'knowledge from below' to be transformative not only of our understanding but of our world. (Barr 1999:79) I distinguish such a standpoint from the dogmatic protectionism that Hammersley and Gomm (1997) regard as 'ontological gerrymandering'.

I seek to be explicit about the extent to which my own professional and indeed life experience cannot be other than a contribution that informs and has informed the

course of the research activity and been indeed a source of 'data'.

Like much 'educational' research, it is undertaken by a practitioner who is therefore both motivated by some sense not merely of enquiry but also of belief that things could be different and concerned therefore not merely to add, however imperceptibly, to the sum of knowledge in the field, but to inform and indeed change practice.

In writing as 'I', I acknowledge that that 'I' is not, has not been and will not be static and indeed that there are different 'I's operating concurrently.

I am aware of some of the risks that are inherent in this approach. Any autobiographical element is open to criticism that:

There can be a narcissistic aspect to such an activity.

This is a criticism which resonates with the Scot who rarely remains untouched by the Scots' prohibition of anything that would suggest that one should draw attention to oneself.

It can be a claim that there is a particular legitimacy to personal experience that makes it 'the trump card of authenticity'. (Barr 1999:4)

Neither the search for identity nor the stories that emerge from that search, can be imagined to be peculiarly protected from the risks of subjectivity and partiality. As Nussbaum suggests, none is 'perfect in self knowledge and a perceptive outsider may sometimes see what a person immersed in an experience fails to see'. (Nussbaum

1997:111) Yet, the insider view of the experiences is not without its value (indeed Nussbaum acknowledges that it is often the best 'starting point') and the impact of the experience, however subjectively, is inevitably a factor in shaping thought and action.

It may afford a spurious defence against the suggestion of bias and gives an appearance of the study being 'unsullied'. Transparency is an important aspect of research reporting. Nonetheless, efforts towards transparency are not guaranteed and may even be a camouflage for other aspects of one's subjectivity not identified and made explicit.

An account that is largely the product of introspection can be thought to be over-individualistic. As we shall see, Grundtvig's affirmation of the importance of life-enlightenment in education resisted the kind of self-exploration that is over-introspective and focused exclusively on the personal. As the national (the *folk*) was to be viewed only in relation to the universal (the human), so the self was to be seen in relation to the community. The self then is the self in context, *livoplysning* is related to *folkeoplysning*. The personal stands constantly in relation to the communal and the communal does not deny but endeavours to enrich the personal.

Barr 1999:81 takes the view in reflecting on one of her own studies that 'I believed that nothing would be served by preceding my account with a litany of political and value commitments'. I hope that there are grounds in what follows for suggesting that an

explanation of the biographical and an acknowledgement of my values is at least honest.

This is, however, not an autobiography and this dimension must remain within strict confines of space. My reading of biographical material on Grundtvig makes me conscious nonetheless of the 'turning points' in his life, these moments of discovery, often not through his scholarship but through life experiences. I can do little more here than offer some 'turning points' of my own, not all of which were apparent as such to me or to others at the time, but have come to have significance, though not necessarily in a very precise way.

Language and power: I am a toddler, staying for a short while in hospital in Glasgow. I had been put into a hospital room with another child, not for medical reasons, but so that I could impart my more polite Scottish suburban speech to my room-mate who was judged to be 'lacking' in this department. I have only the evidence of my parents that the experiment was, in terms of its intended outcome, an abject failure and it was I who acquired a new vocabulary and 'accent'. Even as a small child, I became aware that my primary school (and, as I remember, my home) in banning 'aye' and insisting on 'yes' was 'up to something'. 'The way it had to be said/ Was as if you were posh, grown-up, male, English and dead.'³⁹ (from *Kids poem /Bairnsang* in Lochhead 2003) The words that really expressed what

³⁹ An experience echoed in Jennie Erdal's *Ghosting*: 'If you spoke in the way it felt natural to speak, the way you heard spoken all around you, you were marked in the eyes of the world beyond. It was daylight snobbery, but that's the way it was. My mother was fiercely aspiring, and my father, perhaps in the interests of peace, went along with her. English was the thing; hence the elocution lessons and all that pitiful vowel management.' (Erdal 2004)

you were thinking and feeling, what Grundtvig delighted in as 'the mother tongue', were frowned upon and suppressed.

Scottishness: I have always been conscious of being 'Scottish', though probably for most of my life in an imprecise and changing way. In the more (but still not really) ethnically homogeneous years of my early lifetime, I suspect that I still had notions of my nation being an ethnically distinct one. As a musical child, I was drawn into Scottish culture, particularly its poetry and song (though not without a significant element of populist cultural tartanry). At school, I was conscious of learning Chaucer rather than Burns, the English civil war rather than any period of Scots history, Dickens rather than Scott... Even then, I was conscious of the extent to which (though I could not then think it deliberate) education can support the cultural invisibility of a nation even within the nation itself.

Fresh perspectives: Encountering feminist perspectives and critiques at theological college⁴⁰, I came to re-examine some of my fundamental assumptions about theology, about scholarship and about life. I belong to a relatively liberal Christian denomination and indeed one that as 'early' as 1928 ordained a woman to ministry⁴¹ but my reading of Rosemary Radford Reuther⁴² and Mary Daly⁴³ and my conversations with a feminist

⁴⁰ Not, sadly, through the teaching programme, but in informal discussion and in personal reading

⁴¹ the Revd Vera Finlay (later Vera Kenmure)

⁴² See Reuther (1983)

⁴³ particularly Daly (1990, 1992). I owe to Daly some understanding of the depth of feminist critique of male hegemony in its different forms. It was challenging. I found more difficult to accept in her writings a tendency, in the understandable causes of women's solidarity and of

fellow student extended my sensitivity to the silence in the sacred texts concerning women's and others' stories and the extent to which the presence of some, and the questions of some, were marginalised, undermined, suppressed and ignored.

Meeting Grundtvig: As a community education worker, I became involved in a project⁴⁴ with Danish partners, on counselling the long-term unemployed. I encountered in Danish society, as it seemed to me, a community that was (relatively) confident in itself, had a high degree of social cohesion and care for the marginalised in society, was respectful of the individual but set this within a communal context and had a more consistent expectation of adult education as learning for life in community. I write here that I 'met' Grundtvig, though literally of course this is untrue, but I found myself encountering a 'living word' in the life of a community; this was complemented by going on to read books about Grundtvig and then some of the writings of Grundtvig. Of course, my reading of what he wrote (often in translation or even paraphrase) is influenced by what I had seen of how Grundtvig's thinking was taken up (and sometimes departed from). His positive 'folk' affirmation, his commitment to the living word in the mother tongue, his encouragement of dialogue and interaction, the encouragement of each and all in community to seek enlightenment spoke to me as an educator.

recognizing deeper connections across difference, to homogenize women and their experience and not to recognise other strands of oppression.

⁴⁴ managed by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working conditions for the European Community

Philosophical inquiry: Working collaboratively with a colleague from Glasgow University, I became interested in the use of philosophical inquiry with children at later primary school stage. I was struck by the extent to which young children were able to engage in discussion with one another around moral questions, in recognising strengths and weaknesses in argumentation and in extending stories imaginatively into fresh realms of possibilities. At the same time, I felt that the agenda of much adult basic education was being shifted into functionalist literacy and other skills, into life 'skills' rather than life issues and life enlightenment. As a Christian minister, I became more conscious that lay theological education in my experience was 'fact'-oriented, paid less heed than it ought to the experience of people, answered its own questions rather than the actual enquiring of seekers and not infrequently was focused on finding expert 'truth' rather than personal or shared meaning. Education was less and less 'socratic'.

Storytelling: I had always enjoyed storytelling and hearing stories, but they had been a form of recreation. Indeed, my academic and professional life was suspicious of, even disdainful towards, the 'anecdotal'. The turning point came at a conference⁴⁵ where I had been asked to deliver a paper on conversations for unity that I had convened. I made several attempts at writing a paper of ecclesiological, missiological, theological and ecumenical analysis. I had no doubt that the drafts contained truths about what we had done, but my explanations from these

⁴⁵ organized by one of the ecumenical instruments in the UK on the theme of 'ecumenical methodology'.

'learned' perspectives did not go to the heart of the process in which as human beings we had engaged. There was also untruth, in that the analysis reflected well the official documentation of the process but it told little of the human dynamic in what had gone on. Indeed, it seemed rather to draw a veil over the untidy, muddled, darker aspects. Michael Mann's assertion regarding societies being 'much messier than our theories of them' resonated. (Mann 1986:4)

Each of these experiences brought some 'epiphany', some realisation, some breakthrough. Their influence underpins and suffuses this study.

Chapter Three

'WE MEET GRUNDTVIG AT THE BORDER'⁴⁶

Like perhaps many Danish sayings, there is something enigmatic (at least to the outsider) about the saying of this chapter title. We have relatively little chance to encounter Grundtvig outside of his country, Denmark. Though there has been some flourishing in recently of books in English about Grundtvig and his life and work, and these⁴⁷ are to be most warmly welcomed, there are aspects of his thinking and very much of his original text that are hidden from the non-Danish speaker. There are a few anthologies of Grundtvig's thinking.⁴⁸ Other works of a more applied character have assisted in the dissemination of information about him. In some non-Danish settings, there has been reception of Grundtvig's ideas or of adult education developments and these have been reported⁴⁹. Compared with many other thinkers of his magnitude and significance, Grundtvig is somewhat hidden still within the confines of his own native country.

⁴⁶ The title of this section comes from a common saying concerning Grundtvig: 'Danes have a saying that... Grundtvig is met at the Danish border. When foreigners come into Denmark, they meet Grundtvig.' (Warren 1998:147)

⁴⁷ The reader is referred particularly to the more recent publications: Allchin et al (1993), AM Allchin (1997), Allchin et al (2000), Borish (1991), Thaning (1972), Thodberg and Thyssen (1983). I understand, at the time of writing, that I work by SAJ Bradley is in preparation.

⁴⁸ Broadbridge and Jensen (trans) (1984), and Johannes Knudsen (ed) (1976)

⁴⁹ This aspect is considered in the chapter 10 *Efterklang* in which the focus is on issues of reception and resonance.

There is another sense in which the saying is true. There is something quintessentially Danish⁵⁰ about Grundtvig:⁵¹ his love of the Danish mother tongue and its proverbs and sayings; his concern for its folk life and for all that was Danish; and his speaking, writing and acting in the context of Denmark's experiences of that time; his enduring influence on Danish society, through the development of folk high schools, through the hymnal and through the pervasiveness of aspects of his values and modes of thought.

I offer here only the briefest outlines of key features of Grundtvig's life in the form of a biographical timeline⁵² (Table 2).

⁵⁰ This view of course gives rise to the suggestion that there is an inherent un-exportability in Grundtvig. This issue I address in chapter 10.

⁵¹ We might of course with equal truth suggest that there is something quintessentially Grundtvigian about Denmark.

⁵² See footnote 47 for works to which reference can be made for additional biographical information. More detailed aspects of his life and work will be considered through the thesis.

Table 2 Grundtvig: a biographical timeline

Year(s)	Events in his life	Wider events
1783	Nikolai Frederik Severin Grundtvig born 8 September in Udby, Sjælland	
1789		The French revolution
1800	Student Aarhus Cathedral school	
1801		The Battle of Copenhagen
1801-3	Attended lectures by his cousin, Steffens	
1803	Graduated in divinity from Copenhagen University and returned home to Udby	
1805-7	Tutor at Egelykke on Langeland, where he falls in love with Constance Leth	1807 The bombardment of Copenhagen
1810	Probationary sermon Spiritual crisis and returns to Udby	
1811	Helps his father, acting as his curate at Udby	
1813	On his father's death, tries to become parish priest at Udby but is unsuccessful. Returns to Copenhagen	The defeat of Napoleon in Russia
1814		Norway surrendered to Sweden
1818	Marries Elisabeth Blicher	
1821-22	Priest at Præstø	
1822-26	Priest at Our Saviour's Church, Copenhagen	

1824	Grs 'matchless discovery' of the Creed as the Word from God's own mouth	
1826-	Placed under censorship	
1829, 1830, 1831, 1843	Journeys to England (and Scotland in 1843)	
1839	Commences as priest at Vartov hospital	
1844	Period of deep depression	First folk high school, Rødding, Jutland
1848		Revolutions in Europe
1849		New Danish constitution promulgated
1849-58	Serves in the Constituent Assembly, then the lower and later upper houses of Parliament	
1851	Marries Marie Toft only 9 months after Lise's death	
1858	Marries Asta Reedz	
1861	Appointed titular bishop	
1864		Surrender of Slesvig-Holstein
1867	Period of manic depression	
1872	Dies 2 September	

As the study is concerned with Grundtvig's ideas and their potential in the contemporary situation, I propose briefly to consider him in context. In terms of the history of ideas, a connection with Romanticism

is discernible and it is to that 'movement' that I want to turn very briefly.

ROMANTICISM

Frye (1963) warns us of the dangers of attempting to summarise and to define for 'whenever anyone embarks on a generalisation of the subject of romanticism...someone will always be found who will produce countervailing evidence'. (Berlin 2000a)

Our efforts may be further impeded by the imprecise and sometimes contradictory or paradoxical elements of what is described as 'romanticist'.

It can appear almost sentimental and of no assistance in scholarship : '...it is the familiar, the sense of one's unique tradition, joy in the smiling aspect of everyday nature, and the accustomed sights and sounds of contented, simple, rural folk - the sane and happy wisdom of rosy-cheeked sons of the soil. It is the ancient, the historic, it is Gothic cathedrals, the mists of antiquity, ancient roots and the old order with its unanalysable qualities, its profound but inexpressible loyalties, the impalpable, the imponderable.' (Berlin 2000a:17)

Quiller-Couch (1918) has suggested that 'the whole pother [...] amounts to nothing more than need trouble a healthy man'. If we are to engage in any meaningful discussion, however, it is necessary to set out at least some of the recognisable key dimensions, even if some romanticist writers sound contrary tones.

In this section, the focus is primarily on the work of **Herder**⁵³, though he might best be thought to be a pre-Romanticist.

HERDER

The 'Folk'

The heart of Herder's thinking can be found in his particular consideration of the phenomenon of the folk song.

If a folk song speaks to you, they said, it is because the people that made it were Germans like yourself, and they spoke to you, who belong with them in the same society; and because they were Germans they used particular nuances, they used particular successions of sounds, they used particular words which, being in some way connected, and swimming on the great tide of words and symbols and experience upon which all Germans swim, have something peculiar to say to certain persons which they cannot say to certain other persons. The Portuguese cannot understand the inwardness of a German song as a German can, and a German cannot understand the inwardness of a Portuguese song, and the very fact that there is such a thing as inwardness at all in these songs is an

⁵³ This is not to argue that Herder was necessarily first in the assertion of some of these ideas, but perhaps we find them more fully and comprehensively set out in his writings. Berlin acknowledges that the concept of each person having roots within a people is clearly anticipated in Vico's *New Science*, though he doubts if Herder was himself aware of Vico's work (Berlin 2000b: 60). Montesquieu (1758/1995) had asserted that the people of one place, brought up in the conditions of that place, might not want the same as the people of another place, brought up there. Here was an undermining of the assumption that propositions affirmed in one culture might not be thought to be true in another and that values or beliefs or ideals or cultural practices or lifestyles might be suited to one people and not to another. Rousseau too resisted the cosmopolitan assumptions of the time when he wrote to the Poles, advising them to resist Russian attempts to force on them assimilation and to hold on to their national customs and characteristics. (Korsgaard 2006; see also Putterman 2001)

argument for supposing that these are not simply objects like objects in nature, which do not speak; they are artefacts, that is to say, something which a man has made for the purpose of communicating with another man.

(quoted in Berlin 2000a :59-60)

The argument is in present terms somewhat overstated, rather antiquated and potentially exclusivist, though it may be right to hear the comment of Conversi on Herder that his 'view is more a hymn to human creativity than cold reason'. (Conversi 2001:37)

The folk song - or indeed anything that had such folk characteristics, which was of the people - owed its special nature to being of the people's shared experiences, their language, their imagery, their way of being. The serious weakness in his reasoning is his failure to take adequate account of the heterogeneity of a *folk* and of their experience of the cultural forms. It does not follow necessarily that all members of a particular 'national' or 'cultural' community do in fact find that the cultural products of their fellows speak to them in a special way. They may be deaf to its appeal or even antagonistic. Their cultural preferences may in some respects lie elsewhere. Nonetheless, it has to be an assumption of cultural nationalism that 'access to one's culture is something that people can be expected to want'.

(Kymlicka 1995:86)

This view however stood against the notion that anyone could apprehend the qualities of the song by the implementation of rational methods of study. It undermined the phenomenological approach that made the

folk song something to be examined scientifically rather than apprehended intuitively and internally rather than objectively. For Herder, every culture had its own centre of gravity or *schwerpunkt*. Each culture would have its own experiences, insights, emphases, values, modes of expression, desires, through which it would see and express what was true to its heart. (Herder 1877-1913:Vol5:509)

To judge another culture and its forms of cultural expression, particularly without endeavouring to enter into the experience of that time and place is therefore an inappropriate activity. One could arrive at a meaningful judgement only through viewing it as it was viewed by the people, valuing it as they valued it, in their context and through the lights of their tradition. It is necessary for understanding to 'enter the time, the place, the entire history' of a people by a process of feeling oneself into (*sich hineinfühlen*) everything (Herder 1877-1913:Vol5:502-3) He was 'one of those not very many thinkers in the world who really do absolutely adore things for being what they are, and do not condemn them for not being something else. For Herder, everything is delightful...If there is anything which Herder dislikes it is the elimination of one culture by another.' (Berlin 2000a:64)

Though cultural expressions might bear considerable similarities across peoples and places, for Herder, it was not the uniformity that was of interest (though he was not unaware of commonalities), but rather the exceptions, the differences. He warned against the tendency of rationalist methods to fit heterogeneous

experience into homogeneous units in order to be able the more readily to label them and to fit them into theoretical frameworks that could be predicted and controlled. 'Attempts to bring manifestations so complex as and so various under general law, whether by philosophers seeking knowledge, or by statesmen seeking to organise and govern, seemed to Herder no better than a search for the lowest common denominator - for what may be the least characteristic and important in the lives of men - and, therefore, to make for shallowness in theory and a tendency to impose a crippling uniformity in practice.' (Berlin 2000b:200) Indeed, we may see in Herder a tendency apparent in much Romanticism of an exaltation of the minority over the majority, the peculiar over the general. Against a tide of universalism, Herder affirmed *pluralism*. It had to be recognised that the values of different cultures are multiple and, more than that, that different ideals could be equally valid though they are mutually incompatible. This conclusion was of course both permitting of variety and destructive of the Enlightenment notions of the ideal man or of ideal society. 'Not a man, not a country, not a people, not a national history, not a State, is like another. Hence the True, the Beautiful, the Good in them are not similar either.' (Herder 1877-1913:Vol4:472)

This respect for the culture of a people had to be reciprocal, however. Herder did not have much sympathy for political nationalism - 'What is a nation? A great wild garden full of bad plants and good.' (Herder 1877-1913:Vol17:211) Nor did he affirm the superiority of any particular culture over others. Herder is 'repelled by the claims of contemporary

Celtomaniacs or Teutomaniacs who rhapsodised over the ancient Gaels or Northmen. He celebrates German beginnings because they are part of, and illuminate, his own civilisation, not because German civilisation ranks higher than that of others on some cosmic scale.' (Berlin 2000b:206) He would have regarded the rabid nationalism of Fichte and others as a distortion, though they traced the logic of their beliefs in national freedom and the right or duty to wage war in the cause of national freedom back to him.

Differences then do not need to entail conflict where there is respect for the distinctive in others. Indeed, Herder is conscious of the hostile nature of what now we might call cultural imperialism. In his periodical *Adrastea* (1802), he has a dialogue between an Asian and a Christian:

The Asian: 'Tell me, have you still not lost the habit of trying to convert to your faith peoples whose property you steal, whom you rob, enslave, murder, deprive of their land and their State, to whom your customs seem revolting? Supposing that one of them came to your country, and with an insolent air pronounced absurd all that is most sacred to you - your laws, your religion, your wisdom, your institutions, and so on, what would you do to such a man?' 'Oh, but that is quite a different matter' replied the European, 'we have power, ships, money, cannon, culture''

(Herder 1877-1913:Vol23:498)

At the heart of his thinking lies a *populism*. These shared cultural norms and forms become possible and necessary because there is a shared value of and commitment to belonging to the group. There is a tendency in Herder, like Rousseau, to identify 'the people' with the poor, the peasantry, the common folk,

the rural. The people (*Volk*) was, however, to be distinguished from the rabble (*Pöbel auf den Gassen*). (Herder 1877-1913:Vol25:325)

Herder believed that a human being was made a human being by other human beings, by education, by language. Language, traditions, customs, outlook, were a creation of other people with whom one formed an organic unity. So, gradually, he moved from the notion of the individual as an empirical human being in space to the notion of the individual as something larger, say a nation, say a class, say a sect. The key idea for him here was of *Bildung*, a drawing of the individual into a community, a people with a national character, a character that was not simply inherited but learned. (Korsgaard 1997)

Being of a nation was not a passive state but an active experience. As Anthony Smith says of nationalists more generally:

Regeneration involves a summons to the people, mobilizing the members of the community, tapping their collective emotions, inspiring them with moral fervour, activating their energies for national goals, so as to reform and renew the community. Here the nationalist-archaeologist is revealed as a missionary romantic, drawing political conclusions from the cultural work of rediscovery and reinterpretation: 'if this is how we were, and this is how we must understand things, then this is what we now must do'.
(Smith 1999:178)

That the Danish people were a *folk*, that they were distinguishable from others by reason of language and

culture⁵⁴ and that they formed a community of mutual commitment were key ideas in Grundtvig's developing thinking.

The mother tongue

In the affirmation of cultural identity perhaps no issue is more clearly a focus than that of language. The language of a people is often acknowledged as a key component in its identity and the practice of that language asserted as a mark of belonging to a people. 'Has a nation...anything more precious than the language of its fathers? In it dwells its entire world of tradition, history, religion, principles of existence; its whole heart and soul.' (Herder 1877-1913:Vol18:58)⁵⁵

It is, according to Herder, through language that our thoughts and ideas are formed and expressed. 'If language is the organ of our soul-forces, the medium of our innermost education, then we cannot be educated otherwise than in the language of our people and our country; a so-called French education in Germany must

⁵⁴ They are prioritised over legal sovereignty which could change by fortunes of war and diplomacy.

⁵⁵ 'The defence of the German language had been vigorously taken up by Martin Opitz in the early years of the seventeenth century, and had since then formed part of the conscious programme of theologians, men of letters, and philosophers. Mencke, Horneck, Moscherosch, Logau and Gryphius are names that may not mean a great deal to English readers today; but in the two centuries that followed the Reformation they fought with stubbornness and success under Luther's banner against Latin and French; and more famous men, Pufendorf and Leibniz, Thomasius and Wolff, Hamann and Lessing, were also engaged in this campaign that had begun long before. Once again, Herder began with something that had by that time become established as a traditional German attitude.' (Berlin 2000b: 174)

by necessity deform and misguide German minds.'
(quoted in Kohn (1994))

As I consider further in chapter 9, the mother tongue came to be, for Grundtvig, a key concept and way of life as contributing to identity and shaping forms of thought.

TO WHAT EXTENT WAS GRUNDTVIG A ROMANTIC?

Any conclusion concerning Grundtvig is complicated by the extent to which, in his long life, he underwent a series of changes in thinking.

Two points in his life were instrumental in introducing a romanticism into his thinking. The first was a series of lectures that his cousin, Steffens, a philosopher, had delivered in Copenhagen in 1802-3.⁵⁶ The time would come for the memories to be awakened. Secondly, his falling in love with the mother of his pupils on Langeland led him to recognise the dimension of the feeling in human living - and in particular in his own.⁵⁷

Several of Grundtvig's principal ideas are related to those of the romantics, though their origin and path

⁵⁶ '(Grundtvig) had listened doggedly to, and taken random detailed notes from, the philosophical lectures and subsequent talks on Goethe that his cousin [...] had given. But he had completely failed to understand the basic premises and had been content to note down the most paradoxical phrases so that he could use them [...] in order to excel in witty conversation...' (Lundgreen-Nielsen (1983:20))

⁵⁷ 'He was in love for the first time, and forced to recognise that he was a deeply feeling human being. His passionate nature could no longer be suppressed. He went through a typical romantic awakening. He began to read furiously, Schiller, Fichte, Goethe, Shakespeare. The content of Steffens' lectures came back to him.' (Allchin 1997:31)

are sometimes difficult to trace: a love of the natural landscape as a spiritual as well as a physical thing, an attachment to the nation not so much as a political entity than as a community bound together in spirit, a revival of the old Norse myths⁵⁸, his identification of himself as the exceptional human being who linked the past and the present and the future and his particular regard for the place of the ordinary people.

In other respects, he differed from Romanticist thought⁵⁹. He too had a strong individualist focus, but he held it firmly within a more communitarian framework. He celebrates nature but he never embraces pantheistic theology. He sees human life less as tragic than as a glorious reality and potentiality. He takes seriously the question of sin, but salvation is of Christ, not by self-redemption. He has a stronger sense of good and evil, regarding them as fundamental contradictions in human life.

His long life and dynamic mode of thinking led him to embrace romanticism in his early years (up to 1810) and then for two decades to oppose it strongly and finally to recognise its spiritual power and qualities (without necessarily drawing particularly from specific thinkers or theories).

⁵⁸ Even when Grundtvig looked back on his early mythology-focused period with some regret for its 'heathenism', 'the old gods were never really expelled from his life, they were subdued to a *praeparatio evangelica* rather.' Allen (1949:39) It was, for him, a source of Danish Christianity's strength that it was, at least in some measure, rooted in and continuous with its spiritual past.

⁵⁹ See for example *Imod den lille Anklager* 1815 and *Kort Begreb af Verdens Krønike i Sammenhæng* 1812

It is Lundgreen-Nielsen's conclusion that in a great many ways Grundtvig came close to romanticism in the first two decades of his writing career, but he never became a proper romantic. (Lundgreen-Nielsen 1983:33)
'Perhaps Grundtvig's literary philosophy should be called a christened romanticism.' (ibid 1983:42)

Chapter Four
**'THE INTERPRETATION OF GRUNDTVIG'S IDEAS AND
PHILOSOPHY IS A TOUGH TASK'⁶⁰**

It was with trepidation that I decided to pursue doctoral research which had at its heart the life and teachings of NFS Grundtvig. This reticence was not at all concerned with the suitability of the subject or its interest to me as an educator or researcher. Indeed, having found inspiration in my 'encounter' with Grundtvig, I was motivated by some measure of missionary zeal to play my small part in sharing his ideas and in exploring my own fields of interest utilising some of his insights.

It was and remained apparent to me throughout my studies, however, that there are very significant difficulties associated with entering into this field.

GRUNDTVIG AND HIS THINKING

Changing ways of thinking

There are issues related to his longevity⁶¹. It is rather to be expected then that this long life reflects different stages and that there is change across those different periods of his life, not least in reaction to the altering historical context around him and to his own life experiences. It is not surprising that

⁶⁰ The section title is a quotation from the Translator's Note in Broadbridge and Jensen (1983)

⁶¹ Born 1783 died 1872

someone of his extended life should change their mind or at least come to questions from different perspectives. It is certainly true that he moves in his views, for example on the nature and role of the Christian faith - there are periods in which he is a Biblical Christian, then someone thirled to the divine force of the myths of Old Norse heritage, and a proclaimer of the idea of 'human first'. His attitude towards democracy similarly changes from a supporter of absolute monarchy⁶² to someone dedicated to equipping ordinary folk for participation in the emerging parliamentary forms of government. It has to be acknowledged then that an idea or set of ideas may not have *consistently* been the position of Grundtvig. His thinking can be inconsistent even on the same topic to the extent of occupying polar positions at different times. (Pedersen 1998) Yet, paradoxically, there is often a certain unity and cohesion to this thinking.

It is one of the exciting aspects of Grundtvig that there is a dynamic to his thinking. The expression that 'he writes his way to clarity' is reflected in the manuscripts where drafts can be compared as well as in a broader analysis of his corpus of writings. This approach is fundamental to his mode of scholarship: 'Quite frankly, I never have a result in my own mind at the outset of my investigation, but permit them to develop on their own as I discuss my ideas. (Grundtvig's Diary, 9 September 1806) It is however consistent with the basic thinking of Grundtvig that ideas should develop out of an interaction with life

⁶² albeit it partly on grounds of the safeguarding of ordinary people from vested powerful interests in society.

and be therefore 'living words' and therein lies one of his strengths and his gifts.

This may contribute to, but is probably not a total explanation for, a certain lack of cohesion in his thinking. Bugge (1983) suggests that Grundtvig's educational thinking is not very systematic, not put together in particular order, nor logically developed. In similar vein, Nielsen (1951) argues that Grundtvig is not a systematic theologian in his religious writings. Lundgreen-Nielsen (1993) comments similarly of his poetics. In part, one might attribute the output to the role in which Grundtvig so firmly cast himself, as an advocate of change, as a participant in debate, as a preacher and as a polemicist⁶³. It is not that Grundtvig is simply responding to situations, but he is writing and writing for speaking, not in the abstract but in his contemporary context and for contemporary action. For the student of Grundtvig, then, it is not easy to place his thoughts within a coherent system. At the same time, however, it is possible to discern an interconnectedness that encourages the reader to recognise or to find potential for a transferability of ideas from one context to another.⁶⁴

There is no doubt that Grundtvig, though not divorced from the major streams of thinking of his day, was nonetheless a most individual thinker. The reasoning processes however could consequently be very personal, the connections he recognises very much his own, his

⁶³ not least in his own publication, *Danskeren*

⁶⁴ For example, the term 'vekselvirkning' is utilised by Grundtvig in a pedagogical sense of a lively interaction between student and teacher and amongst students but it may refer also to dialogue in social contexts and even to the cross-fertilisation of ideas.

logic obtuse and the symbolism on which he draws⁶⁵ somewhat obscure.

The breadth of Grundtvig's activities and influence

A further problem lies in the polymath qualities of Grundtvig as a scholar and practitioner. There is every justification for considering him to be a hymn writer⁶⁶, an Anglo-Saxon and Old Norse scholar⁶⁷, an educational thinker⁶⁸, an essayist and debater⁶⁹, a philologist and translator⁷⁰, a priest and preacher⁷¹, poet⁷², politician⁷³, prophet and visionary⁷⁴, propagandist and polemicist⁷⁵, theologian⁷⁶, historian⁷⁷ and more.

⁶⁵ in, perhaps primarily, his poetic works, such as his hymns and sermons

⁶⁶ He wrote around 1500 hymns and his contribution dominates the Danish hymn book (*Den danske salmebog* 2003)

⁶⁷ for example, in *Beowulf* scholarship and in his extended works on Nordens Mytologi (1808, 1832)

⁶⁸ for his influence on the development of the Scandinavian folk high schools and in shaping wider underpinning Danish pedagogical principles and values. It would not be true to say however that he was significantly an educator (though frequently engaged in educative activities with others) or even an educationist

⁶⁹ The title *Imod den lille Anklager* (Against the little Accuser) perhaps indicates something of the strength of his debating

⁷⁰ notably, for the translations of *Beowulf*, Saxo's Chronicle of Denmark and Snorri's Chronicle of the Kings of Norway

⁷¹ He served for many years as chaplain to the charitable institution *Vartov* and preached to, amongst others, members of the royal family

⁷² *Christenhedens Syvstjerne* 1854-55 is a didactic poetic composition of more than 800 stanzas; *Nyaars-Morgen* 1824 (New Year's Morning) is amongst his best-known poems

⁷³ serving in both houses of the Danish Parliament

⁷⁴ and thus shaping Danish culture perhaps more than any other Dane

⁷⁵ His major propaganda was against the intrusion of German culture into Danish life, not least in the context of the Slesvig disputes

⁷⁶ His thinking on the nature of the sacraments of baptism and eucharist, his view of the nature and role of the creed, his thinking around Human first and then Christian, and his understanding of the relationship of faith and knowledge (together with his sermons) surely justify the term 'theologian' even if he was not the exponent of a systematic theology

⁷⁷ *Haandbog i Verdens-Historie* 1833-43

It is, then, not only the volume of his work but the range of it that is problematical in coming to terms with Grundtvig's thinking. 'They are interwoven in such a way that it is impossible not to fully understand anything, if you do not consider the totality... this is virtually not feasible. All one can obtain is - and remains for this reason - an approximation. (Dam 1983:32)

It could be appealing to adopt Haarder's observation that 'It is often either suggested or asserted that Grundtvig was so many things... and it is always a temptation to take out a patent on him for one or two of these many things or shrug one's shoulders at him, call him a unique muddle, and leave him in peace.' (1983:73)

The challenges in meeting this immense figure are considerable, not least for the demand that they potentially place upon the person who seeks to study his life and work.

It is virtually impossible to measure up to the breadth of Grundtvig's scholarship and engagement with society⁷⁸. One solution to this problem is of course for the focus to be narrowed. So, the scholar in Anglo-Saxon or Old Norse concentrates on that element in Grundtvig's corpus which is concerned with that aspect of study. That scholar is able then to bring to

⁷⁸ It can be asserted that Grundtvig's work across many fields is positively even if critically evaluated by his peers. It would appear also to be his self-evaluation: 'Even viewed from abroad, I belong to the renowned writers of Denmark, and whether this opinion is justified or not I leave to posterity to judge without any worries that they can ever ignore me in the literary history of Denmark.' (Private letter from Grundtvig to a fellow clergyman, 1825; quoted in Lundgreen-Nielsen 1993:87)

bear the knowledge, skills and experience of someone who shares that specialist area. That is right and necessary if Grundtvig's thinking is to be evaluated rigorously and disseminated within a specialist community.

There are potential dangers and losses in this specialisation in the study of Grundtvig. It makes it less easy for there to be an exchange (a *vekselvirkning* in Grundtvigian terms) across disciplines.⁷⁹ There is a natural tendency for scholars to remain within their own professional context, not to risk going beyond the scope of their recognised specialist competence, not to move beyond the perspectives of their discipline and instead to focus on those questions which interest them intellectually. More often, it falls to the editor or writer of the introduction of the book to endeavour to bring together different perspectives and to discuss them in a more dialogical way. It is important that we do not lose sight of a more holistic view of Grundtvig's thinking. As Allchin comments, '... although his life and work was significantly many-sided, it has a strong inner consistency, and for its full significance to be seen needs to be taken as a whole'. (1993:4)

At a personal level, while I had begun my interest in the life and work of Grundtvig through an encounter with his impact in the sphere of adult education, I had soon found myself engaged with other aspects: singing and teaching others some of his hymns and delighting in

⁷⁹ This is not however to suggest that there is no interaction. The recent publications in English on Grundtvig have drawn widely in their scope, so for example the Acknowledgements section in Allchin et al (eds) (1993) notes: 'The publication of this book results from an interdisciplinary dialogue...'

his poetic imagery and reflecting on the challenges of his understanding of a 'folk' for a Scottish nation entering into a new phase of defining and expressing itself. It did not feel at all right to withdraw into a compartmentalisation of my experience of Grundtvig, into those aspects which were 'relevant' to my specialist area and those which were therefore to be consigned to being outside of the focus.

It seemed to me that central to my research was the notion that the educational development with which I was concerned could be enriched not by Grundtvig's pedagogical thinking alone, but by a significantly broader range of his ideas.

Indeed, this corresponded with my understanding and, I suspect, the reality of the education sphere: that it is a crossroads territory. It is a key meeting place of concerns about and intentions for the creation of identity and meaning, purpose and participation; it is about life. Education is never divorced from the contests of public life. What Grundtvig may have to say to us about community and culture, about memory and meaning, speaks to us of the context in which we function as educators, the ends that we serve, the content of the education and the process through which it is taken forward.

This broader view of my task has drawn me into areas with which I have hitherto been less than familiar - theoretical perspectives on nation and on narrative⁸⁰ and on the nature of knowing. I have sometimes found

⁸⁰ though I have avoided the more extreme postmodernist forms of theoretical discussion

these to be intellectually challenging. I believe that where I have resisted the deeper and more complex territories of these subjects I have done so, not through intellectual cowardice, but because that path would not have significantly or usefully enhanced the research, not taken forward my commitment to explore how we might shape adult lay theological education from a *folkelig* perspective.

After these years of reading, and reading about, Grundtvig and of taking his thinking into my other reading and thinking, I believe that I am not (in the formal sense) a 'Grundtvig scholar'⁸¹. This is not, in the same sense, a 'Grundtvig study', though it certainly is one that seeks to learn about and from him. He lies at its beginning and at its heart. Paul Borum, the Danish poet, once commented that

Grundtvig is enormous and formidable and mysterious and remote, and seems to be reserved as it were to two strange races called 'Grundtvigians' and 'Grundtvig-scholars'. Even so there is of course a **Grundtvig for the people**⁸²...

(Zøllner 2000:8)

My motivation and my purpose is to address an audience which is wider than the community of Grundtvig scholarship, that is barely, if at all, familiar with Grundtvig, to take to them my understanding of his ideas and to initiate (through this thesis and what may flow from it) a conversation with them around those ideas as a stimulus to thinking.

⁸¹ I distinguish this from what I do believe about my work, which is that I am taking a scholarly approach in my research.

⁸² my emphasis

The language issues

It is inevitable that any study based on Grundtvig has to encounter challenges that come from the simple fact that, largely, Grundtvig wrote and spoke in the Danish language.

Indeed, his strong commitment to the mother tongue (*modersmål*) raises our awareness that there is a sense in which we cannot encounter the thinking of Grundtvig in its truest form⁸³ other than in the Danish language itself. Of course, there may be equivalences, most of the time, but by no means always. They are inevitably approximations, sometimes perhaps misleading approximations. They will often lack nuances of meaning. They will sometimes be partial, reflecting something of the meaning of the term or phrase but silent as to other dimensions. Resonances will by no means always be the same and sometimes will be absent. The phrases - their cadences, their allusions, the extent to which we have a sense of ownership of them - will rarely be heard by the linguistic outsider as by the listener in the mother tongue. Where words or terms hold within themselves a constellation of meanings, it is particularly difficult for another language to reflect that spread of meaning. There are words which, culturally contextual, seek to express something that is only dimly reflected in another culture. There are words and expressions which seem to be equivalent but which are rooted in radically different understandings. There are words which are

⁸³ In writing 'truest form', I recognise that there is always a level of approximation in our apprehension of the thinking of another, even if we share language and have opportunity to interrogate and have dialogue with the other person.

less amenable to definition than to being experienced in their lived-out form.⁸⁴

Even a limited knowledge of the original language and a degree of skill in the use of a dictionary do not equip the non-Danish hearer/reader for the task. There may be some degree of exaggeration in Grundtvig's own assertion in Den Dansk Fiir-Kløver (1836) that 'the best of Danish cannot be translated into any language, not even into English, without losing at least half of it'. What is lost may not always be meaning, but Grundtvig is often a writer of 'lively' words and, as Jasper (1993) comments, the 'rather flat translations' may lose something of the vitality of the original.

I acknowledge my own shortcomings in this regard. I have some measure of reading competence in Danish, matched with very poor speaking, listening and writing skill.⁸⁵ Despite that modicum of reading ability, it became necessary to have some reliance on translation into English or indirect references. I recognise that

⁸⁴ At the risk of falling into anecdotalism, I offer a personal experience of this last difficulty. Danish has a word *hygge* and so *hyggelig*. This is frequently translated as 'cosy' or 'comfortable' in English (as, for example, in Garde and Jones (ed) 1991). I was in conversation in Scotland with a visiting party of Danish scouts who had spent the day in Edinburgh. They offered the opinion that Edinburgh was a *hyggelig* city. I countered as a near-Glasgow native that it was my city that was *hyggelig*. This was not a case of alternative readings of the data, but rather different but equally legitimate uses of *hygge*. They were referring to the historical qualities of the capital city, its cultural significance as an expression of Scottish heritage and identity; I was speaking of the welcoming warmth of the people of my city. A word that can speak of Danishness, the use of candlelight to create atmosphere, strength of hospitality, old-fashionedness, physical comfort and much more is a word that is problematical for those who would translate it.

⁸⁵ In my mitigation, I would comment that in its oral form in particular it is not an easy language with which to come to terms and to achieve a good degree of facility. From reports of Grundtvig's visits to Britain, it would appear that he similarly had difficulties with the English language.

this was not ideal, but within the priorities of my professional life, it was not realistic to expand my competence in Danish to the level that I would have desired.⁸⁶ Of course, as the literature of Grundtvig-related studies in English will confirm, I am by no means in a minority in this regard.

This problem is a restricting one, not least because only a relatively small (though perhaps relatively significant) portion of Grundtvig's work has been translated into English.⁸⁷ Some works, which are regarded as being core texts, are available in translation within anthologies of Grundtvig's writings. Other translated writing quite often is fragmentary rather than of complete texts, as occurs where the passage or section is translated only as a quotation within another author's work. The problem is exacerbated by the extent to which some authors, particularly in earlier periods, did not feel it necessary or appropriate to give a precise - or indeed sometimes any - citation which would aid the reader in attempting themselves or by accessing a competent Danish reader to verify the passage. Given the volume of Grundtvig writing, finding a passage without any guiding citation and only an approximate sense of the original Grundtvigian Danish words can be a virtually impossible task. The researcher's preference for primary sources is not at all times a realistic option and a certain reliance upon respected secondary sources is necessary.

⁸⁶ I have no pretensions to being a good learner of other languages.

⁸⁷ It is true of course also that only a fraction of Grundtvig's writings have been published at all, never mind translated into other languages.

There is a similar difficulty in relation to works about Grundtvig and his thinking. Most studies are published only in Danish or other Scandinavian languages and these may or may not be accompanied by an English summary. Though one ought to appreciate the willingness to provide such summaries, it is not infrequently the case that they are more pointers to what hides within the original Danish text than any usable précis of the actual content. They consequently tantalise rather than inform.

In utilising one's limited reading skills in Danish, one may encounter further issues. A familiarity with modern Danish does not necessarily equip for the sometimes archaic style and vocabulary of Grundtvig's original, for his uses of words do not always correspond to contemporary modern usage. It is a strength of Grundtvig's writings that they are poetical but this is not readily accessible to the less competent reader. Further, Grundtvig is happy to coin new words or to use old words with a fresh meaning.⁸⁸

THE USE OF SECONDARY SOURCES

I have taken the view that my degree of reliance upon translations of Grundtvig's writings and indeed on excerpts did not pose an unsurmountable obstacle to a proper undertaking of my thesis.

Firstly, I am satisfied that the sources from which I have taken translated passages are from reputable anthologies translated and gathered by recognised

⁸⁸ *Folkelig* is itself an example

figures and held in the library of the Grundtvig Academy in Copenhagen.

Similarly, I have only relied upon quotations in works about Grundtvig where again I am satisfied that these are in works by recognised scholars and where these works have been received and cited within the community of Grundtvig scholarship.

Wherever possible, I have sought, albeit with my limited Danish language skill, to verify quotations.

In a very small number of cases, I have thought the idea expressed in an unreferenced translated quotation of Grundtvig's writing has been of sufficient interest and relevance to utilise it without having the opportunity to locate it either in the original or in a suitable anthology.

I believe that the issue is also rendered less problematical by the nature of the research itself. As I have indicated earlier in the Introduction to the thesis, this is not ultimately a piece of specialist research into Grundtvig's thinking. I have rather used Grundtvig's work and its reception as a key resource from which I have sought to explore a wider field of scholarship with a view to proposing some ideas for adult lay theological education in Scotland. It seems to me then that such a study does not require the level of close textual analysis of the 'original' sources that a more narrowly 'Grundtvig' study would do.

CHANGES IN CONTEXT

As I have suggested elsewhere, Grundtvig thought and wrote and spoke in some relationship to the great streams of intellectual and cultural life and to the historic (and sometimes) personal events of his day.

There is no question but that he is of Denmark as well as contributing significantly to what it means to be Danish. The commonly used phrase of 'meeting Grundtvig at the border' reflects something of this particularity. There is then a question of the transferability of Grundtvig's thinking, its exportability, across time and place, across history and culture.

I discuss this issue in the context of reception and resonance in the chapter 10 *Efterklang* and refer the reader to that section of the thesis.

Chapter 5

LITERATURE and TECHNICAL NOTES

LITERATURE

- 1 The following are major collections of primary literature⁸⁹
 - Letters (Grundtvig/ udg. af George Christensen og Stener Grundtvig 1924-26)
 - Poetical writings (Grundtvig/ udg. af Svend Grundtvig 1880-1930)
 - Selected works (Grundtvig/ udg. Georg Christensen og Hal Koch 1935-36)
 - Selected writings (Grundtvig/ ved Holger Begtrup 1904-09)
 - Sermons (Grundtvig/ udg. af Christian Thodberg 1983-86)
 - Song works (Grundtvig 1944-56)

- 2 I have made use of three anthologies of translations of Grundtvig's writings into English:
 - Broadbridge and Jensen (ed) (1984)
 - Knudsen (ed) (1976)
 - Lawson (1991)

- 3 Where Grundtvig's own writings are quoted or cited in the text of the thesis, when I have used the original Danish title, it is underlined and in *italics* (as I have italicised all non-English words and phrases). Occasionally, I have shown a title in a generally used abbreviated form for reasons of brevity⁹⁰. Where the reader wishes to identify the work by a familiar English title, this may be ascertained in the section on Primary Sources in the Bibliography. Some titles are not

⁸⁹ All are Danish language editions

⁹⁰ As an example, I have translated and shortened *Om Videnskabelighed og dens Fremme, især med Hensyn til Fædrelandet* 1807 to *On Scholarship* 1807

amenable to concise translation into English and have been left untranslated (eg Folkelighed 1848).

4 I wish to acknowledge that I have drawn generally on the following works on Grundtvig:

Allchin (1997)
Allchin et al(eds) (1993)
Allchin et al (eds) (2000)
Borish (1991)
Thaning (1972)
Thodberg and Thyssen (eds) (1983).

THE DANISH ALPHABET

The present Danish alphabet includes three letters which do not occur in the English alphabet. They are the vowels Æ / æ, Ø / ø and Å / å and are placed in that order at the end of the alphabet.

The letter Å / å may still be, and often is, written as a double 'Aa', so Århus (the city) is also to be found as Aarhus. In alphabetical lists, the Aa/aa form is treated as an Å/å.

I have generally taken the spelling that has been used in the original source from which I have drawn or, in the case of names, the spelling that is adopted by the person named. This may occasionally give rise to some inconsistency.

A British computer alphabetical table sorter will however generally treat æ and å as forms of 'a' and ø as a form of 'o' and will insert entries with these letters in alphabetical lists on that principle. I have tried to correct this and to place words in the Danish order.

There is a slight complication in that a double Aa does occur in names that are not of Scandinavian origin (eg Aaron). The reader who is unsure of which it is in seeking a reference should check both possibilities in alphabetical lists for a particular reference, but given the nature of the thesis most will be found at the end of the alphabetical sequence.

FOREIGN WORDS

Words in languages other than English (mainly Danish) are printed in italics. I have generally quoted passages in translation, but occasionally have offered the Danish original, usually where there is some poetic or other quality that I would wish to make available to a Danish-reading reader.

GENDER

I have sought myself to use throughout inclusive language. The occurrence of false-neutral use of terms such as 'man' or 'mankind' and 'he' in quotations is, I fear, frequent. I have not altered these, nor placed (sic) in order to register my disapproval of the usage, though such usage is now, quite properly, not considered acceptable.

'GRUNDTVIGIAN'

The reader may be surprised to see that, generally, I have used the word 'grundtvigian' without an initial capital letter when referring to ideas that I believe to be consistent with my understanding of Grundtvig's thought or are a valid progression from that thought. I was conscious that some commentators refer to an ideology which they term 'Grundtvigism' or 'Grundtvigianism'. I am aware too that there are

'parties' within church and education who would style themselves or be identified by others as 'Grundtvigian'. I am not however seeking to represent a particular ideological position as being truly 'Grundtvigian', nor am I sufficiently convinced that there is a discernible, single, coherent ideological position to which a name can be attached unequivocally. Moreover, I believe that my relationship to the thinking of Grundtvig is somewhat looser than would justify a capital G 'Grundtvigian' label for my thinking. My relationship to the thinking of Grundtvig is more dynamic. He is the primary inspirational source for this study. In keeping with scholarly standards, I seek to give a fair and accurate account of his ideas. I take them often as a point of entry into reflection. My criterion is whether or not I develop a coherent argument rather than whether my argument coheres fully with Grundtvig's. Nonetheless, I think it right to set out where I believe that the idea owes significantly to Grundtvig and so, to signal this, I have, when expressing my own judgement that an argument is a legitimate extension of Grundtvig's thinking or is within a broadly grundtvigian ethos, used a small initial 'g'.

PART TWO

A DANISH FOUR-LEAFED CLOVER

FOUR CONCEPTS EXPLORED

Chapter 6

OPLYSNING

Enlightenment and Education

INTRODUCTION

Purpose

As the thesis as a whole is concerned with 'education', there are elements of Grundtvig's educational thinking dealt with more thoroughly in other chapters and to which I therefore make only relatively brief reference here.

In working with the Danish language and particularly with Grundtvig's use of it, one becomes conscious of the extent to which words enjoy multiple meanings that are capable both of confusing us and of broadening and deepening our understanding. Such a word is *oplysning*. In ordinary dictionary terms, it can be the equivalent of 'education' or even simply 'information'. In Grundtvig's usage, however, it often has another meaning of 'enlightenment', as in *livoplysning* (the enlightenment of life⁹¹) and *folkeoplysning* ('popular', national, community or folk enlightenment⁹²). I propose also to consider it in the pedagogical sense, concerning those educational processes which foster enlightenment. Those two aspects, enlightenment and educational processes, form the twin pillars of this chapter.

⁹¹ Garde and Jones (1991)

⁹² It is with some reluctance that I add in parentheses such English 'equivalences' for they are at best inexact and have significant potential to mislead.

Background

Grundtvig is thought of first for his contribution to education, as a result of the founding of folk high schools and other educational institutions.⁹³ Though he is rightly to be thought their inspiration, he himself neither founded any nor was responsibility for their establishment, management or for teaching on their staffs⁹⁴. Indeed, his 'professional' responsibilities within an educational context were relatively sparse.⁹⁵ He was a powerful preacher (if we make see a teaching aspect in that activity) and public speaker and lecturer, so he had a feel for a listening and learning audience. He is not so much an educational philosopher as a thinker whose wide range of reflection brings him to thoughts about education (Bugge 1965) and so his educational thinking is not properly divorced from other dimensions of his work. (Kildegaard 2000) He does engage in some strategic thinking (eg in relation to the establishment of a school at Sorø) but is not so much one who constructs a coherent 'system'. Rather, his focus is on addressing practical concerns and on proposing practical measures. Indeed, it has been suggested that his concern was not purely educational and his views on education and pedagogy were to a degree spin-offs from his thoughts about the nation and the people. (Korsgaard 2000:240)

⁹³ It is important to recognise that Grundtvig himself was not responsible for the establishment of folk high schools and their relationship to Grundtvigian pedagogical ideas is somewhat variable.

⁹⁴ The comparison is for example with the roles of Christen Kold (Ryslinge folk high school) and Christian Flør (Rødding folk high school)

⁹⁵ He was teacher in a 'grammar' school for three years, acted as personal tutor to children on Langeland and had some responsibilities as a school board supervisor in Udby and Copenhagen.

Grundtvig's contexts

I do not believe that Grundtvig's relevance is confined to his own time and place; were I to be of that view, it would be an inappropriate starting point from which to engage in a study of a contemporary 'grundtvigian' contribution⁹⁶. It is important nonetheless to recognise that Grundtvig is inevitably influenced by his historical context and is, as the practical thinker, responding to situations and challenges of his day.

Romanticism

As I have asserted in chapter 3, we cannot legitimately categorise Grundtvig as wholly in the stream of Romanticism. Nonetheless, there are features of his educational thinking that draw significantly on Romanticist ideas and values. His idea of the nation, as 'folk' is in the tradition of Herder, shaped his primary contextualization of education within the community life of the particular nation. He attaches considerable importance to the mother tongue (*modersmaal*) and to oral transmission of experience (*det levende ord/ the living word*). He gives a central place to the past of the people, not simply as history, but as bringing the people within a living stream of consciousness and spirit (*folkeånd*). His view of education is poetical, teaching through folk song, myth and the language of the people. Against the allegedly excessive rationalism of the Enlightenment, Romanticism sought to give voice to emotions and feelings (Pateman 1991) and Grundtvig was

⁹⁶ Some related reflection on this transferability can be found in the chapter 10 *Efterklang*

concerned to speak to those *hjertelig* (heart-centred) dimensions of the participant.

The Danish-German situation

As I suggest in chapter 8, Grundtvig's development as a 'nationalist' (if I may use that as an shorthand, while acknowledging its inadequacy) was not merely Herderian in origin.

Critical reactions to the cultural hegemony of Germany on Danish soil were exacerbated by military and political difficulties associated with the duchies of Slesvig⁹⁷ and Holstein. The conflict had cultural and language dimensions. Grundtvig sensed that the Danish people had lost much of their sense of pride in their nation. It might also be noted as relevant that the Second Slesvig War (1864) was a culmination of an extended period of territorial loss which now brought to an end the *helstat* which had incorporated within the Danish realm Norwegians and, in South Slesvig and Holstein, Germans. The protracted period of territorial decline of the Danish state has fed its form of non-aggressive national identity⁹⁸ and particular mixture of international concern and inward focus and confidence.

While there remained Iceland, Greenland and the Faeroes, Denmark was now closer to being a nation-state and, perhaps even more significantly, to have a population that was particularly ethnically,

⁹⁷ I am using the Danish form *Slesvig* rather than *Schleswig*.

⁹⁸ Noëlle Davie's identification of Grundtvig as a 'Guide to small nations' (Davies 1944) raises the issue which I consider in chapter 8 of whether or not nationalism has a 'softer' side in those nations which (at least no longer) have pretensions to territorial expansion or cultural hegemony.

linguistically and culturally homogeneous. Though this is within the last decade of Grundtvig's life (d1872), the continuing cultural and social influence of Grundtvig has been largely, and (with patterns of inward migration) until recently, within a context of that high degree of homogeneity. Education and enlightenment had then to be a folk education, one that affirmed, drew from and developed the cultural identity of the people.

The early stirrings of democracy and economic change⁹⁹

However hesitant Grundtvig was concerning the development of democratic-style political institutions in Denmark, he took the view that the early contributions of ordinary folk within the provincial assemblies (*stoenderforsamlinger*) were worthy and that there had to be some form of learning to support their active participation.

There was significant economic change too, not least owing to the loss of land for which compensation had to be made by bringing existing land into more economic agricultural usage, changing the structure of farming and rural society, the development of cooperative enterprises and an expansion of industrialisation. Such changes had implications for vocational training needs.

It was Grundtvig's hope then that the students of the high school 'would return to their task with increased

⁹⁹ Bugge 2003:46ff brings together a range of examples to demonstrate that the role of the folk high schools was not instrumental as such in initiating political, social and economic change in Denmark but can be credited with having contributed significantly to supporting these trends and forwarding these objectives.

desire, with clearer views of human and civic conditions, particularly in their own country, and with an increased joy in the community of people'. (Davies 1931:171¹⁰⁰) Education and enlightenment had then to be practical, for social, economic and political change.

Grundtvig's own reading and research

Two experiences, I would mention in particular.

Firstly, his reading of Schlez (1817) led him to a more philanthropic perspective and an affirmation of the reciprocity of social responsibility and care. (Davies 1965) This sense of mutuality within society, of responsibility for one another within a nation, becomes an important dimension of Grundtvig's understanding and indeed of Danish ethical culture. 'We humans hold part of each other's destiny in our hands.'¹⁰¹ (Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1993:3)

Secondly, reflecting on his visits to England¹⁰², he had harsh critical things to say about the country¹⁰³, but it is clear that they were influential in a number of respects. In particular, he was clearly affected by:

¹⁰⁰ referring to *Lykøskning til Danmark med det danske dummerhoved og den danske høiskole* 1847

¹⁰¹ The quotation is there attributed to KE Løgstrup

¹⁰² Only very briefly did Grundtvig visit Scotland, though his diaries mention Edinburgh and Abbotsford in the Scottish Borders. (Nygård og Schrøder 1890-91:208-13) [I am indebted to Professor KE Bugge for this information.]

¹⁰³ Allchin and Thyssen (1993: 19ff) refer to his adverse comments on the poetry, materialism, spirituality and lack of historical and cultural awareness of the English.

- The process of industrialisation¹⁰⁴, which was beginning in Denmark, largely around Copenhagen
- The liberal nature of British society with democratic activity and freedom of speech
- His visits to Oxford and Cambridge which had introduced him to the interactive qualities of the tutorial teaching system
- The 'monitorial' system in English schools which were an example of a sharing within the group of learners (albeit by a more senior pupil).

OPLYSNING AS LIFE ENLIGHTENMENT

Korsgaard (1998:4) regards Grundtvig, with Herder, within the popular-national enlightenment perspective, where enlightenment draws significantly upon the cultural resources of the *folk*¹⁰⁵. The Herderian idea of innate potential linked to the notion that enlightenment was concerned with awakening¹⁰⁶ this potentiality.

One dimension of this enlightenment of the people was 'the enlightenment of life'; at its deepest, the exploration of what it means to be a human being¹⁰⁷.

¹⁰⁴ 'Grundtvig had many quite harsh remarks on the conditions of labour in Britain in his time and.. on the British way of relieving poverty. Human dignity suffered, and Grundtvig could not advocate a system, which in the first place created misery and in the second place under the cover of helping the poor robbed them of their dignity and thus of their equal part in the community of the people.' (Dam 1983:36)

¹⁰⁵ Authentic enlightenment resonates with the spirit of the people (*folkeånd*) and its national character. It is a *folkelig* enlightenment, for and of the people, though Romanticism like other movements made full use of cultural élites, such as historians, poets and painters.

¹⁰⁶ We have to read 'awakening' as a poetical rather than a scientific psychological term.

¹⁰⁷ I am conscious that, in the view of some, there are no universal meanings. While respecting the degree to which there are cultural differences, I am committed to the belief we need

'Therefore every man on this earth/ Must strive to be a true person'. (*Menneske først og Kristen saa* 1837)

Learning should therefore be about 'the wonderful riddle of life'. (Thyssen 1983:94) Education should be a school for life, dedicated to the clarification of the meaning of human life (*menneskelivets forklaring*). This was a fundamental task in human living, for a 'striving to find a meaning in one's life is the primary motivational force in man.' (Frankl 1985:121)

The purpose of this search was not merely for understanding of, but for participation in, human life. It is an engagement with life for its clarification, not for the purpose **only** of clarification, but for a better engagement with life.

Grundtvig found himself in much agreement with the work of Irenaeus, concerning 'the belief that man is made in the image of God... (and) that this image of God is never lost.' Human life, in the *imago Dei*, was therefore to be recognised as being intrinsically worthwhile (Allchin 1995:22), for it is in a sense part of the divine life, reflecting something of that divine life and lived out in interaction with that divine life. The concept of '*vidskab*', or striving for a living wisdom, then refers not simply to a rational search for knowledge but to a quality within humankind that is part of its created-ness in the image of God. (Kvist 1995:32)

some 'understanding of what humans are like and what their needs are' (Barr and Steele 2003:512, citing Nussbaum and Rorty 1992).

Each individual has the task of living out uniquely their own life, not to try to live out another's vision of life. 'Man is not an ape¹⁰⁸, but a divine experiment', wrote Grundtvig. (*Nordens Mytologi* 1832) His meaning is perhaps clearer when we recognize the verb form 'to ape', to imitate. Each person is called to lead their own authentic life, not to live out a borrowed copy of another. Consistent with his understanding that aspects of life, whether personal or of the community, lie dormant awaiting 'awakening', Grundtvig sees that authentic living as, with the assistance of education, a drawing out of the individual their indwelling personal gifts¹⁰⁹. (*Om Videnskabelighed* 1807)

If human life be a 'divine experiment', no less was each life a human experiment. Buber's¹¹⁰ affirmation seems to me to wholly consistent with this idea: '... I think we should live with this constant discovery. We should be open to this adventure in heightened awareness of living. We should stake our whole existence on our willingness to explore and experience'. (MK Smith 2000:1¹¹¹)

The distinction might be said to be between 'learning for living or livelihood' and 'learning about/for

¹⁰⁸ Grundtvig is not in fact responding to Darwin. *Nordens Mytologi* was published in 1832, while Darwin's *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection, or the Preservation of Favoured Races in the Struggle for Life* (Darwin 1859) was not published until 27 years later.

¹⁰⁹ The idea of indwelling potential represents a perspective on education that stands against the 'blank canvass' or 'empty vessel' model of education which casts the learner primarily in the role of passive recipient.

¹¹⁰ Yaron (1993) reminds us of the influence of Grundtvig on Martin Buber, in particular in the concept of 'the living word' and the creation of the residential folk high school

¹¹¹ The article cites the quotation of Martin Buber as being in Hodes (1972)

life'. The first is concerned with the knowledge and skills required for effective daily living; the second focuses more on the meaning of life. It is however concerned with a practical rather than a generally speculative introspection. By this, he was not proposing a superficial understanding, but a profound one. It was Grundtvig's conviction that learners responded best where the learning took up their interests and concerns and addressed the issues and deepest questions of the significance of their life, not as an abstract notion, but as a lived reality. This was consistent with his wider view of life. 'Grundtvig regarded himself as a realist, philosophically speaking. At least in his mature age he had a cordial detest of all figments of the brain. His ideas were fully rooted in his conception of reality, not in any abstract world of thinking and idealization, nor in any moralistic vision of how things ought to be.' (Dam 1983:32)

Grundtvig's conception of this understanding of life in its practical form is in no way a reduction of learning and development to a functionalist form. 'The scholarly clarification (here in the sense of understanding) is always subordinated to and included in the 'clarification' of life as lived - which is, in fact, nothing less than a secularized or 'secondarised' aspect of the greater clarification, transfiguration or glorification, the *δοξασμός* of Redemption itself, seen as the unfolding of the full meaning of Creation'. (Christensen 1998:550)

My use of the term 'learning' rather than 'education' is based on a distinction that can be drawn across the

Nordic languages. *Bildning*, a Swedish word sometimes translated as 'education' and related to the German *Bildung*, has the connotation of learning that is developmental and humanistic. Högnäs notes that 'In fact *utbildning* (education) is not at all equivalent to *bildning*. *Utbildning* has a defined and limited goal. *Bildning* concerns the individual's personality; it is supposed to change and develop the personality.'

(2001:30) This educational philosophy, while not excluding education that is particular, planned and programmed, would seem to require that the focus is not over-specific and that the ethos remains one of encouraging and enabling a broader spirit of enquiry. Ægidius, linking this 'Bildung' approach to Christian understandings of humanity, argues that the goal of such education then is the cultivation of all that is 'genuinely Human... whereof each nation's spirit and culture is but one version...'. (Ægidius 2003:23)

There is no doubt, therefore, that in Grundtvig's view enlightenment is a personal task and that 'knowing oneself' is its core. The educational process is concerned with strengthening the individual's sense of self-worth and dignity and in facilitating their search for meaning. It is not simply a deeper knowledge but a greater fulfilment of oneself (*realisere sig selv*) (Korsgaard 2003:232). Yet, the purpose of such 'enlightenment' is not a narrowly introspective and individualistic self-exploration¹¹² but a setting of oneself in the context of humanity and of the particular community to which one belongs. 'We in Denmark do not applaud the individualism of the

¹¹² which Qvortrup suggests can be egotistical and narcissistic (2003:194)

individual, but the people's collectivity as a formational ideal'. (Qvortrup 2003:195) Battail comments that this perspective has created in contemporary Denmark, 'a highly evolved individualism [...] accompanied by very strong community values'. (2000:2) The desires and the rights of individuals could not be absolute, but had to be set in a wider context. Grundtvig was conscious of the double-edged nature of this focus on personal growth; such enlightenment was 'a very ambiguous word'. (Statsmæssig Oplysning 1983:26)

Grundtvig's mode of thinking was not to see the individual and the communal so much in competition or conflict with one another as in reciprocal balance. The liberty of the individual is affirmed, but it is within a context¹¹³ of belonging to a community and so the person's potentiality will be best nurtured when it is realised as part of a community; the community too can only be true community where there is freedom and where people are enabled to realise their potential. This view accords with the assertion of Martin Buber that 'genuine education of character is genuine education for community'. (MK Smith 2000:11) This may be an idealised form of what we now call 'win-win' situations. (Schwarz 1987) It may well underestimate the extent to which the desires and the perceptions of individuals and those of the wider community can clash in ways that are fundamentally at odds with each other. This tension has to be resolved in the connection of and interaction between the personal, the people and the humankind that is so fundamental to Grundtvig's

¹¹³ In writing 'context', I do not suggest that the freedom of individual is permissible only insofar as it is practised within the norms or boundaries of the community.

thinking. It must be in the mind of the person and the mind of the society that they should seek to achieve a healthy and creative balance between the needs of individual persons and the wider community. Education inevitably then is engaged in both opening up learners to the norms and demands of society and in developing in them the will and the capacity to question and challenge these critically and creatively and to assert their own values, needs and priorities. Grundtvig proposes a folk education as a practical measure, interactive space and a values orientation to allow people to engage with this tension.

If life then was to be the focus of the learning, then experience of life was a key pedagogical tool. Enlightenment 'must originate mostly from the single person's own life and or at least be tried to see how it fits.'¹¹⁴ (*Skolen for Livet* in Broadbridge and Jensen 1984: 74). In this form of 'experiential learning'¹¹⁵, education is a direct participation in the events of life'. (Houle 1980: 221) 'It is and must be the deepest task of our lives to acquire this Enlightenment for Life, for only through its realization will we be able to distinguish light from darkness, truth from lies, and the cause of death from that of life'¹¹⁶. Yet this liberating insight is something that no schoolroom lesson will ever teach us.' (Borish 1991:167) There was then not only an

¹¹⁴ Grundtvig himself not infrequently found enlightenment through less institutional and accidental processes and the educator should not ignore the capacity of life itself, what we call experience, the stories of our living, to be a resource for learning.

¹¹⁵ The term is also sometimes used to refer to learning situations in which the learner directly engages *in situ* with the context rather than learning in a removed situation such as a classroom.

¹¹⁶ These oppositional elements are typical of Grundtvig's own thinking.

interaction (a *vekselvirkning*) between teacher and learner, but also one between conversation about life and life experience itself. This relationship was not, Grundtvig suggested, a bridge, which is static, but a dynamic relationship (*Taler paa Marielyst Højskole* 1856-71, quoted in Johansen 1956:108)

There was no substitute for discovery that was rooted in life itself. Grundtvig was scathing concerning the 'German fancy' that 'life can be explained before it is lived.' (*Skolen for Livet* 1838) Life enlightenment could not be acquired by proxy, by reading about it or by hearing about it from the experience of others for 'dead is all knowledge which does not find response in the life of the reader.' (Grundtvig quoted in Manniche 1978:115) Such an understanding was taken up by the folk high school movement: 'The (folk high) school was in a way like a large narrative, in which each individual had his part, and into which he was narrated.' (Eriksen 1989:73)

Rather, there should be an interaction between the experiences within and outwith the 'classroom', where 'ideas, skills, and insights learned in a classroom are tested and experienced in real life. Essential to praxis is the opportunity to reflect on experience, so that formal study is informed by some appreciation of reality.' (Brookfield, 1990: 50)

The importance of encounter with experience we might even discern in the phrase '*Menneske først*', 'first a human being'. It is Grundtvig's understanding that there can be no real comprehension of theological ideas without some experiential understanding of human life.

It echoes the thinking of Holberg that no-one should be taught theology before learning to be a human being, for then they would imperil their becoming a human being¹¹⁷. (1943)

We do not expect first to teach a child, or even a grown-up, what life eternal is, we believe that we can give him an experience of it and only then will he begin to discover things. There are things, which on the level of the intellect are insoluble, but which are being solved in the experience of things. This does not apply only to religion. It applies to beauty, to art, it applies to love. One does not give evidence of musical or artistic beauty before making someone experience it. And however rich the world's literature is in books, in poetry and prose, in which love is spoken of, described, conveyed somehow, it cannot be conveyed unless the person has a direct personal experience of love.'

(Anthony of Sourozh 1987)

If the learner had no experience of what was being discussed in a learning situation, then in time that experience might come and the discussion be brought to life.¹¹⁸ This issue was at the heart of Grundtvig's hesitation (expressed strongly) concerning the role of books in education¹¹⁹. It was not that life could not be found in books, but that it came alive through awakening and resonating with what is alive in the reader. How were learners to engage with the author's

¹¹⁷ From Bugge (1965) we learn that Grundtvig was, around 1804, reading Holberg' writings.

¹¹⁸ To a student who was concerned at not being able to keep up in the taking of notes in class, Kold is alleged to have assured him, 'Do not worry ... It would be another matter if we were speaking about dead knowledge. It is like what happens out there in the fields. If we put drain pipes into the ground, we must mark the place in order to find them again. But when we sow corn, there is no need to mark the place, for it comes up again. You may be sure that the things you have heard from me with joy will come up all right again when you want them'. (Kold quoted in Lawson 2000:3)

¹¹⁹ See chapter 9 for further discussion on Grundtvig's attitude towards books in learning.

understanding of life if they could not take to it their own and others' life experience? Similarly, the words of the teacher needed to be subjected to critical reflection that was rooted in experience of life.¹²⁰

Learning was not to be concerned only with facts. It was not even to be thought strictly synonymous with education. As Ellen Key would declare later, 'education happily is not simply the knowledge of facts, it is, as an admirable paradox has put it, what is left over after we have forgotten all we have learnt.' (Van Setten 1998:c5 quoting Key¹²¹ 1909:c5) Grundtvig's own experience too was of earlier words and experiences¹²² being re-awakened by later events and fresh lessons learned from them, for he writes of the past¹²³ as 'the voices which had slumbered through the ages of time, and the longings which whispered in the depths of my heart'. (Davies 1944:16)

Though this form of education was for **life**, it did not need to ignore education for living and training in vocational skills was not thought unimportant. Indeed, these practical skills were not to be thought inappropriate or ill-suited to be partnered to the more (practically) philosophical engagement. In the course of a fictive dream (Grundtvig writes), 'it sounds like

¹²⁰ It was in part for this reason then that folk high schools were to be residential. The student who came in lacking much life experience would gain experience and insight through that living interaction within the school community.

¹²¹ In using this quotation, I do not imply my adoption of Key's views on gender roles or on the raising of children.

¹²² In the particular quotation, Grundtvig is speaking of historical memories, but it was certainly true in his own life that personal experiences could lie dormant for some time, only to be brought to life.

¹²³ Though he is writing here of the historical rather than personal past, it is true that Grundtvig's broad vision and personal experience were often in parallel with one another.

a joke that once upon a time people were so stupid that they thought it impossible to combine intellectual and practical pursuits.' (Bugge 2003:37¹²⁴) *Oplysning* is less focused on the attainment of particular and specific learning goals, such as competences, and more on a breadth of experiences upon a journey, largely driven by the expanding horizons of the learner, in a process of encounter, interaction and discovery. Many folk high schools did and do, however, combine practical/ vocational and more reflective elements within their curricula, skills for living and knowledge of life.

There is an interesting play on words to be found in the idea that the search for life enlightenment is a seeking for *forklaring*. In its 'ordinary' sense, it means 'clarification' or 'explanation'. As we engage in a cycle of living/experiencing and reflecting, we focus on experiences in real life; we do not merely note them, but subject them to a process of examination to discern what they have to say to us; we form from them more generalised concepts; and we apply these understandings in further situations of experience. It is not however only the meaning of the experience, as something external to ourselves, but what it means for us and for our living. In reflecting upon experience, the potential for self-awareness and for change in ourselves is opened up to us.

There is a further sense in which *forklare* can be used, for the root of *forklaring* / *forklarelse* corresponds not only to 'experience' but also to 'transfiguration'.

¹²⁴ quoting/translating *Akademiet I Soer. En søde drøm* Fasc 343.2 in the Grundtvig Archives

Theologically, through reflection on life in human experience, we can 'discover or recognise the sacred within the secular, or the divine in the ordinary.' (Sexson 1982: 3-4) In human living, through the eye of faith¹²⁵ eternal life can be glimpsed, the eternal becomes present in the temporal. (Allchin 1982) While this might be affirmed in relation to any part of the Creation, there is a particular truth in our encounter with other people.

In the chapter on *Fortælling*, I shall discuss the issue of life enlightenment further, particularly in the context of how a narrative approach contributes to this task.

FOLKEOPLYSNING¹²⁶ AND THE PEOPLE'S ENLIGHTENMENT

Grundtvig uses the term *oplysning* also in relation to the enlightenment of the life of the people, the 'folk'.

In chapter 8 on *Folkelighed*, I look at the thinking of Grundtvig concerning the people as 'nation', focusing on the cultural dimensions of that sense of identity and belonging. In that chapter and also in chapter 13 on *Fortælling*, I consider the interaction of past, present and future in Grundtvig's understanding of the life of a people.

¹²⁵ Evdokimov's 'iconic vision' (Phan 1985)

¹²⁶ The term is also currently used to refer to non-formal third sector adult education in Denmark. 'Folkeoplysning' is not an institution, it is an idea. And it is just as much companionship as it is education.' (Undervisnings ministeriet 1997: ch6]

In anticipation of those parts of the thesis, let me summarise some of the fundamental elements of *folkeoplysning* as a concept and practice.

The school envisaged by Grundtvig had to be thoroughly 'Danish', that is, consonant with the values and culture of the people of the country (*folkelig*)¹²⁷. Learning should be in the mother tongue, in the language of everyday life (*modersmaal*). There should be an emphasis on orality, on the living word (*det levende ord*).¹²⁸ All the members of the learning community, whether 'teachers' or 'students' should be engaged in a common search for enlightenment. There should be use of *vekselvirkning*,¹²⁹ in this context, a lively oral interaction or discussion in which they shared not only their ideas but their experience of life. There should be a concern for the heritage¹³⁰ of the people to give a sense of identity and as a resource for the present and future - history as 'life-experience in its widest perspective' (Bugge 1983:220) It should be historical yet provisional, as history is always still in the making.

Folkeoplysning incorporates the element *folk* which we shall examine in much more detail in chapter 8 *Folkelighed*. The difficulty from an English-speaking perspective in translating this Danish term is, however, real and problematical. We might offer 'popular'¹³¹ but this carries associations with such

¹²⁷ Chapter 10 *Efterklang* and chapter 13 *Fortælling*

¹²⁸ See chapter 11 *Det Levende Ord*

¹²⁹ See chapter 5 and the chapters in Part Three

¹³⁰ See chapter 13 *Fortælling* in which I look in more detail at the contribution of the past to learning for the present and the future

¹³¹ not least because of its association in comparative adult education with the French term *education populaire*

ideas as common or vulgar or unlettered. It might correspond to 'folk' in English, but that is (with Herderian echoes) coupled frequently with certain cultural forms, such as folk music and folk tales.

There is the link to the German 'Volk' but the expression, from being associated with 20thC conflicts, carries very negative resonances¹³². It is sometimes used as 'nation', though more with connotations of 'as a people' rather than 'as a state'¹³³; equally, it can refer to what we describe as 'civil society'¹³⁴ and indeed a *folkelig* enlightenment may be about being a counterweight or even a resistance to the state. (Ahonen and Rantala 2001:14)¹³⁵

There are times when it is translated in its compound forms from the Danish into English as 'adult-', so 'adult education' becomes a corresponding term for *folkeoplysning*; indeed, though there is a distinction between *folkeoplysning* and *voksenundervisning* (literally 'adult'+ 'education'), it is not unknown to find in Denmark the first being used as a synonym for the second.

¹³² 'People or *Volk* lost its innocence in the 12 years of Nazism from 1933 to 1945. After the war it was impossible to use notions like *Völkisch* and *Volkgeist* ...' (Korsgaard 2004:591]

¹³³ though the capacity of the state to utilise the idea of 'the people' for its own political purposes is evident

¹³⁴ ie the engagement of people together in society for political and social purposes but outwith the activity of the state and, in some definitions, outwith the sphere of party politics. I consider the nature of civil society further in the Chapter 11 on interaction in civil society.

¹³⁵ Ahonen and Rantala acknowledge that in the Nordic context these grassroots organisations may indeed at times form a level of the state (2001:14]

Korsgaard's judgement is that, though one handbook on adult education¹³⁶ contains some twenty, allegedly 'synonymous', terms for adult education in the English-speaking world, none of them 'adequately covers the *folkeoplysning* concept as it is applied in the Nordic countries' (Korsgaard 2002:13)¹³⁷.

This, however, is not simply a matter of absence of good equivalences between languages.

There is the difficulty, apparent in doing any study of Grundtvig, that he, not infrequently, either coins words or revives words and endows with a fresh meaning or he invents new words. When Grundtvig then combines '*folk*' with another word we cannot assume that he is employing '*folk*' as it has been used either in his own time or historically. He may partly adopt the word but give the term his own slant. Similarly, the word *oplysning* is a Danish term for the period and the ideas of Enlightenment, but Grundtvig's use does not align him (at least not wholly nor whole-heartedly) with Enlightenment thought¹³⁸. Hence we have the argument of Korsgaard that '*Folkeoplysning* is to be perceived as

¹³⁶ Courtney (1989)

¹³⁷ Sean Courtney, the writer to whom Korsgaard refers, however, does not regard the difficulties in achieving unequivocal definitions as being wholly negative, but rather as of the nature of a discipline that is more fluid and indeed contested. He (Courtney) writes, 'The value of a definition lies in its precision or ability to illuminate. These qualities often depend on how well we already know the concept the definition makes explicit. Definitions are rules for the correct use of terms; they are quasi-legalistic. At the same time, the workability of these definitions will depend on the extent to which the phenomena they describe are clearly bounded, standardized, or codified. That being the case, if the time is ever reached when it becomes easy to define adult education precisely, this may well be a case for worry rather than for rejoicing.'
(1989:23)

¹³⁸ Grundtvig's scholarship was perhaps too idiosyncratic to be considered strictly rational and he in turn felt rationalists to be too lacking in heart and imagination.

Grundtvig's adding a spiritual dimension in his redefinition of a concept... that had been assigned to a rationalist category.' (2002:13)

Korsgaard (2004) refers to the word '*folk*' as being one of the most complex and conflict-ridden ideas¹³⁹. It is not simply that different renderings make translation problematical, though that is true; nor that the term is an imprecise and ambiguous one. The concept is not neutral. The existence together of different usages reflects a struggle; these various emphases actually reflect the contested nature of the idea. The expression '*folk*' then both holds within it competing ideological positions and is the ground on which these struggles are played out.

Korsgaard traces three principal categories of the use of *folk*

- social: the earliest meaning, referring to a particular class, the peasantry, and therefore all that is associated with them
- ethno-cultural: referring to the traditions and practices, cultural forms such as dance and song and story, to the mythic and historical past of the people and to those aspects which are (it is being suggested) inhere in a people such as a spirit or soul
- political: equivalent to *demos*, where the '*nation*' is being conceived of in terms more of the sovereignty of the people.

¹³⁹ The title of his 2004 book *Kampen om Folket* (Korsgaard 2004) - the Struggle or Fight about the People-) reinforces this.

I return to these issues and their broader significance in the chapter on *Folkelighed*, but this element must be introduced here because it underpins different understandings and different emphases concerning the nature of *folkeoplysning*.

The three categories employed above create different objectives and contexts for folk enlightenment.¹⁴⁰ The categories are not however mutually exclusive. In *folkelighed*, the social class emphasis in his focus on the peasantry, the political in his concern that folk education should support the participation of ordinary people in the new provincial assemblies and the cultural in his emphasis on national history and the use of the mother tongue.

The key elements in Grundtvig's understanding are that It should seek to create a community of learners in which people were brought together from different aspects of life, but there should be a particular concern to foster the learning of those who had less experience of education but who could bring their heritage and their experience of life.

It should foster a 'poetic' view of life, not exclusively centred upon rationalist principles and values; it should nurture a love of all that was good

¹⁴⁰ There is for example, in the Swedish *folkbildning* a primary emphasis on the democratic and socio-political whereas in the Danish and Norwegian *folkeoplysning/ folkeopplysning* there is a stronger sense of the historical-cultural. In Norway, for example, with particular challenges in nation-building arising from its long state association with either Sweden or Denmark, there was a language issue, a cultural concern, but the folk high school movement in its *folkeopplysning* also served a significant democracy-building role. (Slagstad 2004:71) In Denmark, *folkeoplysning* played a part in the development of representative government. (Skovmand 1951)

within the cultural heritage of the nation and all that was worthy in its ways of thinking and living; it should strengthen the ability of the person to engage fully with life but within a community where reciprocity and respect are practised; it should cultivate a sense of mutual care and responsibility and commitment to the common good.

In such a summary, we see each of the aspects of which Korsgaard writes - concern and respect for the less educated, commitment to fostering civic and political engagement and developing people's knowledge and skills for participation and nurturing knowledge and critical affection¹⁴¹ for the culture of the national community.

Yet again, as Korsgaard (1997:16) observes, '*Oplysning er således ikke bare oplysning*' (enlightenment is never simply enlightenment). What constitutes enlightenment and what are the key sources of enlightenment alter through history, but not by a process just of progressive development, rather by a series of discontinuities. These are matters that are contested continually - in Korsgaard's language, there is a 'struggle for enlightenment' (*kampen for lyset*) (ibid 1997;1998).

¹⁴¹ I use the term 'affection', believing that it expresses something of Grundtvig's thinking of belonging in a committed and feeling way without at all extinguishing the possibility of being critical of, or in disagreement with, aspects of that culture. If we take the idea of interaction seriously, then it implies that we are not called to be passive recipients of the culture but to be constantly and critically in interaction with it.

Folket overfor de dannede :
the ordinary people over against the élite

As Korsgaard (2004) demonstrates, the earliest use of folk in Danish refers to a social grouping within society – to those who belonged to the peasantry. In the Romantic tradition, there was an emphasis in Grundtvig's educational thinking on the contribution of ordinary folk. 'His rediscovery of the peasant as the true guardian of ethnicity is clearly influenced by the younger Herder and romanticism.' (Rerup 1993:239) In that respect, it can be an idealised and even sentimental view.

From his experience, Grundtvig had particular respect for the people who lacked formal education¹⁴². He himself felt that he had learned in his childhood from those regarded as untutored¹⁴³. He discerned a practical wisdom and quality in their thinking and speech. In gathering folk sayings, he became aware of a folk wisdom that was passed down from generation to generation and became embodied, sometimes as traces, in the everyday expressions that were used by ordinary people. They were in touch with the realities of life and were the nurturers of the people's culture. They had, as Hansen (2001:202) puts it, a 'well developed but untheorized practical knowledge': 'The common characteristics of the people are admirably suited to give them a much deeper love of country and a far more genuine culture than otherwise would have been possible.' (*Skolen for Livet* 1838)

¹⁴² Grundtvig is by no means alone in this, cf eg Iris Murdoch's notion of the 'virtuous peasant' (Murdoch 1985) and Tolstoy's notion of seeking after moral simplicity and moral directness (Tolstoy 2006)

¹⁴³ His nurse-maid was a clear example of this.

We see something similar in the Scottish 'kailyard' literary tradition with its depiction of rurality, decency, poverty, piety and modesty. They were exposed less to contact and therefore retained their 'purity' and connection to the folk spirit, the *folkeånd*. The role of a folk education was then to re-instil or re-awaken the love of the traditional in their way of life and to portray to others within the nation this 'unspoiled' peasant life as a model of national life.

By contrast, he had much less regard for those educated people (*de loerde*), whom he thought guilty of opposing and undermining the culture of the nation, preferring the classical, the supposedly international and the alien¹⁴⁴. He was persuaded that 'the same potential for educational and cultural achievement is discoverable in both cottage and manor house.' (*Skolen for Livet* 1838)¹⁴⁵ Yet, if the common people was the repository of wisdom, in what sense did they remain in need of *oplysning*? Grundtvig discerns in the ordinary people much practical understanding in living, a connectedness to the spiritual and a wisdom that ought to be shared with others and which would grow and be extended through interaction with others. Enlightenment was an

¹⁴⁴ Battail argues that this distinction is still alive in Nordic culture where *folkelighed* (and its equivalents in other Scandinavian languages) 'explains the existence of a peasant workers' literature which has not only produced some great works but has also enjoyed full and wholehearted recognition. A not insignificant portion of Nordic literature is attached to what Almquist called *allmøgekultur*, as against an aristocratic imported culture (*herrgårdskultur*)'. (2000:4)

¹⁴⁵ It is reported of John Wegener, the first Principal at Rødding that 'After less than one and half months (of working with young peasants who had enrolled in the school) he complains... 'If one speaks about matters beyond eating and drinking and fraudulent civil servants, one is not understood... I don't think there is a single spot in the whole country so devoid of people of brains and culture as here'.' (Henningsen 1995:8)

opening up of consciousness, a fanning of small flames of wisdom to a fuller and deeper one. There were elements that had become largely dormant with only a vestige apparent in the life of the community. The communal life was a soil for growing ideas and values and relationships but the life of the ordinary people was the more fertile soil, because it was spiritually productive as a garden of truly Danish ways.

There was then the issue of *folke-lighed*, in the sense of the equality of or fairness towards the people (from the word for 'equality'). Grundtvig regarded inequality as a riddle or enigma. (Dam 1983:33) He does not propose an analytical perspective or address structural or systemic dimensions of social and economic inequality. His approach is more moral and practical. If all the people of a *folk* were part of a common fellowship, then they were bound together in a relationship of mutuality. It was important then that education should awaken that sense of togetherness and the implications that followed from it. Instilling a capacity for freedom, building respect for self and for others, nurturing a sense of unity and developing skills for life were to be tools of a folk education in working together for a more *folke-lighed* society.¹⁴⁶

There are dangers of this becoming over-individualistic, of education becoming an escape route for some to break free from their social and economic

¹⁴⁶ It is possible to be critically aware of the shortcomings in this approach and yet honour and affirm the understanding that a society in which all people are viewed with dignity and as having mutual rights and duties will have to face its shortcomings in social and economic justice. It is a value base that has, on the whole, shaped Danish society's commitment to wealth distribution, social care, gender equality and human rights.

conditions.¹⁴⁷ Nordhaug (1986) distinguishes forms of adult education on two axes: collectively or individually oriented and opposing or not opposing the social order. (1986:46) Grundtvig's thinking has a strongly individual emphasis but firmly within an orientation towards the building of community. It is not focused directly on collective political action for social change, but it was significantly connected to supporting social progress and was linked to other social movements. Noting the social and economic developments of Denmark in the late 19thC¹⁴⁸, Dam concludes that 'the main explanation must be found in self-confidence infused into the broad layers of the population by the concept of *folkelighed* and the educational and religious movements in its wake. The important thing is that all this activity originated from ordinary people with a rather limited education but with belief in their own ability to solve their own problems'. (Dam 1983:34)

There is something that is partial about the emphasis on only a section of the identified community - the rural peasantry. If we take the linguistic example, there was an honouring of the speech of ordinary people within Grundtvig's idea of the mother tongue, but not merely the Danish language as a whole; rather, it was the Danish tongue as spoken in particular geographical

¹⁴⁷ In an Indian reflection on parallel movements in that society, one commentator observes: 'In leavening bread we do not aim to have the gas escape from the mass and rise to the top, but rather we desire to trap the gas in small bubbles all through the dough, so that the entire mass will rise with uniform light texture... For a continuing democracy it is essential that our programme of liberal education shall not promote the escape from the common people of the culture which that education generates, but shall inspire able students to remain common people, in and of the people, acting as their servants and leaders and raising the whole social lump.' (Bhattacharya 2000:181)

¹⁴⁸ For example, the development of cooperative enterprises

and sociological territory. The Romanticist ideal did not confer the same status within the ideology of national cultural tradition upon the urban working class¹⁴⁹. It is right to remember however that, in Grundtvig's day, the population of Denmark was indeed overwhelmingly rural.¹⁵⁰

Grundtvig does not fall into the error of imagining that there is somehow a level playing field in which all can participate on an equal basis. To the contrary, he is acutely aware of inequalities, on which basis there is need for folk education in order that those who are in subordinate social roles and of lesser education might engage fully and effectively. Nor is he unaware of the power of dominant groups, for his thinking emerges in resistance to the influence of some of those in the élites of the church, the academy and the state.

Grundtvig was however acutely concerned to maintain the coherence of Danish society and to avoid whatever might divide it. 'If one class regards itself as superior¹⁵¹ to the spirit of the common people/ Then

¹⁴⁹ Similarly, in the Norwegian context, the ordinary dialect speech of the city of Oslo had low status. (Högnäs 2001:38)

¹⁵⁰ Until the early 19th century as much as 80% of the population lived in the countryside...' (Andersen and Engelstoft 2004:56) Grundtvig, however, was not entirely unfamiliar with the developing urban population of Denmark. He was resident for many years in Copenhagen. In his 1848 electoral 'campaign', his principal audience was made up of sailors and skilled workers from the naval yard. (Dam 1983:33)

¹⁵¹ It would not be wholly true to attribute to Grundtvig alone the suggestion that the unity of the society was to be affirmed over the claims of particular groups within that society. When Holberg, the Dano-Norwegian satirist and dramatist, wrote 'virtue consists in mediocrity' (Holberg 1969-71: VolXI:79) he too was reflecting the notion that the harmony of society should not be disrupted by any part of society asserting itself over and against others. The contemporary Nordic expression of this is 'janteloven' (the Jante law), the fictional but very real set of rules as to behaviour, created by Sandemose (1933/2005).

the head, the hands and the feet will part ridiculously on their own/ Then the nation is torn apart/ Then the history has come to an end/ Then the people have been put asleep/ And you cannot wake them up again.'

(Folkelighed 1848) A folk education should therefore seek to bring together people from different walks of life to share in learning and living in order to foster a sense of unity amongst the people. Within this affirmation of the importance of unity, the existence and practice of privilege is incompatible with *folkelighed*.

In this respect, Grundtvig shares the partiality of the folk enlightenment movement. On the whole it was more concerned with a project in nation building, thus concentrating on overcoming the cultural division between the educated classes and the common people. Popular enlightenment was meant to integrate all within the national community, not to increase social segregation and foment political conflicts.

This attempt to focus on whole society and its unity rather than on society as an arena of competing ideologies and interests is, of course, at best, running a risk of ignoring reality and, at worst, of seeking to suppress, or being implicit in the suppression of, dissent and difference and of maintaining inequality.

There is also inherent in such a 'holistic' view the dark reality that one of the tools of fascism and other such ideologies and political movements has been its

suggestion that it had the ability to transcend social divisions and so create a unified society. (Mann 2004)

Grundtvig does not however try to build community on the basis of continuing tolerance of inequality. Education is to build self-awareness and awareness of community, consciousness and to develop skills of critical analysis, dialogue and action.

VEKSELVIRKING

It is a term to which we shall return in other chapters and indeed the three 'application' chapters in Part Three are concerned in some way with a *vekselvirkning* or interaction - with the issue of creating dialogue in the public space, with the capacity of storytelling to be a means of interaction and with Socratic Dialogue as a particular form of interaction.

Vekselvirkning is itself at the heart of an interaction between different aspects of Grundtvig's thinking, bringing together a number of emphases. In this way, he holds together particularity and universality, the Christian and the secular, nation and humanity, in an interaction rather than opposition. It is, pedagogically, about an oral exchange, about the interaction of people who come together in shared search and exploration, about the interplay of ideas and about creating a community where dialogue and engagement are essential elements. 'It appears that the idea of 'living interaction' is specially well suited to be the basic formula for Grundtvig's educational theory.' (Bugge 1965:367)

Educationally, it is about education through a free and open human exchange - between teacher and learner¹⁵² and amongst learners. It brings together the different experiences of the participants, who should bring their insights and their stories into the discussion. It enlivens the learning for it is participatory and it is intended to stimulate and challenge. It trains the cognitive and the communication skills of participants as they engage together in lively debate.

It is debate¹⁵³ however in a dialogical sense rather than an adversarial or confrontational form. Its purpose is mutual enlightenment rather than winning an argument or persuasion.

It is rooted in experience, as a contributing source of knowledge and understanding. It is concerned then to develop a wisdom that is practical, rooted in the challenges of life. It is concerned with 'real questions'. (Yaron 1993) It brings together what Grundtvig regards as the 'natural' gifts of different stages of life, so that different perspectives and approaches can inform understanding and decision-making.

It relates to the 'living word' as an oral interaction and is generally conducted in the 'mother tongue' with an emphasis on conversation in the speech of everyday rather than in specialised language.

In these different aspects, it is not only an educational method but a modelling of the society it

¹⁵² Their rôles in the interaction are more reciprocal.

¹⁵³ It is not debate in the other sense of being abstracted from action, for *vekselvirkning* is interaction for action.

anticipates. By training people in the skills concerned and forming appropriate attitudes, it prepares for a society in which dialogue is not merely a tool but a feature at the heart of its life. "It is a way of life. To be a human being is to be in dialogue." (Mortensen 2003:129)

It is implicit in the idea of interaction that it is imbued with a commitment to freedom of thought and speech. There is perhaps something of Grundtvig's experience involved in his commitment to the cause of freedom.¹⁵⁴ Freedom in education was a preparation for freedom in society. Pedagogically, he believed that there could be no true interaction unless there was freedom of thought and speech. There should be no pressure (even the thought of eternal damnation!¹⁵⁵) that would curb the exercise of open enquiry and expression of thinking. Participants in discussion should know that they were free to disagree with others, including the teacher.

There was something of the pragmatist in Grundtvig; he thought that it was futile to try to force people into adopting ideas with which they were not freely in agreement. A discussion that was held in check would lack an essential vitality and ultimately, in his view, make for people who themselves lacked vitality. It was

¹⁵⁴ From early in his life, he had been subject to a censorship interdict which controlled and restricted his ability to publish. Another experience of influence was his visits to English society, where he saw for himself the exercise of a greater degree of political liberty than was the case in the absolute monarchy Denmark of his day. He came to understand that the early democratic stirrings in his own country needed a climate of freedom in which to progress.

¹⁵⁵ Kold once commented that he had had in early life an image of God as either a policeman or a strict schoolmaster. (Bjerg 1993:21)

important that education should foster an independence of spirit, which in turn would not be quashed by vigorous and robust criticism. (Det danske Selskab 1983:7) Participation had to be voluntary. It was unlikely that in an atmosphere of compulsion, there would be open enquiry and exchange.

Personal freedom demanded reciprocity. 'Freedom for Loke as well as for Thor'¹⁵⁶ was the principle. Freedom was not only for those with whom one agreed. Yet, tolerance and acceptance of difference were not to be confused with acquiescence and fear to challenge and dispute. This is not the tolerance of holding differing opinions in intellectual ghettos. Rather, there has to be *vekselvirkning*, in which difference is brought into interaction and therefore explored and challenged as well as explained and affirmed.

Vekselvirkning requires of participants that they engage in a 'feeling oneself into' the view of others. (Berlin 2000a) Grundtvig follows a broadly Herderian view of the legitimate diversity of cultures, but that legitimacy implies that those beliefs, values and practices are within the moral territory of what might properly be regarded as compatible with our humanness, for otherwise we are 'understanding' only in the sense of knowing of their existence. *Vekselvirkning* becomes possible only if we are able to recognise what the other holds as true to be **imaginably** within the limits of our shared universal values and reflective of some value that, at some level, we hold together. (Berlin 1978) There is then the potential that the engagement

¹⁵⁶ Egidius (2003:30) labels them as 'respectively the bad guy and the good guy in Nordic mythology'.

can be an interaction in which, on the basis of a profound commonality, the participants can talk with one another, including offering one another critical analysis.

It will be clear, however, that this could admit into the conversation quite fundamentally illiberal beliefs, practices and values which would, in most judgements, pass the test of being within the bounds of what is recognisably human, while being to many people beyond acceptability, as lacking in human qualities.¹⁵⁷ The basis of *vekselvirkning* lies, however, in a recognition not so much of **humanity** as a **concept** as of **humankind** as a **community**, as the bond that binds us together. It is a recognition that 'the core of rational and moral personhood is something all human beings share, shaped though it may be in different ways by their differing social circumstances'. (Nussbaum 1999:70)

Vekselvirkning involves conversation and 'to deny humanness to beings with whom one lives in conversation and interaction is a fragile sort of self-deceptive stratagem...' (Nussbaum and Glover 1995:96).

¹⁵⁷ Isaiah Berlin, on such a basis, considers that the activities of the Nazis fall within the bounds of the recognisably human (though morally detestable). (Berlin 2000a: 12-13]

Chapter 7
MENNESKE FØRST OG KRISTEN SAA
FIRST A HUMAN BEING, THEN A CHRISTIAN
Grundtvig's view of Christianity and humanity

Menneske først og Christen saa
Kun det er Livets Orden
Kaldes vi Faar, tænk dog ei paa
At lægge Dyr til Hjorden
Og Djævelskab til Christendom
Kan Almagt selv ei skabe om
Kast ei for Svinet Perlen!

Stræbe da hver paa denne Jord
Sandt Menneske at være,
Aabne sit Øre for Sandheds Ord
Og unde Gud sin Ære.
Er Christendom da Sandheds Sag,
Om christen ei han er idag
Han bliver det imorgen.

Menneske først 1837

A human being first,
then a Christian!
This alone is life's
order. Even if we are
called sheep, we must
not think of bringing
the animal into the
herd for even the
Omnipotent cannot make
devils into Christians,
so cast not pearls
before swine!
Every human being on
earth must strive to be
a true person, to open
his ears for the word
of truth, and to give
glory to God. As
Christianity is a
truthful cause, even if
he is not a Christian
today, he will be one
tomorrow.

A human being first 1837

THE HUMAN AND THE CHRISTIAN

The purpose of this chapter is to consider how Grundtvig's thinking on humanity, on humanness, human life and human community, relates to his theological views. It reflects a wider question of why theology and therefore theological education ought to have an interest in and something to say about folk-life, the life of a people - and, indeed, in reciprocity, what folk life and enlightenment has to say to theology.

It complements a wider consideration of Grundtvig's contribution as a cultural nationalist. It is not intended therefore to be a broad consideration of Grundtvig's theology as a whole.

The opening line of Grundtvig's poem of 1837 has been a contentious element in his thinking about Christianity and humanity. At the outset, we perhaps ought to observe that Grundtvig is ever the poet and of course not least so when he is writing poetry or hymns. He is *skjald* rather than theologian in our systematic sense.

His formulation has been criticised from different perspectives. The pietistic criticism was that he was placing Christianity at the tail of the human and secular, that he was inverting the primacy of the Christian faith; and the traditionalist view was that the revelation of Christ thereby becomes subject to natural theology. (Lindhart 1951:92)

Grundtvig however is not seeking to diminish the importance of Christ or the Christian faith in the redemption of humanity. He seeks nonetheless to recognise that there is a certain priority in the temporal sense. Human beings are created before they are saved, creation precedes redemption. 'Even if the Gospel is unconditionally the Word of God to us, it presupposes that we are men not beasts... we are humans and only then we become Christians.' (ibid 1951:93) Our being and our nature is that of human beings and this is not denied by God's work of salvation.

There is a risk of reading a radical separation into *menneske først, Christen saa*, for much of Grundtvig's thought is penetrated with the notion of reciprocity and interaction. The folk and the Christian, the secular and the religious, the divine and the human are to be actively in relationship with one another, even though for some purposes he holds to a distinction. (Allchin 1993:14) At the very least, the order is not to suggest that the first aspect (the human) is to diminish or eclipse the second (the Christian).

We are being invited nonetheless to see a natural order. It is only as human beings that we can receive the salvation that God offers. If we cannot know life in this temporal world, we cannot grasp the meaning of eternal life. If we have not found truth in this temporal world, we are not ready for divine truth. It is the task not only of the Christian but of all people to find and exercise an authentic existence and to seek after the truth and thereby to bring glory to God the Creator.¹⁵⁸

Grundtvig too was concerned to affirm the commonality in our humanness.

Human life remains authentic human life, all-embracing, common to both Christian and non-Christian [...] the way is opened for a human Christianity, that is a Christian faith, hope, and love which is a truly free matter, borne only by the power of the truth of the word... and for a Christian humanity, that is to say, a human life which remains human and therefore can freely open itself to Christianity and freely refuse it, when the gospel is freely preached.' (Prenter 1973:29, quoted in Root 2000:57)

¹⁵⁸ This is Grundtvig's belief but he understands that not all people will believe it to be so and he does not consider that they ought to be compelled to think or behave differently.

Grundtvig does not distinguish the task of authentic living as a Christian and as a human being. The human being, whether embracing Christian faith or not, is engaged in a search for meaning, for enlightenment. 'The thief on the cross had the same human life as God's only Begotten Son'. (Den Christelige Børnlærdom 1868 - Det medfødte of det gjenfødte menneske-liv¹⁵⁹)

Indeed, Grundtvig asserts that it is not right to suggest that the non-Christian is in some way divorced from the divine aspect of human life¹⁶⁰. The non-Christian is already 'one whose own characteristic patterns of action and purpose bear some uneradicable relation to an origin in God'. (Werpehowski 1986:287) On this, Root comments, 'it is part of the openness to life that Grundtvig saw as intrinsic to Christian faith and theology'. (Root 2000:57)

'Life' or 'living' are recurrent words in Grundtvig's work. He had turned from detached scholarship to the task of life as the core of his thinking. We may discern the influences occurring at different levels. He had an often unhappy relationship with the church authorities, academic and thinkers of his day.¹⁶¹ The key changes in his thinking were sparked by very personal experiences; he learned immensely from life itself.¹⁶² But there was also a theological rooting of his orientation towards life and liveliness as at

¹⁵⁹ *Udvalgte Skrifter IX*, 428

¹⁶⁰ The theological doctrine of *theosis*

¹⁶¹ His propensity for conflict brought him both legal censorship and an inability to find either church livings or academic appointments.

¹⁶² Not least was Grundtvig influenced by falling in love, for example with his pupils' mother, Constance Leth, at Egeløkke, which brought to life the things he had heard in the lectures on Romanticism by Henrik Steffens at Copenhagen earlier in 1802 and 1803

the core of human being. Grundtvig turned to the early Church Fathers in his 'Greek awakening'.¹⁶³ (Thomsen 1983:197ff). Kildegaard (2000) notes that Grundtvig was particularly drawn to the declaration of Irenaeus, 'The glory of God is man fully alive'.¹⁶⁴ Grundtvig's emphasis shifted from the fact of salvation in Christ and from what humankind is saved to 'what man is saved for' (Thodberg 1983:170) and that is for 'life'.¹⁶⁵

Grundtvig's thinking is deeply incarnational. Humankind is made in the image of God.¹⁶⁶ Grundtvig disagreed with the idea that the Fall had caused an utter loss of that divine aspect within humanity. He did not refute the reality of the Fall¹⁶⁷ nor deny the capacity for destructiveness in human nature. Yet Grundtvig was convinced that the creation still bore the image of God.

They insist that that 'the Fall' [...] has distorted or rather erased, the life of God's image and destroyed humankind, so that there is nothing left of the created glory or the relation to God [...] Then the story of the revelation and the whole work of reconciliation becomes a series of impossibilities which must be surmounted by the dead and powerless written word that whatever is impossible for humans is possible for God [...] The word which is in our mouth and in our heart would then obviously be denied all facility for expressing spiritual and eternal truths...'.
(Den Christelige Børnlærdom 1868¹⁶⁸)

¹⁶³ We may discern this particularly in his hymns (See The Hymns of NFS Grundtvig 1959)

¹⁶⁴ Cf John 10:10b 'I came that they may have life and have it abundantly' NRSV

¹⁶⁵ This is not only life beyond death, but life in the present.

¹⁶⁶ Cf Genesis 1:27 'So God created humankind in his image, in the image of God he created them' NRSV

¹⁶⁷ Udvalgte Skrifter V:101

¹⁶⁸ translated in Knudsen (1976:76) The title of this work is perhaps misleading, as these writings are not teachings for

The Incarnation, Life, Death and Resurrection of Jesus the Christ, the second Adam¹⁶⁹, had restored humankind to its right relationship with God. The coming of the second Adam required one to take seriously the act of creation of the first Adam, the first of humanity. (Thaning 1972:42)

Humankind had a special place in the created order. 'Man is [...] is a matchless and marvellous creation, in which divine powers are to reveal, unfold and clarify themselves through a thousand generations as a divine experiment to demonstrate how spirit and matter may interpenetrate and be transfigured in a common divine consciousness.' (Grundtvig, quoted in Koch 1943:121)

Grundtvig came to believe that 'The most important inborn talent of the individual is the potential for Humanity, considered by Herder to be a reflection of something divine, a potential exclusively bestowed on Mankind, and by which Man is different and distinguishable from the Animal world's bodily character, in which Man also has a part.' (Thaning 1973:43) The realisation of this divine potential for Humanity is the highest objective or destination of the individual as well as of Mankind.' (Ægidius 2003:23) This divine action was revealed to humankind which thus became aware of its unique relationship to the divine.

children, but rather basic or fundamental Christian teachings. The title is perhaps suggestive of the view that a more child-like faith is preferable to a 'sophisticated' theology. For this view, see Toftdahl's introduction to the translation 'Elementary Christian Teachings' in Broadbridge and Jensen (ed) (1984)

¹⁶⁹ Cf 1 Corinthians 15:21-22 'For since death came through a human being, the resurrection of the dead has also come through a human being, for as all die in Adam, so all will be made alive in Christ' NRSV

'Man sees himself as created in God's image, and he sees the universe as God's handiwork'. (Danne-Virke III, 206, quoted in Allchin 2000:139)

By what means is this divine image made apparent in human living? Prenter suggests that 'The fundamental thought ...is that God's image is God's word itself, and human persons take on the image of God by hearing God's word and echoing it in their own voice.' (Prenter 1967:304, quoted in Root 2000:54) The capacity for speech and language¹⁷⁰ lies at the very core of what it is to be human, in Grundtvig's view. In one of his poems he extols and sets out the special place of the Living Word in the divine creation of human beings:

If all the birds with beak and claw
Were to lay their heads together,
They could not think up the smallest word
Which belongs to the race of man.

Human life on an isle in the ocean of time
Is matchless still for fullness and for power.
The word in the ear and the word in the mouth
Far transcends what strikes our eye:
Its mother dwells in the depths of the sea of sound,
Its father is God's spirit from on high.

The sound of the word upon our lips
Resembles in small our maker's voice...

(Grundtvig, quoted in Koch 1943/1952:123-4)

In the Old Testament¹⁷¹, God's creative activity is through word and this is affirmed to in the Gospel¹⁷². Furthermore, the Word dwells amongst in Christ and in

¹⁷⁰ It is the capacity of the whole human community for speech and communication that is affirmed. There is no suggestion at all that those who are impaired in speech are in any way regarded as less than fully human. Grundtvig's focus on oral expression is not however without its problems as seeming to prioritise a capacity for speech.

¹⁷¹ Cf Genesis 1 - 'God said...' NRSV

¹⁷² Cf Prologue to John's Gospel

the life of the Church. The Living Word¹⁷³ is spoken and heard in Baptism, Eucharist and the Confession of Faith. And in and through the Living Word passed between human beings, the divine mark of creation is made evident and spiritual realities become possible. He himself asserts that 'the word is nothing but the spiritual which enters the sphere of experience and reveals itself to spirits'.¹⁷⁴ 'Through the word God speaks to man; through the word man speaks to God; through the word man speaks to man.' (Knudsen 1955:162) Against prevailing ideas that the Word of God was to be **heard** by the many but **expressed** only on the lips of the few, Grundtvig affirmed that this capacity was inherent in the humanness of all. 'Grundtvig's confidence in 'own enlightenment' is based upon the conception that every man through the word has access to enlightenment of life. In the 'small' word every man has part in the logos of the 'great' word.' (Journal of World Education 2003:13)

The key to spanning the gulf between Christian believers and others came to Grundtvig in his discovery that a distinction could be made between faith and *anskuelse*¹⁷⁵. Faith was a matter for the believer and for the community of believers. Such faith however did not prevent believers and non-believers sharing together in the discussion of life. 'Be he Christian or heathen, Turk or Jew, every man who is aware of his

¹⁷³ The concept of the Living Word (det Levende Ord) is a fundamental plank in Grundtvig's thinking - for example, as the basis of the Church and its faith, as communication in the mother tongue (modersmål), as a fundamental aspect of pedagogical practice.

¹⁷⁴ 1817 treatise - Udvalgte Skrifter III, 13

¹⁷⁵ a Danish word generally meaning 'view' or 'opinion' but used by Grundtvig to mean to 'a way of looking at life' (Thaning 1972: 36).

spiritual nature is in himself such a glorious mystery ...'. (Grundtvig quoted in Jensen 1984:41) They were engaged in the same journey of questing. Rather, Grundtvig's issue was with those who sought instant wisdom. All are summoned to the search for truth, for it is in the shared search that we share in our humanity.

FIRST WE MUST BE OF A PEOPLE

For Grundtvig though, human life was fundamentally communal and indeed national. 'Humanity is not an abstract idea, something cosmopolitan, international, but always something tremendously concrete, namely, being human in a particular place and among a particular people with its own history and its own speech'. (Koch 1943/1952:125) He counselled against any notion that we could speak of human beings as if they inhabited 'a life in heaven or in the sky, never on earth. On earth, you never find humanity without folk-life'. (Folkelighed og Christendom 1847, translated in Knudsen 1976) When he writes therefore 'First a human being', we are to understand this is in the context of humankind and in particular in communities (which Grundtvig saw pre-eminently as national or ethnic or cultural communities).¹⁷⁶

¹⁷⁶ While in one sense, Denmark was a nation with some degree of homogeneity, we have to be conscious that, even in Grundtvig's day, the Danish realm included amongst other lands Norway, Iceland, Greenland and the Færøerne as well as the Duchies of Slesvig and Holsten and that inhabitants would have spoken a range of languages including German and Friesian. Indeed, Grundtvig was an advocate of linguistic rights of these 'minorities', eg Swedish speakers in Finland. Grundtvig preferred the term 'Folk' to 'nation' and, in common with Romanticist ideas, saw this constituted by such factors as common language and shared memories, stories and cultural artefacts. It was therefore a spiritual community as much as a political one, though Grundtvig does not ignore the political/ constitutional dimension, eg in Den

Indeed, in his revision of 1847, he supplemented his formula of 1837 so that it proclaimed: 'First a Dane, then a human being, finally a Christian.' Folkelighed og Christendom 1847, noted also in Lundgreen-Nielsen (1993:92) He had little time for what he regarded as fragmenting definitions of community (such as by class).

From Romanticism, he had adopted the view that the nation or 'Folk' was not merely or essentially a political unit, but a spiritual one. (Thyssen 1999:27-64) It was there primarily that the Living Word in the form of the mother tongue was spoken and heard. It was within the community of a folk and its folk life that the grace of God could pre-eminently be present. (Om folkeligheden og Dr Rudelbach 1848)

It is therefore primarily within the national setting that human beings will contextually share experience and questions and seek enlightenment. People must receive Christianity through their indigenous culture is that it, alone or best, deploys the imagery and language that enables them most readily to apprehend the Gospel or indeed life enlightenment. 'Living Christianity does not have its own language but borrows the language of every people it visits.' (Christehendens Syvstjerne 1854¹⁷⁷)

Danske Fiir-Kløver - the four leaves of the clover being the King, the People, the Mother Tongue and the Homeland. It was for him predominantly a cultural community, so therefore he argued that Goldschmidt, a Danish Jew, was indeed a citizen of the Danish nation, but he could not be a Dane, even though his family had resided in Denmark for over 150 years. The use of Grundtvig of the terms, 'folk', 'folkelig' and 'folkelighed' and a consideration of the issues this raises are explored further in the chapter of my thesis *Folkelighed* focusing more on the political and cultural nationalism of Grundtvig.

¹⁷⁷ Published in *Danske Kirketidende* nr 475

Christianity cannot become meaningful and satisfy if there is not already some sense of belonging beyond oneself, if one is not alive to imagery and language, if the Gospel story does not resonate with the people's stories, if the people has no soul or spirit. (Journal of World Education 2002:20) It was necessary that 'the relevance of the Christian faith must be verifiable in the life experience of the individual'. Here perhaps we see the principle of *Menneske Først* at its plainest meaning. If people are to make sense of life or indeed of the Gospel, then they can do so in terms of their own experience, experience which is contextual and in terms of their own language, rather than being asked or expected to appropriate an alien or external thinking.¹⁷⁸ It is in and for life that the word of salvation is heard and it will be heard particularly in different places and by different peoples.

Grundtvig himself identifies the correctives to an excessive emphasis on the local. Though he readily and enthusiastically celebrates the folk/national and in particular (for him) the Danish, he affirms with equal strength that the national cannot be lifted out of the context of the whole of humanity. It is perhaps significant that he never wrote a history of Denmark but rather Nordic or universal histories.¹⁷⁹

It is a certainty that any nation which forgets that they are human beings and that

¹⁷⁸ If the Word is one of redemption or salvation or liberation, then 'since the redemptive word always comes to me through particular persons (and thus always shaped by particular interpersonal relations) and in a particular language, any simple separation of the redemptive word from the creative word is impossible.' (Root 2000:55)

¹⁷⁹ For example, *Tidens Strøm* 1829 or *Haandbog I Verdens-Historie* 1833-43

all their affairs should be conducted as humanely as possible, will in no-wise become gods thereby but beasts or devils as the case may be [...] When I speak of the national as the supreme in every land, it is by no means as opposed to the human, but only as a mark of distinction from what is purely national in other lands, and only as opposed to whatever shall by force or guile render a people alien to itself, without, in the nature of things, being able to make of it either another people or pure, unadulterated human beings [...] Not since mankind was divided into many 'peoples, races and tongues' has there be any possibility whatsoever, humanly speaking, of a mere human being... (Grundtvig quoted in Koch 1943/1952:125-6)

His concern about the right of each national culture to its own integrity was his doubting that there was in fact any truly 'universal' culture rather than one that had been once particular in a nation or ethnic group. And so Grundtvig resisted what he considered was a flaw in the German spirit, an inability to remain where it was intended to be to pursue its desire to reform the whole world.¹⁸⁰ In his view, those who sought to achieve a single cosmopolitan culture, far from affirming a universal humanity, denied something quite fundamental in humanity. The right to live out a culture is bounded by the place in which it had a right to reign.

Nonetheless, Grundtvig was criticised for supplanting a universal perspective with a particularistic one. (Korsgaard 2004) He held to a distinction between faith and *anskuelse*¹⁸¹ considered that Christianity retained its 'universality'¹⁸² as an eternal truth

¹⁸⁰ *Forbandlingerne paa Rigsdagen* 1849 Danske Kirketidende nr288

¹⁸¹ which we might translate as a world view

¹⁸² Grundtvig considered Christianity to be a universal; it transcended national boundaries and it (from a Christian

while folk-culture was necessarily local and temporal, yet the Spirit/spirit was in each and in both.

SEPARATION OR INTERACTION?

In the folk-life of the people, Christian faith and Nordic myths might co-exist peaceably. 'Mighty Odin, white Christ, expunged is your fight, both sons of the Universal Father.'¹⁸³ He could unite them in the single sentence because he discerned in Christianity and in the ancient religion of the North an indication of the same universal life and spirit and impetus towards life.¹⁸⁴ Though he renounces his Asa Ecstasy, nonetheless he continues to see the Nordic myths as having spiritual worth. In the New Testament too, he found support for his holding of these two together. He read into the words of St Paul at Athens (Acts 17:28) that pagan poetry could contain the image and truth of God.¹⁸⁵ Both the Nordic myths and the Christian Gospel spoke to the heart of the people, could strengthen the heart of the people, and aid them in the struggle for life.

Most notably, it was in an exchange of articles with Rudelbach¹⁸⁶ that Grundtvig faced the allegation that he had confused and conflated Danishness and Christianity. He refutes the suggestion: 'I do not

perspective) belonged to the whole *οἰκουμένη*. From a modernist perspective, Christianity is more likely to be considered one of a series of particularities.

¹⁸³ *Nordens Mytologi* (1832) *Udvalgte Skrifter* I: 233

¹⁸⁴ In the same way, he regarded the Old Testament figures as anticipating Christianity.

¹⁸⁵ St Paul's address at Athens is recorded at Acts 17:22-32. It contains two apparent quotations from Greek poetic sources, one attributed to Epimenides and the other the opening lines of *Phaenomena* by Aratus, a Greek Stoic poet of Cilicia.

¹⁸⁶ I return to the case of Dr Rudelbach in my chapter *Folkelighed*

imply that it (folk life) is a substitute for Christianity or that it qualifies a people for Christianity.'¹⁸⁷ The main ground of his refutation is that he regards the confusion and loss of distinction as being death to both Christianity and folk-life. As he had argued that the corporeal and the spiritual ought not to be set apart from and against one another, so we might see that the human spirit folk-life and the Christian spirit ought not to be framed oppositionally. Speaking of the bodily and the spiritual, he writes: 'They in no way abolish or deny one another, but are linked in a friendly interaction, which presupposes a common reality and a common origin.'¹⁸⁸ (Danne-Virke II 1817: 39)

In his open letter to Dr Rudelbach, he first sets out his own confession of faith:

I for my part am a Christian, not as most of the inhabitants of Christianity just by name, but I am a Christian really; that is of my faith and of my joy, and my Christianity gives me what I think is the very best both of this life and for the life to come. So I must necessarily give a much higher priority to that than to all possible Danishness or to anything else that applies only to this earthly life.

And then he points to what he believes would be the dangers inherent in such a joining together of two distinct things.

But the attempt by the Middle Ages to Christianise the whole world I would call a terrible mistake, not only because it so often happened by means of the sword and not by means of the spirit, but also because it forced the original people of the North who had their own valuable, noble life. And that was detrimental both to the Nordic and

¹⁸⁷ Om Folklighed og Dr Rudelbach (1848), English translation by Johannes Knudsen (1976) at p44

¹⁸⁸ translated in Allchin 2000:138

to the Christian life, so that both have come into a deathly peril which is not just won. I know that both these lives are still very really existing and they can very well come into agreement, because I live both lives perhaps only weakly and in a limited context, but nevertheless I live so really that they endeavour to regenerate themselves, but not as before mixed together or mistaken for each other but each clearly distinguishable under its own name. And that is why I do not want to the Danish folk life to be Christian just as little as I want it to be French or German. This folk-life is namely a real life which can be no more or no less than what it is.¹⁸⁹

Discerning a continuity in history, Grundtvig thought it dangerous to divorce people from their roots and distance them from their past.¹⁹⁰ The people had already a folk-life before the coming of St Ansgar and this had not been torn out of the ground by the coming of Christianity to Denmark. That would have wrenched apart the people and its spiritual heritage. Rather, the Christian faith had come to them peacefully and rooted itself in the same soil as the folk-life.¹⁹¹

Both Christianity and folk life had its own gift to humankind and to assimilate them denied their difference and their contribution. They were not identical and ought to be allowed each to do their own work. Indeed, Grundtvig maintains the reality of the tensions that exist between human life and eternal Christian life and between the earthly folk-life of a

¹⁸⁹ Fasc. 353:1; translated for me by Professor KE Bugge

¹⁹⁰ Grundtvig's immense efforts in recovering the treasures of Nordic past were only in part an antiquarian interest. Through his translations into contemporary common Danish, he endeavoured to re-unite the people of his own time with their lost past.

¹⁹¹ There is comparison to be drawn with the bringing of Christianity in Celtic form to the British Isles with the 'baptism' of 'pagan' practices, figures, rites and celebrations.

people and the spiritual life of the Christian congregation. (Prenter 1950:49)

Furthermore, the bringing together of these two dimensions does not eliminate the possibility of *vekselvirkning* (interaction). They come together in a lively reciprocal exchange, the earthly and heavenly, church and culture ought to be brought into interaction of thinking where the contrasts would meet in a free and reciprocal influence. (Wigh-Poulsen 2004)

Where ambiguity is built into the words of Grundtvig, it is an opening to the possibility of interaction between alternative readings. So, his affirmation *Fædreland er et helligt Ord* (the Fatherland is a holy word) may point us to the tension between the Christian's heavenly and earthly citizenship.¹⁹² (*Dansk Svanesang* 1848) On one hand, Kingo's hymn had declared, 'My citizenship is in the heavenly kingdom'¹⁹³ and, on the other, Luther's presumption had been that the rule of the worldly realm was Christian, but Grundtvig challenged such dogmatic conviction. (Korsgaard 2004:569) We are not citizens only of our earthly place **or** of the heavenly realm, it is a false dichotomy.

HUMANITY AS FREE PERSONS

Grundtvig had been at times on the receiving end of the discipline of the Church authorities and was aware of the potential for Church ruling of thinking.

¹⁹² Danskeren 1848 nr4 in Værker i Udvaglt VIII at 274

¹⁹³ *Vågn op og slå på dine strenge* (Awake and sound your instrument) Den Danske Salmebog (1997) no 692

Grundtvig was keen to affirm separation on grounds of freedom, for otherwise Christianity becomes ruler rather than servant. Korsgaard (2004:577f) suggests that 'The church's alliance with the state since Constantine the Great was to Grundtvig nothing short of a Fall of the Church [...] Grundtvig is thus convinced that freedom, as a common cultural ideal, is a precondition for a true popular community [...] only freedom can uphold freedom.'

This strong affirmation of the cause of freedom was not solely based on Grundtvig's own experience and in his reading of history but even more rooted in his view of humankind as created in and with freedom as part of our humanity.

Freedom is better than gold,
Though the world were full of it,
And our freedom in God's grace,
Though the world laughs at it,
Is still the best freedom of all.
Freedom follows with God's Spirit,
Bursting every chain!
(Freedom is better than gold in Buckser 1996)

Freedom was more consistent with Danish folk-life, even in its embracing of Christianity as the religion of the people. Grundtvig argued that Christianity had been adopted voluntarily by the Danish people through preaching, rather than through a process of enforcement. For the individual then, Christianity had to be a matter of personal decision.

Freedom was also the only condition under which Christianity now could prosper. 'The older I grow, the clearer it becomes for me that my Christian errand in my circle is really this: to make it clear with my

utmost powers for both friends and foes that true Christianity, far from being allied with any spiritual thralldom or compulsion of conscience... can not only bear all human freedom, and can only flourish, can only work with its full power and be seen in its glory, when its enemies have the same freedom as itself to make their strength felt spiritually.' (Grundtvig, quoted in Davies 1944:26)

It was then a spiritual necessity that freedom flourish. 'Freedom on both sides (listener and speaker) is the basic requirement; but this holds good not only at this point, but in the whole realm of spirit, since freedom is the spirit's element.' (Koch 1952:129) 'Neither the Christian nor the folk spirit then can be a matter of enforcement. And this approach is a key precondition of Grundtvigian pedagogy as Bugge asserts. (Bugge 1993:217ff) If there is to be a lively and reciprocal interaction between learners, then there must be freedom of opinion and of expression of opinion.

But Grundtvig, ever aware of the destructive potential of human beings, drew a distinction between two different kinds of oppositional interaction¹⁹⁴. He therefore distinguished between two kinds of conflict: *kredsang* was a life-giving conflict whereas *holmgang* was a destructive form. 'Then we must the difference learn/ between sunshine and lightning/ though they both may burn/ and both create a vision;/ for common sense tells us/ one light brings life/ the other strikes to kill!.' (Grundtvig, quoted in Journal of World Education 2002:11) *Kredsang* is a life-giving

¹⁹⁴ He draws this distinction based upon the Nordic myths.

struggle, a duel of ideas in which the participants act as collaborators, not seeking to vanquish but to create fresh understanding.

The spirit of the people both becomes possible and finds expression in freedom. It is 'an invisible life force, [...] the element of which is free activity, and the breath of which is the mother tongue'. (Mands Minde 1838)

The distinction and separation of Christianity and folk-life is not to suggest that the character of the people is unspiritual in nature for the spiritual encompasses not only the religious but is the meeting point for the interaction of the human spirit, the spirit of truth and the Holy Spirit. Folk life is life rooted in God-created humanity. The Holy Spirit is the life source for both Christianity and the spirit of the folk. The spirit in the people and in Christianity engages in interaction; they are distinct spirits but from the one Spirit of God the Creator. The folk character adds to Christianity a new facet through being preached in the mother tongue and 'made concrete' in the imagery of the folk. Reciprocally, Christianity offers to the character of the people the living hope of Christ and therefore gives it re-birth.

HEART AND HEAD

'One of the key words alike in (Grundtvig's) hymns and in his sermons is the word 'heart' [...] It speaks of a centre in men where feeling and thought, intuition and will are fused together in one [...] The heart of man is made to receive and respond to the love which comes

from the heart of God.' (Allchin 1979:72,77) It reflects an essential quality in humanness. The heart then is not the organ simply of sentimentality but rather that coming together of intellectual and the affective, the intuitive insight and the volitional.

Grundtvig is not blind however to the possibility that it can and will take us into more negative places. 'The human heart is the most wonderful thing God has created, for it is so small that it can be contained within the human breast and yet so big that it can contain all heaven, all hell and usually something of both'. (Grundtvig, quoted in Eskesen 1948, cited in Johansen og Højrup (eds) 1948)

He discerns in his own people a particular orientation towards things of the heart. As Thyssen argues, 'The emphasis on the heart of the Danish people rests on their natural warmth, which has manifested itself in their feel for poetry and history,..' (Thyssen 1983:87ff) It was one of the gifts to and of the Danish people that they had a poetic nature and a warm character.¹⁹⁵ It was in the ancient Nordic literature that Grundtvig had found the hearty, lusty love of life in the peoples of the North.

The heart was also the image of what most deeply engaged us. 'And he has never lived/ who deeply understood/ what first he did not love.' (Gylden-Aaret 1834 stanza 41) The Nordic or Hellenistic-Nordic¹⁹⁶

¹⁹⁵ Again this was most evident amongst the common people where Latin learning and the German spirit had not done their damage and destroyed life!

¹⁹⁶ Grundtvig had a stronger sympathy for the place of the Greeks in universal history than of the Romans who had inflicted a dead culture on the world

and Mosaic-Christian understanding of life starts with life itself and with its enigmas and riddles¹⁹⁷ and whoever does not love life cannot understand it. For us, if we are to seek to develop a theology and a theological education that takes Grundtvigian anthropology seriously, then we here find one of our most core ideas. Perhaps this is where we find our contemporary situation most wanting. 'As a recent Danish writer on the meaning of the word 'heart' in Grundtvig's thought drily remarks, it is scarcely to be found as a significant term in modern dogmatic or specialist theology. There could scarcely be a sharper condemnation of the theology of our time, or a clearer indication of one of the reasons why it seems to many, believers as well as unbelievers, an irrelevance.' (quoted in Allchin 1979:172)

THE CONTRIBUTION OF FOLK LIFE TO HUMANITY

Grundtvig had fairly idiosyncratic notions of the place of certain (predominantly European and including the Danish) nations in the working out of world history, but perhaps we may rescue from this difficult aspect of his writings the idea that the belief in election or call is a not uncommon aspect of nationalism.¹⁹⁸ The struggle is a universal one, shared by all peoples, but 'in all places and in and through every tongue something of the mystery of life could be and is expressed'. (Allchin AM 1997:78) That was their contribution. Isaac Watt's hymn line declares: 'let every creature rise and bring peculiar honours to our king'¹⁹⁹ (Rejoice and Sing 1991:No 269); the offering

¹⁹⁷ *Værker i Udvalg* VIII 391

¹⁹⁸ See, for example, AD Smith (2003)

¹⁹⁹ The first line is 'Jesus shall reign where'er the sun'. We know that Grundtvig was familiar with Watt's hymns as he

to God of such 'peculiar honours' was the unique expression of faith in its own language and imagery and the gift of its folk-life. (Knudsen 1955:142-3)

Each folk was called to be true to itself, to its folk-life. It is a moral community with values. Nabudere finds resonance with the Bantu concept of *ubuntu* - 'the essential divine capacity that enables people to act according to their norms and values'. (Nabudere 2003) The people's call is to live in accordance with its historic virtues and to build on these in seeking greater enlightenment in living.

The comfort of the spirit comes to me
That God has blessed our human, frail endeavour,
That in his hand alone our soul is free
And growth will come in nature's way forever...
And though our day of years be short or long,
Creative growth we may to all be giving.
Our faithful efforts all to God belong,
And sunset glory crowns the gift of living.²⁰⁰

Aabent Brev til mine Børn 1839/41

In summary then, we may see that Grundtvig's theological perspective is thoroughly incarnational. Our humanity is affirmed, not only so far as it corresponds to an embracing of Christian faith, but in its own right. Humankind is affirmed as a community of mutual respect and commitment, but one that finds expression in a variety of forms, of which the *folk* is a fundamental one. Human life is affirmed, for it is a shared search, in talking together, for clarification, for meaning. Humanness is affirmed, for a whole human being embraces the heart as well as the head.

translated some for the then Danish hymn book, *Den Danske Salmebog*.

²⁰⁰ translated in Knudsen (1976)

Chapter 8

FOLKELIGHED

INTRODUCTION TO THE CONCEPT

Of all the terms used in the thesis one of the most problematical of all is *folkelighed*.

It is, even more than many other Danish words, not amenable to direct brief translation. There is no simple equivalence in the English language and attempts at translation inevitably involve a substantial risk of significant misunderstanding. '*Folkelig* is a special Grundtvigian and Danish word, and any translation of it is bound to be inadequate'. (Christensen 1998:538fn2) 'The word '*folk*' is one of the language's most complex concepts.' (Korsgaard 2003:232) Exploring its meaning(s) is like, 'somebody in the jungle who tugs at a single tendril and instead of freeing it gradually drags out the whole primeval forest'. (Brix 1938:81)

Grundtvig scholar Kaj Thaning writes that *folkelighed* is 'a Danish word normally applied to that which has a popular, democratic, unassuming quality or character.' Uffe Østergård tells us that it 'refers to enlightened, responsible and tolerant participation in the exercise of power.' Vagn Skovgaard-Petersen has discussed its close connection to the problematic ideal of equality, a connection reflected in the etymology of the word itself (when split, its two elements ('*folke-ighed*') can be respectively translated as 'the people' and 'equality,' though the word can also be very loosely translated as 'the quality of being of the people,' or just plain 'peopleness'). On the death of King Olav V of Norway in January 1991, the Norwegian artist Håkon Bleken

wrote of him: 'He was easy to talk with, and could combine *folkelig* sociability with royal dignity in a fantastic way. He was a king to be properly happy about.' As even this brief review indicates, the concept of *folkelighed* possesses a range of meanings and connotations.

(Asian Human Rights Commission 2001b)

As I have noted in the chapter on *Oplysning*, even the root of its first part '*folk*' has shifted in meaning over the years and resonances of those different meanings continue on into the present. (Korsgaard 2004) Though the '*class*' reference is less common in contemporary Danish, there remains a sense in which the '*people*' to whom '*folk*' refers are in '*lower*' socio-economic categories, those whom we might call '*ordinary*' folk²⁰¹. The ethno-cultural dimension was strong in Grundtvig's thinking, following on from Herder. The political dimension was expanding as the sense of the people as a *demos* grew with the early development of democratic institutions and values in Danish society. In Grundtvig's more practical than analytical usage, the different dimensions are not confined within conceptual compartments but there is more of a blurring of edges and something of an interpenetration of the ideas. The people is a segment of a constitutional entity (together with the king), is an ethno-cultural entity and is (while not yet sovereign, the absolute monarchy only ending at this time) a *demos* in the making.

²⁰¹ Korsgaard identifies the term particularly in relation in earlier period to the peasant or servant classes. In Grundtvig's time and context, the role of the peasant farmers came to be a highly significant one in political and economic change.

Grundtvig's 'nationalism' grew within and in response to a context of change and perceived threat.²⁰² It is important to understand this. His thinking is primarily not arrived at through a process of abstract philosophical reflection, though it is certainly influenced by broader philosophical movements and works (not least Herderian thinking); rather, it is taken forward in the context of particular political challenges against a background of his deep values and attachments. Secondly, he is sometimes writing in a more 'journalistic' or a more 'oratorical' mode than in scholarly language, delivering speeches of a polemic nature or otherwise engaging in a fierce debate within the country and his forms of expression and the strength of his expression reflects this rather than more restrained arena of scholarship. Further it was his nature to approach an issue not with a calm equanimity but rather seeing it as an extreme, insistent question, '*yderst påtrængende spørgsmål*' (Korsgaard 2003:237). *Folkelighed* and the nature of nationhood was practical, urgent and something that mattered. And so it often is. Nationalism may be analysed dispassionately in academic rooms but it gives rise to real passion outside.

²⁰² This is important in two particular regards. His thinking is primarily not arrived at through a process of abstract philosophical reflection, though it is certainly influenced by broader philosophical movements and works (not least Herderian thinking); rather, it is taken forward in the context of particular political challenges against a background of his deep values and attachments. Secondly, he is sometimes writing in a more 'journalistic' or a more 'oratorical' mode than in scholarly language, delivering speeches of a polemic nature or otherwise engaging in a fierce debate within the country and his forms of expression and the strength of his expression reflects this rather than more restrained arena of scholarship. Further it was his nature to approach an issue not with a calm equanimity but rather seeing it as an extreme, insistent question, '*yderst påtrængende spørgsmål*' (Korsgaard 2003:237).

UGLY NATIONALISM

In Denmark I learnt that a small nation is not the same as a large nation... In the twentieth century the devastating effects of the pretensions of large nations, particularly when they become imperial or totalitarian or both, have been so evident, that many people seem afraid to speak or think of nationality at all. But national identity will not go away, even though we pretend it is not there. Certainly the nationalism of large nations which define themselves mostly in terms of their economic or military power, their capacity to control and dominate other nations, is something which itself needs to be very strictly scrutinised and controlled... But the situation of a small nation... is totally different. It cannot, even if it wants to, define itself in this way. Its economic power is very limited; its military power negligible. It cannot dominate others; it has to learn to live in relationships of interdependence with them. Its definition and awareness of its national identity will necessarily be more internal than external, to do with shared memories and shared traditions, common experiences and common insights, usually conveyed and embodied in a shared language, whose very existence is often threatened in our age of mass-culture.

(Allchin 1992:15)

Allchin contrast two nationalisms, one that seeks to be peaceful and culturally rich and another that is expansionist and domineering.

The prevalence of wars and violent civil struggles between conflicting ethnically-based states and communities readily creates in society a negative and even fearful view of nationalism, as a divisive and destructive force.

In the 20th Century, affirmations of ethnicity and purity of the people, the 'folk', were used as tools in policies and practices of hatred and violence²⁰³.

'Mosse²⁰⁴ characterizes 'Volkish' thought as containing the following elements: the union of a group of people with a transcendental essence or spirit, the special role of history in explaining human destiny, the idealization of the peasant and rural life, the idealization of the past and the primitive ... and the nation as a spiritual essence rather than as a political identity.' (Fain 1971: 72)

There is evidence that during the Nazi period there were Danish fascists who imagined themselves to be in a 'Grundtvigian' tradition and they made use of or misused Grundtvig's ideas and phrases. (Lundbak 2003:36-37) Quisling in Norway proclaimed that he had been raised amongst Viking graves and the ancient Norse sagas²⁰⁵. (Griffiths 1991) The majority²⁰⁶ of Grundtvigians however would appear to have remained committed to democratic principles and to culture rather than blood as the unifying force. (Nielsen 1999)

²⁰³ Similarly, the terms *Norden* (the North) and *Nordisk* (Nordic) has had a discredited link to Nazism and led still to some usage of *Skandinavisk* (Scandinavian) to refer to a wider context than the strictly Scandinavian nations of Denmark (excluding the Faeroes and Greenland), Sweden and Norway.

²⁰⁴ Mosse (1964)

²⁰⁵ Grundtvig was a significant promoter of the Norse traditions

²⁰⁶ This would appear to be a fair assessment of the situation, though Skov (2000) alerts us to the use of myth in the process of reconstructing pasts, particularly painful pasts. 'The image promoted by Free Danes abroad showed the country as unanimous and unified (*enig og samlet*) in its opposition to the Germans. Embracing this idea, the Danes at home embarked belatedly on living up to the image...' (Skov 2000:101)

We have to be careful too to avoid the assumption that philosophical ideas **cause** the events that follow and even more the notion that the ideas **inevitably** result in a particular outcome. 'It is an historical and moral error to identify the ideology of one period with its consequences at some other, or with its transformation in another context and in combination with other factors.' (Berlin 1965:44) Lundgreen-Nielsen's notes that 'All those factors that in Germany led from Herder and Fichte to the disasters of Wilhelm II and Hitler led²⁰⁷ in Denmark to the emergence of the folkehøjskole, cooperative movements and parliamentary and folk culture based on discussion and compromises - ideally always with respect for the minority'. (Lundgreen-Nielsen 1992: 173)

Davies (1944) entitles one of her books on Grundtvig '*Grundtvig of Denmark. A Guide to Small Nations*'.²⁰⁸ It is perhaps now one of the key features of the Nordic region that it is made up of smaller countries. Østergård (2002) suggests however that the 'choice' in the case of both Sweden and Denmark may have been more of political and military necessity than moral virtue²⁰⁹. The concept of 'smallness' has become a significant one in the Danish collective mentality. Ostergård (1992:168), tracing this attitude back to Grundtvig, comments that 'almost all of the Danish political spectrum agrees on a fundamental distrust of everything

²⁰⁷ While I accept this general assertion, I would note that such ideas continue to be available to those in Denmark or other countries who oppose a pluralistic culture. (See below on the campaigns of the Danske Folkeparti.)

²⁰⁸ See also Allchin 1992:15, quoted at the outset of this section

²⁰⁹ In particular, he notes the gradual shift in Swedish imperial hopes after the defeat of 1709 at Poltava and in Danish power and influence after the loss of Norway in 1814.

'big', ie transnational and 'European'. Reflecting a history of territorial shrinkage and the presence of a powerful neighbour in Germany, Denmark's diminutiveness has become a source of pride...'

Size and power play their part in shaping what nations believe to be their national identity and their potential²¹⁰. Allchin refers to the nationalism of large nations who may define themselves mostly in terms of their economic or military power, distinguishing this from the forms of nationalism that he discerns to be more common in smaller nations. (Allchin 1992:15)

'(Grundtvig) emphasised the world-historical missions of the smaller peoples by showing that it is possible for people to derive its strength and its self-respect from other things than the naked exercise of power.'

(Jørgensen 1993)

The vision is of nations living peaceably together, each, in a sense, 'cultivating their own garden'²¹¹. This ideal of course somewhat overlooks²¹² the perennial issues that there are continually disputes as to the positioning of the boundary fences, as to how many gardens there should be and to whom they belong and as to who has a right to be in the garden. It is fair

²¹⁰ in traditional nationalist parlance, their destiny

²¹¹ According to Voltaire's *Candide*!

²¹² I am not suggesting that Grundtvig was at all unaware of the political realities that would be apparent even in his Nordic context, eg the Danish losses of Skåne (1658) and subsequently Norway (1814) to Sweden and the contested issues in Slesvig and Holstein in the mid-19thC. The extent to which territorial loss has shaped not only Denmark's geography but its character is reflected in the statement: 'Very bluntly speaking, it can be claimed that the present configuration of Denmark is the result of 400 years of forced relinquishments of land, surrenders and lost battles'. (Denmark.dk: 2006)

however to acknowledge that Grundtvig thinks of the boundaries as primarily linguistic and cultural²¹³ and believes that nations ought to remain within those bounds.

The slogan '*Hvad udad tabtes skal indad vindes*'²¹⁴ (Outward losses shall be met by inner gains) (Frandsen 1993) could also be, when reversed, a statement concerning the form of nationalism that encroached on the territory of others (both militarily and culturally). Military action could be justified only in the context of external threat. Cultural, spiritual and intellectual conquest was itself violence. (Andersen 2003) Such outer gains could only be accomplished at the cost of inner loss. 'By making conquests any noble nation loses far more than it gains, and by conquering the world it would actually lose itself.' (Speech by Grundtvig, 14 April 1843 quoted in Lundgreen-Neilsen 1997:91) This notion of moral regeneration arising out

²¹³ This approach of course brings its own difficulties as it assumes, and assumes erroneously, the existence of a homogeneous cultural group. While it is true that language can be a source of cultural cohesion, this need not always be a unifying factor in relation to the nation state (eg in Belgium and Switzerland). Though language may be a 'marker' of national identity, it is not necessarily true, by linguistic criteria, that the languages of neighbours are sufficiently different to be considered, on language considerations alone, separate language groups (eg the mutual intelligibility of Norwegian, Danish and Swedish languages combined with their own internal differences which may be almost as great as those which are said to separate the languages themselves).

²¹⁴ The phrase is attributed to Dalgas, an agriculturalist, and used as a motto for *Danskeren*, Grundtvig's periodical publication, after the defeat of 1864. Its original reference was to the need to compensate for a loss of territory (albeit the territories in question had been linked to Denmark proper through the king's role as duke) in Slesvig, Holstein and Lauenburg. This was to be achieved principally through a process of moorland reclamation. The phrase however came to have a moral and cultural significance that Denmark's territorial loss could come to have a good result in terms of the strength of the people.

of territorial loss and redefinition of identity and role in the world was not peculiar to Grundtvig.²¹⁵

There is a kind of national confidence that is closer to arrogance. It can be reflected in myths of exclusive chosen-ness and specialness. Such national identity is more likely to be difficult to confine to its own territory. Tamir (1999:73), referring to the thinking of Ahad Ha'am²¹⁶ (1964), draws the vital distinction between nationalism that is about 'different from'²¹⁷ rather than 'elevated above' other nations. This is not inconsistent with taking a pride in one's nation and in aspects of its heritage and contemporary life, provided that one is prepared, in a spirit of mutuality, to acknowledge and respect the pride that others take in theirs. 'Different from' is capable of being compatible with a sense of belonging to a wider community of humankind and yet of distinct but connected peoples; 'elevated above' not. Grundtvig counselled against too much 'pomp and striving' a warning that rather influences the Danish social norm and its view of its position within the international community. (Rifberg 2003:ch8)

Grundtvig, affirming the heart-felt, offers to us an image of belonging that is gentle and loving. 'Dansk er immer kærlighed' (Danishness is always love) (Folkelighed 1848) Yet, there is also a strength of

²¹⁵ For instance, Poul Martin Møller's *Glæde over Danmark* (1820) (referred to and analysed in Brix 1908:103-21 and cited also in Pizer 1996:74-6)

²¹⁶ Pseudonym of Asher Ginzberg

²¹⁷ It is important too that this is not an assertion of **wholly** different from, which could readily underpin a denial of shared humanness and make others utterly other.

belonging and commitment whose intensity leads not to love but to hatred; 'there is a deep connection between violence and belonging. The more strongly you feel the bonds of belonging to your own group, the more hostile, the more violent will your feelings be towards outsiders. You can't have this intensity of belonging without violence... if a nation gives people a reason to sacrifice themselves, it also gives them a reason to kill'. (Ignatieff 1994:188) As there are clearly situations in which there is a depth and strength to belonging that does **not** give rise to violence to the 'other', Ignatieff's assertion has a false inevitability²¹⁸ to it, but it would equally be wrong to deny the validity of his understanding and his experience or the negative potential in nationalism and other group commitments when membership is raised to a fanaticism and myths, personal experience, fear, revenge and hatred fuel its loathing and violence.

While it may be so that this strength of feeling and violence is particularly associated with 'ethnic' nationalisms, it would not be true that this is exclusively so. For example, the struggle between the Turkish government and the Kurds relates not to ethnic exclusiveness but rather to an attempt to assimilate an ethnic minority into a civic state with an ostensibly non-ethnic but civic definition of being a Turk.

(Kymlicka 1999: 134)

²¹⁸ As Gellner (1994) observes, there is no justification for seeing and judging nationalism only in its more extreme forms, as it is not generally associated with violent action.

Nor can it too readily be assumed that a transnational perspective always comes from positive universal values and actions. Howe (2002) argues that those who undertook the attacks on the USA on 9/11²¹⁹ 'were themselves not inspired by anyone's nationalist claims, but by an ideology more comprehensively, and perhaps more rigorously, anti-nationalist²²⁰ than any other available. Against the claims of nationality or ethnicity, they posed appeal to a conception of global community based on shared ethical principles - even though most other declared adherents to that ethical system apparently thought these enthusiasts' interpretation of it peculiar and their methods unacceptable.' (Howe 2002:80) He similarly views the response to the 9/11 events as transnational in seeking to mobilize commitment and action for the defence of democratic values.²²¹ Neither would contribute to a view that all visions of world order are necessarily liberal.

Tempting though it might be, in the United Kingdom, to imagine that it is possible to distinguish nations and their sense of national identity on the basis of a rational compared with emotional distinction, this may come close to self-congratulation and re-assurance, based on the imagined idea that 'our nation' and those allegedly like it belong to the class of rationalist nations. One UK Member of Parliament suggested in 1998:

²¹⁹ 11 September 2001 when a series of attacks were made in the USA

²²⁰ Concerning this evaluation, Howe cites Sehmi (1983)

²²¹ Though I acknowledge that the latter to have been the political discourse, I believe that there is a significant and strong national motivation rooted in the exercise of global economic and political power.

I think that we tend to feel that (English) people are more rational, more cool, more calculated than, in fact, they are, and I think with some skill, you could find a demagogue[...] who could stir those passions in some rather strange quarters [...] I think these passions are there to be moved, and I think there are some very ugly forces who would love to move them'.

(Condor and Abell 2006:2,
quoting from Hansard 1998:para 276)

References to patriotism or nationalism not uncommonly would suggest that they have the character of being over-riding loyalties. This was not the perspective of Grundtvig. 'National sentiments should not become the object of religious cultivation of faith'. (Grundtvig quoted in Lundgreen-Nielsen 1997:86) National identity and commitment to the life of the nation was important but should not be elevated to the status of idolatry.

Of the nation-building in which Denmark engaged after the loss of the duchies, it has been said 'One of the prerequisites was the building of a new self-confidence within the population'. (Østergård 2002) This was not to be an exclusive confidence, however. Grundtvig subscribed to the belief that only as each people is secure in its own sense of who it is can it turn to a more universal orientation. Hansen articulates the question, 'if you do not know your own roots and history how may you be able to understand other nationalities or cultures, be empathetic'? (Hansen 2003:182)

LIVING WITH A LARGER NEIGHBOUR

In Grundtvig's time, substantial territorial loss²²² had resulted in or contributed to a decline in national self-confidence and pride.²²³ The 19th Century wars, and in particular the conflicts centred upon the duchies of Slesvig and Holstein²²⁴, had resulted in a serious diminution in the extent of the realm and consequently of its world importance defeat undermined a sense of pride within the nation.

²²² See Table 3 below

²²³ This low self-esteem may have reflected other contemporary views also. 'The question was whether the Schleswigers were to be forced to follow the fate of small, impotent, half-civilised Denmark'. (Engels 1850)

²²⁴ Constitutionally, Slesvig was not part of the Danish kingdom as the King of Denmark ruled there in his capacity as duke. There were however both Danish and German (linguistically and culturally) populations within the duchy. Whatever the constitutional detail, a conglomerate state existed and many within Denmark had for long thought of the duchies as part of Denmark. (Rise Hansen 1959; Jespersen 2002:140)

This loss of pride was not simply a response to military defeat. Grundtvig discerned in his own country a disdain in certain, powerful sections of society of the Danish language and its culture.²²⁵ The Struensee²²⁶ affair had cast a shadow over Danish public life. The lack of usage of the Danish language in public life and amongst the educated classes was regarded by Grundtvig as a sign of a deeper loss of pride in the nation. It seemed that 'Every man, who was well educated²²⁷, only expressed himself on paper in Latin, with the ladies he spoke French, to his dog he spoke German, and finally, to his servant he spoke Danish' (Wilster, quoted in Feldbæk (1991:119) and so 'as for their national language... many of them were inclined to be ashamed of it and to look on it as the unpolished speech of an inferior class'. (Davies 1994:6-7) It was the fate, Grundtvig wrote, of being 'thrown on the dunghill'. (Mands Minde 1838)

There were fears of German intentions towards territorial expansion. Grundtvig's assertion, no doubt intended to be read with some irony, was that Germany was incapable of confining itself to the known earth but would desire to dominate even the invisible world. (Kongerit Danmark og Hertugdømmet Slesvig eller

²²⁵ I consider the issue of the mother tongue/ *modersmaal* further in chapter 9 *Det levende ord/* the living word.

²²⁶ Struensee, a German, had been royal physician to King Christian VII of Denmark and minister in the government. He wielded considerable influence over the king who was mentally unstable and he achieved huge power in the nation. He introduced a substantial number of reforms and was opposed both for these and for his preference for the German tongue over Danish. On suspicion of sexual relations with the Queen, he was tried for high treason and executed.

²²⁷ According to the archives of their correspondence, Bernstorff and Reventlow (18/19C Danish statesmen) wrote their letters not in Danish but in French or German.

Sonderjylland 1848²²⁸; see also Jørgensen 1993:91ff and Rerup 1980) Grundtvig was concerned about what he regarded as a movement towards Germanisation²²⁹ of Denmark. Against this background of national decline and danger, he felt despair at the lack of awareness or concern amongst the Danish people. (Maskaradeballet 1808)

Grundtvig protested that his antipathy towards Germany²³⁰ did not pursue them 'across the Eider'²³¹. (Somme andres og mit Tyskerhad²³² 1848) His resistance to or 'whole quarrel with the Germans is really concerned with the fact that they are determined either to make me a German or to regard me as a fool; and I give as good as I get and do not wish to be either'. (Mands Minde 1838, trans Broadbridge and Jensen 1984:100)

The fear of invasion or infiltration producing (unwelcome) cultural change continues to impact upon or at least be utilised in argumentation within Danish society. Glistrup, leader of the Progress Party in Denmark, referring to immigration and asylum-giving and the presence of people of ethnic minority background, employs the language of *fremmedinvasion* (an invasion of

²²⁸ An article which appeared in *Danskeren* 1848: nr 12 den 7 juni

²²⁹ Danish fears and apprehensions concerning Germany are something of a recurrent element in Danish thinking. 'Where Germany appeared [in songbooks for Grundtvigian schools], it is almost invariably an antagonist.' (Buckser 1995:263; see also Bagø et al 1894) Peter Munch, the Danish Liberal Minister of Defence wrote at the close of the First World War of it 'ending in the defeat of that Germany which through the ages has represented **the** great danger for Denmark and the strongest threat to those ideas of freedom and humanity.' (Munch 1959-67:356)

²³⁰ He was prepared to refer to them otherwise in complimentary terms: 'they are a people who have done much good for the world and surely will do more yet'. (quoted in Lundgreen-Nielsen 1992:84)

²³¹ That is, the border between Slesvig and Holstein

²³² An article in *Danskeren* 1848 nr22 den 16 august at p351

strangers) and alludes to a fear of being over-run that hints back to old fears of German conquest and Germanisation. (Glistrup 1991:140,245) There is an appeal to an exclusive form of Danishness:

For more than a thousand years we have, in this country, formed a nation with a common religion, language, culture and history, and this national community cannot just be kicked aside as something trivial, because economic or ideological interests dictate they should. One shouldn't do it. Love of fatherland and home is one of the loveliest human emotions to be found, closely connected with honesty and decency—and an old nation state represents a home. (Krarup quoted in Schierup 1993: 161)

The issue of Denmark's relations with Germany has some degree of parallel in the context of Scotland and England, though this ought not to be exaggerated. Historically, there had been territorial contest between the two countries. Though Denmark, unlike Scotland, had once been a significantly larger realm, it had become a little country which felt some apprehension about its territorial vulnerability. Moreover, there was a concern for cultural independence from the larger neighbour who had the capacity to exercise hegemony and indeed there were those within Denmark who were cooperative in supporting such external influence.

The role of the 'larger other', England²³³, and its relationship with the smaller nations within the United Kingdom has been for centuries one of the enduring issues.

²³³ It is interesting that the 'other' for Scotland, both in academic literature and in the popular imagination, is England with significantly less attention to the influence of the United States of America, culturally and politically.

In neither Denmark²³⁴ nor Scotland²³⁵ have territorial issues with their larger neighbours been significant in the recent past, though the 'memory' of historical struggles casts a long shadow over subsequent history²³⁶. The recurrent concern, however, has been not territorial but cultural²³⁷: the issue of alleged cultural hegemony.

Jackson and Maley assert that the process in the UK was one of internal colonisation: 'The emphasis on empire overlooks the process of conquest and plantation which accompanied the unions with Scotland and Ireland, and so the British state, itself a multi-national entity, is viewed from a modern perspective as a unified polity whose colonial interests lie overseas rather than within its borders' (Jackson and Maley 2002:69) and they cite Hugh MacDiarmid's declaration that the project of British imperialism was 'to consolidate the British Isles as a single English entity...' (MacDiarmid 1971:237)

²³⁴ German occupation of Denmark in World War II was more of the nature of 'occupation' than 'annexation'. Until the election and disruption of 1932, Denmark maintained much of its civil government institutions. While the old issue of Slesvig/ South Jutland had been the subject of the Treaty of Versailles and therefore a source of German concern, Nazi policy centred more on a sense of establishing a Nordic brotherhood rather than on German territorial acquisition. (Hæstrup (1976:9).

²³⁵ 'The English-Scottish frontier is and was the dividing line between two of the most energetic, aggressive, talented and altogether formidable nations in human history.' (Fraser 1971:3)

²³⁶ *Scots Wha' Hae* is more probably related to a concern for the universal value of freedom than a nationalist sentiment. (Norman Buchan quoted in Cowan 1993:174) At least at the level of political song, Scotland reflects the themes of human solidarity and universal values. (Linklater 2002 cites Burns' *A man's a man for all that* and Hamish Henderson's *Freedom come all ye*. In *O Flower of Scotland*, however, there is (as Linklater acknowledges) a more explicit connection between the wars of independence, freedom, national resurgence and indeed political independence. (Linklater 2002)

²³⁷ I am conscious that many conflicts in the later 20thC have had a stronger cultural, or perhaps ethno-cultural, emphasis more than a territorial one.

While Connell (2004:255) disputes²³⁸ the model²³⁹ of colonialism, he does not appear to doubt that cultural hegemony has been at work²⁴⁰. He argues however that standardisation²⁴¹ was widespread throughout the United Kingdom, not peculiar to the smaller nations²⁴².

In Scottish education, the perception or the fear of anglicisation has been a recurrent one. For many years in the 20thC, the assumption within education²⁴³ that vernacular Scots or Scottish forms of English or dialect forms were faulty speech²⁴⁴ to be corrected²⁴⁵ and eliminated²⁴⁶ and the marginalisation within of Scottish literature and history within the school curriculum were significant elements in a programme of cultural shaping. Anderson (1983) observes that historically, in

²³⁸ partly because he believes there to be a more plausible explanation in the needs of capitalism for cultural standardisation
²³⁹ It is perhaps from treating colonialism as a model that criticism comes. McCrone (2001:67) suggests that its power lies more as metaphor than as an analytical or explanatory concept.

²⁴⁰ He also doubts the systematic nature of the process which he regards as being a fundamental aspect of colonialism. This view of colonialism is shared by Franz Fanon: 'A national culture under colonial domination is a contested culture whose destruction is sought in systematic fashion.' (Fanon 1959)

²⁴¹ The hegemonic nature of the situation is reflected in the reality that the standard which is imposed is routinely rooted in a particular set of values and practices.

²⁴² It is clear that in the name of standardisation regional - and Welsh national- cultural particularity was eroded.

²⁴³ An issue, wittily, perceptively and (for those concerned) evocatively raised by Liz Lochhead in her poem *Child's Poem/Bairnsang* (Lochhead 2003)

²⁴⁴ In his *Sunset Song* (1932), Lewis Grassie Gibbon focuses on this linguistic issue: 'what a shame it was that folk should be ashamed nowadays to speak Scotch - or they called it Scots if they did, the split-tongued sourocks! Every damned little narrow-dowped rat that you met put on the English if he thought he'd impress you - as though Scotch wasn't good enough now...' (Gibbon 1988:156)

²⁴⁵ For many years, the use of Scots vernacular was assumed to be an act of impertinence. In Wales, the use of the 'Welsh knot' as a punishment for being heard to speak in the Welsh language shows that the linguistic suppression was not confined to Scotland.

²⁴⁶ I pursue issues of language further in chapter 9 on 'the living word' where one focus is on the importance of 'the mother tongue' (Danish *modersmål*)

educational debates, as well as appealing to versions of the past, arguments were often countered on the basis that they were importing English principles and practices²⁴⁷. Of more recent times, Humes (1986) notes suggestions that the then Scottish Education Department was often accused of a lack of independence from its English counterpart. Even within the more recent devolved arrangements, the criticism is made of Scottish Executive departments failing to follow a sufficiently different policy direction from those in England.

It is beyond the scope or capacity of this study to adjudicate the extent of Anglicisation, either historically or in contemporary Scottish society. A belief in this process does resonate with generations of Scots whose experience of the Scottish educational system was of one that often had as strong, if not stronger, a United Kingdom/England focus than a Scottish one. The tendency of Scots (or members of many smaller nations) to define their identity, not positively, but over and against the larger neighbour (the what-we-are-not approach to national identity) has an element of defensiveness against a perceived threat coming from an assumption that Britishness²⁴⁸ and Englishness were believed in England to be the same thing or closely related. (Reicher and Hopkins 2001:65)

²⁴⁷ McCrone 2001:53 comments that in the 1980s, though the Conservatives believed that their policy proposals were consistent with perceived 'Scottish values' of 'thrift, hard work and enterprise, their problem was that the Thatcherite project was largely perceived as an alien, an English, political creed'.

²⁴⁸ 'If "British" is seen as merely a device to impose a hegemonic Englishness in which Scottish identity is obliterated, then it becomes a mode of domination rather than a possible source of identification'. (Reicher and Hopkins 2001:65)

The relationship between the 'Scots' and 'English' within the United Kingdom is a complex one. Of the c10% of the Scottish population born outwith Scotland, the largest section (7%) was born in England. (McCrone 2001:29) By comparison: Of people living in England, 87.4% gave their country of birth as England and a further 3.2% of the population came from all other parts of the UK. (Census 2001 results at National Statistics 2003)

The presence²⁴⁹ of a sizeable 'English' minority in Scotland does not necessarily lend credence to suggestions of Anglicisation, not least because those English people coming into Scotland show a strong tendency to 'go native'. (McCrone 2001:29) Watson (2003, c 10) reported that around one in three of interviewed English immigrants to Scotland expressing feelings about national identity claimed to have taken on a Scottish national identity, one in four expressed feelings of Britishness, and a similar number explicitly claimed that they no longer felt English.


There is however some evidence of non-acceptance of English people within Scotland. Scottish Executive research, for example, with primary school children²⁵⁰

²⁴⁹ There is a certain hiddenness in the English-Scots population, because of similarity in ethnicity, language, occupation and religion to the majority population. (Watson 2003) Though spoken accent is likely to be a significant marker of 'Englishness' to the ear of the listener, it is clear that other criteria are employed within the community in determining whether or not one is deemed 'Scottish' though born elsewhere. These criteria might include length of residence in Scotland, involvement in community life and interest in Scottish heritage.

²⁵⁰ I report a study involving children rather than adults for a number of reasons. It points to the future and to the need for education and community to attend to the formation of attitudes amongst the young. As the home is a major conditioner of children's

revealed that there was a significant element of anti-English feeling in relation to voting for the Scottish Parliament,²⁵¹ though this lessened after lessons on the theme of the Holocaust (Survey 1 to survey 2).

Table 4: Attitudes of primary 7 school aged children



(Source: Maitles, Cowan and Butler 2006)

social attitudes it may be suggestive of opinions there. In adult studies, people, perhaps particularly participants asked questions in studies, may be reluctant to express directly 'prejudiced discourse' to which some stigma attaches and from which the respondent may seek to distance themselves. (van Dijk 1984)²⁵¹ On the other hand, at the time of writing, there is evidence of some concern within England at the role of Scots within British public life and in particular in politics affecting areas which are 'Westminster' business in England but devolved matters in Scotland, where Members of Parliament for Scottish constituencies may vote and indeed may serve as the responsible minister. The constitutional issue is a new one, though it may be noted that English MPs and governments based on majority English support long voted on Scottish business in the the Westminster Parliament. Members with the national identity of one nation within the UK sitting for constituencies in another UK nation is not new. Colley (1992:49) notes that significant numbers of Scots represented English or Welsh parliamentary constituencies between 1760 and 1790.

Though there is some evidence (Massie 2006) of heightened negative feelings at the time of significant sporting events where 'national' sides compete against one another, Watson (2003) nonetheless reported that around 94% of English people resident in Scotland felt that anti-English feeling was not a problem in Scotland and that 88% considered that their neighbours and work colleagues had welcomed them and that they had settled successfully into Scotland.

Viewed objectively, the English and the Scots may be thought to share more than distinguishes them. As Ignatieff (1999) argues, nationalism has a strong tendency to focus on what might appear to be 'small differences'. 'Small' of course need not at all imply insignificance in the sight of the comparators. These differences may appear to third party observers to be minimal variants, an in-betweenness²⁵², rather than distinctively 'other'. In community terms, this may make it easier for those with whom much is shared to be assimilated into the majority community (as noted in Watson 2003 above). On the other hand, the lack of clearly distinguishing cultural differences may lead to what the majority population may regard as inappropriate inferences of sameness. Against its desire to assimilate those who come in from outside (in which case small differences should be ignored or treated lightly) is the desire also to be able to assert its particularity and difference from its neighbours (in which case small differences have to be acknowledged and treated as significant).

²⁵² a term used by Robert Crawford of the Scots language (Crawford 1993:7)

In seeking to define themselves, nations rarely operate in a vacuum, for one way of settling the issue of who you are is by asserting who you are not. 'Collective identities - whether national or supranational- are the outcome of processes of inclusion and exclusion: to be 'us' we need those who are 'not-us', against whom boundaries can be drawn and conceptions of belonging and not-belonging articulated.' (Schlesinger and Foret 2006:65) This is a recurrent process. The distinction is often not between those who use differentiation as a means of identity-making, but between those who use internal and those who use external points of reference. It may be smaller nations, with a consciousness of vulnerability to political and cultural domination, who will seek positively to assert their own distinctive characteristics and negatively to demonstrate their difference from their larger neighbour. Larger, and perhaps more confident nations, tend to use an internal measure: what is typical of us and who, within our territory, do not conform to that type and are therefore not of us.²⁵³ In either case, there is potential for

²⁵³ This may in part lie behind the observation of Condor and Abell that, whereas Scottish respondents maintained a cohesion in their expression of national community, English respondents' answers were liable to fragment as the speaker attended to class, ethnic or regional diversity. (Condor and Abell 2006) A more diverse focus in England compared with a nationalized Scottishness north of the border may be owed to a number of factors. The relative ambiguity of 'English' as a national identity with consequent weakness in affirmation of that identity (compared with 'Britishness' in England) is one. There is an extent to which Englishness is seen as compromised by differences of geography, social status and ethnicity in a way that does not appear to be as true for Scotland (despite significant differences in the population, not least between the lowlands and the Highlands and islands). This may point to a tendency to have a 'typical' understanding of Englishness that is related to other factors. There is no significant evidence that in England class references are used, in contrast with national identity, in terms of transnational solidarity.

'ugly' nationalism which sees difference as a basis for enmity or discrimination.

WHAT KIND OF NATION?

One type, civic nationalism, maintains that the nation should be composed of all those - regardless of race, colour, creed, gender, language or ethnicity - who subscribe to the nation's political creed. This nationalism is called civic because it envisages the nation as a community of equal, rights-bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values. This nationalism is necessarily democratic since it vests sovereignty in all of the people.

(Ignatieff 1994:3-4)

It has been common to make a distinction between 'ethnic' and 'civic' forms of nationalism, the former involving beliefs in biological and cultural essentialisms, and the latter involving commitments to ideas of citizenship and the rule of law.

(Hearn 2000:7)

The assumption that Grundtvig makes that the nation is fundamentally a cultural as well as a political unit is a contested one today. Rooted in his conception of the *folk* as primarily a linguistic and cultural community, albeit with a minority of others, the nation (though not necessarily the state) had a homogeneity, which was reinforced by a sense of shared ethnicity (even if it was, even then, not entirely true).

Any notions of ethnic or racial homogeneity in the biological sense would be, in almost all modern nations, simply incompatible with the data. We are in Scotland, as is often remarked, a 'mongrel nation'. (William McIllvaney, quoted in Russell 2002:15²⁵⁴) In the context

²⁵⁴ Kearton 2005: endnote 24 cites a number of instances in which this phrase has been taken up within Scottish public discourse

of nation-states²⁵⁵, it is clear that belonging to a particular cultural and historical community no longer constitutes a sufficient base for citizenship²⁵⁶ (Ferry and Thibaud 1992: 165). Still less is 'descent' now used by nation-states²⁵⁷ as sole²⁵⁸ criterion for citizenship. There are very few contemporary nation-states or even sub-state nations²⁵⁹ with either a high

²⁵⁵ I use the term 'nation-states' as the more common term but acknowledge that Tilly's expression 'national states' may be more accurate. 'Nation-states' perhaps suggests that there is a stronger connection between a particular ethnic community and the state than is generally true; whereas, 'national state' is more reflective of the state engaging in forging a shared identity. (Tilly 1975)

²⁵⁶ States may nonetheless seek to discriminate between citizens on grounds of ancestral or 'blood' link. In a legal case ongoing at the time of final preparation of this thesis, in relation to eligibility for compensation under a UK government scheme for Far Eastern Prisoners-of-War. 'So far as civilian internees were concerned, in order to qualify they either had to have been born in the United Kingdom or have a parent or grandparent born here. The claimant did not meet that requirement and therefore was not allowed to benefit from the scheme. The criteria involved in her case inevitably involved indirect discrimination on grounds of national origin under s 1(b) of the Race Relations Act 1976. [...]The criteria chosen was closely linked to national origins and so the scheme as adopted was unlawful. Using those criteria was by no means the only way in which the minister could have achieved his legitimate objective. He could have chosen criteria which narrowed the category of British subjects **without linking them so closely with descent and national origins** [my emphasis], such as a period of residence in the United Kingdom within a period leading up to internment, or the adoption of criteria based on domicile which would have been proportionate to the objective being sought.' (Case reported as R (Elias) v Secretary of State for Defence [2005] at *The WLR Daily* London: The Incorporated Council for Law Reporting Online report at <http://www.lawreports.co.uk/WLRD/2005/QBD/julf0.1.htm>) [Last accessed on 8 October 2006]

²⁵⁷ German legislation in 1999, for example, relaxed requirements based on lineage (Bundesministerium des Innern 2005)

²⁵⁸ The distinction is drawn here between 'sole' criterion which excludes qualification on other criteria and other situations in which lineage is one means by which citizenship or nationality may be gained but other routes to citizenship are possible (eg by place of birth or by naturalisation following a period of residence).

²⁵⁹ It is into this category that Scotland falls as not having national sovereignty (even with a significant amount of legislative, governmental and civic autonomy) but having characteristics of a nation sufficient to warrant the use of the title (not least evidence that a significant majority of inhabitants within the understood territory regard themselves as being members of that nation and are so recognised by outsiders). I recognise however

degree of ethnic homogeneity²⁶⁰ or single *ethnie* cultural-historical continuity²⁶¹. Recent research evidence (Kiely, Bechhofer and McCrone 2005) has suggested that an appeal to ancestry, to lineage, to 'blood' is, in Scotland, not a major basis for claim to national identity²⁶². 'What was striking was that even those who **could**²⁶³ make blood claim seldom did, preferring instead to claim Scottish birth and upbringing²⁶⁴.' (Kiely et al 2005:155) While this could nonetheless still be exclusivist, it does lie closer to 'belonging' than to 'blood'. This is an

that this is neither an indisputable definition nor is its application in particular circumstances free from contest. The claim to the status of nationhood may be enhanced if there are other factors that speak to a distinctiveness, such as shared national myths, shared 'historical' memories, language, affective attachment to a particular ethnoscape and public culture (though by no means of all of these require to be present). (AD Smith 1999) I acknowledge that questions of 'What is a nation?' and 'When is a nation?' are subjects of debate, but I do not rehearse them in this thesis, except indirectly, as it seems (for the present at least) settled that Scotland has widespread recognition as being a 'nation'.

²⁶⁰ The extent to which historically homogeneity has been the norm and is only now being 'threatened' is often exaggerated. For this criticism, see: '[...] the homogeneity of British identity [...] was confined to a relatively brief period'. (Cook 2001) '[...] we may ask, when was the nation ever homogeneous, or perceived to be so?' (Gutiérrez 2001:24) See also McNeill (1986) cited in Gutiérrez (2001).

²⁶¹ In the Nordic context, Iceland is perhaps most prominently more homogeneous than other states. Even so, the historical and archeological record shows an intermingling of Nordic and Celtic peoples, probably through the settlement of Celtic peoples within the Norse colonies in the British Isles. See Weber 1968 for a more general criticism of attempts to link ethnicity (an assumed relationship) and kinship (a blood relationship).

²⁶² The authors there note that the exception to this in the Scottish context was those who were identified as belonging to the 'landed elite'.

²⁶³ their emphasis

²⁶⁴ The term 'upbringing' suggests that, while birth is one means of acquiring 'Scottishness', it is continued into a process of socialisation within the national community. If this is considered to be true in relation to those who acquire identity and rights by birth, it is perhaps a smaller step to suggest that those who come into a national community also are involved in a process of socialisation. It is important to emphasise however that, as elsewhere, the content of the identity and way of life is one of ongoing contestation as well as affirmation.

important difference, for ancestry is fixed (even if it may be disputed) but 'belonging' is more open. Even if there is an imagined (even fictive) kinship, the focus on cultural allegiance allows outsiders to join, assimilate and belong. (AD Smith 1991:24 endnote 17)

Belonging through birth is not restricted to a particular ethnic group²⁶⁵ and is often independent of questions of ancestry and so available to second- and subsequent generation families of those who have migrated into a country. Further, belonging as a social status may be conferred in the light of such factors as length of residence, cultivation of a local accent or commitment to the local community²⁶⁶.

As some nations seek to compensate for long-term declines in population and labour market skill shortages, it is probable that higher levels of immigration will give rise to still more heterogeneity. It is interesting, however, that the Scottish Executive

²⁶⁵ In minority ethnic groups in Scotland, according to the 2001 census, Scotland is either the most common or the second most common country of birth. However, the percentages vary greatly between different ethnic groups: 47% of Pakistanis were born in Scotland compared to only 18% of Africans. (General Register Office for Scotland 2006)

²⁶⁶ I offer two major caveats to my general assertion here. Firstly, the status of acceptance as having a national identity may vary in relation to the same group, depending upon the context in which the evaluation is being made. A narrow 'civic' assessment may simply be a recognition of the right to participate in public affairs. A person may come to be regarded as generally belonging within the identity but not in all circumstances and not by different criteria that come into play in a different situation. Secondly, the degree of apparent 'otherness' to the 'typical' may limit the degree of acceptance of their belonging-ness, so visible ethnicity other than 'white' or the adoption of minority cultural practices or speaking with another accent may compromise acceptance or undermine or qualify it.

initiative²⁶⁷ makes specific reference²⁶⁸ to seeking immigration from the 'Scots Diaspora', to 'millions of people with a strong emotional and cultural link to Scotland' and to places with whom Scotland has 'strong historical ties'. (Scottish Executive 2004:7) It would seem from these excerpts that the Executive acknowledges the strength of sentiments of historical and cultural nationhood as a force in encouraging settlement in Scotland.

Historico-cultural 'memory' however is not always tied to notions of once-existing but now lost homogeneity. Though memory can be fictive and even distorted, it is capable of being used in a variety of causes. While, very commonly, it is deployed in the cause of affirming 'sameness' and therefore unity, there is also historical evidence available that would affirm diversity and difference²⁶⁹. For instance, a remembering of 'the multi-ethnic mix of the early Scottish kingdom is presented as a precursor of the modern civic nation'. (Kearnton 2005:40)

²⁶⁷ In the Scottish context, there is the *New Scots* or *Fresh Talent* initiative. 'The single biggest challenge facing Scotland as we move further into the 21st century is our falling population. It is at its lowest level since the first half of the 20th century and is projected to fall below the symbolic 5 million in only five years' time. [...] Scots want to stay at home, to enjoy all the economic, cultural and social opportunities that 21st-century Scotland has to offer. They are proud of their country and think it is the best place in the world to live and work. But if we are to make Scotland even better, if we are to compete - and succeed - in the global economy, we need a constant flow of fresh talent to flourish alongside our home-grown talent.' (Introduction by the First Minister of the Scottish Executive in Scottish Executive 2004:1)

²⁶⁸ This is not an exclusive targeting, however.

²⁶⁹ In chapter 11 on Fortælling or storytelling, further consideration is given to the issue of alternative stories, alternative sources of narrative material and alternative interpretations as enabling dialogue, interaction and contestation.

Though 'ancestral' myths of origin are not absent from nationalist repertoire (and are particularly potent when mixed with biological racism²⁷⁰) and indeed there is some resurgence in academic study of a more biological, genealogical perspective on nations (eg Van den Berghe 2005), it is perhaps more common now to encounter an affirmation of a more spiritual or ideological affinity with our presumed 'ancestors'²⁷¹, 'through the persistence of certain kinds of 'virtue' or other distinctive cultural qualities, be it of language, customs, religion, institutions or more general personal attributes'. (AD Smith 1999:58)

The nature of the post-1707 Union developments has implied a strong **civic** continuity. Storrar (1999:22) has suggested that 'the key to understanding the present turning point in Scotland's history is the concept of a civic²⁷² nation. Scotland has existed as a nation within the British state for three hundred years because of its

²⁷⁰ The potentiality for genocide and other extreme nationalistic actions is commonly linked to a biological categorisation that begins as racial and leads to placing the 'others' outside the category 'human'. (Ignatieff 1994; Kuper 1981; Poliakov 1974; Van den Berghe 1967)

²⁷¹ This is not to exclude that, in the popular imagination in countries, there remains a strong sense of 'kinship' (however fictive) not only with the common ancestry but also with other members of the national community in some form of 'social solidarity' (AD Smith 1999:191). This is not entirely unhistorical. In the ethno-symbolist understanding of the formation of nations (in the modern sense) nation-making often relied significantly on 'pre-existing, and often pre-modern, *ethnies*' (AD Smith 1999:13) Any inference of absolute continuity is unwarranted, however. Even allowing for the identification of a distinct *ethnie* behind a nation's history and identity, however, it is futile to pose any continuous connection between all the present members of the nation and its pre-modern *ethnie*. The efficacy of ethnic myth, however, lies less in its veracity than in the willingness of those who believe themselves, or aspire to be, within the mythic community to appropriate it.

²⁷² Marwick (1986:1) discerns a 'secular presbyterianism' that has informed and acted as a foundation for community and civic values in Scotland.

autonomous civic institutions²⁷³. With the removal of 'statehood', distinctive identity and civic life²⁷⁴ were thus maintained through institutional separateness. What is more, this distinctive civic life served for generations as a major source of national pride. (Humes 1986:9²⁷⁵) These civic institutions were settings in which cultural attributes and distinctiveness were affirmed and developed.

Nairn (1997) offers a different analysis, that national identity was maintained through culture, but this is not portrayed in a positive light. 'It was cultural because of course it could not be political; on the other hand, this culture could not be straightforwardly nationalist either - a direct substitute for political action [...] It could only be 'sub-nationalist' in the sense of venting its national content in crooked ways - neurotically²⁷⁶,

²⁷³ These are generally understood to be the legal system (courts and professions) and jurisprudence, the education system and the kirk. The creation in 1886 of a distinct Scottish Office within the government of the United Kingdom may also be included. Reference is also sometimes made to years of banking independence, including the issue of Scots banknotes, and distinctive local government structures.

²⁷⁴ The preservation of civic institutions secured also the distinctiveness of Scottish professions (Connell 2004:254) While élites frequently play an important role within nationalism (AD Smith 1999), there are ambiguities. One may distinguish state (political, civil service and military), cultural (teachers, arts and culture workers and clergy) and economic (business leaders etc); each sector of which may have tendencies towards a different attitude to and relationship with nationalism. (Kellas 1998:99) In sub-state nationalism, major business and government élites are more likely to be opposing and cultural and small business supportive. (Kellas 1998:174) Élités may form alliance with elites beyond the nation (Laborde 2001) and (as Grundtvig discerned in the Denmark of his day) be a source of indigenous cultural loss rather than protection or promotion.

²⁷⁵ Humes makes this assertion in the context of considering Scottish education, but its applicability seems to me to encompass the range of Scottish civic autonomy.

²⁷⁶ Beveridge and Turnbull (1989, 1997) challenge this recurrent tendency to evaluate Scottish identity and culture in pathological terms and to hold that the fundamental national question is 'What is

so to speak, rather than directly.' (Nairn 1977:156) It is not clear why Nairn should regard cultural life **merely** as a substitute for political life. To the contrary, the more general nationalist assumption is that political institutions are necessary primarily in order to protect culture.

There is something of an academic consensus with Storrar on the **civic** nature of Scottish national identity (eg Keating 2001:264; McCrone 1998:129 and 2001:165; Nairn 1998:127; Schlesinger 1998; Smout 1994:107). Indeed, it does seem as if this is the form that fits best the needs of a nation that is neither ethnically nor culturally singular. The civic nation, where belonging is a matter only of sharing in a political community with respect for the rule of law, popular sovereignty and affirmation of democratic principals and processes, seems admirably suited to a pluralistic society which cannot be legitimately held together on any other apparent basis.

A problem with this consensus is that, as we shall see, it may represent more of an élite aspiration rather than a contemporary sociological reality.

wrong with us?'. Even Carol Craig's positive endeavour to instil renewed confidence in the Scottish nation (Craig 2003) is entitled *The Scots' Crisis of Confidence*. One of the issues of identity of a smaller nation with a more powerful neighbour is a vulnerability to inferiorism (Beveridge and Turnbull 1989), a lack of confidence (particularly amongst the élites) in its own cultural resources, a pessimism about its capacity to engage with the future successfully and a sense of dependency. It was in a similar context that Grundtvig took the view that not until the Danish people had found their sense of self-worth and (re-)discovered their identity and culture once again would they begin to flourish once again. (Thaning 1972:16)

The idea of national **identity** however raises other considerations. When people in Scotland are asked about their national identity, it would appear that they interpret the question in a way that is not exclusively civic. Indeed, the framing of the question is problematical. As in Table 5 below, respondents are invited to choose an identity that has Scottish/ British in various combinations. Both identities are potentially civic in character, so civicness does not discriminate between them. Scotland and Britain are civic entities. You have membership of them if you are domiciled in the territory and are regarded as belonging by civic criteria.

People within Scotland can and do express their 'national identity' in terms that may embrace attachment both to Britain and to Scotland. In nation theory, a distinction is often drawn between nation/ nationality and state/ civil society. (Calhoun 1999; Connor 1978; McCrone 1997; McCrone and Kiely 2000; Thomas 2002; Walby 2003). A question that asks people's perceptions of their national identity cannot meaningfully be asking about which civic society they belong to, for they belong to both, the British nation-state and the Scottish nation-substate. The question implies that their sense of identity goes beyond that participation in civil society.

Table 5:

National identity expressed by respondents in Scotland

<i>National identity</i>	<i>Percentage</i>
Scottish not British	23
More Scottish than British	38
Equally Scottish and British	27
More British than Scottish	4
British not Scottish	4
None of these	4

Source: Scottish Election Survey 1997
Data extracted from McCrone 2001:164 in its Table 7.6

Firstly, let me deal with the data in the table. Though this is a 'snapshot', nonetheless there is a measure of stability across the data from 1986 to 1999: 'people living in Scotland give much higher priority to being Scottish (categories 1 and 2) over being British (categories 4 and 5) (ratios are between 7:1 and 10:1)' and 'over time the results are fairly consistent, and [...] one cannot conclude that there has been a shift towards or away from Scottish identity in any simple sense'. (McCrone 2001:162) There was however a politically influenced shift away from the Britishness pole to Scottishness when the UK Government reflected a different electoral outcome in Scotland and in England, giving rise to perceptions of 'democratic deficit' and to political opposition to policies.²⁷⁷ (McCrone 2001:163)

The question does not ask about identities outwith the British/ Scottish pairing. It is probable that

²⁷⁷ The link between civic identity and political processes and outcomes is, I suggest, a source of potential weakness.

respondents would identify a range of other identities they have, as multiple identity are common.²⁷⁸ We consider ourselves to have identities²⁷⁹ beyond (and for some people and in some contexts these are stronger than) any sense of national identity - identities of family, gender, class, region/ town, marital status, ethnicity, occupation, sexuality and many more. These identities are not simply personal, for they create the possibility of forming solidarities both within and beyond the nation and of transcending national boundaries. I do not wish at all to underestimate this or its significance, but the context of nation and loyalty to nation has great and persistent power in human society²⁸⁰. As we shall comment on further in the section on Cultural Plurality, there are also hyphenated identities (eg Black-Scottish, Asian-Scottish, Pakistani-Scottish²⁸¹) or 'concentric circles of

²⁷⁸ There may be times in people's lives when these identities and the loyalties they imply clash with one another. There are points at which choices may seem inevitable. There are tensions between identities. It does not seem to me however that multiple identities necessarily imply a constant prioritisation. Rather, it is the common experience of people that they manage, re-organise and sometimes re-prioritise these identities without difficulty and often depending upon context. 'Identity, personal or national, isn't merely something you have like a passport. It is also something to rediscover daily, like a strange country. Its core isn't something solid, like a mountain. It is something molten, like magma.' (McIlvanney in *The Herald*, 13 March 1999)

²⁷⁹ I acknowledge that more postmodernist scholars assert that the contemporary world is not one of stable identities. In our context of Scottish folk or national identity, the survey evidence, including those we have rehearsed here, would appear to point a continuing strength of identity commitment and to a commitment that respondents justify.

²⁸⁰ While *Dulce et decorum est pro patria mori* appears now an antiquated sentiment, it remains true that national loyalty is a cause for which people are prepared to sacrifice their lives. (AD Smith 1999:100) I acknowledge, however, that, as with the 'International Brigades' in the 1930s Spanish civil war, some people are similarly prepared to fight and die for an internationalist or transnational cause.

²⁸¹ This dual-identity may reflect, when used by the person concerned, an honouring of their ancestral history and/or an

allegiance' (Coleman 1958) Coleman's term perhaps us more suggestive of the idea that some identities within a plural identity may be, or may be at certain times more central and others more peripheral.

Choosing between Scottish and British references raises different questions, however. Are we seeing different concepts of national identity at play together? From a Scottish perspective, the United Kingdom can seem to have characteristics primarily of a state, a constitutional and political entity, the context of citizenship. The extent to which the attractiveness of the 'British' component fluctuates in some measure in response to political circumstances might suggest that that element is more aligned with the civic/political identity than ethnic/cultural. This can appear to contrast with Scotland which, while having governmental and political expression and its own forms of civic institutions and civil society, has for many of its members also a crucial cultural and historic dimension that is a far weaker dimension (in Scots' view) of the UK 'national identity'. The dual nature of Scottishness/Britishness as identity can readily offer Scots an opportunity to embrace both 'civic-ness' in 'being British' in a multicultural, multiracial and multifaith civic mode, and 'being Scottish' (or other particular national identity within the United Kingdom) appearing

affirmation of contemporary cultural belonging. The usage in academic work is strengthened by a movement away from offering in surveys straight single category options to 'and' options which often ask the respondent to weigh the different elements in their choice (eg 'more Chinese than Scots' or 'more Scots than British'). These graded options, conventionally referred to as 'Moreno' statements, make it less likely that a respondent has to opt for a 'better' option rather than one that expresses well their opinion.

more to be related to myths of shared community, history and culture. (Kymlicka 2000:72)

As Keily et al (2005) concluded from survey evidence, those Scots who attached more significance to being British invested it with an overtly political meaning. The inverse was not true, however. Those Scots who attached greater significance to being Scottish seemed to be making more of a cultural than a political statement. Choosing the more 'Scottish' responses was more often a cultural rather than a political statement. In the case of other hyphenated identities, such as Pakistani-Scottish, generally the first component is cultural, but it does not follow that the second is simply civic; it may incorporate also some sense of entering in some measure into the cultural community of Scottishness in its 'thick' form.

That Scotland may be an example of a wider trend in associating more with 'national' rather than 'state' identities is acknowledged by Keily et al (2005:80), citing McCrone (2001:162), noting that 'These may [...] be unusual cases, but they may also be significant straws in the wind in a world in which state, sub-state and supra-state identities, to say nothing of cultural-religious identities, appear to be growing.

There continues to be a significant degree of attachment to cultural rather than a more neutral, residence-based civic identity. 'There is little evidence that devolution has led Scottish nationals [...] to rethink the

nature of or processes underlying Scottish **national**²⁸² identity.[...] That English migrants (a term usually applied to people born in England but now living in Scotland) can vote in Scottish elections is not seen as problematic. But this political right does not confer Scottish national identity as such. In other words, there are clear limits to civic nationalism.' (Institute of Governance 2006)

Civic nation as a concept rather seeks to conflate nationality and citizenship. The person who has Scottish ancestors or who was born in Scotland may surrender or never have had citizenship in the United Kingdom and domiciled in Scotland, but they may nonetheless have a strong sense of being Scottish as a cultural or even ethno-cultural identity. Conversely, someone who has connections with another country but lives and participates in the civic life of Scotland may be unwilling and see no need to surrender their sense of belonging still to their original nation or even to compromise that identity through hyphenation. Civic rights do not alone ensure that the person from within a minority community will be made to feel part, or themselves feel part, of the wider national community. 'One might enjoy all the rights of citizenship and be a formally equal member of the community, and yet feel an outsider who does not belong.' (Lord Parekh, quoted in Hussain and Miller 2004:2)

The promotion of civic nationalism as the nationalism for today can seem to suggest that it is fundamentally contemporary and future oriented in its focus.

²⁸² their emphasis

Cultural identities by contrast are wedded to history and history is culturally specific, particularly specific to the dominant cultural grouping within the nation. As Yack asserts, however, even 'civic' nations have histories and cultures and even ethnic majorities. (AD Smith 1991; Yack 1999:105ff) Kearton (2005:39), reviewing the use of history in Scottish nationalist discourse, argues that the dominant *ethnie* in Scotland has been the lowland Scots²⁸³, whose historical experience has largely shaped the public culture of the nation. 'Thus, while the Scots civic identity is inclusive in that (in theory) anyone can join²⁸⁴, some of its recurring tropes have particular cultural and ethnic origins.²⁸⁵ [...] This demonstrates one of the limitations of a civic understanding of nation. Ethnicity comes in through the back door of history.' Her conclusion however is not one that undermines the quest for a more civic nationhood. 'A predominantly forward-looking conception of community is anchored around (an) historically grounded ethnocultural core. Paradoxically, however, in the Scottish case, this

²⁸³ At first sight this might appear odd, as the major icons of Scottish identity have tended to be 'Highland'. By a process of romantic imagination, lowland Scotland significantly adopted and embellished these icons as being emblematic of the nation as a whole.

²⁸⁴ This assertion is not strictly true as civic nationality is not available simply on request. People may be lawfully resident in a state without being granted the full range of civic rights.

²⁸⁵ An example of this is the position of the Catalan nation. Its constitution sets out a civic form of nationhood. There is a clear contrast with Basque nationalism with a strong attachment not only to linguistic particularity but to a relationship of blood kinship. AD Smith (1991:15) identifies Catalan nationalism as one of those in which ethnic components 'constitute only one, albeit ever-present, set of (often contested) elements [...] and can also encourage openness and receptiveness to outside influences'. Yet, there is evidence that in Catalan society, there is an expectation that becoming Catalan does involve, for those who are not culturally 'Catalan', learning the language, honouring its heritage and living in its way. (Conversi 1997)

ethnic core is used to project an inclusive, forward-looking vision of the nation.' (Kearton 2005:39)

Use of the civic /ethnic distinction is common. (Hearn 2000:7) The civic and the ethnic may be in a more mutual relationship than the terms might suggest, even though they are frequently presented oppositionally. A 'civic' nation may practise values that are deeply rooted in the hegemony of the 'ethnic' majority, whereas the 'ethnic' nation may strive nonetheless to be civically inclusive. 'Ethnic nationalism, as all nationalisms, is cultural, but not all cultural nationalisms are ethnic.' (Nielsen 1999:125)

They are also presented sometimes as moral choices, as civic/good and ethnocultural/bad - a practice noted (and criticised) in, for instance, Beiner (1999), Brown (1999), Henderson (1999) and Kielely, Bechhofer and McCrone (2005). This use in academic papers and in the political arena is at some times as analytical categories and at other times as political judgement and rhetoric²⁸⁶. This association mis-reads the nature of the terms, for they are conceptual (and therefore ideal) pairs within nation theory rather than categories to which real nations can be straightforwardly and unequivocally allocated. (Hearn 2000:194; Kiely, Bechhofer and McCrone 2005) They may be helpful as tools but few nations sit neatly within a single form.

²⁸⁶ As ethical judgements, other categories as 'inclusive' and 'exclusive' might serve more accurately the causes in which they are employed, but issues of defining criteria and the problem that nations rarely fit consistently any single category would remain.

Despite the claims that are made for its blindness to ethnicity, it cannot be assumed that civic nationhood achieves this any more successfully than an 'ethnic' nation. As van den Berghe observes (2005:117), a multi-ethnic civic state like the USA may nonetheless employ in a diverse range of situations ethnic or even racial criteria, albeit sometimes for liberal reasons²⁸⁷.

Purported civic values can be utilised for the purposes of suppression and exclusion, as in the work in the mid-20thC of the 'Senate Un-American Activities Committee' in the United States of America.

Evaluating practice within nations does not reveal unambiguously that 'civic nations' adhere to civic principles and 'ethnic' to more ethno-cultural ideas. For example, the Republic of France (constitutionally a 'civic' nation²⁸⁸) has sought to exclude the wearing of certain forms of religious or cultural dress (Sikh turbans²⁸⁹ and Islamic headscarves²⁹⁰) in certain public contexts, raising debate as to the neutrality of civic nations²⁹¹. AD Smith questions whether, when one applies

²⁸⁷ 'The USA is still a racial caste society because the government continues to institutionalise the 'one-drop rule' of who is 'black'. Any 'black' African ancestry defines one socially as 'black' in the USA and that is the criterion used in the census, in race-based 'affirmative action', in reports of crime or educational statistics and so on.' (van den Berghe 2005:117)

²⁸⁸ Article 1 of the French constitution provides that 'France is an indivisible, secular, democratic, and social Republic. It ensures the equality of all citizens before the law, without distinction as to origin, race, or religion. It respects all beliefs.' [English translation was prepared under the joint responsibility of the Press, Information and Communication Directorate of the French Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the European Affairs Department of the National Assembly.]

²⁸⁹ Le Conseil d'État (2006)

²⁹⁰ The Guardian (2003)

²⁹¹ As we are focusing significantly on Danish experience, it may be observed that Denmark too has had its 'headscarf' cause involving a

such liberal 'test cases' as immigration policy, it is clear that ethnically based states are significantly different from civic ones. (AD Smith 2001:41)

The idea of national 'identity' is not merely a matter of self-description but of identifying or attaching oneself affectively to a community. There is a dimension of loyalty, not least when the attachment requires some degree of self-sacrifice for the good of the community.²⁹² (AD Smith 1999:100) The civic concept of nation consequently has been criticised as lacking the 'thickness' of ethnic and cultural nationalisms. A framework of adherence to principles and institutional forms is no match for emotional ties (Miller 1995:25, 175) or the engaging narrative of cultural nationhood. (Schnapper 1994:79) Our strongest sense of association and of care is, it is alleged, with those to whom we are linked by 'thick' ties of common history or kinship (however fictive) or shared culture. (Margalit 2002:101)

Of attempts to create a 'civic' Europe, similarly, AD Smith judges that the efforts have 'failed to attract the passions and loyalties commanded by nations' (AD Smith 1998:195) **as it is unlikely to be successful on the social and cultural levels'** (AD Smith 1993:134). Survey results, represented in Tables ?? and ?? below, support this view that, while significant numbers of respondents within the EU feel European as well as of

city department store and a work-experience student. (Goldschmidt 2003:262)

²⁹² By this, I am not denying that people may be prepared to act sacrificially for the sake of community that is either more local or more universal than the national, but historically there is more evidence of sacrifice of life for 'national causes'.

their own nation, European identity alone has not superseded national identities as a focus of belonging.




Source: Eurobarometer 52.0 – Fieldwork: October-November 1999.

Table 6 : Feeling European v National Identity

Table 7:

There is a European cultural identity shared by all Europeans



Source: Eurobarometer 52.0 – Fieldwork: October-November 1999.

This is not to suggest that trans-national communities lack memories (Giesen 2003) or heritage, but their sharedness can be compromised by contrasting experiences within the shared experience²⁹³ and by processes of denial and revision. In keeping with its sense of having a civic identity, against a background of and fear of ethno-cultural divisions and conflicts, the European Union does not focus in a major way on the affirmation of the common richness of European heritage²⁹⁴. I do not question that it is possible to form in populations

²⁹³ Strongest and most enduring memories are often of conflict within the region.

²⁹⁴ There is a risk that some endeavours to introduce a thickness, for example by affirming the 'Christian' heritage of Europe, both exaggerate the exclusiveness of its claim to be **the** cultural underpinning and can even be close to a political claim to exercise a strong cultural and political influence.

wider identities but this task is made significantly more difficult when a thin transnational 'civic' identity is put into competition with a thicker 'national' identity with stronger cultural ingredients.

In sharing the view that civic models can lack this important thickness, I am conscious nonetheless that one strand of thinking that speaks of thinness in 'the culturally empty notion of British identity as 'mere' constitutional patriotism' (Condor et al 2006:126) would seek to affirm a narrow, partial and exclusivist form of British²⁹⁵ identity with which I would not wish to associate.

The alleged 'thinness' lies partly in the fundamental grounds upon which civic nationalism is constructed. Its answer to the question of what constitutes national identity is rooted in civic participation and civic values²⁹⁶, producing a citizen, 'an informed person skilled in the processes of a free society, who is committed to democratic values and who not only is able to, but feels obligated to, participate in social, economic, and political processes.' (Parker and Jarolimek 1984, cited in Shaver 1991). Ignatieff (1994:3) regards it as embracing 'all those²⁹⁷ -

²⁹⁵ by which they might mean 'English'

²⁹⁶ There is here a problem of definition and of historic continuity. For example, Germany did not cease to be a nation during the period when the democratic institutions and practices were suspended. Nor, presumably, did any of its nationals think that they had ceased to have German identity, to be 'German'. One wonders too, faced with the traditional choice of 'civil' or 'ethnic' into which category one might allocate nations that are evidently not ethnic in character but are far from civic in polity, lacking democratic institutions or democratic values.

²⁹⁷ Ignatieff is being somewhat more generous than states, however. It is self-evidently not open to **everyone** who so subscribes, as immigration is regulated by most states. (One cannot become an

regardless of race, colour, creed, gender, language or ethnicity - who subscribe to the nation's political creed'; Hearn (2000:7) sees it as 'involving commitments to ideas of citizenship and the rule of law'²⁹⁸. This laudable commitment is not to be denied, but the question is how far on its own it constitutes a sufficient basis for national identity for many people.

Commitment to national identity is of course not static and indeed may be influenced by a range of factors²⁹⁹. A civic form of identity is rooted both in broad, enduring political values (eg the right to participate and freedom of speech) and in a sense of involvement with political institutions and processes. When the credibility of, and commitment of the public to, these institutions and processes is low, there is the potential for a weakening of one of the foundations of civic belongingness.

Some advocates of the civic model have acknowledged that history³⁰⁰ is a useful ally in establishing a common identity. It is more difficult however to arrive at an

American citizen simply by swearing allegiance to the Constitution of the US.) Also, one does not cease to have a national identity if one refuses to subscribe to values of democracy or tolerance of other civic values.

²⁹⁸ It is of course the reality that an individual's or a group's civil rights within the nation are not dependent upon an acceptance of common values of democracy, human rights or the rule of law. There may be inhibitions on action, such as statutes prohibiting incitement to hatred, but they do not require commitment of heart and mind to values of equality, justice, tolerance and respect, that might be thought to fall within the scope of civic nationhood.

²⁹⁹ eg success internationally in popular sporting contests

³⁰⁰ Linda Colley, however, as well as affirming the histories of the constituent nations within the UK, suggests: 'there should be common history lessons [in schools] too, which would recognise all kinds of diversity but which would hammer out something of a common story. This would be partly an invention; all histories are. But it might be a useful invention.' (Prospect 2005:22)

unambiguous story that can embrace the whole civic nation.

The pluralist nature of a civic nation inevitably reduces the scope of sharedness in values upon which the nation can rely as being fundamental to its life. Its resort is to affirm the more universal. The UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (Matsuura in UNESCO 2001) handles this tension by raising 'cultural diversity to the level of 'the common heritage of humanity''. No-one from a liberal perspective would deny the appropriateness of these as foundations of a nation. As Kaufman argues, one problem lies in trying 'to define something particular like a nation by something universal like values. Unless you have got radically different values from other countries, it is not going to give you a lot of purchase.' (Prospect 2005:22) There is of course some scope within a set of universal values for specific interpretation and application but these are cultural differences and liable to be historically conditioned. Perhaps the difficulty lies in one of the underlying questions in national identity formation: It is not simply a matter of *Who are we?* but implicitly also *How are we different? What is special about us?* Such questions cannot be answered adequately from a simple affirmation of universal values, but they are recurrent human questions.

The associated problem is that, while the neglect of universal values is something that should and can excite active concern, the affirmation of these rights (where they already exist, however imperfectly) does not carry

the same emotional weight. We might declare our allegiance to these values and principles and indeed be prepared to take action in their support or defence, but this is not the same as the sense of loyalty and belonging that national identity implies.

Grundtvig affirms the importance of the heartfelt in human community. In this context, the search for Britishness³⁰¹ is impeded by its lack, for many people, of much by way of emotional content. (Ascherson in Prospect 2005:22) If we reflect on the verbs that are used in relation to identity, they often relate more to the realm of feeling than of believing. This dimension of emotional commitment is a critical one. 'I am more and more convinced that true revolutionaries must perceive the revolution [...] as an act of love'. (Freire in McIntosh 2001)³⁰² This echoes the sentiments of Grundtvig that what we do not first love, we shall not take much trouble to be concerned with.³⁰³

There is a link between love and loyalty. If indeed it is true that an attachment to features of a cultural nature enhances our sense of belonging to a nation, then

³⁰¹ I am not suggesting that all people in Britain or even all those who support the retention of the Union necessarily subscribe to the view that a shared national identity is what glues the constituent nations together. The survey results that indicate that many people in each nation favour the maintenance of the Union but declare themselves unconcerned whether or not this is the outcome suggests a pragmatic commitment to the present constitutional and economic arrangements which is poorly related to any deep sense of common identity.

³⁰² A similar sentiment was expressed by Guevara: 'Let me say, with the risk of appearing ridiculous, that the true revolutionary is guided by strong feelings of love. It is impossible to think of an authentic revolutionary without this quality.' (Guevara in McIntosh 2001)

³⁰³ The original context is learning, but it is a truth of wider applicability.

of course if one does not love them or even identify with them, then such a dimension may make one feel marginalised or excluded. Also, in research on relations within the community of Scotland between the majority population and minorities, there is evidence of a majority suspicion that minorities³⁰⁴ 'will always be more loyal to something outside Scotland that provides a basis for more exclusive 'ethnic' nationalism'. (Hussain and Miller 2004:4)

Identity and belonging are closely related to notions of attachment and pride.³⁰⁵

My contention would be that an orientation towards a more civic, inclusive form of nationalism is indeed right. Only it is tenable in a pluralistic, liberal society. In real political life, however, the borders are not as tidy as its proponents would suggest. Civic and cultural nationalisms have more in common than conceptual differentiation would indicate. Perhaps the real distinction is indeed between more exclusivist and more inclusivist forms of national life. National identity, a sense of belonging, feelings of pride, attachment to history and to culture remain an important element in the life of a nation and cannot lightly be dismissed. A thin civic nationalism has need of enrichment.

³⁰⁴ The research focused on two minority populations within Scotland 'English' and 'Pakistani'.

³⁰⁵ 'Respondents in Scotland almost universally oriented to a perceived normative requirement to claim a strong sense of self in nationalised terms, the authenticity of which was established by displays of emotional attachment. In contrast, respondents in England were inclined to treat all strong avowals or public displays of national self-identity (whether 'British' or 'English') as indicative of irrationality and reprehensible chauvinism and particularism'. (Condor and Abell 2006:30)

CULTURE MATTERS

As I have argued in the earlier section on 'What kind of nation', my belief is that civic nationhood with its emphasis on equality of membership in the nation, the protection of rights and the affirmation of universal values is an important plank in the modern nation, it is not sufficient in itself. Its thinness is its weakness. We are, as Geertz asserts, cultural animals. (1993:38) We require a certain amount of thickness in our nations.

Grundtvig was more focused on *folk* as 'people' than as 'nation' and by people he meant not simply the generation of a particular time in history but a fellowship³⁰⁶ that linked together a people in its past, present and future.

The 'four-leafed clover' (*Den danske fiir-kløver* 1836), a symbol of the unity of Denmark, was for him 'king and people, fatherland and mother tongue'. His sense of nation and people embraced the territorial³⁰⁷ and the

³⁰⁶ I use 'fellowship' as it implies in my understanding a bond that is not familial and therefore not essentially 'ethnic' in character.

³⁰⁷ Grundtvig attached less importance than Herder to the natural territorial setting in which a people lived out its life. 'It is not the sea that produces the Vikings, but the Vikings find in the sea the element which corresponds to their nature, their symbol.' (Grundtvig, quoted in Allen 1949:45) Cf Baudelaire's 'Homme libre, toujours tu chériras la mer! La mere est ton miroir: tu contemples ton âme dans la déroulement infini de sa lame...' (Baudelaire 1857/2005) It may be that here Grundtvig underestimates the impact of place on people and in particular the extent to which land-/seascape is not only interpreted but also influences the common characteristics and spirit of the people. (Schama 1996) Certainly, it is true that landscape is one of the elements utilised by nationalists and a source of pride amongst those who identify with a particular nation. For instance: 'You my sons, like the beautiful country,/ you too form a diverse whole;/ In language and thought, in thought and feeling/ You are shaped by mountain peaks and valleys

human, the past and the present, the constitutional and the cultural/ linguistic. 'There is a conjunction of a particular territory, a land with a particular language³⁰⁸ with its own literature, and a particular people who have a common memory and a common history, sharing their own unique experience over many generations of the fabric of human life. This interpenetration and interaction of people, place and language goes to make up the distinctive character of a particular nation.' (Allchin 1993:11) This interaction is closely connected to the human processes of the making of memory and meaning. 'Places are locations in which people have long memories, reaching back beyond ... their own individual childhoods to the common lores of bygone generations'. (Tuan 1974:245)

'We are led to imagine each group developing its cultural and social form in relative isolation,' suggests Barth (1981:11), but there are not (despite Herder's views) unequivocally and exclusively 'national' cultural perspectives and ways. In reality, cultures may overlap with one another to a significant degree. I am

alike...' (from the *Festspiel für die Eidgenössische Bundesfeier in Schwyz*, quoted in Zimmer 2003: 207) It seems to me inherently probable that physical environment contributes to shaping us as we shape it by our actions; we live in a state of reciprocity with our physical surroundings. 'Human beings are an expression of their landscape.' (Durrell 1969) Grundtvig's own poetic output both utilises the imagery of the Danish landscape and was a source of inspiration for such Danish landscape painters as PC Skovgaard. See also Orr 1988:136ff on the role of landscape in Romanticism and nationalism.

³⁰⁸ If we are to use the criterion of a single language as a defining characteristic of a nation, then it is evident from the statistics that 'only about 10 per cent of them [states] are nation-states by the criterion of 90 per cent or more of the population speaking a single language'. (van den Berghe 2005:121)

conscious of such transnational ideas as *négritude*³⁰⁹, expressing a commonality that is said to transcend particularities. I do not doubt that politically and culturally they have revalorising power and can usefully create solidarities, particularly bringing in those of a diaspora. Nonetheless, such transnational concepts do inevitably gloss over very real differences, as such critics as Confiant have argued³¹⁰. (1993/2006)

Cultures, with relatively few exceptions, are rarely (even in Herder's time) as hermetically sealed as might be suggested, but rather have permeable borders, constantly influencing and being influenced by other cultures. Collective cultural identities 'are ever in the process of development and interpretation', using both internal and external resources. (Yack 1999:106) 'The Nation can have its BEING only at the price of being forever in search of itself.' (Braudel 1989: vol I: 23) This is not to suggest however that there are not distinctive and distinguishing features to the cultures of nations and groups, but to acknowledge that these are neither consistently stable nor wholly exclusive.

A Herderian approach tends to assume a measure of homogeneity within the people and its culture in a context that is both changeable and contested. In the vast majority of countries, as I have asserted earlier, the notion of homogeneity is no more than a fiction.³¹¹

³⁰⁹ an idea taken forward particularly by Senghor, the writer and first President of Senegal

³¹⁰ Confiant asserts that *négritude* not only ignores the heterogeneity of black nations but also of the heterogeneity, indeed creoleness, of many black societies.

³¹¹ It is perhaps one of the obstacles to the reception of Grundtvig's ideas in our contemporary societies that, at a critical

'Most societies are not mono-ethnic; and even where they are, common ethnicity does not of itself obliterate division...'. (Ignatieff 1994:4)

Any attempt to define what is the common core of cultural identity enters strongly contested ground. Any version of memories or values or beliefs or cultural practice generally results from contest and struggle within the collectivity (Halbwachs 1992) and, though these may achieve the status of cultural norms, nonetheless alternative versions remain and may continue to be pressed. The Grundtvigian idea of *vekselvirkning* or interaction is of importance and introduces a tension. With his commitment to notions of the spirit of the people, of the awakening of the dormant cultural heritage, Grundtvig takes a fairly essentialist view of Danishness. Yet, the dominant dynamic of community life is to be *vekselvirkning*, community in conversation. Are we then to put some aspects of life beyond the bounds of that conversation? Grundtvig implies that 'alien' influences have to be judged as to whether or not they are compatible with the national culture. The test however is not a set of abstract criteria but rather whether or not they are judged to be so by the ordinary people and take root in the community life. Reception is rarely direct and absolute but more a matter of adaptation. I share the affirmation of Cairns Craig that 'Culture [...] is the site of a dialogue, it is a dialectic [...] It is being between'. (Craig 1996:206) Any liberal cultural

point in their development, with the territorial losses came in a period of considerable homogeneity in ethnicity in Danish society (at least as regards to 'metropolitan' Denmark).

nationalism will affirm that 'no culture can deny the liberal freedoms which enable members to evaluate and possibly revise it'.³¹² (Kymlicka 1995: 158-163)

This contrasts with the more static attempts of politicians of different UK political parties to propose the essence of the British (or perhaps more commonly or more correctly English) culture, (Harris 2006: 17) such as the Orwellian echoes of John Major in declaring that '50 years from now Britain will still be the country of long shadows on country grounds, warm beer, invincible green suburbs, dog lovers and pool fillers and 'old maids cycling to Holy Communion through the morning mist'' (Major 2004). It can seem rather reminiscent of:

Think of what our Nation stands for,
Books from Boots and country lanes,
Free speech, free passes, class distinction,
Democracy and proper drains.
(Betjeman 1958/2006)

An observer may or may not recognise these features as true of 'Englishness' or of a particular form of it, but the Major quotation illustrates the fundamentally private nature of these 'national' characteristics.

If we try to make a private set of cultural values stand in for a shared public identity, we commit two kinds of mistakes. On the one hand, we have nowhere to look for guidance in directing our public life: saying that the British love animals and country pubs is no use at all if what we have to decide is whether to privatize the welfare state or ratify the Maastricht treaty. On the other

³¹² More problematical is the question of whether or not participation in liberal and pluralistic society implies not only freedom to believe and freedom to live in accordance with these beliefs but also at least an acceptance that those beliefs and ways are open to criticism, require in some measure to be defended as reasonable and consistent with the good of the whole community and (in theory at the very least) open to the possibility of change.

hand, we make national identity depend upon on a private culture which may not be universally shared across the society. If we say that you are not genuinely British unless you enjoy gardening and watching critic, then we immediately erect barriers in the face of all those who happen not to value these things [...] Another problem with 'cultural Englishness' is that it overlooks the existence of the Scots, the Welsh and the Northern Irish.

(Miller 1995:172-3)

It is apparent in, for instance, the UK Government website on British Citizenship (Home Office 2006) that 'cultural belonging' involves variously dimensions of factual knowledge, awareness and understanding, linguistic and social skills, attachment and cultural nostalgia.

It is noteworthy too that the context in which these questions often arise tends to be focused on the acquisition of cultural competence by those outwith the dominant cultural group. To belong to the community or the nation if you are in a minority demands an engagement with the majority culture.³¹³ 'Members of the mainstream culture find esteem for their way of a life as a public good unproblematically available to all. Minority groups, by contrast, lack the social ideational bases through which their way of life can be recognized and affirmed.' (Seglow 1998:964)

Nor is it always clear what constitutes the **primary** cultural unit. In Grundtvig's thinking we find both Danish and Nordic forms; hence, his proposal for the

³¹³ I share Kymlicka's view that this is a practical obligation, even if it may not be an unequivocal ethical one.

creation of a Scandinavian university to complement the 'Danish' folk high school. There were similar movements in other fields.

It is not for the idle, yawning populace that the work of art is to be produced, but for compatriots who await a lively understanding of what resides in their hearts. It is not idle curiosity that pursues this new subject-matter, but a sacred feeling for the native land and the forefathers... Until this has been accomplished, the feats and ancient legends of **Scandinavia** must wait in vain to reveal themselves in form and colour.'

(Høyen 1844: 360-1, quoted at Østergård 2002:13)

Nor is it so clear in the Scottish and British context what is the unit. If the criteria of national identity are civic, then what meaning attaches to the separate identities of British and English/ Scottish/ Welsh, given that we are to assume that they are each rooted in democratic institutions and shared values?

There is a characteristic respect for cultural difference within the ethno-cultural perspective. Against the more universalising tendencies of the Enlightenment, Herder affirmed particularity and pluralism³¹⁴. Each had its unique qualities and therefore gifts to humanity. 'The universal **is** the particular', declared MacDiarmid (1978:845)

In recent times it has been fashionable to talk of the levelling of nations, of the disappearance of different races in the melting-pot of contemporary civilization. I do not agree with this opinion, but its discussion remains another question. Here it is merely fitting to say that the disappearance of

³¹⁴ A major difficulty lies in the shift from a plurality of distinct cultural communities in parallel with one another to situations in which the pluralism exists **within** the community.

nations would have impoverished us no less than if all men had become alike, with one personality and one face. Nations are the wealth of mankind, its collective personalities; the very least of them wears its own special colours and bears within itself a special facet of divine intention.

(Solzhenitsyn 1970 section 5)

Ignatieff, in his article, 'Nationalism and the Narcissism of Minor Differences' (Ignatieff 1999:91ff) lays at the door of such particularity a heavy weight of responsibility for the world's ills. 'Yet without this fiction - that humanity is primary and difference is secondary - we are sunk.' (at 101) His assertion is true and must not be set aside. His linking of this truth to a challenge to the nurturing of difference is more contestable.

I am not persuaded by Ignatieff or by experience that this stark oppositionality is either necessary or helpful. To celebrate diversity does not require us to abandon the conviction that our common humanity is the most fundamental of all values. That we are alike in important ways, that we share an essential identity, that we owe each other responsibility and that we belong together as members of humankind³¹⁵ does not require an inference that we are the same.

I do not dispute some of Ignatieff's concerns, but I believe that he either tends to exaggerate them or he refuses to allow their complementarity to his own

³¹⁵ A deep conviction which, in Christian theology, is expressed in the affirmation that all of humanity and each human are made in the image of God.

position. If we allow our sense of particularity to become a source of division rather than difference (and undoubtedly that human failing can be observed in the world), then we shall have abused the gift of diversity, but it is neither inevitable nor overwhelmingly the case. In his affirming of what we have in common with each other over what is different, he is right, but it does not follow that the distinctive aspects are not of value or interest. Both require to be held together, as we do in affirming both our shared humanity and our personal uniqueness. He is dismissive of difference - it is 'minor', the focus on difference is no more than a form of 'narcissism' - and so he marginalizes the view that there is, in the words of Rabbi Jonathan Sacks, 'the dignity of difference', and that cultural diversity can be regarded as valuable and enriching.³¹⁶ (Sacks 2003)

Ignatieff argues that as differences in reality become smaller, then the larger they 'are likely to loom in (the) imagination. In this, however, he underestimates the extent to which the affirmation of difference is crucial to the development and preservation of identity. He identifies this differentiation process as a means of group formation which is nurtured by hostility towards those people who do not share the characteristic. Sacks acknowledges this danger, in the form of 'tribalism', 'my tribe against yours, my nation against yours, my god against yours. In the pre-monotheistic world, the gods were local, they belonged to a particular place, and

³¹⁶ It is in this way that I think we can hear Herder profitably, even allowing for our conceptual differences, as an affirmation and celebration of diversity.

watched over the destinies of particular people'. (Sacks 2002:3) Popper associates nationalism with tribalism for it 'appeals to our tribal instincts, to passion and to prejudice'. (Popper 1962:49) What Sacks does however is to suggest that, paradoxically, the antithesis of tribalism, universalism, is also 'deeply threatening and may be equally inadequate as an account of the human condition'. (Sacks 2002)

Grundtvig, as I affirm throughout this thesis, works to hold together and in interaction with each other the universal and the particular. We should not think about nation without thinking about humanity and not think of humanity without thinking about nations. As Fanon argues in the context of post-colonialism, the 'building of a nation is of necessity accompanied by the discovery and encouragement of universalising values. Far from keeping aloof from other nations, therefore, it is national liberation which leads the nation to play its part on the stage of history. It is at the heart of national consciousness that international consciousness lives and grows. And this two-fold emerging is ultimately the source of all culture.' (Fanon 1959) The relationship of the universal and the particular ought not to be oppositional but reciprocal.

Grundtvig honours the universal rather than universalism. We are, at our most fundamental, one with each other in humankind but the nature of our humanity is to be diverse, not to be the same, still less to have that sameness imposed upon us. His universal understanding is of humankind having (in Dunn's words) a

'destiny [...] to be intensely and necessarily particular'. (Dunn 1999:29)

The coincidence of 'state' and 'cultural' boundaries is rarer than might be assumed; for example, the Slesvig-Holstein situation that was so prominent in Grundtvig's context left Danish speakers in Germany and German speakers in Denmark.³¹⁷ Even though the political representation of minorities may reflect their 'origins', nonetheless it would appear that there is no strong movement towards a realignment of boundaries and the minorities seem to be established within their respective states. (Østergård 2002) The liberal question is then not about the right to statehood or to belong to the 'right' state (culturally speaking) but of the freedom and the space (including room within the public space³¹⁸) to express that culture within one's existing state. The key issue then is of how capacious the state is, how much room it allows for cultural groups not merely to flourish but to flourish in the public space. (Kymlicka 1999:133) Indeed, this may not be a matter of generosity, for the multicultural state may only be able to maintain the coherence of national

³¹⁷ There were those who argued for a division of Slesvig on cultural-linguistic grounds so that there would be a closer match between state and cultural nation. (Adriansen, 1990: 25)

³¹⁸ This represents one of the more difficult challenges, for most states allow for the performance of cultural difference from the majority in private spaces (in culturally specific voluntary organisations and religious bodies, for example) but the extent to which this should be brought into the wider civic space is more contested. The boundaries of the private and the public and the balance of rights is a matter of some dispute. See, for example, on the issue of regulating the wearing of religious clothing within educational establishments *Şahin v Turkey* before the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights, on 11 November 2005, reported at <http://www.echr.coe.int>; and also *R (on the application of Begum (by her litigation friend, Rahman)) v Headteacher and Governors of Denbigh High School* Case heard by the House of Lords Appellate Committee, reported at (2006) UKHL 15

identity at the price of allowing other identities and their particularities to be framed and to flourish within the shared state. (Parekh 1991:74-5)

It is sometimes thought axiomatic that cultural nationalism has to have a nationalist political dimension to protect the culture (for example, MacDiarmid 1931:594). I acknowledge that, without political influence and distinct political forms, cultures may be vulnerable or thought to be vulnerable. I recognise that, as in Scotland, it is possible to discern a wider cultural renaissance not unconnected to a fresh recognition of political nationhood. In this connection, it is perhaps interesting to observe that Walter Scott 'was so committed to the union between Scotland and England that he believed Scotland to be every bit an equal partner, and therefore its culture worthy of recognition, study and enthusiasm'. (Kelly 2006:6) How far the Scottish education system and cultural institutions shared this perception is more questionable (as Paul Henderson Scott argues in his 'Still in Bed with an Elephant'). (Scott 1985)

Even in relatively homogeneous national communities, it cannot be assumed that there is any consensus as to the key attributes of the culture and their significance. While the appeal to historic origins can be an attempt to close down debate (Lebovics 1992), the effort is not guaranteed to have success. While proponents of a particular cause may endeavour to use the cultural material for a determined purpose, cultural legacies are often 'complex and ... contradictory' (Yack 1999:106) and may be more likely to occasion contest than to be a

final word. While ethno-symbolist analysis might seem be more respectful to the role of history and culture in the construction and maintenance of national identity, it is also because of its focus on that material, aware of its contested nature. As AD Smith suggests, 'ethnosymbolists have been at pains to emphasise the plurality of ethnic pasts, ethnic myths and ethnic cultures, and the way such plurality encourages rival nationalist mythologies and memories'. (AD Smith 2003:365)

To this issue of dominant and contested accounts, particularly of the past but also in the formation of the present and the future, I return in the chapter *Fortælling*. Though Renan is perhaps better known for his suggestion that nationalism was a 'daily plebiscite', he did recognise that a significant element in any nation-building was a consciousness of the 'rich legacy of memories' held in common, but he argued that the process is one that involves choices being made within our cultural inheritance. (Renan in Bhaba 1990:19)

Culture does matter, but no definition of that culture is entitled to rule, frozen in a mythical always, free from contestation, imposed on all. Rather, it is the arena in which alternative cultural strands are shared, examined critically and used as a resource for the enrichment of life within the national community.

NATION AND CLASS, GENDER AND CULTURE

Nation

The relationship of state and nation is a complex and contested one in thinking about nationalism. The Herderian conception is more oriented towards 'people' as a cultural community than towards 'nation' as a set of political institutions and processes. Grundtvig, similarly, was himself, while a supporter of the monarchy and later of the developing institutions of the democratic state, rather more focused on cultural and linguistic concerns than on the constitutional and political aspects. Meyer argues that 'It may well be that the experts will maintain that Grundtvig wasn't really a democrat, because democracy means the power of the people, while Grundtvig wanted *folkelighed*, which is something other than the people's power. *Folkelighed* builds on love of language and culture.' (Meyer quoted in Asian Human Rights Commission 2001a) His concern was to foster the enlightenment of the individual and the cooperative spirit of Danes for life together in society, though he does not neglect the role of education in preparing people for participation in the democratic institutions. As Auken (2004: 116) describes the position of Grundtvig's more 'leftist' followers, the view was '*menneske først og borger så*³¹⁹, *mindre stat, mere samfund*' - 'a human being first and then a citizen, less state and more society'.

Some contemporary theorists distinguish 'patriotism' or allegiance to the state and its institutions from

³¹⁹ In passing, one might note the play on Grundtvig's own famous affirmation '*menneske først og Christen saa*'

'nationalism' or loyalty to the nation itself. (Connor 1994:196) Some, like John Breuilly and Eric Hobsbawm,³²⁰ would restrict the use of 'nationalism' to exclusively political movements. Others, such as Anthony Smith and John Hutchinson³²¹, suggest that 'It is better... to see 'cultural and political nationalism as competing responses''. (Smith 1998:179, incorporating quotation from Hutchinson 1987:40-41) Ignatieff (1994: 3) asserts that indeed the political, moral and cultural dimensions of nationalism 'underwrite one another'.

'*Folkelighed* will be our watchword in the North, and gently solve the riddles of equality,' Grundtvig predicted in a famous passage.

Grundtvig was not unaware of the differences, indeed extreme social and economic inequalities that existed in the Danish society of his day. His sense of and desire for a common 'Danish' identity assumes or requires a shared identity that is nothing less than a profound, horizontal fellowship that involves the setting-aside of other dimensions, including a focusing on unity rather than on inequality . (Anderson 1990:11)

Class and Gender

Criticism is made that nationalisms both ignore and subvert awareness of class divisions. As Linda Colley observes:

paradoxically, class politics in the past often worked to unify the different parts of Britain. Think of Neil Kinnock in 1975 speaking in praise of 'the combined strength of working class people throughout

³²⁰ See, for example, Breuilly 1993 and Hobsbawm 1990

³²¹ Hutchinson 1987 and 1994 and AD Smith 1998

the whole of the United Kingdom brought to bear against any bully'. No ambitious politician would speak in such terms now; and nor would the majority of voters. Instead, and as a substitute for class politics, you increasingly get the politics of place, ethnicity or religion. Unable or unwilling to regard themselves anymore as British workers ranged against the country's employing class, or as British property-owners looking down on its masses, men and women in these islands are more likely now to adopt other, local or sectional labels, and define themselves primarily as Welsh, or Cornish, or Muslim, or whatever. Class politics, whatever their inherent costs, were still indisputably British politics. The new, sectional interest politics often explicitly rejects notions of a unitary Britain.

(Colley 1999)

It is interesting however to set that general observation against the research of Condor and Abell (2006) which suggested differences in this regard between Scottish and English respondents. The Scottish participants in the research emphasised the cohesiveness of the (Scottish) national community, whereas English accounts of nation were qualified as respondents attended to issues of class, ethnicity or regional distinction.

Without thereby asserting any guarantee of typicality (for accounts of national identity will to some degree be idiosyncratic³²²), Condor and Abell (2006) reported the following interview excerpts³²³ from Scottish participants:

³²² See Cohen (1996)

³²³ Though the transcripts offered were few and inevitably in some degree idiosyncratic, they were presented on the basis that the particular features pertained to factors that analysis indicated to be common within, and often distinctive to, the national samples from which they were drawn.

They spoke of 'pride' in aspects of national history, celebrating for instance -

the fact they dragged themselves out of the gutters and poverty in the east end of Glasgow or the Gorbals or wherever they were brought up, particularly where there's deprivation.

(Condor and Abell 2006:10)

There is a clear class dimension to this reported comment, though it is expressed in terms of **national** history rather than as referring to the experience only of some of the nation (a point to which I shall return shortly).

In relation to a question concerning her 'sense of being Scottish', the following dialogue ensued -

Interviewer We've touched a couple of times in the interview, you feel a sense of being Scottish, and this may be a difficult question to answer, but why?

Respondent Why? Why do I have the pride³²⁴ or why do you have the feeling? [...]

Respondent It's a sense of identity, isn't it, really? I think that's what it comes down to. [...] You have something in which, you have something that reflects, that you're part of, that you're proud to be part of. That's why, I think, that's why I feel strongly about it. I'm so proud of my country. I'm so proud of my countrymen, not only those are living but those that have gone before and the contribution that's been made over the centuries. I'm just so

³²⁴ The reader will notice the recurrence of pride/proud in the respondent's affirmation of her sense of identity. This very affective form of identification is represented significantly amongst Scots people. McCrone 2001:147 reports a survey (in 1999) in which some 90% of respondents indicated that they were very or somewhat proud of being Scottish. The sources of pride included both traditional iconic representations and community values.

proud to be part of that, albeit that I had no input in it whatsoever. I'm proud, by association.

Interviewer Do you mean by that [...]?

Respondent Fleming, figures in history. Right down to the unsung. The girls that worked in the munitions factories down in Clydebank and risked their lives (that) night when the German bombers kept confusing the moonlight on the tarmacadammed road, but they still went. You just feel this incredible fierce pride.

Interviewer You do feel pride?

Respondent Yes, I swell with pride..

(Condor and Abell 2006:10)

As Condor and Abell note, the interviewee locates her own pride in her nation, not (she believes) on a chauvinistic bias, but on what purports to be a rational assessment of the qualities demonstrated in its history. Though the justification for pride includes a gender component (the courage of the factory girls) and indeed there is nothing exclusively 'national' about the situation (for presumably there were similarly German women taking risks), the respondent appears to focus on the national compared with a transnational gender solidarity, as a woman, or class solidarity, as a working person.

I think, however, that that would be a misinterpretation of the data. Rather than ignoring or marginalising other identities she holds, the respondent appears to bring them together **within** her definition of what it is to be Scottish. This sense of national identity "is achieved through a particular characterization of Scottishness". (Reicher and Hopkins 2001:74) Her 'national' identity is confirmed through a perception that the virtues of the nation are the same as the

working class and the women's virtues of comradeship, commitment and courage. As Anderson (1983) amongst others has observed, it cannot be doubted that national identity is, at least in Europe, the most widely and strongly held form of identity. This does not require us to believe that other forms of identity are thereby obliterated. They may be present within and contributing to defining the content of that national identity. In the Scottish case, 'the category may be national but it is defined by working class values'. (Reicher and Hopkins 2001:74)

More fundamentally, however, it is argued that nationalism is a gendered concept and nations gendered entities. (McClintock 1997:89) The challenge perhaps most strongly comes in the affirmation that the prioritisation (indeed the existence) of national identity is contested. "As a woman I have no country. As a woman, I want no country. As a woman, my country is the whole world." (Wolff 1943:197)³²⁵ Further, the role of nationalism and nations in the exercise of power is evidenced. Struggles for national recognition have commonly been struggles between men for power. The construction of memory, a powerful ingredient in nation-building and maintenance, has largely been in terms of men's activities and experiences. Nation-states have been institutions that have significantly protected gender inequalities. Female symbols have been employed in nationalism and its narratives but not in the cause of advancing women's rights and share of resources. The

³²⁵ There are parallels of view in the assertion of *The Communist Manifesto* that 'the working class has no country' (Marx and Engels 1848: II The Proletarians) or in movements to affirm a black international consciousness (Edwards 2003)

history and the discourses of nationalism and of nation states are notably silent in relation to the contribution of women as active participants rather than as symbols. I do not think that these assertions can be properly denied. 'Nowhere has feminism in its own right been allowed to be more than the maidservant of nationalism.' (McClintock 1997:110)

While Grundtvig's *folkelighed* does have an emphasis on national unity and therefore may seem to marginalise difference, including gender difference, this would not be consistent with its ethos.³²⁶ Grundtvig's perspective would not deny Wolff's declaration of solidarity with the whole of humanity. A liberal *folkelighed* would not deny the right to and the benefit of building transnational solidarities to bring about social, political and economic change in the cause of greater equality (a commitment that lies within *folke-ighed*). As feminism seeks to advance the political rights of women in particular, the question has arisen within national liberation movements of how far it shares rather than is in opposition to other forms of liberation (including the assertion of the rights of a people as a nation)³²⁷.

The critique of some feminists rightly problematises the nation, as idea and as practice. Conceptually, politically, morally, the nation is open to very substantial criticism. Yet, the reality of its

³²⁶ Danish society, on the basis of *folkelighed*, has moved significantly towards a more equal distribution between the genders of power and participative capacity.

³²⁷ McClintock (1997) acknowledges this argument amongst women in countries where the cause of national liberation has been pursued.

widespread existence and the enduring quality of its presence has to be wrestled with. Perhaps the more realistic question is not 'Whether or not nations?' but 'What kind of nations?' If, as is apparent, nations are imagined, are the subject of contestation, are cultural and moral entities, are the locus of political argument and determination, then (while there cannot be pretence that power and capacity to engage is equal) there is potential for refiguring the nation, its processes, its priorities, its memories of the past, its values and its patterns. To belong to a nation is to have responsibility for its shaping. National identity is spacious and flexible enough to allow for both a sense of pride in belonging and a critical capacity concerning the realities of its life, including its errors and faults. *Folkeoplysning* is concerned with building the capacity of individuals, communities and groups within society to participate fully in that critical engagement.³²⁸

An egalitarian discourse is deeply ingrained in Danish values and behaviour (Liep and Olwig 1994: 18), but what is the basis of this sense of togetherness and mutual responsibility?

Sir James Mellon, in a somewhat idiosyncratic account of the Danish people (Mellon 1992), wrote

The Danes are not a nation [...] they are a tribe, this is the strength of their fellowship and the reason they have unshakable trust in each other [...] When talking about the idea of a 'nation', this also involves the idea of

³²⁸ Part Three of the thesis is dedicated to consideration of such processes.

fellowship, but a nation requires if not more, then at least something different'.
(quoted in Jespersen 2004:6)

In this quotation, there are tones of ethnic nationhood, the term 'tribe' having more commonly connotations of a social organisation made up of interlinked families with solidarity based on a form of kinship, reinforced by cultural and language.³²⁹ Explicitly, Mellon refers to an enduring and significant feeling and bond of 'trust' that he discerned in Danish society. The notion of 'trust' as a factor that both emerges from a sense of cohesion and confers and confirms cohesion is considered by Miller (1998), arguing that trust 'is much more likely to exist among people who imagine themselves to share a common national identity, speak a common language, and have overlapping values'. (Miller 1998:48) This would seem to suggest that a trust between people who do **not** share in or share **less** in an imagined national community with cultural and moral attributes is liable to be weaker.

Folkelighed is not a question of passive status. This belonging and this equality within community is for engagement, for sharing and for participation. (Nabudere 2003:18) Taken together with the concept and practice of *vekselvirkning* (interaction), *folkelighed* is about a sense of shared reflection and action for common purpose within a committed community, with a strong sense of mutual responsibility within society and particularly a concern for those who are socially and economically

³²⁹ I have construed Mellon's observation in this way, but am conscious that some studies, eg Fried 1975, have evidenced the existence of tribes with different cultural practices, differing languages or dialects and permeable boundaries.

disadvantaged. Those who heard Grundtvig's teaching (either directly or through intermediaries) in those days were clearly inspired not only to have a sense of shared belonging and therefore relationship but to take community action to respond to common needs. Writing of the village of Solbjerg on Mors, Buckser notes that the followers of Grundtvig around 1870 'surrounded the church with a full range of Grundtvigian social institutions - banks, bakeries, butcher shops, a co-operative market, historical societies, gymnastics clubs, speakers' clubs, a newspaper, and a political party - all based on the principles of Grundtvigian theology'. (Buckser 1995:260)

Manniche asserts that *folkelighed* is concerned with 'community life that embraces everyone' (Manniche 1972:21)

Cultural difference

Efforts to create a society in Scotland that does embrace everyone often give rise to a claim that such issues are largely irrelevant, firstly on grounds of population ratios and secondly by reason of a myth of Scottish openness.

Compared with England and in particular with its cities, the numbers and percentages of people in Scotland who identify other than as white Scottish are low, as may readily be seen from Table 8. It does not follow, however, on any principles of rationality or of justice that this means that such a society does not have to take account of questions of ethnic and cultural diversity. With such ethnic balance, the likelihood

that the white majority culture will become wholly normative simply by its presence and the absence of much visible alternative is strong. Indeed, the consequent lack of political power in small minorities lays a particular responsibility on the majority community not to create an overwhelming cultural hegemony and to ensure that the society is sufficiently capacious, not only to allow the private celebration of cultural differences but to give that culture access to the public space also and to develop opportunities for cultural sharing and learning.

Table 8 Scottish population by ethnic group

	% of total Population	% minority ethnic population	Base
White Scottish	88.09	Na	4,459,071
Other White British	7.38	Na	373,685
White Irish	0.98	Na	49,428
Any other White background	1.54	Na	78,150
Indian	0.30	14.79	15,037
Pakistani	0.63	31.27	31,793
Bangladeshi	0.04	1.95	1,981
Chinese	0.32	16.04	16,310
Other South Asian	0.12	6.09	6,196
Caribbean	0.04	1.75	1,778
African	0.10	5.03	5,118
Black Scottish or any other Black background	0.02	1.11	1,129
Any Mixed Background	0.25	12.55	12,764
Any other background	0.19	9.41	9,571
<i>All minority ethnic population</i>	2.01	100.00	
All population	100.00	Na	5,062,011

Source:
Scottish Executive Office of the Chief Statistician (2004)

The assumption too of an incontrovertibly open and tolerant society is rooted in a recurrent myth, but this may not be as true as the myth asserts.

Table 9 Racial prejudice in Scotland

56% of Scots felt there is 'a great deal' or 'quite a lot' of prejudice towards minority ethnic communities in Scotland.

(Source: Attitudes to Discrimination in Scotland 2003)

The number of racist incidents recorded by Scottish Police Forces continues to rise annually.

Hostile attitudes towards asylum seekers and immigrants are most widely held by male Scots in their mid-20s and 30s, in the C1 and C2 social classes. Older Scots tend to be more tolerant. *(Source: Scotland on Sunday Opinion Poll on Racist Attitudes, April 2002)*

18% of people said that attempts to give equal opportunities to people from minority ethnic communities had 'gone too far'.

(Source: Attitudes to Discrimination in Scotland 2003)

52% of people said that most people in Scotland would mind either 'a lot' or 'a little' if one of their close relatives married someone from a different racial or ethnic background.

(Source: Attitudes to Discrimination in Scotland 2003)

20% agreed that people from minority ethnic groups take away jobs from other people in Scotland. *(Source: Attitudes to Discrimination in Scotland 2003)*

27% of people that 'taking all things into account' people from minority ethnic groups had 'nothing at all' or 'not much' in common with people from white backgrounds. *(Source:*

Attitudes to Discrimination in Scotland 2003)

46% of people said they would prefer to live in an area where 'most people are similar' to themselves. *(Source: Attitudes to Discrimination in Scotland 2003)*

(extracted from One Scotland nd)

How far can a process of interaction respond to the changing demography and shifts in attitude? The evidence is that ethnic communities are not

interpenetrative at the level of making families.³³⁰ It is in the public space that most engagement is likely to occur, if at all³³¹.

There is some measure of inevitability that in any state or society there will be some privileging of the historically dominant culture, particularly if this is the culture with which the majority population associates itself. This is built into the fabric of its institutions and processes³³². (Nielsen 1999: 125-6)

'As the American feminist Iris Young has argued, any public space, any policy, any society is structured around certain kinds of understandings, around practices that are inherited, which prioritise some cultural values and behaviours over others.' (Modood 2005) A liberal democratic state must seek to ensure that in terms of civic entitlements there is equality of access and take positive steps to advance this.

Further, such a nation ought, as part of protecting the rights of all, seek (and be particularly aware of the need) to protect the rights of minorities within its society. (Nielsen 1999:126) An inclusion agenda has to be concerned with the 'politics of difference' and the 'politics of recognition', no less than issues of

³³⁰ Percentage of households where not all persons are in the same ethnic category 0.97% (General Register Office for Scotland 2006)

³³¹ I continue this issue of dialogue in the public space in chapter 12 *Interaction in civil society*

³³² Instances of this may include the designation of a particular language as the 'official' language of the state (while perhaps making provision for other languages to be used in particular circumstances) or the correspondence of public holidays to religious or traditional cultural celebrations

material inequality³³³. (Bond 2006, citing Fraser 2003; Stewart 2000 and Taylor 1992).

As there is engagement within the public space, albeit with its biases, the dominant cultural assumptions and behaviours may be contested and this may lead to modification. (Modood 2005) Indeed, there is this double-edgedness to cultural nationalism. While the dominant groups within a society may endeavour to bring all within the majority culture (the traditional role of ethno-cultural myths), this commitment to affirming cultural heritage and values may evoke and be used by minorities³³⁴ to give rise to and nourish alternative aspirations. (Deutsch and Foltz 1963; Esman 1977; Mayo 1974)

The focus of civic nations tends to be principally on the law and on democratic rights. The critical goal is the operation of rights within civic society and it is through the operation of civic society that these rights are enforced. Though this impacts more widely, for example, on the formation of attitudes and on the social practices³³⁵. Charles Taylor (1992) argues that equality of rights has to be complemented by an 'equality of recognition', rooted in a presumption of equality of worth. This perspective has merit in it, in that it invites an interactive, interpenetrative relationship

³³³ There is of course a correlation between social exclusion and economic disadvantage, not least through a lack of full acceptance into the national community impacting often on labour market position.

³³⁴ or indeed by competing groups within the ethnic majority

³³⁵ While anti-discriminatory legislation is targeted through the civil and criminal law at preventing certain behaviours, it can also have an educative function in creating an alternative set of societal norms.

between cultures within a society. In acknowledging worth, we are engaging on the basis that the culture is worthy, not only to and in the sight of the member of that culture, but potentially to others who learn about it, experience something of it and in some measure share in its impact as far as it enters the public space. Taylor does not however argue that all cultures are, in the end of the day, of equal merit. Indeed, in a rational and open enquiring society, all will and should be subject to examination and challenge. How far is this then an equality of regard if all that is presumed is that there is something of value within each cultural tradition? Many people would (understandably) bear a commitment to the belief that there is not just something of worth in their own culture but that it is **particularly** worthy³³⁶? I am not however dismissive of the idea, whatever its conceptual and practical weaknesses, for there is a thinness in the commitment to civic values. It provides for minority culture participation in the political and civil public spaces but may not recognise sufficiently the need for mutuality of respect and regard between cultures in the living out of that participation.

The development and healthy maintenance of a pluralist, multicultural society inevitably involves some measure of tension between cultures, not least between the 'dominant' and the 'minorities'. Kymlicka adopts a pragmatic evaluation: 'they³³⁷ know that this uprooting

³³⁶ It is difficult to imagine that human beings would seek to commit to anything that they did not think, even provisionally, has more merit than other versions and possibilities.

³³⁷ minorities who have settled more recently in a nation

will only be successful³³⁸ if they³³⁹ adapt to their new country, including its language and customs'. (Kymlicka 1999:131) This view is not inconsistent with Senghor's injunction 'assimiler, ne pas être assimilé'³⁴⁰. (Murphy 2003:5) It is difficult to conceive of a successful civic nation if those of minority cultural backgrounds were to refuse to use a common tongue, at least in public life, or to adopt in some measure the values³⁴¹ and behaviours of the majority (while retaining the right, and responsibility as may be, to challenge these).

Increasingly in Western societies, the multi-cultural (related to multi-ethnic) make-up of society is of those whose citizenship comes through birth within the country. Eriksen writes of Norway³⁴² yet describes a widespread scenario that goes beyond that country:

³³⁸ Kymlicka's assertion seems to assume that there is a single version of success in this context, but there may be rather different criteria from the perspectives of the majority and depending upon the goals of the minority group.

³³⁹ It has to be acknowledged that not all cultural communities have the expectation that, or are prepared to permit, all members of their community should participate fully in wider society.

³⁴⁰ 'to assimilate, but not to be assimilated'

³⁴¹ I think that this does go further than merely those values which are traditionally conceived of as universal civic values of democracy, respect for the rule of law etc, but this is an arena of major contestation in contemporary British society. What are the minimal values? Who is to be the judge of what constitutes acceptability? The private and the public spheres (and where religion or faith lie) have fuzzy boundaries. It in such matters that *vekselvirkning*, an honest, free and open discussion, becomes so vital to the health of society.

³⁴² having first acknowledged that, though Norway is often regarded as having a high degree of homogeneity, the presence of Sami and Finnish 'Norwegians' has back to mediaeval times been complemented by immigration from Germany and from the other Nordic countries.

These young people speak Norwegian without an accent and consequently can scarcely be described as coming from an alien culture by those who oppose immigration. They are far more familiar with Norwegian society than their parents are and know how to promote their interests and safeguard their rights. They are familiar with both worlds and this fact creates special problems for the group as a whole. On the one hand Norwegians have told them since childhood that they are different, while they in fact know no other homeland than Norway. On the other hand they often feel pressured by their parent generation to remain faithful to the traditional values and not become 'too Norwegian'.

(Eriksen nd)

The relationship of birth and belonging, the significance of multiple identity for many people from ethnic minorities, the tension between family and territorial heritage are all issues that are recognizable in many modern societies.

'(I)f by multiculturalism one means that young Americans should learn more about the many backgrounds of those who together make up America, it would enrich us all. If (however) one means that there would be no shared heroes³⁴³ or values³⁴⁴, that there would be no recognition of one shared core - especially democracy, mutual respect, and individual rights...it might destroy our unity and thus our society'. (Etzioni 1995:37)

Against singular views of national identity, McCrone (2002) suggests³⁴⁵ that there is a significant degree of

³⁴³ Any inclusive roll however would require to be drawn from a broad range of histories.

³⁴⁴ My understanding is that different cultures properly bring their own gifts to this sharing and it is not merely a matter of subscribing to the 'traditional' recognised symbols and values.

³⁴⁵ See also Modood et al 1997 and Saeed et al 1999

use of hyphenated identities within Scotland (eg Pakistani-Scot or Asian-Scot)³⁴⁶. Such phrases carry different significance depending on whether they are self-labels or involve labelling by others and whether or not the hyphenation is being utilised to compromise the sense in which the person/group is thought to be 'truly' Scottish by the first element being considered to be a qualification of the second. It cannot be assumed that those Scots with an ethnic minority heritage necessarily wish to exclude themselves from the simple, unhyphenated 'Scottish'.³⁴⁷ Potentially problematical too is the relationship then to those whose 'Scots' identity is not hyphenated³⁴⁸ and whose identity is not therefore considered open to question³⁴⁹.

A difficulty in framing nationalism as the recognition of the legitimate political and cultural rights of a people is that this can be at the cost of the recognition of the existence as right-bearing communities of others within the nation. 'It is astonishing to hear pundits and politicians speaking of the 'four nations' of Britain. Windrush and its aftermath is not even an afterthought in this discourse. So when Scotland has got kilted up and the English have

³⁴⁶ We may be most aware of this form of self-labelling in the context of the United States of America. (Portes and MacLeod 1996_

³⁴⁷ Cf, in the context of the use of 'English' as an identity, Joly 2001.

³⁴⁸ There is no equivalent 'Scots-Scottish' either occurring in the literature or in common parlance. The absence of hyphenation is of course not suggesting that such Scots do not have or do not attach significance to multiple identities relating to such aspects as their class or gender or sexuality or other sources of identity.

³⁴⁹ Bond 2006:611 argues that 'Within any national context, an individual who can claim national belonging on the basis of all three of these markers of national identity [residence, birth and ancestry] will almost certainly have a straightforward claim to this identity'.

established their homelands far from the Welsh and Irish, where do we, the black Britons go?' (Alibhai-Brown 2000:271) If we may appeal to Grundtvig in this regard, it is clear that, together with his assertion of the rights to be Danish, linguistically and culturally, went hand-in-hand with a recognition of the rights of linguistic and cultural minorities.

BEYOND ETHNICITY

The phrase in Grundtvig's *Folkelighed* of 1848 '*Byrd og Blod er Folke-Grunde, ikke Luft og mindre Staal*' ('Descent and blood are the folk-foundation, not air still less steel'³⁵⁰) at first sight appears to affirm a decidedly ethnic view of the *folk*. Lundgreen-Nielsen counsels us, however, not to read the phrase as a reference to genetic or racial purity but as a poetic reference to the family affection and respect that ought to be borne towards one's forebears. (Lundgreen-Nielsen 1997: 89) Ole Vind, however, asserts that Grundtvig's nationalism has a background that is rooted in the ethnical story of Genesis 10.³⁵¹ (Vind 1999)

A concern that Grundtvig may have been following an exclusivist ethnocentric line of thinking is fed by the correspondence in 1849 between Grundtvig and MA Goldschmidt, a Danish Jew. Grundtvig was happy to recognise that Goldschmidt was a **citizen** of Denmark but considered that he was not culturally a Dane. (Thing

³⁵⁰ 'air' here is used in the sense of 'cant' and 'steel' is a symbol of military power

³⁵¹ 'These are the descendants of Japheth in their lands, with their own language, by their families, in their nations.'

2001) *Prima facie*, this appears to take an exclusive view of Danishness and one that sits uncomfortably with the expressions of his opinion on ethnicity that we shall consider immediately below. It would be consistent with Grundtvig's idea of the *folk* that, within a single state, there should be different ethno-cultural groups. We might then construe Grundtvig's attitude towards Goldschmidt less as an exclusion from Danishness and more as an affirmation of his membership of the Jewish cultural community.

Something of Grundtvig's approach may be discerned in current discussions concerning identity terms that have both 'national' and 'cultural' applicability. If we take the example of 'English' identity in Condor and Abell's study (2006):

Respondents³⁵² [...] did not suggest that they resented their 'exclusion' from English identity, or that they see this as curtailing their civil, political or social rights. In fact, rather than regarding an exclusive sense of English identity as a marker of white racism, they were more inclined to treat injunctions to the effect that 'everyone should call themselves English' as a form of cultural racism.
(Condor and Abell 2006:150-1)

'... What is a people? ... Is it the nose or the mouth that gives it away?³⁵³ ... They belong to a people who think they do, those who hear the mother tongue, those who love the fatherland, the rest are separated from the people, expel themselves, do not belong.' (Grundtvig, quoted in Østergård 1992:3-27) 'To a nation they

³⁵² Young adults of Pakistani ethnic heritage in Greater Manchester
³⁵³ This reference to physical characteristics would seem to be an indication of genetic or racial criteria and so it is clear that Grundtvig is rejecting this definition of national identity.

belong/ who consider themselves so/ with an ear for their language/ and fire for their country.' (Folkeligt skal alt nu være 1848, quoted in Thyssen 1993:349³⁵⁴)

The 'dark' side of nationalism, national culture and national identity is well-evidenced and apparent. Nielsen suggests that nationalism can never be anything other 'xenophobic, authoritarian, exclusivist and, where it has the opportunity, often expansionist as well' (Nielsen 1999:120) and Barry argues that national interests are generally pursued 'at the expense of the interests of other countries and without regard to other values such as the avoidance of bloodshed, respect for international law, or the maintenance of international cooperation'. (Barry 1987: 353-4) Those who are suspicious of or even hostile towards nationalism do not have to look far, historically or in contemporary world politics, to identify supporting evidence. Ignatieff, for instance, in choosing the title *Blood and Belonging* for his 1994 work on 'journeys into the new nationalism'³⁵⁵ brings together two dimensions of some forms of nationalism reflected in the word 'blood', the notion of nation as a community of people of kinship (as in 'blood relations') and the shedding of blood through violent nationalist-based struggles and wars. Reviewing situations of ethnic cleansing, of exploitation of 'guest workers', of unjust treatment of ethnic minorities, of dispossessed communities and of sectarian conflict, he portrays a picture of nationalism that is not false but it is partial. To suggest this is not to

³⁵⁴ The text appeared originally in *Danskeren* of 30 August 1848 in nr24: side 381-4 and is also published in the *Folkehøjskolens Sangbog* (1989: nr 451)

³⁵⁵ This phrase is the subtitle of Ignatieff (1994)

dispute the horror of some of the situations that he describes or the potential of nationalism to be destructive and dehumanising. It is however to propose a more balanced evaluation. 'For if on the one side this obstinate sense of national identity can lead to violent conflict and blind hatreds, on the other side it can play a more constructive role in human affairs...'

(Allchin 1993:11) 'Some nationalisms are peaceful, liberal and democratic, while others are xenophobic, authoritarian and expansionist.' (Kymlicka 1999:133)

Such descent-based approaches to national membership have obvious racist overtones...It is indeed one of the tests of a liberal conception of minority rights that it defines national membership in terms of integration into a cultural community, rather than descent. National membership should be open in principle to anyone, regardless of race or colour, who is willing to learn the language and history of the society and participate in its social and political institutions.

(Kymlicka 1995:23)

It is common to describe Denmark as an imagined egalitarian community based on a significantly homogeneous society imbued with a culture of consensus. (Marcussen and Zølner 2003, citing Borish 1991; Hansen 1980; Liep and Olwig 1994; Reddy 1991; Østergård 1992a, 1992b and 2000) On this view of national identity, it is not ethnicity that binds the community, nor even a democratic commitment to civic institutions, values and processes, but a kinship of character. 'This is what we are like' might be its motto. One suspects that Grundtvig would have seen this in somewhat essentialist terms, that these were the outworking of the spirit of

the people, the *folkeånd*.³⁵⁶ Hume, for example, is rather less essentialist, believing there to be discernible traits in a people³⁵⁷ but that these were neither common to all, nor immutable. (Scott 1985:96) In truth, it is to Grundtvig himself that one largely should look to find the stimulus and the guide. 'The egalitarian discourse is so deeply ingrained that it shapes Danish self-perception and defines acceptable modes of action.' (Liep and Olwig 1994: 18) Craig (2003) suggests that at times such myths of national character correlate poorly to actual behaviour and in fact become a proxy for actually living out the myth's content. They may also however be prophetic myths in which the essential character is declared, not so much as an explanation as a call to 'return' to some trait. The purpose of the myth can be to serve a 'movement of moral regeneration which seeks to re-unite the different aspects of the nation... by returning to the creative life-principle of the nation'. (Hutchinson 1987:14) The notion then of the 'trait' being true to the people's character is less a looking back into primeval origins as a looking to develop the characteristic in response to contemporary needs.

So commonly and positively affirmed are the features of 'Danishness' that it would be easy to view Danish society stereotypically and to ignore the evidence that there are other, and contradictory, facets in Danish

³⁵⁶ The essentialist view of national character may be tinged or even by explicitly related with ethnicity as 'inherited traits'

³⁵⁷ 'Men of sense condemn these indistinguished judgements; though, at the same time, they allow that each nation has a peculiar set of manners, and that some particular qualities are more frequently to be met with among one people than among their neighbours.' (Hume, quoted in Scott 1985:96)

public life. We are well accustomed to our image of Denmark as an open, *hyggelig*³⁵⁸, social democratic, egalitarian and welfare-oriented society. There are signs in contemporary Denmark however that the exclusivist side of national identity is not without influence and effect. The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights noted in November 2004 that '(The committee) was concerned that the rise in the number of immigrants and refugees arriving in Denmark over the last years had been met with increased negative and hostile attitudes towards foreigners. It recommended, among other things, that the State party closely monitor the incidence of, and combat racism and xenophobia, and that it continue to promote intercultural understanding and tolerance among all groups in society.' (United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 2004)

In recent Danish parliamentary elections, there has been a growth of electoral support for right-wing parties and, at the time of writing, the government has the support of the Danish People's Party (Danske folkeparti or DF)³⁵⁹. 'The DF is profoundly anti-immigrant, proclaiming that 'we will not accept a transformation to a multi-ethnic society (...) Denmark belongs to the Danes'' (Blau and Christensen 2006: 3). The website of the DF declares, 'vi elsker vort fædreland, og vi føler en historisk forpligtelse til at værne om landet, folket

³⁵⁸ *Hygge* is another difficult-to-translate Danish term but expresses a range of characteristics, embracing cosiness, welcome, authentic relationship to the national character, consistent with the people and their history.

³⁵⁹ The *Dansk Folkeparti*. The party's share of the vote in parliamentary elections in Denmark was 7.4% in 1998, 12% in 2001 and 13.3% in 2005. (Danish Interior Affairs and Health Ministry 2006)

og den danske arv' (we love our fatherland, and we feel a historic commitment to defend our country, our people and the Danish inheritance). Two affirmations in its statement of principles declare: 'Landet bygger på den danske kulturarv, og dansk kultur skal derfor bevares og styrkes... Vi vil ...ikke acceptere en multi-etnisk forvandling af landet' (The country is built on the Danish cultural inheritance, and Danish culture should therefore be preserved and strengthened... We will not accept a multi-ethnic change in the country.) (Dansk Follkeparti 2006) The romantic Grundtvigian perception of the countryside as the nation unspoiled by alien influences³⁶⁰ is available to modern exclusivist politics. Wren's view is that this is becoming a more distinct part of Danish political discourse. (Wren 2001)

The boundary between a sense of celebration of national particularity and beliefs about ethno-cultural purity can be maintained only through a vigilance and a resistance when the language of love of that particularity begins to turn to a hatred of that which is different.

³⁶⁰ Rural landscapes and the life of their populations are popular 'signifiers of national identity' in nationalist discourse. (Agyeman and Spooner, 1997)

UNIVERSALISM, COSMOPOLITANISM and *MELLEM-FOLKELIGHED*

Universalism, particularity and national identity

'I love my family more than myself; more than my family my fatherland; more than my fatherland humankind.'

(Herder quoting Fénelon and himself quoted in Foster 2001)

It was fundamental to Grundtvig's thinking that there was no contradiction between the particularity of a *folk* and the universal nature of our humanity, for human life 'unfolds itself in a definite people, who have their own character created through history' (Hanne Severinsen, quoted in Asia Folk School Online 2001). 'Human nature is only found in national form.' (Thaning 1972:74)

Neil MacCormick adopts a similar position. 'Could one learn to love mankind universally if one has not first learned to love people in the concrete in the narrower range. Respecting other people entails respecting the things they value. If I have no sense of what is my own to which I have special regard, I can hardly respect your sense of special regard for what is your own.' (MacCormick 1999:194)

In Grundtvig's mind, there was a suspicion that what was passed off as universal was indeed something that had once been particular in an ethnic group or nation. That is indeed not unknown: Condorcet's argument for a universal language concluded with the identification of French as the ideal choice for this role. (Kymlicka 1999) More broadly, visions of the universal have not

infrequently borne a striking resemblance to Westernization (Conversi 2001:38) and cosmopolitanism in some forms has seemed 'just like idiosyncratic variants on American patriotism' (Howe 2002:81 citing Brennan 1997)

Though universal principles and nationalist claims are cast oppositionally in much of the literature, Grundtvig approaches the question of 'nation' from a universalist basis, that there is a fundamental right for nations as cultural groups to exist and to have the means of expressing their culture. As Henningsen (1993b:59) argues, '(Grundtvig's) perspective was universal. History was a process of interaction and enlightenment. But, Grundtvig urgently emphasized, there is no shortcut of harmonization leading to the universally human.'

Freedom was a fundamental issue for Grundtvig and influenced his thinking on many things, from church organisation³⁶¹ to pedagogy³⁶². The road to universal values could not lie down the path of domination. It could not be right to impose particular values or norms upon peoples under the pretext that they were universal. Our common humanity could not be affirmed through denying some human beings their right to self-determination.

³⁶¹ In relation for example to the rights of free (valgmenighed) congregations to elect their own priest or liberty to attend worship and participate in the sacraments outwith one's 'own' parish

³⁶² In relation, for example, to the need for a spirit of freedom in learning situations

The idea of 'chosenness', though common as a form of national myth³⁶³, now seems to us an outmoded way of thinking and capable of reinforcing aggressive and dominating ideas within a nation. Yet Grundtvig offers a more servant-oriented interpretation. Its affirmation is that the world has need of nations that are different because they find a vocation to serve the world in different ways. He discerns in history a special role for the Danish and indeed Nordic peoples, not for their own aggrandisement but for the good of humanity. (Fain 1971: 84) We may no longer employ the language of vocation or chosenness, but this is no reason to dismiss the concept of each nation having a particular contribution to offer (a concept with which we are perfectly content in relation to individual human beings).

In this context too, we may reiterate the point made in other contexts that, as Grundtvig is concerned to affirm the particular, so it is within the context of the unity of humankind. Bugge emphasises that

his thoughts about 'the folk/ people/ nation' and 'nationhood' did not express the narrow and aggressive consciousness of identity of which examples could be found in nineteenth-century Europe, or which find expression in so many nationalistic movements in our day... (but are rooted in) a universalist view of humanity which in the final analysis has its roots in the Judaeo-Christian idea of creation. Therefore, mankind's progress occurs in a positive dialogic interaction with other peoples and their cultures.

(Bugge 1999a:144)

³⁶³ See, for example, AD Smith and Schöpflin

Globalisation and cosmopolitanism

'Globalisation³⁶⁴ may be thought of initially as the *widening, deepening and speeding up of worldwide interconnectedness* in all aspects of contemporary social life, from the cultural to the criminal, the financial to the spiritual.' (Held et al. 1999, 2)

In this context, nations or at least nation-states are thought to be obstructive and ultimately irrelevant if not obsolete. (Aranason 1990; Hobsbawm 1990; Smelser 1968) It is not for here to evaluate in detail these trends. Globalisation is unquestionably a powerful force in the world. It is rooted in an evolutionary understanding that imagines humanity to be progressing to more universal forms of living and more universal values³⁶⁵, though late 20thC developments have called into serious question the assumption of this trend. (Connor 1973) They clearly could have consequence for

³⁶⁴ It is not necessary here to explore in detail issues of causality and context, but briefly it may be helpful to acknowledge such factors as

- Internationalisation of markets and economies with consequences for the mobility of labour across state and indeed continental boundaries and the development of immense transnational corporations
- Challenges in major fields of global significance transcending national boundaries and not amenable only to national strategies and solutions, eg health and environmental issues
- Scientific development, particularly in relation to communication technology, facilitating a diffusion of cultural values (though Schlesinger 1987,1991 offers evidence of a resurgence of ethnic communities in diaspora through the capacity of dispersed 'members' to build relationships and renew 'memories' through IT communication networks)
- Migration as economic and legal boundaries are relaxed both within political and economic collaborative organisations and more widely
- International treaty recognition of human rights and with them an increasing sense of universal personhood (Soysal 1994).

³⁶⁵ The UNESCO declaration on cultural diversity (2001) for example endeavours to hold together particularity and universality, rooted in an affirmation that the right to cultural diversity is a universal human right.

both the nation-state and for cultural particularity. The development of relationships, activities and mechanisms at a global level can be seen to undermine the relevance of the nation-state which may be bypassed. Our role as citizens is relegated in comparison with our role as consumers and consumers in a global market. It is in that setting that we are to exercise our freedom of choice and of action.

The term 'cosmopolitanism' is scarcely a novel one³⁶⁶, but there is a contemporary usage that is more specifically linked to a modern consumerist perspective.

The cosmopolitan... refuses to think of himself as defined by his location or his ancestry or his citizenship or his language. Though he may live in San Francisco and be of Irish ancestry, he does not take his identity to be compromised when he learns Spanish, eats Chinese, wears clothes made in Korea, listens to arias by Verdi sung by a Maori princess on Japanese equipment... He is a creature of modernity, conscious of living in a mixed-up world and having a mixed-up self.

(Waldron 1996:172)

One might be tempted to dismiss this as rather superficial, but the argument is made that this permeability of geographical and cultural borders renders national and cultural group boundaries superfluous and nonsensical and that the case for particular nations or cultures is consequently undermined. While it has to be recognised that the late 20thC and early 21stC have brought more accessible air travel, it is not the case that the lives of the vast majority of people in the world have been transformed so that they are moving constantly between places and across cultures. 'Sated people can afford to be

³⁶⁶ In ancient Greece, the κοσμοπολιτης was a citizen of the world.

cosmopolitan'. (Ignatieff 1994:189) Though the quotation purports to be about identity and seems to suggest that this cosmopolitan lifestyle results in a 'mixed-up self', it also affirms that 'he does not take his identity to be compromised'; there is nothing to suggest that the person's identity is undermined or altered by moving through these diverse experiences. There is a seriously consumer-oriented perspective at work here; 'I am what I consume'. Grundtvig was dismissive of any notion that one became a member of another *folk* simply by learning the language. (Fain 1971: 83) Though our anonymous cosmopolitan is able and happy to partake of these different 'cultures', there is nothing to suggest that s/he wishes them to lose distinctiveness or fails to recognise that they are in some way different or foreign to his own; indeed the opposing assumption may be the more likely. The mere fact that Waldron lists the names of nationalities and these will evoke an understanding in the mind of the reader suggests that these cultures still exist at some level or another in an recognisable form. Indeed, as Conversi (2001:37), 'cosmopolitans still depend on the locals to be able to conceive themselves as cosmopolitans'. The locals, meantime, may regard the more acculturated élites as no longer belonging fully to the cultural community (Laborde 2001), just as Grundtvig viewed critically the élites who had lost their 'Danishness'.

The other major ground on which cosmopolitanism is advanced against particularity is that the latter is labelled parochial or limited in vision. It is an accusation to which the Scots have been particularly

sensitive. It implies a narrowness and a backwardness that conflicts with a declaration that holds Scotland to be a nation that is both comfortable with itself yet open to the world and to modernity. 'It damns up before we start because we must leap in desperation to join 'the world'; condemns us when we finish with having been no more than ourselves'. (Craig 1996:11) Kavanagh³⁶⁷ offers a more positive view of 'the parochial mentality (... which) is never in any doubt about the social and artistic validity of his parish...'. It has to be acknowledged that a parochialism which is blind to the ideas and ways of other places or arrogantly imagines its own superiority or has no interest in anything beyond its own bounds would be a poor thing.

A local and global *mellem-folkelighed*

If *folkelighed* is not to be understood and practised exclusively in the context of the nation, how are we to understand its international dimensions?

It is, firstly, an affirmation of our common humanity and a commitment to be in solidarity with one another. It recognises that, though we express our humanness at some level in different ways, nonetheless there is an underlying universal quality. It refuses to allow our particularity in identity to mask, or worse to undermine, our shared identity.

It also celebrates and uses our diversity, not as a source of division, but as an enrichment of human life. Further, it requires of us (as far as is consistent with

³⁶⁷ (cited in Fallon and Mahon 1990:xviii)

fundamental human values) to respect the views, values and ways of those who differ from us so that, as we explore experience more deeply, we may be able to discern the meeting-points, the harmony and the cohesion that lies there.

It calls us out of isolation and separation into interaction. 'It is not just more knowledge, not just a wider horizon, not just a better judgement about good and evil in our moral jungle. It is that, but it is more than that. Grundtvig would say that education is transference of life from lone personality to another through the spoken word, the 'living word' ... But even this definition is not enough. Education is interpretation of life... We must go into fellowship with other men and women in order to interpret our own experiences in fellowship with them...' (Manniche 1973:38-9)

This interaction leads us out of independence into interdependence and reciprocity, out of distancing into dialogue, out of division into respect for difference.

Chapter 9

DET LEVENDE ORD

THE LIVING WORD

THE LIVING WORD

As a theological idea

The Living Word related to fundamental questions of the nature of humankind within the created order, with the place of the Bible within the Christian community, with the words spoken by Jesus himself and with language as a part of creation.

In his early years, he had taken a strict view on the authority of the Christian scriptures as the Word of God. In time, however, he recognised that there was indeed a Christian Church with an oral tradition before the New Testament as a book had come into being. (Thaning 1973) Christianity had not been founded, not upon the Bible, but upon early congregations. (Harbsmeier 1973)

He was a stern critic of the rationalists whom, he felt, had undermined by their biblical criticism the foundation that Luther had built through the translation of the Bible into the vernacular. (Michelsen 1983) He underwent as part of his 'unparalleled discovery' of 1823-4 however a fresh realisation about the relationship of the Bible and the Church. It was his awakening to the idea of the Living Word, which convinced him that it was not possible that the living word of God should come to life through a

book rather than the oral word³⁶⁸. (Eastern Churches Quarterly 1959 :131) Now he says, 'The Bible is the shadow of the Word: the shadow follows the man, not the reverse. The shadow is a picture of the living man. Only when the Word is made living by force of the spirit and the living faith does it rise from the dead.' (Christelige Prædikener II:325ff).

The capacity for the Bible to be used for 'death' rather than 'life' was acknowledged by Grundtvig. 'Only in the warmth of the oral word is the light living, and where it fails to accompany the divine scriptures, these become nothing but a rack for the little ones' (Grundtvig quoted in Bugge 1993d)

In the light of the prologue to John's Gospel, Grundtvig argues: 'The Word rather is Christ himself, the love of the Father revealed in our own language, living and present in the strength of the Spirit' (Lindhart 1951:45) If the Word is to be a Living Word, it comes through verbs of action. (Lindhart 1951:44) The ministry of Jesus was oral rather than written; the Gospel was spoken and heard rather than written and read. (Lundgreen-Nielsen 1993:92)

The Christian congregation was not a 'reading society' but rather a 'community of faith'. Preaching the Word was not 'to write with pen and ink, but in the strength of the spirit and with a living voice to proclaim the word of faith...' (Christelige Prædikener I, Preface; trans

³⁶⁸ This perspective on the Scriptures is consistent with his wider criticism of the place of books in the human community.

Lindhart 1951 at 42) in order that it might evoke an active response in the hearer. (Lawson 1991:11)

It was in the sacraments that most clearly the Word was to be heard. Grundtvig himself argues: '...we must place the open Bible on the Altar, and not imagine that we can construct the Altar on the book'³⁶⁹ (quoted in Eastern Churches Quarterly 1959:131) Grundtvig's new theological conviction is related to his thinking in secular areas. In his theology, the word is the vehicle of the spirit; that also is his basic idea when he speaks about education. He advocated the use of the living, spoken word in worship, but in the secular area of education the living word is of course not Jesus Christ, but a human word. (Bugge 1983a)

The living word was rooted also in the nature of humankind, : 'Man is in God's image made/ with living words on his tongue; among trees and beasts he can therefore with the gods have speech and make song' (Koch 1943:123)³⁷⁰. A fundamental characteristic of humanity was the capacity for speech. The human word is 'the mark of the human in distinction from the animal, the expression of our wonderful inner life, the evidence of our likeness to God. He who was the complete image of God was therefore called also the Word of God.'³⁷¹ (Allen 1949)

³⁶⁹ At the celebration of the sacraments, the words of Jesus are heard and the congregation respond with their own living word, particularly in the Creed and the Lord's Prayer. 'When the creed is spoken at baptism and communion, says Grundtvig, the Holy Spirit creates a fusion of the human, spoken word and Christ, God's living word.

³⁷⁰ Also, 'the sound of the word upon our lips/ resembles in small our maker's voice/ is still from that other world/ utters power in the spirit's name' (Koch 1943:124).

³⁷¹ Grundtvig however does not confuse the Living Word as it comes from God and the living word spoken by human beings. As KE Bugge

Yet, the Word of God and the word of human beings do not remain wholly in isolation from one another. There is potential for interaction. God speaks to humankind but humankind is also capable of speaking to God with a human word, for 'earth's creator gave to men speech that they might talk to him.' (Koch 1943:132) The capacity for encounter and engagement is fundamental to the centrality of the oral.

The oral v the written word

The decisive factor in the mind of Grundtvig is not theological but practical. It was the poetry and power of language that convinced Grundtvig that the living word was indeed the spoken and not the written word. 'The word belongs on the mouth and not on the pen' (*Nordens Mytologi eller Sindbilled-Sprog* 1832 trans Broadbridge and Jensen 1984: 28)

It was indeed life itself that had nurtured this idea in Grundtvig's head. His childhood experiences with his mother and with Malene, the helper at the Udby parsonage were formative for him³⁷².

suggests, 'we find a distinction between that which originates in God and that which originates in man. The Word of God is of course Jesus Christ who was and is the light of man.' (Bugge 1983a:10-11)
³⁷² It was she (Grundtvig's mother) herself who taught the little boy to read, and soon he was poring delightedly over books like Suhm's 'History of Denmark'. Kall's 'World History' and 'The Life of Luther' - great volumes which were almost too heavy for him to carry. It was she, too, who told him old Scandinavian sagas, and sang him Danish songs, giving him his first experience of the 'living word' which he afterwards regarded as such an essential means of education.' (Davies 1944: 14-15) Grundtvig wrote to her in 1815 - 'with thy noble blood thou gavest me the sense of song and saga.' (quoted in Davies 1944:15)

From early years, he had been absorbed by the Norse legends. Though they were now in written form, he was conscious of their oral basis. When he turned to translation, he attested: 'I have endeavoured with all my might to render into living speech what I saw in the poem'. (*Beowulf* 1820) He would pause and ask himself, when in doubt about a phrase, 'How would Malene have said that?' (Davies 1944:15)

Another formative event for him had been hearing lectures by his cousin, Steffens. The memory of **what** Steffens had said was significant for him in leading him to recognising the importance of what is *folkelig* in the life of a people, but he remembered also **how** Steffens had spoken. It had been inspirational. 'it was the power of the spoken word that caused the spark to jump.' In a poem composed at Steffen's death he called him 'the lightning man' as a tribute to that spark lit by Steffens' speaking. (Thaning 1972 at 77) Grundtvig knew from this and from his own experience of speaking that the lecture, the talk, could inspire and challenge and change.

Later, Grundtvig was impressed by the capacity of the voice of the ordinary people to express what was good and right in Denmark in the consultative assemblies. He wrote (1936): 'I have been struck lately by the thought that the original Danish national feeling and the People's Voice enlivening all that is Danish, the voice I was looking for in old books and within myself, they too have truly risen from the dead in The People's State Council, so as long as we just give it time as we should, everything in Denmark will gradually take Danish

shape, just like everything in the Church will take Christian shape, with the help of God.' (quoted in Lawson 1991:19)

Grundtvig was himself a powerful orator, as reports attest³⁷³:

That was a blessed moment. How it still remains beautiful for me when I think of it! I can see even today that venerable figure sitting by the window. I feel as if I can still hear his strange and curious voice, both mild and weighty at the same time. It was as if he took a veil away from my eyes. [...] I had never seen things in that light before. It became so clear for me. [...] 'While he talked', I later wrote to my fiancée, 'it was as if I came home to myself. The most beautiful dream of my youth had been brought to life again.' I finally knew what it was I had to take hold of.' (Trier 1890:12 quoted in Borish 1998:241)

He was effective as a soap-box orator. Some 27 years after the event, Termansen wrote of the speech at Skamlingsbanken: 'Every chord within me responded, and I have hardly forgotten a word. For hours afterwards I repeated them to myself in my quiet working hours, to which they brought refreshment, life and enrichment... It was one of the most memorable days in my life.' (Davies 1944:25) A newspaper report noted that 'he spoke for an hour and a quarter in the open air' and it commented on 'the immediate understanding and audible resonance with which every innuendo, even the very slightest, was received by the crowd.' (quoted in Thaning 1972:11) His preaching was commanding and his lectures popular. (ibid

³⁷³ Gosse, an English visitor to Denmark in 1872, also testifies to Grundtvig's charismatic appeal (Gosse 1911:85-87, quoted in Borish 1998:242)

1972:11) Thaning suggests further that a key to this extensive appeal was his ability to captivate different audiences by discovering and exploiting the kind of language they understood and the subjects that appealed to them: students, artisans and, at political meetings, sailors and farmers. But gatherings of learned scholars also listened to what he had to say. The living word was one that spoke to the hearer, whoever that hearer might be.³⁷⁴ The capacity of the oral word to engage, move and convince is its strength in education and communication.

'The starting point for Grundtvig's thinking on the Living Word is a qualitative distinction between the spoken, oral word on the one side and the written, possibly printed, word on the other side. The oral word is primary. Its source is life, it is living, and it arouses or creates life...'³⁷⁵ (Bugge 1999:41)

³⁷⁴ Not all were similarly impressed on all occasions. 'A contemporary has recorded one tragic-comic scene from Roskilde Synod in 1812, when to the assembled clergy Grundtvig read aloud his fine poem *Roskilde Rim*, glorifying the historical and religious associations of the ancient Cathedral. (Grundtvig said afterwards that some of his hearers were moved to tears, but they were a small minority.) During the reading, Bishop Münster wandered around the room, taking books from the shelves and turning over their pages; most of the clergy. Who had just had a good dinner, slept peacefully and snored, while the Dean who sat beside Grundtvig 'with an angel's patience kept re-lighting the candles as often as the poet in his enthusiasm blew them out'' (Davies 1944:19)

³⁷⁵ It is a view he expressed frequently and forcefully. 'The word stands as high above writing as the body above the shadow.' (*Nordens Mythologi* 1832,v,28; Davies 1931:17) 'All letters are dead even if written by the fingers of angels and nibs of stars'. (*Skolen for Livet*; trans Jensen 1984 at 66) He contrasts 'glowing tongues and ice cold pens'. (*Pentecost Sermon 1858*) [F]irstly and lastly it is the mouth which must be used, particularly because it is the only living tool for the spirit on earth, and partly because we never will get more in common with the People than that can be therein and by itself be passed on from mouth to mouth as well, and it is as easily said that only to the same degree as the speech becomes dialogue partly between old people and young ones, and partly between the youngsters themselves, only to the same degree the enlightenment will succeed... (*Bøn og Begreb om en dansk højskole i Soer* 1840; trans in Lawson 1991:58)

For Grundtvig, then, the oral word is the most powerful in impact; it is hearing rather than reading that most engages the audience. The oral word carries emotion; the written lacks passion. The oral engages; the written leaves detached. The oral reflects and speaks to the spirit of the people; the written stands apart from the people. The oral is living and conveys life; the written is dead and brings death.

'I have already sought to emphasize the enormous difference between word and script, given equal circumstances...Life profits as little by dead words as by dead fish; as little by blunt quills as by pointed pens of steel; as little by shadowy words as by shadowy people...the word belongs in the mouth and not in the pen and that ideas and emotions, faith and *anskuelse* are expressed orally not manually and...Children are born with tongue and with ears but not with books under their arms or with pen in their hand.' (*Nordens Mytologi* 1832 translated in Knudsen 1976:22ff)

For Grundtvig, the supremacy of the oral word over the written was self-evident. The written word should try to imitate the oral, to recover some of the power of the oral word. There was no hope of renewal and of the continuation of folk-life in the spirit unless the pen was cut according to folk-speech so that the written word became at least for the liveliest people a fiery utterance of the ancient folk-spirit...' (*Skribenten Nik Fred Sev Grundtvigs Literaire Testamente* 1827; Haarder 1983 at 24-5) In the Christian life too, there was an

acknowledgement that the written word was dead without the oral attributes of faith and power.

...earlier he had believed ...that every educated reader could see what Christianity was from the Scriptures. But now he saw that that as a mistake. The paper is dead and the letters are dead without faith and power. Faith comes from *hearing*, hearing 'the Word of Faith that we preach.' (Thyssen 1993:246)

Part of orality's power lay in its naturalness, its spontaneity. The living word had 'precious little to do with the wisdom of books, it has everything to do with the experience of everyday life, the meeting with women and the open talk.' (Grundtvig quoted in Harbsmeier 1993:130) We can see here how closely the living word and *vekselvirkning* are partners to one another.

Grundtvig acknowledges that not all human words are living words. At its best, speech is a mark that, despite, in Christian and Grundtvig's terms, the fallen state of humanity, humankind has maintained 'a sense of truth and longing for life which is the essence of true humanity, and, as such, the absolute prerequisite for man's salvation from sin and death.' (Prenter 1973: 223) Yet Grundtvig was aware of the potential for the misuse of the oral word, a word that may superficially appear to be living, but nonetheless bring death rather than life. 'Grundtvig's living word can just as well be used as a means of leading man to inhumanity as to humanity, unless the person using it at the same time sharpens his audience's critical sense - and then it is no longer the living word.' (Toftdahl 231) The oral word can be used to teach hatred, to destroy, to spread evil, to inspire people to do evil. Where an individual or a people

misuse the language to distort the truth or to speak in an unloving way or to work for death rather than life, then there is a loss of their 'created humanity'. (Prenter 1973:224)

If speech is a mark of our being human, it is only a living word if it reflects our humanity which Grundtvig finds in the honesty, the love and the strength in human speech of men. These three are present in speech not in an objective way, but they are the real human stuff that make up human speech.' (Harbsmeier 1993:131) Grundtvig cherished the power and potential of human speech when it best reflected these ideals of honesty, love and strength.

In our contemporary situation, the priority of the 'living word' would appear to resonate with a fresh emphasis on the oral dimension. In Part Three, I turn to three areas of learning and engagement, each of which is fundamentally oral.

Bielfeldt (1998) however raises a cautionary note as to its continuing relevance in what might be said to be a post-verbal age,

Firstly, the Grundtvigian notion that the word can 'live' and operate in the transformation of a person's life is increasingly problematic today, for dwindling numbers of American college students have been 'linguistically-formed' by the reading of books. Students today are much more accustomed to watching television...than reading, listening or conversation about issues. For most the visual image has a better chance of striking the heart than the spoken word.

Similarly, in the context of pressures to deliver learning opportunities in individualised and distance modes, the opportunities for living words to be heard and exchanged are compromised.

The place of books in learning

I began chapter 1 by alluding to the book-oriented nature of much theological learning. Much theology is in the form of (often very large) books. Written forms are associated with space for development and complexity. Written material holds together quantities of 'factual' resources. Literacy is prized.

'We do not seek life itself in books', Grundtvig declares (quoted in Davies 1931:17). If learning was indeed a *livoplysning*, then it must be concerned with the deepest truths which are found not in texts³⁷⁶ but in living and speaking.

His own school experience had taught him only of the misuse of books in education. (Davies 1944:15) Nonetheless, he had devoted himself for much of his early life to scholarship amongst books. He had been seeking 'the original Danish character and the voice of the people...in old books' (Davies 1944:23) He had become a book-worshipper, a book worm, he admitted. (Thyssen 1983:251)

³⁷⁶ This is not to say that books do not contain truths. Rather, it is that it does not become truth for us until we have appropriated it, related it to our experience and our lives, engaged with others around the questions and discerned its meaning for living.

His position as a critic of the role of books might seem hypocritical, given that he was both a prolific writer and an avid reader. This, he acknowledged. (Davies 1931:17) A significant part of his corpus of written work was however in more orally-oriented forms such as poems, hymns and songs, and speeches.

It was not, however, that he rejected books, but rather that he considered that there was a superstitious assumption about the contribution of books and that they were too often a substitute for learning from life itself. They ought to be 'good friends in reserve'. (Bugge 1983d:219)

'A good book by conveying to me the reflection or shadow of the 'living word' may awake the feeling which is slumbering in my soul; but it cannot transplant new life. Only the 'living word' itself can do that, for the written word is dead.' (Davies 1931:17) One ought not to go to books in order to resolve questions: 'books cannot settle issues; they can only describe'. (Nordens Mytologi 1832; trans in Knudsen 1976:2)

None of this is to suggest that there can be no useful engagement between writer and reader. 'It is the living, communicative situation that is central to the making of poem and tale. This communicative situation, the narrative situation, the interaction between the poet and his public, is as ancient as the hills and for ever new.' (Haarder 1983:76) Yet, there could not be a true *vekselvirkning* or interaction, for there is no contact and no conversation between them.

Rather, the priority was for life to be explored in the context of life. 'Life' which is more than 'food' is certainly also more than the 'books' and must be studied when you want to collect 'knowledge of human nature'; here the books may be good aids, but they are still, as you know, not at all human beings, and very bad substitutes for them too.' (Den Danske Fiir-Kløver in Lawson 1991:28) He was critical of the notion that 'the more steadily you kept at the books from childhood the wiser you became of the human life with which you had nothing to do at all'. (Bøn og Begreb in Lawson 1991:154) 'All book knowledge is dead that is not unified with a corresponding life in the reader' (Skolen for Livet 1838; Broadridge and Jensen 1984:74) The book may inspire the reader to enter into experiences, to reflect upon experience, to converse with others, to decide and to commit, but it cannot itself do any of these things for the reader. The scene of real learning was not the library but life itself where experience and conversation were the teachers.

Not only do books in themselves fail to convey the living word, they can delude the reader into imagining that they have gained insight into life, for in worshipping books and printed words, they 'lost all sense of spirit and life'. (Grundtvig quoted in Thaning 1972:76) In the study of the academic world, there is a risk of 'thinking and talking like a book and treating everybody like a book'. (Thyssen 1983:250) Though reading as an educational tool is very often complemented by some requirement to discuss with others, Grundtvig challenges us to see that, too readily, the focus can be on the book and its forms of knowledge rather than on requiring the book to be an

entry into conversation that is life- and living-focused. If the book is approached in a spirited way, however, it is possible that the printed ideas can come alive through dialogue and 'the frozen past' can be connected to 'students' questions as generated by their contemporary lives and circumstances'. (Spicer 1998:177-8) 'We go then to books not as bookworms who will feed on them as we would feed on corpses and carcasses, but as living people...' (Nordens Mytologi 1832 in Broadbridge and Jensen 1984:45)

Books were aids to understanding, not ends in themselves. 'I looked at life, at real human life as it is led in this world, and immediately saw that in order to learn how to lead a useful and pleasurable human life the majority of people really do not require books at all, but only a good, honest heart, sound common sense, a tolerably good ear, a tolerably good tongue - and then enough liveliness to be able to talk to properly enlightened people capable of arousing their attention and showing them what life likes when the light shines upon it.' (Thaning 1972:96-7)

MODERSMÅL - THE MOTHER TONGUE

The position of Danish in Grundtvig's time

The Danish language had fallen into a state of weakness and vulnerability. The educated believed - and the educational and state systems supported this view - that the path to higher culture lay through a knowledge of foreign languages, particularly Latin and German. In

part at least, this is the root of Grundtvig's antipathy towards the educated and cultured classes of Copenhagen. Borish (1991) notes that in the surviving manuscripts of the elder Bernstorff, statesman and diplomat in Denmark, not a single word of Danish is to be found. Indeed, the educated had become almost apologetic for their lack of language skills. (Smaaskrifter 1872:38-9; trans Lawson 1991:38)

They took a disdainful view of their own native language. As Davies (1994:6-7) suggests, 'as for their national language, in which those treasures were preserved, many of them were inclined to be ashamed of it and to look on it as the unpolished speech of an inferior class'. 'Would it be exaggerated to assume that three-fourths of the students of Copenhagen can hardly write Danish... (Davies 1944:40) In particular, they often regarded the folk language as rude and barbaric. (Nordens Mytologi 1832; trans Jensen 1984:46) Grundtvig asserts, 'for where the mother tongue in its natural simplicity is ousted from official usage and cultured circles it is so to speak thrown on the dunghill.' (Mands Minde 1838 in Jensen 1984:116) The Danish language had been 'downgraded as nowhere else in the cultured world.' (Lykøskning til Danmark 1847; trans Lawson 1991:98) These comments may bring to mind the extent to which Scots came to be regarded as merely a debased form of English (Kay 1986; McClure 1997) 'So a person who doesn't "speak right" is therefore categorised as an ignoramus; it's not simply that he doesn't know how to speak right, but that this

"inability" shows that he has no claim to knowledge of truth.' (Leonard 1973)³⁷⁷

This weakening of the position of Danish as a living and lively language had also permeated the ordinary life of Denmark. 'I listened to it (the people's voice) for five months without hearing more than two proverbs of which one by the way was an imitation...' (Den Danske Fiir Kløver 1836; trans Lawson 1991:32) In the Scottish situation, this would underestimate the strength of Scots or Scots elements in English as a form of everyday speech, but education for long has viewed this tongue as an erroneous form of English, still largely denies its vocabulary and forms any place in scholarly conversation and attaches low status to its expression and those who use it.

The main twin threats to the Danish language were Latin (taught in the so-called Latin schools) and German (through its dominance in the public sphere).

The confrontation around the use of the German language became particularly focused in the situation in the duchies of Slesvig and Holstein. In the duchies, there were both Danish- and German- speaking populations. The official language of the Slesvig Assembly however was German despite the protestations of some Danish-speaking members that they ought to be permitted to use their own mother tongue in debates. (Davies 1944:24) The issue

³⁷⁷ See also Tom Leonard's poem 'this is the six o'clock news' (Leonard 1983)

of language rights became a heated one³⁷⁸, particularly in the southern parts of Denmark with borders to Germany and Grundtvig himself became a significant contributor to the debate. The rights of the Danish speaking populations had to be protected in their own context and also that the position of Danish within Denmark as a whole should not be further undermined.

One of Grundtvig's objections to the use of German was its 'colonising' tendencies. The dominance of the German language was part of a wider Germanisation which Grundtvig sought to resist (and which we consider elsewhere in the thesis in the chapters on *folkelighed* and cultural nationalism). (Mands Minde 1838)

He was particularly critical of the notion that education could be properly conducted in other than the mother tongue. In this, he echoes the thinking of Herder: 'If language is the organ of our soul-forces, the medium of our innermost education, then we cannot but be educated otherwise than in the language of our people and our country; and so-called French education in Germany must by necessity deform and misguide German minds.' (Herder 1770; Allchin 1993:18; Rerup 1993:18)

Language policies in education had created and widened a gap between the ordinary people and the scholars that had grown into 'a yawning abyss'. (Lawson 1991:49) As Lochead's poem (Lochhead 2003) suggests, it drives a gulf also between people's worlds: everyday life in which one

³⁷⁸ In part, this was an economic and social issue as much as a linguistic one, as the use of German meant, for Danish speakers, exclusion and the need to pay interpreters.

form of speech is used and a world of scholarship (including theology) in which a different and unfamiliar language has to be employed.

In his own writings, Grundtvig was resistant to the appropriation of foreign words into the Danish language. The mother tongue had to be cleansed of the 'muddy water' which creeps into the language. (Jørgensen 1993:91) Where he encountered them, he sought out original Danish equivalents. (Thaning 1973:72)³⁷⁹

Grundtvig was deeply concerned at the state of the Danish language in Denmark; he writes of it as an 'old ash tree... the stem of which is being decayed, its leaves being eaten, its root being gnawed away.' (Lawson 1991:39) Yet, Grundtvig was not without hope. After referring to the 'six hundred years to the shattering yoke of the Latin language and to the merciless scourge of the German', he asks 'would it have been possible at all that the Danish could still be a living tongue not only for peasants and for children, but for the King and for all his bards, had it not been for the fact that the people in spite of all apparent contempt still had loved it right from the bottom of their hearts and upheld it as the apple of their eyes?'. (Lawson 1991:39) The sustaining of a mother tongue is not only a practical issue, it goes to the heart of a people's sense of their worth.

³⁷⁹ The cause of linguistic purity is a recurrent one. In Scots Gaelic there are regular debates about the appropriateness of utilizing English words as opposed to creating neologisms. French governments and legislatures have attempted to resist *franglais*. In the mediaeval period, there was resistance to the intrusion of Danish words into English.

In the light of this historical background, we turn now to explore in more detail how Grundtvig responded to the issues that the cultural and political context raised.

Language and the identity of a people

The language of a people was, for Grundtvig, not an abstraction, lifted away from the broader issues of culture. Grundtvig was not primarily a 'political' nationalist, but he acknowledged that language is a pillar of nation-building and indeed the demarcation of space. (*Den Danske Fiir-Kløver* 1836) This follows the classic Herderian association between language and the spirit of the people and the wider and indeed the wider acknowledgement of the crucial function that language plays in many national and nationalist movements. (Blonmaert 1996) 'A people without a mother tongue is like a king without his kingdom and in fact both are equally badly served by the fact that their possessions are only on paper...' *Den Danske Fiir-Kløver* 1836; Lawson 1991:48)

The four leaves of the clover are: The King, the People, the Homeland and the Mother Tongue. Allchin (1993:11) reminds us that these elements come together in the theory and in the lives of nations. 'There is a conjunction of a particular territory, a land with a particular language with its own literature, and a particular people who have a common memory and a common history, sharing their own unique experience over many generations of the fabric of human life. This interpenetration and interaction of people, place and

language, goes to make up the distinctive character of a particular nation.' We might say that the four elements are cornerstones of the nation, yet that is a more static notion. Grundtvig's clover perhaps better captures the organic and developing nature of their relationship. Allchin uses advisedly the term 'interaction', for its equivalent in Danish is *vekselvirkning*, a Grundtvigian word. As we shall recognise below, though we are and he was using it in a particular and pedagogical sense, yet nonetheless it is a concept that goes beyond such boundaries. It is that working together, that interaction, that penetration, that *vekselvirkning* of those different elements which binds together and is a dynamic of a people.

Allchin also draws our attention to the importance of culture and language, not simply for the people concerned but for the whole of humanity. In the context of what he discerns as a growing awareness of the gift of diversity, 'we may be able to give more value to the God-given quality of such things as language and culture; to see the death of a language as an affront to God as well as the impoverishment of humankind³⁸⁰. For Grundtvig the Holy Spirit speaks through the life and poets of every nation. The texts which embody the memory and experience of a whole people are in their own way also sacred texts.' (Allchin 1993:14)

³⁸⁰ The diversity of languages in the world is, in Grundtvig's view, inevitable and proper. In his sermon on Pentecost and the fulfilment of the prophecy of Joel (*Christelige Prædikener* 1859, III, 157), Grundtvig interprets the saying 'You shall speak with new tongues' as a declaration that the Gospel was spoken and heard in the mother tongues of those who were witnesses.

The mother tongue is connected to the people, *folket*, but also to the spirit of the people, *folkeånden* and to its heart. 'Every nation has its own specific national character which is peculiar to that nation and which manifests itself in that nation's language and history'³⁸¹ [...] Only through the Danish language can the power and the activity of the spirit of the people rouse the Danish people spiritually and politically'. (Birgitte Thyssen 1983:304) There is a form of *vekselvirkning* between a people and its language, for though language is formalised and systematised, nonetheless it grows organically in response to the life of the people, 'like the flower of a plant, (it) is developed from the peculiar life of each people,' (Davies 1944:45) Without adopting a wholly Herderian position, I do believe that there is a particular affinity between a people and its ordinary language, the words and the expressions it develops, for they grow out of its experience and its perspective. They are words too that carry not only their particular meaning but are signs and symbols of wider significance as something that is owned in common by a community. 'Ethnic identity is twin skin to linguistic identity - I am my language. Until I can take a pride in my language, I cannot take pride in myself'. (Anzaldúa 1987:59)

³⁸¹ Grundtvig however equally respects the linguistic rights of others, not only in their own nations, but where there are minorities. Grundtvig resisted the efforts of the Danish government to bolster the Danishness of the duchies by enforcing the learning and use of Danish amongst those whose mother tongue was German and he supported his son Sven who asserted the rights of the Faeroese to their own language rights. (Lawson 1991) It is possible, he suggests, for one to have a love of the mother tongue and still show respect for the languages of others. (*Langt højere bjerger*; Borish 1991:245)

The language spoken by human beings is therefore always a particular language, for 'there is no universal language. There is no way we can speak, communicate or even think without placing ourselves within the constraints of a particular language whose contours were shaped by hundreds of generations of speakers, storytellers, artists and visionaries who came before us, the legacy we inherit and of whose story we become a part.' (Sacks 2002:54)

The language of the people

The mother tongue is not only the language of the 'motherland'. In Grundtvig's understanding, it is fundamentally the language spoken to each child on its mother's lap. It is the language that which develops in the child and is encountered by him/her in all kinds of everyday situations. It is the language that is learned in play and activity without any awareness that it is being learned, still less taught. It is not 'defined by linguists or schoolmasters'. (Dam 1983:34)

'The mother tongue has its home neither in the brain of scholars nor even in the pen of the best writers, but in the mouth of the people and it is here, and not there, that the mother tongue must live and move and work, express and extend Danish patriotism, enlightenment, joy and gladness.' (Davies 1944:46) It is the mother tongue spoken by the ordinary people that is the treasure chest of the language: '...irrational as it sounds that the whole wealth of the mother tongue in our books of bards has been found in the mouth of the people, still it is

necessarily true...' (Den Danske Fiir-Kløver 1836; trans Lawson 1991:40)

'The mother's tongue is the power's word/ which lives in the people's mouth' (Koch 1943:126). From his own speaking, whether from the pulpit or in the lecture hall or on the hillside, Grundtvig knew that by using the speech of the ordinary people he could not only speak to them in a way that they would understand but also that this form of speech was powerful in the oratorical sense.

Though Grundtvig does not deny that there are universal teachings (in particular the Christian Gospel), he affirms that these are met in and through the particular language of a people. 'The words of faith get their meaning and importance from our understanding of the words in their human and popular context, as defined and created by the mother-tongue'. (Dam 1983:35)

He was sceptical as to the notion of a standardised language. He was very aware of the debt he felt to the peasant's dialects of his own childhood, in rural Sjælland and in the eastern part of Jylland. His writing made use of many popular expressions in dialect and he called that language 'servants-hall Danish'. With a poet's ear, Grundtvig hears with the deepest affection the cadences of the Danish language, as he affirms in his poem, Moders Navn er en himmelsk Lyd. (Jørgenesen 1993:96)³⁸² He drew often on the traditional sayings and

³⁸² Thaning (1972:14) comments that on the occasion on which he was taken on a carriage ride in order to see the splendours of Norwegian scenery, 'all he was interested in was a chance to talk to the Norwegian peasants he met on the way. He wanted to discover what was

proverbs of the Danish people, but also contemporary popular books and the conversations of the ordinary people as he heard them speak in everyday life. (Saxtorph 1926) In the period when he is publishing *Danne-virke*, Grundtvig adopts a 'plain and humorous Danish speech'. 'He became a passionate collector of ancient popular proverbs and sayings'. He saw that the spirit of the people 'manifests itself not only in mythology but also in the pictureseque everyday speech of men'. (Thaning 1973:72) They, in Grundtvig's view, 'enshrine the spirit of the language' (Davies 1944:46)

These forms of oral expression also enshrine a wisdom, based on experience and common sense'. (E Larsen 1973:65-66; trans S Larsen at pp233-34) In speaking with the ordinary people, one had to communicate in their language: 'Who wants to meet the people/ and know them completely/ must yelp with the people/ if they cannot bark'. (*Den Danske Fiir-Kløver* 1836; Lawson 1991:59)

From his studies of the old Anglo-Saxon texts, Grundtvig was convinced that it was the vernacular that best reflected the thought forms of the people. The mother tongue had a 'natural, fluent, emphatic way of expressing everything which is in their hearts and runs in their minds.' (*Den Danske Fiir-Kløver* 1836) He understood that though the Anglo-Saxon poetry had been preserved in the monasteries and by learned people, nonetheless it was narrated 'not told as learned people would tell the

in their minds, what spiritual support they derived from it, and how they expressed themselves'.

stories (but) in the imagery ordinary people used'.
(Noack 1993:41)³⁸³

He was highly critical of philosophers and others and 'the deep artificial words they have invented for themselves' (Thaning 1972:133) While one acknowledges that there can be value for professions and specialisms in developing a specialist language (though not, I suggest where the principal purpose is exclusionary), I do want to question the development of specialist theological language, not least under the influence of the academy. It does concern me as an educator and as a clergyperson that theological education, concerned with faith and with life, has generated a 'scholarly' language that can distance theology from life, head from heart, faithful people from theology and the wider public from religious discourse.

VEKSELVIRKNING

If a word is to be a living word, then it must be spoken in a living context. There had to be a *vekselvirkning*, a lively interaction.

Again, it is possible to recognise a particular life experience that exerted some influence on Grundtvig and shaped his thinking. In this case, he had spent time in England and had visited Trinity College, Cambridge for two weeks. He was impressed by the tutorial system in which there was a conversation between the teacher and the student.

³⁸³ Similarly, he too embarked upon translation of older texts into modern everyday language.

In the Grundtvigian interaction, there would first be an input by the teacher. In Grundtvig's view, it is the teacher who is best placed to offer this, not through being qualified in any specialist sense, but because of that wider life experience that comes with maturity. (Grundtvig's thinking on the folk high school was developed in the context of the education of the young.) This is not to say at all that the teacher's input should be regarded as the last word; to the contrary, it is the stimulus to a lively conversation. In a glimpse of an awareness of the value of intergenerational learning, he argues that a living dialogue between old and young can be a rich one. In particular, he holds that there are certain attributes which different stages of life bring to that conversation. He argues, for example, that the young have the nature of 'emotion' and the more mature have 'experience' and 'reflection'. This stems from his view that interaction has to be characterised by 'naturalness'. By this expression, Grundtvig means two things. It must assist in the development of the character or nature of the individual or group or people. It must also - and here Grundtvig pursues a personal view of human development - respect the definite order of nature and by this he means that learning has to take account that people bring different factors and orientations at different stages in life. It is wrong, Grundtvig contends, to ignore these 'natural' aspects of human development and to try to force people to be different from how they 'naturally' are at that stage in life. (Bugge 1983b:9)

The teacher must set aside any sense of being in a superior status. Grundtvig himself began his lectures '*Mine Herrer*' and, by this greeting, he understood not only a conventional address but the literal meaning of 'My masters'. 'The teacher must in so many words give up his masterly ways and put on the guise of a servant', explains Bugge (1983b)

The students themselves should be encouraged to engaged in *levende samtale*. As Davies 1944:47 suggests: 'Samtale ... is again a difficult word to render into English; 'conversation' is too reminiscent of the atmosphere of afternoon tea-parties, and 'discussion' smacks too much of intellectualism, the scoring of debating points, and that 'eternal criticising' which Grundtvig deplored. It may be said that there is something of the warmth and intimacy of the Welsh *Seiat* about the real Danish *Samtale*, each contributing something genuine from his own experience.'

Bugge (1999c:9) alerts us to what he sees as the special understanding that is present in the idea of *vekselvirkning*. He acknowledges that Grundtvig did not himself undertake any comparison between his concept and the related concepts of dialogue and dialectics. Bugge himself argues that 'dialogue' is a fundamentally static concept. It is concerned with a process in which the mutuality of the conversation is the key feature. What goes on before or even after the dialogue is not of significance. 'Dialectics' he characterises as a 'logical concept', which seeks sometimes to shape life to fit the logic. The Grundtvigian third way however 'Being embedded in an overall historical perspective reaching

from the beginning of time to the end of the world, Grundtvig's concept of educational interaction adds a development perspective to dialogue and it adds a human perspective to the logic of dialectics'. (Bugge 1983c:9)

At the heart of *vekselvirkning* lies a genuine mutuality. There ought to be a genuine interaction which results in a truly reciprocal education with both 'teacher' and 'students' as learners.

Only if the conditions are right, however, can there be a true, lively interaction.

Emphatically, Grundtvig argues that there has to be freedom and freedom in a number of respects. (Bugge 1983b and 1983d) Despite the intolerance that Grundtvig could demonstrate towards those who disagreed with him, it was a fundamental principle that there should be freedom to hold different points of view, summed up in the declaration, 'Freedom for Loki...'. He himself had known inhibitions on his freedom, his writing subject to state censorship and his preaching limited by the church authorities.

There had to be freedom from examinations, a feature that generally has persisted in folk high schools despite the difficulties that has presented in modern times with such factors as a demand for qualifications and course design focused around assessment arrangements. Examinations - part of the 'Roman yoke' - inhibit the freedom of participants and distort the learning process, in Grundtvig's view.

There had to be freedom from a concern for the 'other life'. Participants in the interaction had to be at liberty to talk about ideas without fearing the religious consequences. The teachers were not under a duty to try to make people pious. Education should focus on the clarification of the meaning of human life and transfiguration of human life and that means **this** life.

There had to be freedom to disagree, for differences of opinion would foster balance and fertilise new thinking. (Borish 1991:169) Indeed, all learning had to be undertaken in a context of mutual respect. One's 'opponent' in an argument had to be regarded as a good friend for their contribution to one's learning process. (Korsgaard in Borish 1999:261)

There had to be freedom from books, for the learners should concentrate on living and life as they had experienced it.

The interaction should be conducted in an atmosphere of 'cheerfulness', which Grundtvig regarded as a mark of a positive life in the school.

This interaction however is not to be confined to the actual participants. In keeping with his belief that learning ought to be historical-poetical, the interaction ought to make use of poetry, myth and history in order that those involved, particularly the young, should hear the voice of the past, of their heritage and so the present interact with the past.

The process of interaction served wider purposes in Grundtvig's context.

With the development of the provincial assemblies, while Grundtvig was impressed by the contribution of the representatives of the common people, he was nevertheless concerned that they would be out-manoeuvred in debate by the educated classes. The work of *vekselvirkning* therefore served the additional purpose of training those who attended the folk high schools.

He was concerned that the educational structures of Denmark created a gulf that split society. It was his hope that a lively *vekselvirkning* would lay a 'bridge ...over the yawning abyss that hierarchy, aristocracy, *Laterini* and social ambition have built for the people on the one side and its leaders and teachers, with a handful of so-called educated and enlightened ones on the other side, this yawning abyss, which if it is not bridged, then all of our middle class society and all possibilities for peaceful, historic progressive development must soon fall into its precipice.' (*Skolen for Livet* 1838; paraphrase by Borish 1991)

PART THREE

VEKSELVIRKNING

IDEAS IN INTERACTION

PEOPLE IN DIALOGUE

Chapter 10

EFTERKLANG

Echoes and reverberations Reception and resonance

Introduction and purpose

As I have set out earlier in this thesis, my work is rooted in my reading of texts of and about NFS Grundtvig, in my reflection about his life and his times and in my understanding of the impact of his life and teaching on the development of adult education in Denmark and indeed more widely.

Here, I want to set out the nature of the *relationship* between this 'Grundtvig' and 'Danish' material and the commitment of my study to contribute to shaping a particular dimension, a folk dimension, in adult lay theological education in Scotland. This leads me on then to examine, analyse and resolve some of the issues and problems that arise in and from such a study. What issues arise in developing a *veklselvirkning* between different and therefore differing educational settings?

Three main sources are used to inform the discussion in this section: the literature on comparative education and in particular processes of transfer between education systems, key principles that I have discerned from within the life and writings of NFS Grundtvig and some reference to experiences in transferring ideas and institutional

models from the folk high school movement to other nations.

The tangled terminology of transfer

The literature of comparative education and, more particularly for us, of the application of the ideas of Grundtvig and of their development in practice in the Danish folk high school movement reveals an extensive terminology for processes of reception. There is some element of the simply synonymous, different words for the same idea, but the language also reflects significant diversity of process. I have endeavoured in the following table to suggest something of the distinctive characteristics that each used term carries.

Table 10: Terminology of transfer

Term	Emphasis	References ³⁸⁴
Appropriation	Taking to the receiver's use what has been developed elsewhere. In some authors, the term is used particularly in combination with 'wholesale' to indicate an adoption that is complete and without significant adaptation.	Hake and Both 1991; Noah 1986; Phillips and Ochs 2003
Assimilation	The emphasis here is on the taking-in of the element with an adaptation and embedding in the receiving culture so that it becomes integrated with the existing, usually dominant, practice	Phillips and Ochs 2003; Titmus 1991
Borrowing	The initiative lies with the borrower, usually by voluntary action. It does not preclude the possibility of adaptation as well as adoption. Some authors represent 'borrowing' as a neutral term as they feel is available.	Hake and Both 1991; Phillips and Ochs 2003; Steele 1991; Titmus 1991

³⁸⁴ The inclusion of a citation in this column is merely an indication that there is reference there to this term and not that it is used by the author(s) concerned with approval, nor that the term is used consistently across the texts cited.


Copying	The implication is often of replication, sometimes un- or insufficiently critically	Andresén 1998; Bugge 1998; Ozumbah 1990; Phillips and Ochs 2003
Dissemination	The element is most often at the conceptual level but also of knowledge concerning experience in the 'sending' place. The spreading is commonly not directed or focused. In this respect, it may be distinguished from proselytisation.	Bugge 2000; Kulich 2002;
Emulation	There is a sense here of the implied superiority of the 'sending' situation which is worthy of respect and replication.	Steele 1991
Exportation	The initiative here lies with the 'sender'. It is however often used to refer to the situation in which the ideas or the provision is exported along with those from the sending context (primarily emigrants). It is represented commonly as rooted in a belief of superiority and a claim to have developed something of universal relevance. It has economic connotations and so is sometimes tied to a wider exportation in terms of commerce and economic development or even of colonisation.	Borgå 1998; Bugge 2000; Freire 1998; Himmelstrup 1998; Lawson 1995; Manniche nd; Schørring 1999; Steele 1991

Importation	Here, the initiative is seen to lie with the 'receiver'. Some writers therefore use the term more approvingly. Others however hold that it contains nonetheless the character of being alien. The suitability of the element for importation remains an issue to be determined.	Bhattacharya 2002; Freire 1998; Himmelstrup 1998; Lawson 1995; Phillips and Ochs 2003; Steiner-Khamsi 2002
Influence	This term is at the 'softer' end of action. It is to the less direct end of the spectrum. It may be either active (seeking to have influence) or receiving (either intentionally or passively). There is a suggestion of persuasiveness in the term. The impact may be either general or particular. The extent of adoption of the additional idea is variable and sometimes there are references to 'traces' of influence. There is often considerable scope for contextualisation and adaptation. The term is sometimes used to describe what I am referring to as 'inspiration'.	Borgå 1998; Bugge 2000; Hake and Both 1991; Korsgaard 1997; Kulich 2002

Inspiration	It is influence primarily as a starting point which stimulates the receiver to explore within their own context and to determine the course of that development. The path from the inspiration to the outcome is therefore less predicatable. While influence is predominantly intellectual, inspiration carries a more spiritual aspect, speaking to the imagination. It motivates rather than directs.	Borish 1995; Bugge 1995, 1998; Korsgaard 2004; Manniche 1969; Pedersen 2002; Reinvalds 1999; Röhrig 1995; Salling Olesen 2004
Lending	The initiative most commonly here lies with the sender and the action is intentional.	Steele 1991; Steiner-Khamsi 2002
Propagation / Transplantation	A more intentional and direct form of influence by seeking to implant the idea or experience in the other 'soil'. The emphasis is on a promotion of replication. The test then is whether or not it flourishes or dies.	Bugge 1993; Kulich 2002; Noah 1986; Stubblefield nd
Proselytising	A 'missionary' form of active promotion with the intention of converting the recipients to the	Andresén 1998; Bugge 2001

Recognition of parallels	The borrowing here stems from some suggestion or recognition that there is a commonality of situations of the sender and the prospective recipient which makes legitimate the appropriation, in whole or part, of the thinking and experience of the sending context. It raises significant questions of validity.	Bugge 2003; Hake and Both 1991; Salling Olesen 2004; Thøgersen 1995
Repetition	Copying of a direct and unvarying kind.	Bugge 1993
Transfer	Sometimes used neutrally but may suggest major transmission, at institutional or model level, with the key aspects intact.	Borish 1991; Bugge 2000; Campbell 1921; Salling Olesen 2004; Verner 1968;

Given the breadth of meaning that is attached to each term by different writers, it is difficult to set these within a clear continuum of thought and practice. In the figure beneath however I have sought to show the terms across an axis of closed-open and sender-receiver initiated.



The content shared

The issue of transfer is further complicated for it is not merely a matter of process; there is the question also of what it is that is being transferred. Here again, there is considerable variation.

It seems to me that there are three main categories of content transfer discernible: the institutional, the intellectual and the spiritual.

Table 12 Content transfer

Institutional ³⁸⁵	Intellectual ³⁸⁶	Spiritual ³⁸⁷
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▣ Exportation of institutions ▣ Propagation of parallel institutions ▣ Support in development of like institutions ▣ Promotion of models ▣ Institutional collaboration 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▣ Principles ▣ Ideas ▣ Frameworks of understanding ▣ Policy ▣ Questions ▣ Lessons of experience ▣ Key concepts ▣ Information 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▣ Cultural influence ▣ Inspiration to thought and action ▣ Core truths ▣ Underpinning ideology ▣ Imagery ▣ Prophetic challenge ▣ Ethos ▣ Spirit

There can be significant quantitative differences too. In some cases, the transferred material may be whole scale and fundamental but at the other end it may be minor or even little more than a trace remaining of its original. (Bugge 2000) Indeed, the expectation must be that a process that is rooted more in

³⁸⁵Andresén 1998; Borgå 1998; Borish 1991; Bugge 2000; Campbell 1921, 1930; Canfield 1965; Czettler 1921; Haitjema 1925; Hansen 2000; Kulich 2002; Manniche 1969, 1971; Reinvalds 1999; Röhrig 1995; *Oxford Chronicle* 1905; Stubblefield nd; The Estonian Folk High School Association 1999

³⁸⁶Björkstrand 2000; Borish 1991; Bugge 1993; Jørgensen 2000; Korsgaard 2004; Kulich 2002; Tefe 1997; Warren 1998

³⁸⁷Allchin 1995, 2000; Björkstrand 2000; Borish 1991; Bugge 1995, 2000; Knudsen 1976; Ozumba 1993; Röhrig 1995; Salling Olesen 2004; Tefe 1997; Verner 1968

inspiration than in exportation will be 'different not only in minor aspects but also regarding fundamental issues' (Bugge 2000:192)

The rationale for sharing³⁸⁸

We have noticed already that there is a distinction to be drawn between sender and receiver in the process. The transfer impulse and impetus may lie with either party or indeed arise out of a collaborative engagement.

The expression 'sender' of course is an imprecise term. It may refer for example to formal governmental action (Ozumba in Hansen 1993:319-20)), to the activities of educationalists and others (eg Manniche 1969, 1971) or to the actions of emigrants (eg Campbell 1921,1930; Horton 1978; Stubblefield nd; Stewart 1987).

The motivation may therefore also differ. In the latter case, of emigrants, there was a desire to retain and transfer something that has been of cultural value to the new context and indeed thereby to retain and reinforce a sense of cultural and national identity. (Campbell 1921,1930; Horton 1978; Kildegaard 2000;Stubblefield nd; Stewart 1987)

More generally, however, the motivation lies also in a sense of having something worthwhile to share. A

³⁸⁸ Consistent with the focus of this thesis, I shall consider the issue primarily within the context of the rationale for and practice of sharing the Danish folk education experience.

prominent figure in such a movement in the sharing and dissemination of the 'grundtvigian' or 'folk high school' thinking and experience was Peter Manniche. Founder of the International People's College in Helsingør, he was a strong advocate of the Scandinavian model. He was convinced that the experience of the co-operative movement and the Folk High Schools had relevance to the developing countries.³⁸⁹ (Manniche 1969:7)

Some perceive a common identity and cause amongst professionals in the field and with that a duty to contribute optimally to the common effort to further the work. 'Adult educators outside the region have a collegial as well as a human responsibility in assisting their colleagues...' (Kulich 1991:52).

Others have had a more missionary zeal, to the extent even of something close to proselytisation. 'Nordic adult educators went zealously spreading the message of salvation to the Baltic countries', comments Toiviainen (1996:5) of the activities following the end of the Soviet Union.³⁹⁰ In similar vein, Borgå argues: '... I see the folkhighschool movement and adult education as a way of living, as a pattern for the future not only for Denmark but also for other countries. It is a big ambition to believe that we

³⁸⁹ Manniche later took the view however that it was not possible for one to export the Danish folk high school, though it was valid to import it. (Lawson 1995:82]

³⁹⁰ It is perhaps fair to acknowledge that the sense of commonality in the Nordic region is strong and the Baltic nations (especially Estonia) are frequently regarded as falling within that sphere of cooperation).

can influence other countries. But I think we should believe and do it. I think we have such a gift in Grundtvig that we should lobby internationally in support of Grundtvigian tradition.' (Borgå 1998:167) We should not read this as an arrogant or aggressive assertion for she continues to set her remarks in the context of what she sees as a hunger for information about the Danish experience. 'There are many people asking for information and knowledge about folkhighschools, adult education, and democracy in Denmark. I think we should facilitate their getting this information and advice if they want it. We shouldn't export information in the sense of neocolonizing the world with new values, but we should share our values with other people, we should tell them what is meaningful in our society, and we should explain how our democracy has developed. I think the folkhighschool movement and principles of democracy can be learned in many ways, and I have never taught anyone abroad exactly how to do such and such...'. (1998:168) Similarly, Anderson (1991:111-2) argues for a Danish sense of obligation rooted in the uniqueness of its 'historical experience' and 'the ideological heritage of Grundtvig' alongside its commitment to democratisation. This is something here akin to the notion of national calling or mission.

Bugge (2000:191-2) alerts us to awareness that there are quite distinct processes and frameworks in operation in the discourse of the movement of ideas and models. There is a language of export which is

rooted in the economic model.³⁹¹ There is an intellectual framework and process concerned to facilitate 'the transfer and adaptation of ideas' and a spiritual framework with its commitment to inspire and challenge and foster creativity. Each is rooted in a different motivation and rationale.

The desire to offer the fruits of experience may be based upon some commitment to evaluate the Danish experience in its own context, to extract some transferable elements and to identify its usefulness in another context. Kulich (2002:9) offers the example of Pál Guttenberg who 'wrote a treatise in which he analysed the work of the Scandinavian folk high schools, and recommended these as a model worthy (of) adaptation in Hungary (Czettler 1921). At the same time he stated the crucial issues related to the adaptation of foreign models, and pointed out that the Danish model presupposed some indispensable prerequisites... well equipped designated facilities, well prepared teaching staff and an appropriate curriculum.'

As Borgå (1998:186) suggests, it may not infrequently be the potential receiver who initiates the conversation. This does not mean however that the potential sender is passive. The literature points to the openness and attractiveness of Denmark as a

³⁹¹ The issue is not merely conceptual. Bugge refers also to the aspect that the 'operationalisation' of Grundtvig's ideas 'through economic cooperatives said by one founder of the Danish aid programme of the 1960s to be 'our biggest export products''. (2002:194)

destination for those seeking to explore alternative educational thinking. Kulich (2002:13-14) refers to the processes of dissemination through visits from abroad, particularly Eastern Europe) to folk high schools and other institutions in Denmark and Scandinavia and to the rôle of Danish institutions, such as the International People's College at Elsinore (Helsingør) and the Danish (Cultural) Institute in promoting dissemination of Grundtvig's ideas and facilitating contact and even experiencing of these through attending folk high schools. This interest is rooted not only in a perception of the value of folk high schools and of Grundtvig's thinking but also a wider evaluation of the place of Denmark in the contemporary world, particularly as a model of 'emancipatory democratic adult education' (Kulich 2002:14)³⁹² As Phillips and Ochs (2003:297) and Phillips (2000:297ff) argue, one of the key factors is the 'popular perceptions of the superiority of other approaches to educational questions'. Perhaps we turn to the Danish example because of our popular perception of Denmark rates it as an example worthy of imitation and the belief that Grundtvig and the folkhighschool movement have had a significant role in the development of what commonly is judged to be a national success story. 'Denmark as a nation spells enlightened government, enlightened

³⁹² See also Kulich (2002: 170) on Lund 1999 Rapport ved. Projekt: Democratic Schools in Russia, demokratiske skoler i Rusland Unpublished report where it is recounted that 'The aim of the seminar was 'to provide inspiration and practical advise (sic) for the establishment of an experimental schools, which in the longer perspective can inspire other schools in the region to base their education on a humanistic and democratic view of education, as well as generally inform about Danish democracy''.

education, enlightened living... you will find no account of national barbarism, lust for subjection, program of conquest or aggrandizement. (Borish 1991:730 quoting Sherman F Mittell)


The literature is not without affirmation of the value of the Danish experience and of the contribution of Grundtvig. 'One student³⁹³ referred to him (Grundtvig) as an inexhaustible and renewable resource that Denmark has given the rest of the world'. (Tefe 1997)

One must be careful to avoid an idealised and hagiographic view of Danish society or its educational life. Danish society is not without its share of the contemporary tensions and problems of the world. Nor is there an absence of arguments and tensions about issues within the folk high school movement about priorities and patterns for the present and future. (Salling Olesen 2004; Warren 1998)

A seeking after fresh thinking from another setting relies not just on some sense that the other offers something worthy of borrowing but also on there being a perceived need to engage in that search (Verner 1968).

³⁹³ The reference is to El Edicio Torre, principal of the Danish Folk High School in the Philippines in s speech in memory of the 75th jubilee of the International People's College in Helsingør, October 1996

Table 13: Philips and Ochs model



Here, I want to focus on the issue of 'impulses', the factors that precipitate borrowing. By 'impulses' Phillips and Ochs (1992) mean the preconditions for borrowing. 'These will encompass such elements as: creeping internal dissatisfaction ...; systemic collapse (inadequacy of some aspect of educational provision); negative external evaluation...; economic change/competition; political change and other imperatives; new world, regional or local configurations...; innovation in knowledge and skills;

and political change. 'Impulses' will also comprehend the motives of those involved in the political process; such motives will be very mixed, ranging from genuine concern based on deep knowledge of educational issues to cynical exploitation of real or contrived weaknesses.' (452)

From a 'grundtvigian' perspective...

Through his concept of *folkelighed*, Grundtvig affirms the unique character of each nation and affirms its right and responsibility to discover and live out its own way. Each nation has its own culture and context: 'for Grundtvig it was a fundamental condition of human life, that it unfolds itself in a definite people, who have their own character crated through history'. (Severinsen 2001) That 'definite people' was fundamentally for him the nation³⁹⁴. (Thaning 1972:74) This emphasis upon the nation is mirrored within the field of comparative education. 'From the outset of published works in comparative education, the main unit of comparison has been the nation-state (Nakajima, 1916; Kandel, 1933, p. xix; Crossley, 2000, p. 322) and, as several commentators (e.g. Green, 1997; Cowen, 2000, p. 336; Nóvoa & Yariv-Mashal, 2003, p. 434) point out, it still resembles the default unit.'

³⁹⁴ I am conscious in noting this that this statement of Grundtvig's thought lacks a transferability outwith the European context of the nation to much of the Third World [Hansen 1993:308]

Within each set of national bounds, Grundtvig considered, it was right that life should be ordered in accordance with the cultural traditions of the people: 'You will not in these pages trace partiality for anything at all, except... for the Danish national feeling *in its right place, in its own home where no question it has a right to rule*' (Det Danske Fiir-Kløver) In particular, he was committed to the idea that the new school at Sorø should be 'really Danish'. (Bøn og begreb) This perspective is echoed more recently by the comparative educationist, Sadler: 'All good and true education is an expression of national life, and character'. (Sadler 1902:162) It was then 'a fundamental point in Grundtvig's educational thinking that the School for Life envisaged by him should be *folkelig*. In other words, it should always reflect the cultural identity of a particular people.³⁹⁵ Grundtvig was especially sensitive in his own time³⁹⁶ to the risk of cultural dominance. His quarrel with Germany was rooted in his belief that 'they are determined either to make me a German or to regard me as a fool' (Mands Minde) So Bugge argues, 'It would be an expression of cultural imperialism to expect all people throughout the world to interpret Grundtvig's ideas in exactly the same way as we have done'. (Bugge 2000:185ff) Paradoxically, one of those cultural differences that Grundtvig and others tie so

³⁹⁵ While not denying the fundamental importance of the culture of the people of a nation, I recognise that other cultures and cultural loyalties can and do exist within the peoples of a nation. Friedenthal-Haase, Hake and Marriott (eds) 1991:19

³⁹⁶ That is, during a period of German dominance and in particular the Slesvig-Holsten problem

particularly to the idea of nation is a differing view of the significance of the national³⁹⁷.

Furthermore, it should respond to the challenges of a particular historical and political situation.' (Bugge 1995:190)

From even this limited account, it is apparent that borrowing has to have great regard to respecting the culture of each nation. It cannot be imported or transferred careless of the differences of context of the two (sending and receiving) nations. As Himmelstrup asserts, '... a folkhighschool can never be exported... but you can import it. By that I mean that if local people find out how a folkhighschool fits into their circumstances, then they can make one... it is up to other countries what to do in their situations. (1998:11,15) This is not peculiar to our case of folk education. Phillips and Ochs (2003:453) in commenting on borrowing of policy more widely in education observe that items of borrowing will have been shaped by elements of their original context and the context into which they are to be introduced will determine whether or not 'they will be adaptable to a foreign situation'. Borrowing may be possible but ordinarily requires some modification 'in order to meet specific national conditions a special and unique form of these efforts must be initiated'. (Salomon 1901:203) When attempts were made, for example, to

³⁹⁷ Of the possibility of transfer of the Danish model of folk high schools to the Netherlands, van der Heide 1931 suggests, 'There is too little national unity to believe that a folk high school can reach the people as such'.

introduce the folk high school model into the United States of America in the 1920s, it was acknowledged that it must endeavour to 'adjust to existing conditions in North Carolina the basic principles of the Danish folk school'. (Campbell 1930:251) Similarly, Horton was careful not to attempt to replicate the folk school structure or method, though utilising the spirit and radical ideas. (Horton 1978:73-81) Lindeman too applied these fundamental ideas while 'first stripping the ideas of their Danish nationalistic and Lutheran religious trappings'. (Stewart 1987)³⁹⁸

Inappropriate transfer encounters significant difficulties in embedding in its new home. As Sadler warns, 'We cannot wander at pleasure among the educational systems of the world, like a child strolling through a garden, and pick off a flower from one bush and some leaves from another, and then expect that if we stick what we have gathered in to the soil at home, we shall have a living plant.' (Sadler 1900, cited in Friedenthal-Haase, Hake and Marriott (eds) (1991:15)

The practice of adaptation, including omission of elements, does raise the question of whether or not it is legitimate to detach aspects from a whole, retaining the convenient parts and dispensing with the

³⁹⁸ The general failure nonetheless to transfer the Danish form of folk school to America has a number of causes. They lacked financial support; they were linked to a Danish identity and later generations from that immigrant group were less concerned to maintain that cultural or linguistic identity; there were available other educational possibilities; and 'perhaps most important, an American cultural basis could not be found.' [Stubblefield nd]

unwanted. On one hand, only in this way, is it possible to create a form of the original that has any potential for reception. On the other hand, one may have removed the element from an organic whole. I am conscious of the observation of MacIntyre (1998) that whilst it was possible to 'fabricate a collage' out of relevant elements of the philosophy of Aquinas and describe it as his 'philosophy of education', this would be a nonsense. (1998:96) Some comfort may be taken however from the reality that it is scarcely the case that Grundtvig's educational ideas constitute an organic whole.

Verner suggests that this planting involves two major stages: acceptance and then integration³⁹⁹. 'The transfer of culture elements involves presentation of the new element, its acceptance by the receiving culture, and its ultimate integration into the pre-existing culture, but the way in which a new element is presented may affect its acceptance and final integration. Acceptance will depend primarily upon the immediate utility and potentiality of the trait in the host culture, while integration rests upon the compatibility of the trait with the existing culture configuration... The particular trait may be an idea or an artefact and the diffusion may be an unplanned, unconscious process or by deliberate intent. The methods of adult education are culture traits which

³⁹⁹ 'Integration' here may have significant affinity with 'assimilation' to which reference was made in Table 1 in the sense that there is a stage of taking the incoming material into the culture with such modification as may be necessary to make it congruent.

have been subject to diffusion... The acceptance of the culture trait occurs only when the trait is compatible with the '... conscious and unconscious values, existing techniques and current forms of the social organization' (Honigmann 1959:220) in the host culture'. (Verner 1968: 49 and 91) It would be untrue to represent Grundtvig's position as resistance to foreign influence, though he had considerable fears concerning and resentment of what he imagined to be the creeping alien influences emanating from more dominant cultures. In the main, his concern was with imposition, whether direct or brought about by more subtle processes.

Borrowing and appropriation does involve some element of creating compatibility between the sending and receiving contexts. As Deutsch argues however, if the exploration of other traditions merely results in the finding of more of the familiar and the similar, then this is an impoverished exchange compared with the opening up that comes from a true cross-cultural encounter. (Deutsch 1997:xiii)

Nonetheless, the literature on transfer of the folk high schools into other contexts (even those with significant Danish emigrant participation) does reinforce the practical truth that the success of borrowing relies heavily on the quality of the adaptation. (eg Kulich 2002:19-20; Stubblefield nd). It is as much in the adaptation as in the original thinking or experience. 'The more faithful a project was in upholding the original principles, the more

foreign it was felt to be and correspondingly the less successful it was in influencing the situation of the target group. And the more a project dispensed with the usual practices and adapted to the lives of the people, the more relevant and integrated those involved felt it to be.' (Bugge 2000: 196)

Indeed, it is questionable whether the model itself is replicable. Rather, Verner suggests: 'the idea behind a method in one culture at one time may be modified to serve a different need in a different culture at a different time but not the precise method itself' (1968:91) It is the idea rather than the model that ought to be borrowed.

Grundtvig was concerned that people should come to decision and commitment as a result of genuine and free engagement with life. There had to be freedom of judgement and of speech.⁴⁰⁰

There is a parallel with Grundtvig's thinking on the issue of Christian mission to foreign lands. He believed that the strategy of promoting Christian faith amongst people who had no developed sense of their humanness and of their folk life was futile⁴⁰¹. (Korsgaard 2004) Borrowing therefore should not result from imposition. 'We cannot tell the Estonians

⁴⁰⁰ 'Freedom for Loke as well as for Thor' - Frihed for Loke saavelson for Thor - *Nordens Mytologi* 1832

⁴⁰¹ Korsgaard distinguishes Grundtvig and David Livingstone: while they both questioned the idea that one could make conversion the first step, Livingstone believed that the preliminary stage was the development of an awareness of the superiority of European civilisation, whereas Grundtvig was committed to stimulating amongst each people of an awareness of their own unique culture.

what kind of folkhighschool they should have.. We cannot come and tell the Mexicans or the Hungarians, or anyone else, what they should do', argues Himmelstrup (1998:11-13). '(Danish adult educators) must not act as cultural and educational imperialists, missionaries of educational ideas, 'know-it-all-experts', trying to impose their own brand of salvation. We need to approach this with a considerable dose of sensitivity and humility.'

(Kulich 1991:52)

A key and indeed multifaceted idea in Grundtvig's teaching is *vekselvirkning* or interaction. Primarily, this is a pedagogical term, referring to a lively oral interaction between learners and between teacher and learner. Its conceptual richness allows us however to recognise its application more broadly. Here, I believe, it has relevance in undermining any notion that transfer can be simply a matter of copying, for then there is no genuine interaction but rather than a unidirectional movement. Furthermore, it destroys any potential for real dialogue (Bugge 1998:54). There can be no genuine mutuality and cross-sharing of experience unless it is conducted within a 'context sensitive strategy'. (Salling Olesen 2004:7)

It is through *vekselvirkning* too that it becomes possible for useful external influences to become accepted and integrated into the existing culture and practice. Only through a 'positive interplay with the cultural tradition of the people' (Rerup 1979:56)

does outside influence move from being a threat that would undermine reception to be an accepted and well-rooted development.

This is not to suggest idealistically that all hostility to external influences will be overcome through interaction. Allchin, for example, on the reception of Grundtvig's thinking, notes that there are situations in which Grundtvig's ideas today would be welcomed as 'penetrating, convincing and relevant' and those where his viewpoint would be 'out of sympathy' with its convictions. (2000:15) It has to be recognised that there are times and settings in which the dominant cultural values would undermine any reception and rooting because of fundamental incompatibility. 'It hardly needs saying that the North American, and particularly the US, context is not friendly to projects that aren't in line with mainstream, capitalist-driven individualism.' (Warren 1998:190)

Implicit in the ideas both of *folke-lighed* and *vekselvirkning* is an affirmation of equality. A transfer of models or ideas that does not respect the receiver's equal status contradicts this fundamental idea. This is both right and responsibility. Our equality does not permit us to abdicate our own duty to participate fully. It demands that we become not recipients but co-creators. 'We need to be **equally** creative'. (Kulich 2002:20 referring to Kulich 1983:44)

Grundtvig was hostile to the notion that 'life could be explained before it was lived'. In educational terms, this meant that it was inappropriate to go to books and to the experiences of others as a substitute for engagement with life itself as a resource for learning. At the heart of it however lay a conviction that living and life decisions were to be rooted in experiential learning and therefore the experience of others would be no adequate substitute for one's own experience. This is not to suggest that the experience of others might not be relevant and helpful but not in the place of one's own engagement with the issues. (Himmlestrup 1998:11-13)

Grundtvig was ever conscious of the co-existence of the local and the universal. For example, his emphasis on the importance of the national culture did not displace his understanding of the integrity of humankind. 'His perspective was always universal. History was a process of interaction and enlightenment. But Grundtvig urgently emphasized, there is no shortcut of harmonization leading to the universally human. His view equally deserves to be termed 'folkelig' and 'inter-folkelig' or in Danish 'mellemfolkelig'.' (Henningsen 1993:59) This perspective encourages an understanding of reception that both affirms the importance of context and recognises the presence of more universal thought underpinning that particularity.

Salling Olesen (2004) suggests that a sensitive approach to sharing will focus on both commonality

(finding parallels) and universality (finding core truths).

However closely tied Grundtvig may be to his times and his country, nonetheless '... the ideas that he put forward (on educational questions) have proven to be of considerable importance even in quite different environments and times from those in which he himself lived. The explanation for this surely lies in the fact that in his work he addressed **truly fundamental questions** concerning the transmission of tradition, which means that his ideas have never gone out of fashion.' (Björkstrand 2000:165)

This does not mean that Grundtvig's ideas are in any sense automatically relevant to a new context. 'The needs and priorities of the people themselves should be the point of departure. Only then will it be meaningful to bring Grundtvig back and ask whether his way of thinking... has any relevance for the process of change and development'. (Bugge 2000:197) The task then is to distinguish the local and the particular in Grundtvig's thinking from those aspects and underlying elements ('mutual basic concerns' (Bugge 1993:275-6)) which are of more enduring and more general significance, 'to undress Grundtvig from his special Danish garment and look for universal values in his thinking'. (Bugge 2000:196)

Some of the wider problems inherent in undertaking a Grundtvig-related study are equally relevant in

relation to reception of his educational thinking in other contexts.

Language

In describing his idea of a Danish school, Grundtvig emphasises the importance of language, of the mother tongue. The teaching and learning must be in the native speech of the learners.

In the field of comparative education, the question of language is a recognised issue in the reception of ideas and practices. (Friedenthal-Haase, Hake and Marriott (eds) 1991:5)

Those who have no or even limited Danish language competence have inevitably to access Grundtvig's ideas mainly through the medium of translation (and then only those relatively few parts that are published in another language) or through indirect references to his writings in publications **about** Grundtvig's life and ideas.⁴⁰² (Kulich 2002:13) Even with some language familiarity, there is the task of mediating the ideas of the author to others which almost certainly has to be undertaken in the language of the hearer or a shared language (most commonly English).

This issue is further complicated in this study by the extent to which there are often only inadequate

⁴⁰² Kulich however also notes that in the central, eastern and Baltic regions, the enthusiasm with which Grundtvig's thinking was taken to and taken up resulted in a surprisingly high dissemination of this work in the local languages (2002:13)

equivalences available. We have already met instances of this in this section in the words *folkelighed* and *vekselvirkning*. While they have 'dictionary' corresponding terms in English, these fall far short of expressing the true breadth and richness of meaning(s) that may be found within the term. To utilise the title of this section, each word carries its own echoes or resonances. Perhaps this is particularly true of the writings of Grundtvig, often couched in a poetic language and imagery; Lindgreen-Nielsen (1997:72ff) writes of the deep Danishness of his Grundtvig's imagery. Grundtvig attached much significance to the mother tongue (*modersmaal*) as carrying the meaning and the spirit of an idea and argued that a 'living participation' in thought about life was through a people's 'natural imagery'. (*Om Folkelighed og Dr Rudelbach*; Knudsen 47-48) Any borrowing of thinking is likely to bear some risk that the receiver's apprehension and appropriation is in some measure approximate.

The issue is not only one of language but also of experience. There is a strong human tendency to 'hear' an idea against the background of our own history and our context. Lundgreen-Nielsen (1997:91-2) illustrates this with the case of Grundtvig's idea that no individual can have more freedom than he or she is prepared to grant their neighbour. 'Several German participants nodded in agreement with this formula for Grundtvig's Danish social pact - oh yes, the notion that the common good should take preference

over the wishes of the individual was something they knew very well from good old Prussia. It became necessary to stress the fact that in Grundtvig's case there was no question of a compulsory collective in the interests of the State. Then a quizzical look would gleam in people's eyes: how is one supposed to coax forth a voluntary form of subjugation?' Any process of borrowing requires some effort to ascertain that our understanding of the thinking is indeed mirroring the original idea.

Across time

We have noted above the issue of cultural transfer impacting significantly on the appropriateness and possibility of borrowing. This is however not only an issue of geography and the cultural differences associated with place. There is also the question of time difference. Grundtvig was writing in a particular historical period and we know that he is motivated significantly by what is happening all around him at that time. The language controversies in Slesvig, the opening up of early democracy with the provincial assemblies: these and other factors move Grundtvig to consider issues and propose action.

How far do Grundtvig's ideas stand the test of speaking contemporarily? In many ways, we live in a different age⁴⁰³ (Bugge 2000:195) and 'challenges grow out of questions raised by new circumstances which

⁴⁰³ Bugge refers to the emphases of Grundtvig's period and place belonging 'to an unfamiliar and outdated context' (2000:195)

differ radically from those known in the past'.
(Kildegaard 2000:59).

This challenge to evaluate the potential of Grundtvig's ideas for today could be met in different ways. Is there some parallel or equivalence between the situation then and now which would justify us in imagining that Grundtvig might have something worthwhile to say to us? Are there more 'universal' qualities in his ideas that allow them to retain relevance beyond their immediate historical context? Is there a prophetic quality to his ideas that speak out of his time to our own?

If we are to seek parallels, then we must do so with some caution. There might be apparent similarities in certain contexts which are ultimately not sustainable. Bugge (2003) considers the evidence at a conference where the focus was on the issue of likeness between the 19thC Danish economic and social situation and that of India and other 'developing' nations. Noting Danish homogeneity compared with Indian heterogeneity and the fundamental difference that 'Danish peasants and labourers may wish for a *better* life (but) for their counterparts in the Third World that basic priority is mere *survival*', he concludes that 'it is impossible to draw a parallel'. (2003:51)

It is important too that we remind ourselves that any study, particularly in relation to the institutional products of Grundtvig's thoughts, has to remember that

(in this case) the folk high schools grew up not in isolation but as part of a wider social movement. (Borish 1991) This is in keeping with the more general comment of Titmus that 'each educational system is a product of and exists in interaction with the society in which it is situated and which it serves'. (1991:14) If we are to envisage the possibility of borrowing, then we must be careful not to tear the model (extending Higginson's imagery) not merely from its roots but from the ecology in which it originally grew and flourished. (Higginson 1979:15)

Nonetheless, though the 21st C Western world (including contemporary Denmark) may be radically different from 19th C Denmark emerging from absolute monarchy, Allchin argues that Grundtvig's ideas do still 'speak powerfully'. In particular, he suggests that there are three areas in which 'Grundtvig can help us towards the future'; the collapse of totalitarianism and the human bankruptcy of unrestrained capitalism; ugly nationalism yet the need to affirm cultural and linguistic diversity and the neglect of the spiritual and the transcendent. (1995:26-7) Grundtvig's thinking on the nature of human community, universal, national and local, may contribute to our exploring how a global world community need not destroy more particular identities and cultures. His understanding of the people as *folk* may be a contribution to resisting aggressive nationalisms, fostering mutual cultural respect and nurturing the richness of cultural difference. His valuing of the historical-poetical in life may offer

the basis for a deepening of human life. Jørgensen too writes of Grundtvig's capacity not to answer our questions but to 'sharpen our awareness'. (1993:189)

The literature does point to the wide reaches of Grundtvig's ideas: the Appalachian Mountain peoples, Japan at the opening of its borders, Israel as immigrants came from many nations, the Philippines after an extensive period of foreign rule. (Zöllner 2003:135)

The potential for more 'universal' quality in Grundtvig's ideas rests primarily on the extent to which he takes us to deeper places. Broadfoot indeed pleads that that should be more the focus of comparative education. 'Comparative educationists... need themselves to be willing to engage in fundamental debates about values; about the nature 'of the good life' and about the role of education and learning in relation to this'. (Broadfoot, 2000:370). This tendency to focus on practical problem solving is noted also by Cowen (2002:413-424) If educational borrowing is concerned at the level principally of institutional and organizational concerns, then it fails to confront the more profound questions. In one sense, a preliminary judgement on the durability of Grundtvig's thinking lies in the extent to which thinkers, policymakers and practitioners still draw on that body of ideas. To that evaluation, Björkstrand affirms that 'the ideas that he put forward (on educational questions) have proven to be of considerable importance even in quite different

environments and times... The explanation for this surely lies in the fact that in his work he addressed truly fundamental questions concerning the transmission of tradition, which means that his ideas have never gone out of fashion'. (2000) The qualities of being enduring and widespread are perhaps twin affirmations of the status of being of more universal significance. 'It would be foolish to argue that great thinkers would be confined in their thoughts and practices within the four walls of a geographical location.' (Bhattacharya 2000:183)

Grundtvig's prophetic qualities are attested to by the title of the publication *Heritage and Prophecy* edited by Allchin et al. It refers to Grundtvig's orientation both to the historical and to the future, as well as in the present. 'This title was meant to suggest that while Grundtvig had his roots deeply in the past, there was something in his stance which spoke to the future' (Allchin 2000:5), reaching forward to a stage of human history which is still to come'. (Allchin 1995:21) In writing of the Danish folk high school, Henningsen too argues that 'Grundtvig was far ahead of his time in his ideas. Today they have to be rediscovered.' (1993:296) Thøgersen (1995) records the interest in Grundtvig of Chinese educationalists in the early 20th C⁴⁰⁴ and in that context Liang Shuming declares that 'The idea which

⁴⁰⁴ The expression concerning Denmark after its territorial losses that there was 'outer loss and inner gain' suggested to them that a weak divided and humiliated nation through investing in education could become united and strong (Thøgersen 1995:319)

gave them (high schools) birth was not conceived in the mind of a college professor: it was conceived in that of a prophet, a spiritual genius who understood the life and mind of his people throughout the ages, and who thereby had the vision of this special enlightenment that was needed to promote the well-being of his people'. (Liang Shuming 1989, quoted in *Grundtvig Studier* 1995:176)

Freedom leads to diversity

Attraction of potential borrowers to a particular educational institutional form or idea is liable to be rooted in some perception of its qualities.

In talking of borrowing, are the borrowers envisaging an appropriation of the educational ideas of Grundtvig (and then which ideas?) or the transfer of the institutional model (in whole or partly)? The two main possibilities are linked for the lived-out qualities of the schools are significantly underpinned rooted in the ideology gifted by Grundtvig. It is to Grundtvig that we would go in order to understand more deeply and fully the purpose and meaning of what happens in this education. Conversely, it is unlikely that many would turn to Grundtvig's writings were it not the case that there were living and lively institutions that reflect to a greater or lesser degree his ideas. There is inevitably then a link between the ideas and the institutions.

In this, a significant problem lies with the commitment to freedom that characterises Grundtvig's thinking. Most centrally, whether in Denmark or elsewhere, the issue is that it is in the grundtvigian spirit for each high school to interpret and apply its ideology in the light of its own vision and experience.

There is not necessarily then any explicit consensus around what constitute the fundamental qualities that justify its being borrowed and lent.

In our own study here, there is an initial difficulty in that the ideas of Grundtvig and the development of folk high schools and other forms of educational institution are linked to one another but there is far from an absolute correspondence. Grundtvig did not himself found any such establishments. Indeed he did not develop a systematic plan though he offered ideas, many quite fundamental. In the event, the leadership of the schools (perhaps most noticeably Kold) departed from key aspects of Grundtvig's proposals.⁴⁰⁵ (Kulich 1997; Bjerg 1994:24) 'The institutional idea that Grundtvig put out was not the type of folk high school we have today'. (Andresén 1998:85)

Throughout their existence, there has been considerable variation in folk high schools. Kulich (2002:185) draws the inevitable conclusion: 'obviously

⁴⁰⁵ For example, Kold introduced a significant **religious** dimension to his high school though Grundtvig had himself proposed that it should be secular in character.

there is not one model of the folk high school (and that not even in Denmark). Andersson (1993:13), writing of the Estonian folk high schools observes that while 'all the folk high schools I have described used the name folk high school... in my judgement they are not yet what we in the Nordic countries call folk high schools'. There is perhaps implicit in Andersson's comment that there is a form that is common to the Danish scene but it is clear that the title is used with reference to significantly differing forms of educational life, perhaps not least because 'many of the Baltic 'folk high schools' are more influenced by other forms of Nordic popular education, such as evening adult education centre and Swedish study circles' (Kulich 2002:126) and are searching for a form that is congruent with their own needs and possibilities.⁴⁰⁶

The difficulty remains of discerning what are the core, common, indeed fundamental, aspects. Some marks are related to the residential aspect, others to the lack of examinations, the curriculum followed, the pedagogy used, the commitment to popular enlightenment and the commitment to democracy. Andresén concludes that 'the schools have taken many different directions, have gone down many different lines... but generally they refer to the old ideas of Grundtvig... These were ideas from the beginning and still

⁴⁰⁶ 'At the annual meeting of the Norwegian Folk High School Association in 1999, Ain Sarv, Chair of the Estonian Folk High Schools, 'emphasised that it is not possible to create folk high schools along Nordic lines (long stays and accommodation at the school). Estonian society must create something for itself instead.' The Estonian Folk High School Association (1999)

continue'. (1998:85) In Part 2 of the thesis, we set out and explore seven of these key ideas.

Efterklang

This section I have titled *Efterklang*, a Danish word for the English *echo*. It was suggested to me by encountering the word in the title of a study *Historie og Efterklang*⁴⁰⁷ and the report of a seminar *Efterklang*⁴⁰⁸.

Its appeal lay partly in the avoidance of the terminological tangle that I have set out above. More importantly, however, it conveyed to me a sense of connection that was real and was related to the origins of the thinking but with an emphasis more on listening and learning than on exportation and emulation. It is about inspiration rather than importation.

The expression *efterklang*/reverberation itself carried resonances that I found helpful in endeavouring to determine how my study might respond to Grundtvig and his ideas and how it might be shared within my own context as an educator.

The echo bears a strong resemblance to the initial sound. In my study here, I am endeavouring to be

⁴⁰⁷Anders Holm (2001) *Historie og Efterklang: En studie i NFS Grundtvigs tidsskrift Danne-Virke*

⁴⁰⁸Jørgen Jensen og Erik Nielsen (red) (1983) *Efterklang - en Grundtvig-seminar*

true to the original, to hear Grundtvig and what he has to say to us.⁴⁰⁹

The echo however is mediated en route. It does not come to us unchanged, because we hear it across time and across cultures and it has been shaped a little or much by the contact it has made on its way to us. It has an insistence as we hear it again and again; I am conscious of the extent to which the ideas and the expressions of Grundtvig come back to me in many different situations. Across the gulf, it makes demands upon us in terms of active listening; we do not receive it passively. It comes to us from the past, it enters our present and it goes on into a future; each dimension is linked and commonality is found across them. The sound resonates with us. It calls forth the echoes within our own thinking and our own experiences and makes connection with them. Professor Bugge again and again speaks of the reception of Grundtvig's ideas as 'inspiration'. It is that resonance, that echoing, that speaking to our minds, our spirits, our hearts that I hope underpins and penetrates this study.

⁴⁰⁹ I am reminded of Professor Bugge's recalling of Grundtvig's statement that 'facts were stubborn things'. We ought to try to hear what Grundtvig actually was saying to us, however inconvenient to our way of thinking or uncomfortable his views may at times be.

Chapter 11 DIALOGUE AND INTERACTION IN THE PUBLIC SPACE

Introduction

One of the central ideas of this thesis is that lay theological education in Scotland, inspired and informed by ideas from and associated with Grundtvig, is undertaken with a context of a nation and the nation's life and is in part at least focused on the vocation of the Christian⁴¹⁰ man or woman to be a human being who contributes to and shares in the life of the community or society of which they are part. I have explored in Part II Grundtvig's affirmation that the Christian is called to be *menneske først og kristen så* (first a human being, then a Christian). As I have suggested there, this is not a matter of hierarchical priority, Grundtvig is not suggesting that it is more important that one be a human being

⁴¹⁰ The long title of the thesis and its focus are concerned with the development of lay theological education within the Christian Church and that emphasis will be reflected in this chapter. Explicitly, however, I acknowledge the pluralist nature of Scottish society and pay heed to issues of interfaith and indeed faith-secular interaction.

than be a Christian. Of the range of meanings that one may find within this affirmation is the idea that Christians are called to exercise their vocation, not in an abstract world or a transcendent world⁴¹¹ or even in the Christian community, but in their secular setting. They are called first and foremost to live out their humanness in the places of human living. Thaning (1972) identifies this as one of the key shifts in Grundtvig's understanding: 'Previously (he) had regarded Christianity as norm in relation to all human matters, whether scientific, cultural, political or moral. Human life was to be shaped in a Christian manner. Now, Christianity was no longer a norm, but a gospel. Human life was now to be *human*, have human shape.' (1972:70) 'Human life was meaningful in itself.' (1972:72) 'It was this human life that people were to be made aware of...'. (1972:87) 'We should all become conscious of ourselves as human beings - for the sake of life itself.' (1972:89) For Grundtvig and for my study, it is human life, human society, human community that must lie at the heart of our search.

⁴¹¹ Kaj Thaning observes 'Unless one first took Adam and his life into consideration one could not comprehend Christ's mission. He was 'the second Adam' and his action in saving mankind could not be understood except on the basis of God's act of creation. This is what lies behind Grundtvig's maxim of 'First a man and then a Christian'. (Thaning 1972)

Human life is of course played out in a myriad of contexts - family life, work, leisure, politics, religious... Each of them is of significance and contributes to the totality of our human 'being'. In societal terms, however, theorists have identified a broad sphere of human living which most differentiate from the state or governmental and from the market: and this they term 'civil society'. This then refers to the 'space' in which associational life occurs. Below, I address some of the definitional problems, at least to the extent that this is necessary to clarify the scope of the space.

We have met also the concept *vekselvirkning* or interaction. The use of the term is often in the context of pedagogy, referring to a lively exchange between learner and teacher and between learners. It is in keeping with the multifaceted use of language that is common in Grundtvig's writings that he employs the term in other ways too. We find then its use with reference to human experience where there is a *vekselvirkning* between the present and the past. In this chapter, I seek to explore the potential for human *vekselvirkning* or interaction or exchange in a particular context, the public space, civil society.

I propose therefore, first of all, to explore what the term 'civil society' and related terms mean⁴¹² and to clarify the senses in which I shall use them here.

The concept of 'civil society'

Broadly, civil society refers to the sphere of life in which voluntary associations⁴¹³ engage in activities of public significance. (Friedland and Sirianni 1995:15) Putnam (1995:67), for example, writes of the 'features of social organisation such as networks, norms and social trust that facilitate co-ordination and co-operation for mutual benefit'.

It is perhaps helpful next to suggest what fall outside the concept of civil society. Most clearly, the state or governmental institutions (monarchical, executive, parliamentary, judicial) do so, as the very idea of civil society is in distinction from the state apparatus. Beyond this, the definition and application is more contested.

⁴¹² As will become apparent later in this chapter, I recognise that the term 'civil society' is contested and that different authors offer different definitions and include or exclude different spheres and associations from their understanding of its scope. I do not propose to enter into an extended theoretical debate. It is necessary to acknowledge however and to consider that the inclusion/ exclusion of faith communities is a contested issue.

⁴¹³ Marshall (1995:11) writes of there being a 'myriad' and mentions 'civic enterprises, religious, education, voluntary, press, business, labor, and charitable organizations'

The 'family' may be allocated to a 'private' sphere, but the maxim 'the personal is political' is perhaps no more evident than in relation to the use of the family as a social, moral, economic and political instrument⁴¹⁴.

A number of writers, perhaps most prominently represented by Charles Taylor and John Keane (Keane 2003; Taylor 1995) argue for the inclusion of the market economy⁴¹⁵. The market in most nations and globally is however conceptually distinct from the state, though it has to be recognised that it does interact significantly with the organs of statehood, that the state may formally and informally regulate economic activity and indeed businesses and other economic organisations may operate as instruments of governmental policy. (Lewis 2005) I have utilised the more minimalist construction however as the market's focus is not primarily with the development of a civic ethos. (Müller 2006:313) Indeed, the market may operate oppositionally to civil society as the economy creates differences in material wealth and associated status which

⁴¹⁴ Indeed, in the contemporary context, the role of dynastic families as political entities is apparent

⁴¹⁵ Even fairly minimalist definitions do allow for organisations with economic significance such as trades unions and professional associations to be regarded as within the civil sphere.

act as key determinants of capacity to participate in the civic sphere. (Alexander 1998:9) Though it targets members of social categories in marketing, nonetheless its interest is not in human beings in collective association but as consumers. The conceptual territory is necessarily blurred however and so, for example, 'the press' and other news media⁴¹⁶ may be agents of the state in certain historical situations, they may be businesses when their primary concern is their market interests and they may be treated as part of civil society when they 'place their public responsibilities ahead of their commercial ambitions'. (Barber 1995:13)

Though 'education' is conventionally regarded as part of the civil society, again there may be ambiguity where and insofar as its institutions act as instruments of state policy and power or where they operate with a market orientation.

Friedland and Sirianni (1995) suggest that it is right generally to exclude political parties, principally on the grounds that they are, certainly in regard to those with representation in legislatures or government, significantly part of the apparatus of the state rather than a means of interacting with

⁴¹⁶ The BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) might be seen to straddle all three spheres.

the state. Again, one has to be conscious of the blurred nature of the distinctions, recognising that many political parties have their origins in civil society⁴¹⁷.

In the context of this thesis, the placing of faith communities within the definition of civil society is of some significance. In the Scottish context, it seems to me to be legitimate to regard them as neither in the state sphere⁴¹⁸ (though operating closely in some contexts and at times with the state sphere and standing sometimes in a position of mutual regard) nor in the private sphere (the latter position on the grounds that, while religious belief may be regarded as a matter of personal belief, faith communities do operate as social organisations, generally voluntary in character, interacting with other associations and engaging in collective

⁴¹⁷ For example, the Labour Party in Britain with roots in the trades union movement, the Fabian Society and other voluntary organisations. See also, Ahonen and Rantala (2001) on the origins of many of the Nordic political parties in civil society voluntary bodies.

⁴¹⁸The 'established' Church of Scotland, though it retains strong links with the Crown and with government and state institutions, exercises autonomy in relation to its internal affairs, its freedom of speech on public issues and its parochial responsibilities. The Articles Declaratory of the Constitution of the Church of Scotland for example provide: ' v. This Church has the inherent right, free from interference by civil authority,' Other Christian churches and other faith communities are organizationally and perhaps by conviction 'voluntary' organisations with no formal structural links to the state. The position of the Church of England is significantly different owing to the nature of its constitution and relationship to the Crown and state institutions but falls outside the scope of this thesis.

action around shared purposes and values). In arriving at this view, I am distinguishing this definitional question from issues of whether or not faith communities ought to engage in the civil sphere, whether or not they are welcome there and on what basis they ought to play a part, all of which are matters which I propose shortly to treat in more detail.

It is important also to acknowledge that the definition of civil society is not merely structural but that there has always been a significant normative aspect. (Müller 2006; Tester 1992) 'It is a concept used to refer to those social and institutional structures that enable us, however imperfectly, to fulfil and meet particular expectations and values.' (Müller 2006:311) While liberal democratic theory sometimes argues that for the maintenance of a sound and just society, it is necessary only that there is a properly functioning political process and means for operating a check on private interests, it does seem to me that this proceduralist perspective is enhanced through being complemented by some shared negotiated sense of ethical behaviour, of public spiritedness and of civic and social virtue.

The breadth of 'purposes' for which associations within civil society exist is

varied and enormous. Much of the literature however focuses not so much on the interests of the associations but on the democratic significance of civil society and it is to that aspect I wish now to turn.

Civil society, the state and democracy

While it is contestable whether or not one ought to include political parties in their voluntary sector form as participants in civil society, it is fundamental that 'civil society exists where there are free associations, not under tutelage of state power'. (Taylor 1995:207)

When we turn again to Grundtvig, we find an emphasis on civil society rather than on the state⁴¹⁹. Like Herder before him, his emphasis was more on the 'folk'⁴²⁰ than on the nation, certainly in its state form⁴²¹. In his perhaps sometimes idiosyncratic logic, he associated the state etymologically with the idea of being 'static', with a tendency to

⁴¹⁹ Though the so-called Four Leaf Clover of Danishness includes the King, we might perhaps regard this as more significantly a reference to the office as a symbol of national unity rather than as an element in the state apparatus - though clearly the King was indeed a major component of state rule particularly in the time of absolute monarchy

⁴²⁰ More essentially a cultural entity than a political one

⁴²¹ A more contemporary rendering of this view is expressed in Tivey 1980 arguing that the state is a legal, political and coercive institution but not a community

seek the preservation of the status quo and of its power and processes. (Bugge 1998:46) In one sense, Grundtvig was not a natural democrat, initially suspicious of the first movements towards a more parliamentary and democratic form of government⁴²², but if it was to be so then his concern was that ordinary people (who were significantly less to be suspected of betrayal of the Danishness of Denmark⁴²³) should be enabled to play their part. He was wary too that a parliament might be the instrument of greater state intrusion into the lives of people and their communities. His concept of the living word (*det levende ord*) was used by Grundtvig to encompass a conviction that people should be able and be under an obligation to think for themselves, to be able to share their thoughts with others and collectively take responsibility for their personal and communal lives. (Bugge 1998:45)

This emphasis fostered a growth in 19thC Denmark of civil society activity. Borish comments on the scale of these developments: 'These social movements, the 'secondary agents of transformation' are of great interest in making clear the reasons why development took the path it did in Denmark.

⁴²² Opposing the introduction of the advisory provincial assemblies in Denmark

⁴²³ Compared with those government members and officials who were Germanized and/or of classical education and inclination

Among the 'secondary agents of transformation' are the well-known cooperative movement in Danish agriculture (*andelsbevægelse*), the less well known cottars' or tenant farmers' movement (*husmændsbevægelse*), the role of the village meetinghouses (*forsamlingshuse*) and independent congregations (*valgmenigheder*), the growth of agricultural training centers (*landbrugshøjskoler*), and the beginnings of social health insurance (the *sygekasse* and *sygeforsikring*). A profoundly revitalized politics, economy, and society emerged in the wake of these 'people's movements' (*folkelig bevægelser*).'

(1991:13) It is to more than anyone Grundtvig that Denmark⁴²⁴ owe its particular balance between the state and civil society. In this process, it is important to acknowledge also the role of the folk high school movement, inspired by Grundtvig. As Korsgaard suggests, the development of *folkeoplysning* or popular enlightenment⁴²⁵ was hugely strengthened by the creation of the adult education movement that underpinned

⁴²⁴ Battail (2000:10) acknowledges also a debt to Grundtvig in the creation of 'study circles' and their relevance for the operation of parliamentary government in Sweden

⁴²⁵ It is necessary to acknowledge the inadequacies of translation which does not reflect the richness or the nuances of the concept

folk sovereignty⁴²⁶ in distinction from state sovereignty.

It is possible to see the role of civil society as something of a corrective to a possible over-emphasis on governance and political activity as constituting the whole of the realm of citizenship and, on the other hand in relation to the economic sphere, on the market place of individual customers and corporate providers. 'For the less we participate in society at large, the more tenuous our bonds - indeed, the more tenuous our democracy. To withdraw from civil life is to cede control of our lives to the state and the marketplace.' (The New Democrat 1995)

The civil sphere can carry a recognition that can compensate for a legitimacy deficit when state institutions are held in low public esteem. A possible measure of the problem might be turnout in legislature and local government elections. By way of a snapshot picture, let us look at some of the statistics for electoral participation in the UK in recent times:

⁴²⁶ Visible in such forms as the use of subsidiarity (taking decisions at commune level rather than above) or the conduct of referenda

Table 14 shows for example for Scotland a decline in General Election turnout from a high point of 80.9% in 1950 to a low point in 1997 of 71.3%. The situation in local government elections across the UK is considerably worse with, for example, 34% and 31% of eligible voters casting ballots in the elections respectively for the London Mayor and London Assembly.

Table 14

Turnout at UK General Elections: 1945-97 ^(a)					
Valid votes as % of electorate					
	England	Wales	Scotland	Northern Ireland	United Kingdom
1945	73.4%	75.7%	69.0%	67.4%	72.8%
1950	84.0%	84.8%	80.9%	77.4%	83.9%
1951	83.1%	84.4%	81.2%	79.9%	82.6%
1955	76.9%	79.6%	75.1%	74.1%	76.8%
1959	78.9%	82.6%	78.1%	65.9%	78.7%
1964	77.0%	80.1%	77.6%	71.7%	77.1%
1966	75.9%	79.0%	76.0%	66.1%	75.8%
1970	71.4%	77.4%	74.1%	76.6%	72.0%
1974 Feb	79.0%	80.0%	79.0%	69.9%	78.8%
1974 Oct	72.6%	76.6%	74.8%	67.7%	72.8%
1979	75.9%	79.4%	76.8%	67.7%	76.0%
1983	72.5%	76.1%	72.7%	72.9%	72.7%
1987	75.4%	78.9%	75.1%	67.0%	75.3%
1992	78.0%	79.7%	75.5%	69.8%	77.7%
1997	71.4%	73.5%	71.3%	67.1%	71.4%


Notes: (a) For 1945, this percentage makes an adjustment for multi-member seats. UK total for 1945 includes Universities. Turnout is based on valid votes as a proportion of the electorate in contested seats.

Sources: *British Electoral Facts: 1832-1999, Rallings and Thrasher, Parliamentary Research Services, 2000*
House of Commons Library

A similar measure might be the level of engagement of people with the political parties through membership.

Table 15

Source: Economic and Social Research Council



Even insofar as these statistics may be valid (and we have to be cautious about their representativeness and their significance), such assertions as:

'No one cares much for government'

(Barber 1995:13) and

'... a powerful wave of Civic Truth has swept contemporary discourse. The State is effectively seen as bad, and Society as good. Hence human rights tend to be defined narrowly as limits on the power of the State... and only reluctantly as involving fundamental socio-economic obligations and individual responsibility' (Sajoo 2001:s15)

Or Baudrillard's view that the masses on the whole have turned away from 'serious'

politics and are turned on to something else more interesting (cited in McGuigan 2005) must be viewed as having a significant measure of over-statement. Nonetheless, it is worrying that even in the heart of educational commitment to democracy, in the Nordic folk high schools, 'democracy is still on the... agenda, although with a mistrust towards political life'. (Borgå 1998:163)

Not least should our caution be rooted in an acknowledgement that there is a fundamental mutuality around the condition of the health of these twin dimensions of democratic process: the state and the civil society.⁴²⁷ There is merit in Walzer's observation: 'I want to warn against the antipolitical tendencies that commonly accompany the celebration of civil society (which) network cannot dispense with the agencies of state power'. (Walzer 1995:168)

There is little doubt that the democratic qualities of the state can be enhanced by a strong and vigorous civil society. Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba, for example, identify its contribution as being of vital importance. (Almond and Verba 1989)

⁴²⁷ Whatever factors may be contributing to a widespread reduction of participation in politics may also be at work in an erosion in participation in the civil sphere (Furbey et al 2006)

The capacity of civil society to complement the role of the state in a compensatory way is important. Where state institutions are weak⁴²⁸ or where there is a normative vacuum⁴²⁹, then the social, cultural and ethical capital of civil society can become an effective and valuable substitute. (Sajoo 2001:24) In this way, the collapse of communism in eastern Europe and less dramatically challenges to social democracy in the West (Kumar 1993:375) have 'elevated civil society to the privileged sphere of radical social change' (Murphy 2001:1)

Beyond this compensatory role, the state may benefit from the capacity of associations within the civil society to stimulate debate and even to challenge, not least when political opposition is weak. Indeed, Putnam 1993:181-5 asserts that there is at least some empirical evidence that civic engagement impacts positively on the quality of the performance of state agencies.

The work of civil society may produce outcomes that are consistent with state policy - as collaborative partners⁴³⁰ or in preventing radical polarization (Walzer

⁴²⁸ As in emerging democracies

⁴²⁹ As where the rule of law has been undermined or is not firmly established

⁴³⁰ Valuable though this may be in policy implementation and service terms, it is the source again of some conceptual blurring

1995:166) or as a source of experienced personnel for government and politics (Boyte 1995).

More broadly, it can contribute to the creation of a national community made up of people enriched by their engagement within society. In Grundtvig's words, distinguishing the nation from the machinery of government, what had to be fostered was a 'real national life in which the lives of all the individuals that go to make up a people must find a loftier dignity, strength, activity and explanation than that which any individual person confined to his own limited can achieve, and the nobler, the more richly endowed and the more intimately bound together the people are, the deeper and thus the more obscure the life of the people must be'. (Thaning 1972:101-2)

Those who are drawn into this form of national life can be significantly broader than those who are attracted to, drawn into or given access to the political process, so under-represented sections of the community find vehicles for their contribution to the public good and indeed a route of access into and skills for political engagement and service. At its best, civil society enables a wider participation in public life than if it were conducted exclusively by and within

state organs and their associated political parties. (Fullinwider 1999)

Yet, the existence of weaknesses and the traffic of indebtedness is by no means wholly in a single direction. Civil society organisation is not without its weaknesses. The democratic base can be low; self-appointed elites can flourish; the politically marginalised may be equally marginalised within the civic sector; undemocratic and even discriminatory attitudes and practices can flourish unless controlled by state power. (Walzer 1995:170)

Different and separate though these two dimensions of public life are and ought to be, it is possible to over-state the nature and degree of rivalry or competitiveness between them. (Dahrendorf 1990:96)

Putnam (1995:71) questions how truly civic some civil organisations actually are⁴³¹. 'They root for the same team and they share some of the same interest, but they are unaware of each other's existence. Their ties, in short, are to common symbols, common leaders, and perhaps common ideals, but not to one another.' The consequence, he suggests, is that they 'typically fail to

⁴³¹ He describes such organisations as 'tertiary associations' (Putnam 1995:71)

foster' what are sometimes described as the key outcomes of civil society, 'the civic virtues ... such as trust, cooperation and reciprocity'.

The creation of social capital

This idea that there are direct, tangible outcomes of civil society finds expression in the concept of 'social capital'⁴³².

Field summarises it 'in two words- *relationships matter*. By making connections with one another, and keeping them going over time, people are able to work together to achieve things that they either could not achieve by themselves, or could only achieve with great difficulty. People connect through a series of networks and they tend to share common values with other members of these networks; to the extent that these networks constitute a resource, they can be seen as forming a kind of capital.' (2003:1)

⁴³² At the outset, it is right to observe that neither the concept nor the language of 'social capital' is uncontested. For some, the use of instrumentalist economic language fails to capture the ethos and nature of civic engagement (Field 2003). For others, the underlying communitarian principle seems to imply an emphasis on social care, social cohesion and voluntary effort (Putnam 1995; Putnam and Feldstein 2003) that may render the civil society a partner in ensuring the governability of society. Gilchrist (2004) and Taylor (2000) question the assumption that social capital is always related to the ethical good of the community (so, for example, war is a means of increasing certain forms of social capital but is not thereby necessarily a positive force). More generally, the term has come under some criticism for its imprecision, and indeed the imprecision and immeasurability of the concepts in which it deals (like trust) but one might observe that such untidiness frequently is associated with clustering human phenomena of Nationalism.

Social capital can be clustered in three main areas:

- Structural - for example, the capacity of building of 'weak' or low density ties which facilitate a bridge to more distant sources of knowledge, expertise and cooperation (Granovetter 1983)
- Behavioural or relational - for example, the capacity of establishing and maintaining relationships through the use of such attributes as trust, cooperation and solidarity
- Cognitive - for example, the capacity of problem-solving, conflict resolution and effective communication.

Is there room for faith communities in civil society?

Conceptually, some theorists exclude churches and other faith communities from civil society as they allocate them to the 'sacred' sphere and indeed, in evaluative terms, they regard them as contributing little to the formation of a civic ethos in the 'profane' sphere. (Alexander 1998:97)

Indeed, this separation of the secular and the sacred is sometimes regarded as virtually a *sine qua non* of a modernist civil society. (Gellner 1994; Taylor 1995:266-71)

A related issue is the question of non-establishment and the separation of church/faith community and the state, a principal common in modern liberal democracies and yet 'never fully achieved' in significant numbers of them. (Fukuyama 2006:6). It is a tenet of the liberal view that there should be neutrality⁴³³ of the state in relation to religion⁴³⁴ (while preserving freedom of religious belief and practice). Even where there is nominal legal separation, as in the United States of America⁴³⁵, there may remain strong institutional links, significant vestiges of the Judaeo-Christian tradition in the civil

⁴³³ This 'neutrality' may go as far (as with French *laïcité*) as prescribing whether or not religious practices are compatible where they meet the life of the state and its institutions (eg the wearing by Islamic women of the *hijab*) (Fetzer and Soper 2005)

⁴³⁴ Kymlicka (2001:23) argues that the liberal state is committed similarly to 'ethnocultural neutrality' though he believes that this claim has been 'effectively demolished' (2001:43 referring to the arguments of Tamir 1993 and Spinner 1994) as liberal democracies themselves usually promote a societal culture which is not untainted with cultural privileging.

⁴³⁵ '*...I contemplate with solemn reverence that act of the whole American people which declared that their legislature should 'make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof,' thus building a wall of separation between Church and State...*' Thomas Jefferson, letter to the *Danbury Baptist Association of Connecticut* on 1 January 1802

religion and 'religious' influence at times remains a powerful force. It is questionable how far principles of liberal democracy and church-state separation correlate with one another⁴³⁶.

Whatever the politico-legal position, however, I would want to suggest that the critical issue is the extent and nature of the privileging of particular religions or religion as whole within the community.⁴³⁷ The question of 'establishment' is rather beyond the scope of this thesis, but the existence of connection, structurally or in perception, between a religion and the state to some extent compromises the faith community's role in the civic space: firstly, because it involves a particular blurring of the separation of state and civic spheres and secondly, because it locates the faith community in a position of privilege and special status. This, in turn, I would argue, makes it difficult for faith

⁴³⁶ In the context of our interest in Denmark, one might note that there is a strong church-state connection in the Crown, in a ministry of ecclesiastical affairs, the collection of church tax from the vast majority of citizens and in the state appointment of bishops and regulation of the liturgy, alongside a decidedly liberal democracy.

⁴³⁷ I regard it as inevitable in the present historical period that some privileging of the Judaeo-Christian tradition will occur, given the long period of Christian dominance and the intertwining of Christianity and the life of the Christian Church with other aspects of national life in creating the national heritage, beliefs, attitudes and practices, but at the same time affirming the need in a pluralistic community of people of different faiths and other life perspectives to broaden the nature of public culture.

communities to engage in a mode of interaction that is consistent with both a pluralist liberal democracy and with achieving a free, open and truly shared search for enlightenment and the creation of communities of justice and harmony.

At first sight, Grundtvig also drew a separation between the spiritual and the secular. In Folkelighed og Christendom 1847 and in Om Folkelighed og Dr Rudelbach 1848 against criticism⁴³⁸, he refutes the suggestion that he has confused 'the Christian' and 'the folk/ Danish' and affirms, 'I take pains to keep Christianity and Danishness apart'. (Knudsen 1976:37-38) Nonetheless, his formulation of 'a human being first, then a Christian' less separates than holds in relationship these two dimensions of life. It is as we explore and live out the fullness of life that we make it possible to apprehend the deeper values and indeed the transcendent. He did, at least from 1832⁴³⁹, draw a distinction between faith and the human interpretation of life (*anskuelse*), the first concerned with salvation, the second with enlightenment about human life, but in no way does he

⁴³⁸ Grundtvig reports that the following had appeared in *Berlingske Tidende* 'Following their master's example, the Grundtvigians mix up Danishness, Nordicism and Scandinavianism with Christianity...' and comments, 'They are suspicious of my so-called confusion of Danishness and Christianity.'

⁴³⁹ With the publication of Nordens Mytologi

suggest that Christians ought not to be concerned with human life - on the contrary. Further, in his own rather unique way, he discerns a 'double accounting system' in which God's salvation history is set alongside human history 'as simultaneously separate and parallel tracks, aiming towards the same perfect and clarified final goal.' (Vind 1993:617)

There were times when Grundtvig held to an exclusivist position with Christianity the norm in respect of all human affairs but after his 'conversion to life' he was freed to 'acknowledge the fruitfulness of a working fellowship with others who thought along the same lines culturally, despite differences in faith.' (Thaning 1972: 70) He recognised that these others would include people who were not of religious faith (naturalists). The essential connection was that all were spirited people who could take a humane view of life, not following an over-rationalist view of human life which he thought was disharmonious with life, neglecting deeper truth and meaning. The fundamental dichotomy was between life and death, between what enhanced and transmitted human life and what deadened or emptied the human experience. Those who could journey together on the path of popular enlightenment, affirming life, able to hear

the living word in poetry, in history and in the life of the people should journey together in conversation.

We might hear an echo of such commitment in the Roman Catholic document from Vatican II *Gaudium et Spes* (Tanner 1990:1096) in which the Council called for dialogue with all people of good will which it acknowledged to include atheists, other Christian communities and followers of other religions. (The Council went on in *Nostra Aetate* and in *Ad Gentes* to recognise - however cautiously - the positive and shared elements in the beliefs and practices of other faiths (Tanner 1990:969) and to encourage Catholics to discern 'seeds of the Word' in all cultures and to celebrate diversity of cultures (Tanner 1990:1018))

However, though Lefebure (2006), for example, can identify the scholarly and lay dialogues that followed from this conciliar initiative, it would appear from the evidence cited there that this has been predominantly focused on other religions or indeed ecumenically within Christianity itself with little evidence of serious engagement with other people 'of good will'.

In reality of course faith communities have and do engage in the public space.

Churches and other faith communities make significant contributions in (in particular) areas of social care and community development. For example, one study noted: 'Across the survey results it was particularly evident that faith communities are extensively involved in providing services for older people, children and more deprived neighbourhoods in the region... Faith communities can help those working for regeneration, social inclusion or sustainable development to reach out to amny of those who could be defined as 'hard to reach'... (North West Development Agency 2003:4) Parallel studies in other regions have produced similar findings (cf Yorkshire Churches 2002; Lovatt et al 2005) and in the Scottish context, a survey commented that '(Church of Scotland) congregations make important contributions to the institutional infrastructure and social cohesion of many Scottish communities'. (Flint and Kearns 2004:18) Though some of these contributions may be at the philanthropic level, it is evident that on the whole they touch upon areas of ethical and political judgement and policy.

Seligman (1992:197-8) acknowledges the contribution of religion and religious organisations to the development of civil

society and indeed civil ideals, but nonetheless he treats this as an historical reality rather than a contemporary contribution.

One barrier to their positive participation, in his view, is that when civil associations are 'ethically constructed as different normative sphere, they represent not the realization but the destruction of civil life'. (198)

In this we come to what is for some the essence of the difficulty. Is it inevitable that the public space should be wholly secularised? (Habermas 1996:329-87) Or, as Sajoo asks, 'should the modernist civic project be embraced on its own terms, and the ethical affinities of the old consigned to the private sphere? (2001:s3) Klotz (2005) asks a similar question: are we limiting our civic language to a wholly secular one, privileging the economic and the political? It is not self-evidently true that the secular sphere of society lacks a moral or a literary or an historical or a cultural dimension, but there is some weight in Klotz's concern that the secular public sphere is heavily oriented towards the economic and the political.

Though Christianity has in many contexts had experience of distinguishing its religious from its cultural forms and utilising different languages of discourse, it is suggested that there is greater reluctance on the part of Islam in the Moslem world to abandon its merging of the secular and the sacred, *duniya* and *din*, and this is viewed as 'inherently problematical for liberal discourse premised on pluralistic civic space', indeed the liberal civic tradition regards mistrustfully 'serious ethical affinities'. (Sajoo 2001:s1) Taylor (1995:186) may be pointing to a root of this when he suggests that 'the ethic central to a liberal society is an ethic of rights rather than the good'.

There can be a perception within faith communities that they are unwelcome or that there are significant barriers to their contributing in the public space, for example to community partnerships around social development. Farnell et al (2003:39) comment on some of the practical issues that they identified:

- a lack of 'religious literacy' among regeneration professionals;
- a perception among religious groups that they are discriminated against in the allocation of funding;

- difficulties in engaging minorities, women and young people;
- some incompatibility between secular and faith definitions of appropriate gender roles and equal opportunities; and
- competition and sometimes conflict within, as well as between, faith groups.

There are in some faith communities recurrent tendencies to act as hierarchical organisations fostering deference and neutralizing or silencing the thinking of non-compliant members, though this is not exclusive to religious organisations, nor is it necessarily an aspect of their religious beliefs rather than their cultural practices.

Liberal societies are liable to find incompatible with the notion of civic society the fostering of intolerance or the exclusion of people on the basis of gender, sexual orientation, ethnicity or race, religion or wealth but religious groups through their theology, their regulation of admissibility to certain offices and roles, their dominant culture and in other ways have a long history of discriminating especially on grounds of gender and sexuality (and sometimes have sought 'opt-out' from

statutory provision in order to continue to engage in such practices). That these practices may be sought to be legitimated by reference to scriptures or tradition or ecumenical obligation does not remove the difficulty in a wider civic sense of their participation in an open and equal civil society.

How far however do these practices, when we encounter them, justify their communities' exclusion from civil society and the arenas of cross-associational engagement? The first argument in response is simply one of openness, for there is difficulty for an open civil society then to act in an exclusive way, if the cost of freedom of some associations is their exclusion. We may nonetheless acknowledge that there are some forms of association which do fall outside the civil law or very fundamental notions of acceptability and they in a sense exclude themselves from civil society rooted in a liberal democratic tradition.

The second is on the notion that openness can lead to open-mindedness as those of a more exclusive mind are brought into contact with disparate communities, alternative lifestyles and challenging perspectives, particularly if the contexts of engagement are ones that demand lively interaction rather than

respectful distance. This is the 'educational' argument rooted in the notion that illiberal practice is rooted in a lack of awareness. On this view, the exposure of the illiberal to the liberal leads to liberalisation. It is perhaps a superficial analysis rooted more in good intentions and optimism than reality. Noting the high levels of education often undertaken in the Western world of some of those who have gone on to take a highly oppositional stand against the world in which they were educated, Fukuyama notes: 'It is highly naïve to think that radical Islamists hate the West out of ignorance of what the West is'. (Fukuyama 2006:12)

Walzer (1995) would indeed challenge the educative quality of civil society, suggesting rather that it is more often the intervention of the state that has brought about change in practice and opinion in the civil society than the internal dialogue and interaction of civic associations themselves. However, though this optimistic view may not be guaranteed its success, it does seem to contain the seeds of more potential than building exclusionary walls.

Thirdly, there is the potential that, even from more oppressive organisations, some of the oppressed who are in membership may

nonetheless act in a representational capacity or otherwise enter into cross-associational activities through their membership and thereby be nurtured through contact with others in other associations who share their characteristics or perspectives. It may seem counterintuitive that people under oppression in associations remain freely inside such organisations, but discriminatory faith communities have, for example, not been deserted by either women or gay people.

It may be acknowledged that some of the suspicion of religion and faith communities within the wider community is rooted in their experience of the place of religion in history and in the contemporary world where it appears not infrequently in the guise of a divisive and inflammatory force. As Lefebure observes, one cannot avoid seeing 'the repeated intertwining of violence and religion throughout history'. (2006:89) It is perhaps then not unexpected that others in the arena of civil society will hesitate to regard the active participation of faith communities as being a contribution towards harmony, reconciliation and social cohesion.

The role of education in nurturing civil virtues

Clearly, the educational dimension has not been missing in what I have said up to this point in this chapter. I want however now to say something, though relatively briefly, more explicitly about the commitment of adult learning to the fostering of civil society.

In the literature of adult and community education, it is possible to discern a concern that there has been a shift away from education for citizenship, for political engagement and for sharing in the public space of exchange towards education for the labour market. So, Miller (1995:46) refers to 'the long and inexorable shift that education has made, encouraged and demanded by constituents and funders alike, from education for citizenship toward preparing people for occupational success'. Concerned as I am for lay theological education, I would discern similarly a tension between lay training that seeks to equip people within faith communities for roles and functions and lay education that takes seriously the work of lay people in their various public interactions.

Murphy (2001:2) celebrates the capacity of adult and community education to identify

spaces 'where forms of counter-hegemonic learning can take place' such as in the sphere of cultural education) and in women's education.

In the context of the desire underpinning this thesis to support the equipping of people of faith to engage in interaction and dialogue for common enlightenment and shared participation in the varied elements of the public civic sphere and our emphasis on people of difference engaging with one another, both in the special places of shared learning and the ordinary places of everyday dialogue, it is interesting to note Merrifield's assessment that 'most learning about civic participation takes place outside of educational settings; people learn by doing. And especially learn through the opportunities provide by taking part in community organisations' (1997:6).

Even with this emphasis upon the 'natural' opportunities for interaction across difference, Oldfield warns us that participatory citizenship is an 'unnatural practice'. (Oldfield 1990, quoted in Hill 1994:14) The capacity to participate as a citizen in the political community and more widely in civil society demands qualities and skills that require *development*. (Furbey et al 2006) Furbey et al notes that the

activities of faith communities largely outside the public space nonetheless may contribute to civil society: 'Faith, worship and people's development within faith organisations can foster qualities essential for civic engagement.'

Two examples from the literature demonstrate something of the range of skills that educators have recognised as being relevant to participation in civil society:

Merrifield 1997:6 : 'to be informed includes the ability to pose questions and identify problems, to find information from a variety of sources... (including) oral sources. People told us you have to learn to 'read between the lines', to understand the realities of how political decisions are made, not just the theory, to know who your allies are and how to influence people. To have a voice includes both being willing to speak out, but also to have something to say, so it builds on being informed. To have a voice means developing your sense of self, as well as speaking so that others can hear and understand you. To work together includes getting involved with others in formal and informal ways, and learning to participate in groups, dealing with difference and conflict.'

Stein 1995:4 : 'to have access to information and to orient themselves in the world; to give voice to their ideas and opinions and to have the confidence that their voice will be heard and taken into account; to solve problems and make decisions on their own, acting as a parent, citizen and worker, for the good of their families, their community and their nation; to be able to keep on learning in order to keep up with a rapidly changing world.'

In the next section however I seek to identify some components of and prerequisites for *vekselvirkning*, for interaction, in the public space. In this, it is implicit that there is a capacity building agenda under each heading, that participants in the conversation have to grow in their ability to engage optimally in the dialogue, in the interaction.

Some 'ground rules' for a healthy civil society

True engagement and interaction

It is the dynamic of engagement, of sharing, of interaction, of exchange that is fundamental to creating communities in which

the public space is a forum for learning and collaboration.

This is a model of the civil society that requires the participating associations to enter into a process of encounter. Yet some liberal societies have, until recently at least, seemed to prosper on the basis of avoiding this contact and engagement. Lijphart (2002) offers the example of the Netherlands (reported in Fukuyama 2006:14) - 'It is much easier to tolerate cultural difference when it is practiced in other, parallel communities rather than in their own. Dutch society has been multicultural without being assimilative, something that fits well into consociational society that was traditionally organized into separate Protestant, Catholic and socialist *verzuilingen* or pillars'. The *vekselvirkning* cannot be conducted from behind walls of division. I have heard it said in common parlance that Grundtvig insists that we meet 'face-to-face' and 'eye-to-eye', that the encounter is very direct. And the concept of the living word too stresses the immediacy of our encounter, not addressing one another in formalized discourses but in spontaneous and lively dialogue.

Bugge has found affinity between the ideas of Grundtvig and those of Martin Buber who writes of encounter (Ger: *Begegnung*) as moving beyond co-existence to 'a decisive event that changes your outlook radically... an event from which there is no escape' (Warren 1998:40)

It is not difficult to see the grounds for hesitance of minority players in society with distinctive beliefs and cultural values and practices. Much of their task in keeping with the notions of multiculturalism and plurality has been to preserve the distinctive characteristics of their community. Yet engagement, encounter and interaction offers risk of taking the community member out of the space of difference into space where change can occur and the dominant culture may have real strength. In the context of interfaith dialogue, Berling 2004 points to a tension in the complex process of a person of one faith seeking to learn about another faith (or indeed another philosophical perspective) as it involves both 'understanding another religion faithfully and... re-appropriating (in this instance, Christian) tradition in the light of new understandings and relationships.' (2004:64) *Vekselvirkning* holds out the potential and therefore the risk (as it may be viewed within the faith

community) that there will be change. This possibility is not necessarily greeted in all communities as a positive potentiality.

'While some groups and their individual members are prompted by their beliefs to engage across religious and faith-secular boundaries and to participate in wider civil society and processes of governance, others understand their faith as requiring segregation from other religious traditions and secular culture. (Furbey et al 2006:10)

Openness together with conviction

The starting point of dialogue is almost inevitably the beliefs that one personally and one's community together holds. There is a commitment to one's own beliefs and those of one's faith/ belief community, but there is also 'the possibility of being personally transformed by ... (the) encounter'. (Lefebure 2006:88). This approach⁴⁴⁰ does not claim a primarily objective stance, even assuming this were a reasonable possibility; the commencement point is a particular tradition. The contribution of each party is to offer its own gifts, insights, perspectives with commitment and conviction and to receive the offering from the other

⁴⁴⁰ Sometimes called the 'comparative theology' approach to dialogue

party. 'True dialogue presupposes commitment. It does not imply sacrificing one's own position - it would then be superfluous. An 'unprejudiced' approach is not merely impossible, but would actually subvert dialogue'. (Bosch 1991:484) There is no question but that the reading of the 'other' is in some measure through the eyes of one's own tradition which inevitably provide the lens, but there is a commitment to open inquiry, even to the extent that the encounter may radically change one's beliefs and practices and even identity.

For Grundtvig, it was important to reach out and move out of the accustomed to the 'so-called strange and unfamiliar... in order not to miss the common human where everything '*folekligt*' will find its object and explanation'. (Bugge 1965:234) It was in moving beyond the known and encountering the different that we can not only discover the uniqueness of the other but also the sharedness. There is a common saying in the Danish folkhighschool movement that one meets Grundtvig at the border of the country. Hendrichvoh (1998:147) reads this saying as casting Grundtvig in the role of the one who welcomes the bringing of difference and who is open to learning from it. It 'has something to do with being open. Being able to accept other people... Accepting other

people and their differences from yourself is a learning process.'

This encounter of difference in *vekselvirkning* is however not about surrender but about 'a balance between two things that remain difference but that they should fertilize each other in their differentness'. (Borish 1991) It is not then, at its best, a process of assimilation to a dominant cultural norm or of surrender.

It does however imply that the understandings and meanings, the cultural beliefs and practices, the visions and commitments of sections of the civic community are brought together, not simply for gentle exchange, but for a process that subjects them to critical, rational examination. 'The associational life of civil society is the ground where all visions of the good are worked out and tested and proved to be partial, incomplete and ultimately unsatisfying'. (Walzer 1995:162-3) While then each comes to encounter with commitment and conviction, it is at its most creative in order to subject this partial apprehension of enlightenment to a shared process of examination and analysis and testing in order to move on to a new place.

The process however does require not simply an openness *to* but also an openness *with*.

In cross-cultural dialogue, often we are understandably cautious and hesitant about misunderstanding or giving offence or injuring sensitivities. Edwards (2004) acknowledges the grounds for this, but expresses a concern that it sometimes inhibits what we might call an honest interaction, a situation in which 'difference cannot be named as the issue, or not the issue, on its own terms (when) it can have a deadening effect on the quality and depth of public engagement, resulting in superficial consensus because people from different groups fear to 'read each other's stories', still less understand and internalize their implications for a life in common.' (2004:68) We cannot bridge the differences of our understandings, or belief systems and our cultural norms if we are fearful and remain on our own safe territory.

Perhaps this capacity to cross imaginatively and sensitively into the world view of the other is part of what Shanks calls 'a flair for tradition'. (1995:139) It is the struggle to enter into the experience and the world view of the other. Fergusson (2005) questions the notion that in cross-cultural dialogue and encounter that we can develop some 'moral Esperanto' and urges rather that we have to develop the ability to use different discourses and to move between them

with sensitivity. We have to learn to be culturally and ethically multilingual.

Openness to experience as the shared teacher

Grundtvig was strongly of the view that learning was about life and that life was itself our teacher. This was one of the reasons why folkhighschools were planned as residential experiences (and indeed in modern times why there was significant resistance to day folkhighschools), for it was in living together that people learned to respect one another, to share with one another and to be educated by each other. It was in the processes of daily life as much as in the classroom that this learning would be generated. In the famous verbal swipe at Denmark's neighbours and their educational philosophy, he was dismissive of the 'high German notion' that life was explicable before it was experienced and could be taught rather than learned. On the same grounds, he was wary of the role of books who could form dead sources if the living word within them did not resonate with one's own experience of life (an experience that was not simply personal but encountered interaction of the communal life of the school, the community or

the nation and indeed between the historical and the present⁴⁴¹).

If this interaction is towards *folkeoplysning* (popular enlightenment) as a goal, it also relies upon *folkeoplysning* as a pedagogy. It is not only enlightenment of the people, but enlightenment by and from the people. In other words, it has to utilize as much as possible and to maximum effect the knowledge, wisdom and experience of all in a direct, lively interaction.

A challenge to this pedagogy, perhaps particularly in interfaith and intercultural dialogue, lies in the practice of resorting to external authorities. In some contexts, there is less tendency to go such sources as hierarchical authority or texts or tradition, for where the norms of the faith or cultural community and the society are largely congruent, the questions of interpretation on the whole do not arise.' (Roy 2004) The major difficulties in this practice are threefold:

- the sources do not necessarily carry the same authority *outwith*

⁴⁴¹ Benjamin's concept of *Erfahrung* captures something of this understanding of experience which is not transitory or of the moment but resonates with a shared experience with not only one's contemporaries but a communal tradition that gives the experience depth. (Benjamin 1961)

the associational group as within it⁴⁴²;

- by going outwith the realm of experience (which may be different but at least allow the possibility of bridging) the scope for entering into common territory is minimized;
- but perhaps most significantly it removes the dialogue from a framework of rational and reasonable discussion which lies at the heart of civil society. (Macedo 1990) One of the risks of seeking to isolate religious, and even cultural, ideas in the realm of the 'private' is that such views and beliefs, customs and practices remain influential through the participation of their holders in the public space of social and political interaction but they are not subject to the test of having to be explained and argued for in terms that are at least accessible to and capable of persuading

⁴⁴² On this basis, then, Sajoo 2000 reflecting on an Islamic context and Kung 1996 call on people of those traditions to rely less upon the internal authorities of their community than on 'moral reasoning that transcends mere scriptural citation - and takes account of the emerging discourse of global ethics' [Sajoo 2000:s35] Mir-Hosseini [2000] too demonstrates the value in the face of narrowness of interpretation of being able to appeal to wider (though still within community) ethical understandings.

others outside the religious or cultural group.⁴⁴³ (Kymlicka 2001:297; Galston 1991:227)


There has to be a genuine *vekselvirkning* or interaction between the aspects of the reflection: tradition, experience and culture. Each must be in a position to assert its contribution. There can be no trump card which silences the other dimensions. For those of a more fundamentalist perspective, it may be difficult not to privilege 'scripture' or 'tradition' but there may also be a challenge to those who generally would privilege 'experience'. 'The conversation (between individual and corporate experience and the wisdom of the heritage) is a genuine dialogue that seeks to hear from our own beliefs, actions and perspectives, as well as those from the tradition. It respects the integrity of both.' (Killen and de Beer 1994:viii)

To illustrate such a process, we may turn to Whitehead and Whitehead's model of

⁴⁴³ Kymlicka allows a partial exemption from this requirement for public defence to those who 'have little or no desire to be politically active' [2001:297] but I believe this to be unsatisfactory on the grounds that citizens, even the politically inactive, contribute through their daily discourses and behaviours to the life of the public space. Educationally, I would regret too a position that would discourage many 'believers' from opening their personal thinking to the scrutiny of rational dialogue.

theological reflection they term
'conversation' (1995) in which faith and
experience are in lively exchange:

Table 16 Theological Reflection as conversation



In the listening stage, the listening has to be attentive and active, undertaken patiently and openly, with an ear to mis-hearing rooted in one's own biases and assumptions and interpretations.

In the assertion stage, there has to be an honest, open, creative, constructive and respectful sharing with the goal of the enriching of the enlightenment of each and all.

In the response stage, the focus is on turning the insights into consequences. In

particular, there is a seeking to discern **new** truths and meanings. What does it mean at the levels of meaning and behaviour?

This interaction around experience does not fail to acknowledge the differences, indeed radical differences, that there may be both in objective experience and in perception. There is however the potential for a significant degree of sharedness when in localized civic space people of different backgrounds and perspectives endeavour honestly to read and to explore the context that they share (using 'the city as text' (Pecknold 2003)).

It is not uncommon for dialogue to commence with the questions. Indeed questions are important, for they are road into the dialogue that takes seriously and considers sensitively and responsively the concerns which other traditions that one's own express. (Ward 1998:8) If experience is different how much more apart are the questions that different faith communities and belief groups pose and how they express them. (Kraemer 1961:76f; Newbigin 1969:28,43f) It is an erroneous starting point to imagine that in dialogue what we begin with is a uniform set of questions which we then turn on different experiences. Rather, in dialogue, the partners should

endeavour to formulate the questions that are meaningful to each.

This living and lively interaction has the capacity to create a particular kind of knowledge and understanding which is both rooted in and applied in context⁴⁴⁴.

Respect

For Grundtvig, maybe a little chauvinistically, 'respect' was an essentially Nordic idea. It lay at the heart of *vekselvirkning* for pedagogically it had usefulness only if one supposed that the other had something that was valid and useful to hear.⁴⁴⁵

This involves a willing rather than a grudging acceptance of the 'other' and its right of participation in the public space. 'We cannot possibly dialogue with or witness to other people if we resent their presence or the views they hold.' (Bosch 1991:483)

⁴⁴⁴ The Hebrew term *yada* perhaps encapsulates something of this sense of knowing experientially [The Complete Word Study Dictionary: the Old Testament 2003 AMG Publishers]

⁴⁴⁵ The habit of Grundtvig to begin his lectures to students with *Mine Herrer* is said to be more than a courteous opening but a mark of commitment of respect and openness to them as teachers as well as learners.

Respect conditions the language and manner in which we engage in the interaction - what Kymlicka 2001:296 refers to as 'civility'.

It demands a commitment to be as accurate and truthful as we can be regarding what the other believes and does. Mosher (2006:125) roots this in the Decalogue, the 'Ten Commandments of Moses', where it is written that 'we are not to bear false witness against our neighbour. Respecting the dignity of every human being presumes bearing truthful witness regarding one's neighbour - and that includes truthfulness in what we say about their religious beliefs and practices (where truthfulness is what an adherent of that religion would recognize as accurate).⁴⁴⁶

It requires honest critical exchange and not deferential acquiescence. The dialogue honours neither party if it offers only a false consensus. Nor is it respectful to assume that the other or their perspective and argument is incapable of coping robust challenge and conversation.

While I have proposed that each party should offer a confident and vigorous conviction, this is not incompatible with a humility. This humility may be grounded in our

⁴⁴⁶ It is interesting that the test is not one of objective accuracy but rather of honouring the understanding of the other.

acceptance of the extent to which our community histories have injured one another or a recognition of the partiality of our perspective or an openness to learn from the other⁴⁴⁷.

Freedom

Grundtvig had himself been the subject of censorship as the result of an ill-judged and probably defamatory article he had written as a young man. His career as a clergyman and as a writer was consequently seriously affected by the lack of freedom that was imposed upon him. This experience and maybe his general tendency to be outspoken and therefore to need a fair degree of liberty informed a strong conviction that freedom was a fundamental aspect of any learning process. The right to freedom had to be reciprocal: 'He who would be free must let his neighbour be free.' (*Mands Minde* 1838)

There would be no true *vekselvirkning* if it was not the interaction of free persons engaging with one another with integrity and in freedom.

It is common for faith communities amongst others to affirm the place of freedom of

⁴⁴⁷ I acknowledge that the notion of humility may also have theological or cultural significance

belonging and of belief and expression in their life. For example: 'There is to be no coercion in matters of faith'. (Qu'ran 2:256) In reality of course religious and other communities are not yet beyond coercive activity from the subtle and indirect to the punitive. Gellner's comment that 'Civil society is a cluster of institutions and associations strong enough to prevent tyranny, but which are, none the less, entered and left freely, rather than imposed by birth or sustained by awesome ritual. You can join the Labour Party without slaughtering a sheep...' (Gellner 1994) Sajoo(2000:s12) however suggests that Gellner's view underestimates the fluidity that does exist in many cultural and faith communities.

The extent of freedom is also sometimes underestimated through assumptions of the level of homogeneity and uniformity within the boundaries of belief communities (Klotz 2005), though McTernan (2003) may take an overoptimistic view in the assumption that 'faith rests essentially on the freedom of the individual to say yes or no to what is proposed as truth. In each tradition, crossing the boundaries of culture and ethnicity, there is clearly a seminal presence of the right of the individual both to seek truth and to dissent - principles

that lie right at the very heart of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights'.

(McTernan 2003:148) It is by no means the reality that all such communities embrace the principles of individual freedom. Sanctions may be deployed. There may (though sometimes there is not) an ultimate right to withdraw from the community but there are heavy pressures on a dissenting or potentially dissenting individual to conform or to be silent, not least because one's whole identity may be anchored in the belief community to the extent that it is unreal to speak of there being for many members a significant scope for personal choice. (Fukuyama 1995:10)

The absence or relative absence of freedom of people within and from such restricting communities impacts on their capacity to contribute to civil society. It undermines also one of the underpinning notions of civil society, that it is part of a democratic process and builds the social capital of the society in the forms of communication skills, ability to reach beyond one's immediate community and such community aptitudes as trust.

Freedom of engagement (and non-engagement) and of thought and expression are therefore

quite fundamental dimensions of a civil society.

Shanks (1995:139) identifies a further form of freedom, a free-spiritedness, an openness to ideas and realities which might readily be overlooked in the light of prevailing orthodoxies. In this he is recognizing that all human beings are to a greater or lesser extent the prisoners of what they already know and believe and the world view that they hold. Freedom lies in the spirit and capacity to find liberation from such constraints. Yet, the practices of some associations nurture not freedom and free thought but traits such as passivity, deference and uncriticalness, which one cannot regard as civic virtues. (Wolfe 1997)

Democratic participation

The context in which Grundtvig developed his plans for folk education was of course the opening up of scope for democratic participation, albeit on a limited scale, in his Denmark.

The notion of civil society is within the context of liberal democracy and the resulting social capital is seen to be primarily in terms of democratic gains.

As Kymlicka and Norman (1995) argue, however, 'the reason why people join churches, families or ethnic organizations is not to learn civic virtue. It is, rather, to honour certain values and enjoy certain human goods, and these motives may have little to do with the promotion of citizenship.'

(1995:296) Even the most philanthropic of community groups is liable to be centred around certain purposes - education, fundraising for charity, social care, leisure or whatever - with the development of civil participation capacity being at best incidental.

The reality is that many of these 'civic' organisations, even if organised ostensibly on a democratic, participative model, may not exemplify the best principles of democratic practice.

Some forms of association have a differential and indeed deferential power structure and dynamic which fosters subservient relations between authoritative heads and their members and some faith communities fall within this category. (Kymlicka and Norman 1995:295)

This deficit in participation, particularly by 'lay' members or by women or other less powerful groups, is identified as a weakness in the participation of faith communities in

civil society. Even if these groups are prominent within the life of the association, it is often the male leadership that is responsible for such key tasks as linking to the wider community. (Furbey et al 2006) Indeed, this usually male leadership may exercise considerable political power because of their supposed capacity to draw on the support of 'presumably loyal members' (Putnam 1995:71)

Almost definitionally, it is inappropriate for the state to intervene in the governance or lifestyle of such associations, for then they would not be 'free' which is an essential condition of them being a part of 'civil' society. While it may well be appropriate and possible for the state to make some provision, eg on grounds of gender or age or racial equality, it is unlikely and undesirable that the state should interfere in terms of regulating the internal affairs of such associations. As Kymlicka and Norman ask, 'do we want governments to reconstruct churches, for example, to make them more internally democratic, or to make sure that their members learn to be independent rather than deferential?' (1995:296)

There may however come a point where cultures of an group may come into conflict with the cultural norms of the wider liberal society.

Multiculturalism has encouraged groups to define for themselves rules of behaviour and treatment which may be at variance with liberal, democratic commitment to equality as individuals. (Fukuyama 2006:15) Tibi (1998) raises the issue of whether or not there is a *Leitkultur* (a guiding culture) in which participation in citizenship and in civil society involves certain obligations such as tolerance and respect. There are major difficulties in this, in determining the content of this culture and in disassociating it from a particular dominant liberal culture.

It is important however not to exaggerate the extent of serious divergence from liberal democratic principles and practices amongst minority groups in civil society; so as Kymlicka 2001 argues, there is no demonstrable basis for Parekh's assertion that 'minority groups in the West are 'generally' non-liberal'. (Parekh 1997:57) Nor would we be justified in assuming that only minority groups have illiberal tendencies.

Where such a tension does exist, Kymlicka argues that liberal society ought not to seek to impose its understandings and its practices upon the non-liberal groups but rather seek to enter into dialogue. (Kymlicka

1995:163-70) He sets out (at 2001:63) however an affirmation that meaningful dialogue is dependent upon clarifying the 'real points of disagreement with other non-liberal groups in society' for otherwise the debate 'exaggerates the actual distance between the majority and minority, entrenches an 'us versus them' mentality and replaces a real dialogue about the accommodation of conflicting needs and identities with a pseudo-dialogue about 'the clash of civilizations'.'

A sense of solidarity

Grundtvig was not unaware of the distinctions within the Danish society of his day. Yet his enduring 'achievement' has been to nurture and foster a sense of solidarity in the Danish people.⁴⁴⁸ As Korsgaard (2002) demonstrates, the term '*folk*' in Danish had had a particular reference to social class (the peasants and the servants) but came (particularly under the influence of Grundtvig) to have a significance that embraced the totality of Danish society. His task was of course rendered somewhat easier by the comparatively high level of

⁴⁴⁸ It is arguably this sense of solidarity that has until recently and even still meant that Danes have contributed very heavily in taxation to welfare, wealth redistribution and other programmes for the socially and economically disadvantaged and has supported a high degree of social and moral tolerance of diversity.

ethnic homogeneity in Denmark up to the 20thC.

Grundtvig's concept of nationhood is one, as we have noted earlier, that is less reliant upon the democratic apparatus of the state⁴⁴⁹ than upon the unity of the people as a cultural entity, drawing upon such factors as the mother tongue and a shared societal heritage and culture.

It is not possible here to rehearse the arguments around the contribution of and impact of policies of multiculturalism as a response to an increasingly diverse and pluralist society. As I have indicated in earlier discussions of *folkelighed* and its implications as a form of cultural nationalism, it is not my purpose to argue that social solidarity is to be purchased at the price of the suppression of cultural difference.

Civil society is however an arena into which cultural differences, differences of belief and practice and much more are brought into play as contributions to the negotiation of life in the shared space of community.

⁴⁴⁹ His position relates both to the emergent nature of democratic institutions in his day but also his emphasis on the people rather than on the state.

Chapter 12

SOCRATIC DIALOGUE⁴⁵⁰
AS LEVENDE VEKSELVIRKNING

Introduction

Grundtvig urged that learning should occur through a process of lively oral interaction (*vekselvirkning*)⁴⁵¹ between 'teacher' and 'learner' and amongst learners. As one of the key purposes of this research is to suggest approaches, contextual and pedagogical, which might contribute to developing a more *folkelig* form of education for lay people within the churches, one of our concerns is to recognise movements in adult learning that might seem to contribute to that goal. Here, I focus on a method and practice which is termed *Socratic dialogue*.

The practice of Socratic dialogue as a contemporary learning tool had equivalences in

⁴⁵⁰ We are using the term *Socratic Dialogue* to refer to a pedagogical method originating in Leonard Nelson. In this section, we shall describe the method in sufficient detail to identify its key features but without exploring in fullest detail the practical or theoretical issues that arise. We note also the comment of Leal (2004:12) that 'Socratic dialogue has evolved' and is used diversely. Even in 1926, Nelson himself observed that 'opinion on Socrates in more uncertain and more divided than ever'. (Nelson 1949:4) Some scholars furthermore doubt whether it is proper to speak of 'the' Socratic method. (eg see Hansen 1988:213-24)

⁴⁵¹ The importance of *vekselvirkning* in Grundtvig's educational ideas is not to be under-estimated. Bugge (quoted in Korsgaard 2000: 155) asserts: 'Vekselvirkning er den grundkategori, der gennemsyrrer hans pædagogiske tanker' (Interaction is the foundation category which permeates his educational thinking)

some of the principles and practices that we find in Grundtvig and Kold.

There was also an historical link between the name of the ancient philosopher and Kold, the 19th Century educator. 'Kold is frequently referred to by writers as a 'peasant Socrates'.' Kulich (1997 at 442) noting that this reference appeared to emanate first from a letter of L Schrøder: 'a kind of Socrates, who sits on his chair surrounded by a crowd of boys and girls from the farms'⁴⁵² Similarly, Wartenweiler (1929) entitled his second edition of Kold's biography *Ein Sokrates in dänischen Kleidern*⁴⁵³ and also Hagemann's 1950 biography has the title *En Sokrates i danske klæder*⁴⁵³. Rørdam too makes reference to Kold as 'a Socrates in peasant clothing'. (1980:35) None of this is to suggest that Kold was an expert in Socratic philosophy, but it perhaps points us more to his drawing of people to learning and inquiry through an informal process of sharing of experiences and ideas.

Introduction to Socratic Dialogue

It is necessary first of all to set out something of the nature, purpose and principles of Socratic dialogue.⁴⁵⁴

⁴⁵² Cited in Borish 1991 at 190

⁴⁵³ Trans 'A Sokrates in Danish clothing'

⁴⁵⁴ Acknowledging of course that any brief statement is inevitably an attempt to set in the main the most common features of what is

Socratic dialogue is a learning process in which the learners, through collaborative oral group dialogue, endeavour to address a question that is philosophical in character. The latter expression might seem initially to limit the scope of this method. While it is often applied to such traditional 'philosophical' spheres as ethics and logic, the spheres of dialogue can embrace anything that is capable of being answered by discussion rather than by reference to empirical data. (Magee 2000)

In what sense this dialogue or inquiry is 'philosophical' has been contested. Scofield doubts the validity of blending together **philosophising** with **philosophy**. (1995:8) One is concerned with critical thinking skills, utilising the approaches and tools associated with philosophical thought; the other with the corpus of knowledge developed by philosophers. This philosophising is perhaps akin to what Walters and Manicom (1996:11) called 'theorizing' or 'the process of bring to light aspects of experience, reflecting upon and making sense of them, finding concepts and drawing connections, pulling out and exploring assumptions.' There is a parallel here in theological education, where there is an often expressed aim that it should equip people

a more diverse practice and that it has a tendency to represent the process idealistically.

('professional' and 'lay') to 'do theology' but again this is uncertainly coupled to the realm of theology as itself a body of knowledge and thought. While it may be more difficult to contemplate philosophical or theological inquiry or dialogue that is unrelated to the issues that concern the disciplines or to the approaches that these disciplines utilise or to ideas that have emerged over the course of the history of these disciplines, nonetheless one might more readily imagine that such inquiry and dialogue might be entered into without the issue being framed in philosophical or theological language or without formal training in those discipline's approaches and methods or without access to the corpus of knowledge in a systematic way or without knowing the authorship of particular ideas. Indeed, more difficult still would be to imagine that philosophising or theologising could become a more embedded practice in informal adult learning or the lives of thoughtful people if entry and participation were limited to those who could or wanted to be knowledgeable and skilled in philosophy/theology as it is learned and practised by philosophers and theologians.

This tension however is apparent in the issue of the role of the facilitator - essentially, the one who supports the discussion by helping the group to remain faithful to its ground rules. It is clear from reports of dialogues

that facilitators do differ in the extent and nature of their engagement with the group. They may, additionally assist in processes of focusing or summarisation or in prompting in the formulation of its questions and propositions philosophically or in enabling the group to relate **their** dialogue to the wider philosophical dialogue of the discipline. Perhaps fundamentally, the facilitator may feel an ethical commitment to encourage participants to behave consistently with the Socratic ideal of listening and learning and to explore not only what they believe they do not know but also what they imagine that they do already know.

They enter this dialogue through first acknowledging what is the concept to be examined. Of course, it is for group members to agree whether or not the question is an appropriate one for them to discuss and indeed whether or not it is interesting and therefore will motivate them and engender a lively and potentially fruitful dialogue and is meaningful and purposeful to them in their life situation. On the face of it, this might seem a relatively simple task, even if it may occasion the expression of different priorities. As MacIntyre suggests, however, 'We do not even have enough agreement to be able to arrive at a common mind about what it is that we should be quarrelling about'. (MacIntyre 1987:28). For a

dialogue to be useful, there has to be careful consideration of the focus and framing of the proposition.

It is then the task of the group to bring into the arena concrete examples of the concept, based on the intuition of each member that it is a valid example of the concept. As Barr (1991:46) argues, a democratic adult education process will not only have as its commencement point the life experience of the learners, it is also for learners to determine what direction the dialogue ought to take and indeed what is worth pursuing.

Table 17 below is a set of criteria from an actual dialogue:

<p>Table 17: <u>Criteria for selection of an experience</u></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none">■ Drawn from our experience - not hypothetical■ Relevant to all participants■ Recognisable as a case (of autonomy in this example) to all participants■ Finished - i.e. the experience has come to an end■ Not unduly complicated■ One where the example-giver is willing to provide additional information to the group so they can investigate it fully■ One which does not involve others present (or criminal acts!) <p style="text-align: right;">(Laurie 1999)</p>

It may be discerned from this set of criteria that a key aspect is *accessibility*. It is 'relevant' or within the realm of related

experience of each of the participants, not
outwith their experience or reasonable
imagining, so that they might be capable of
'entering' the example. 'Relevant' is used here
to imply that it is a situation to which all of
the participants can relate, not that it does
in fact relate to their life circumstances.
There is an empathetic quality: that each
participant ought to be able to imagine their
way into the example from the perspective of
the participant introducing the example. It is
not so complex or convoluted as to be
unhelpful. It is explorable and there is no
personal interest on the part of participants
that would exclude them from taking an
'objective' perspective. The other set of
criteria are concerned with reality - Is the
example an authentic case of the question in
practice?; Does it go to the core of the
question?; Is it concrete, rather than
theoretical?; and Has it come to some kind of
conclusion about which the group can
deliberate? It is the responsibility of the
group to discern which example meets the
criteria and will most effectively stimulate a
dialogue.⁴⁵⁵

⁴⁵⁵ It has to be acknowledged that some forms of practice utilise pre-prepared stories as the stimulus material. For example, in Duke Corporate Education Professor Kim Taylor-Thompson of New York University describes a process in which they 'use a hypothetical scenario that follows a carefully researched road map intended to take participants through a complex issue. The scenario is relatively simple in the beginning, but it becomes more complicated as the questions progress.'
<http://www.dukece.com/spotlight/PowerSocraticDialogue.htm>

It is essential that all of the participants are able to relate to the example, though they may have no direct experience of it. Through questions and answers, they must be able in some way to appropriate the example so that they are not outside of it. This clearly is easier where the experience or very akin experiences are shared by the group members. Whether or not any participant has similar experience, the task is to think into the experience as it was experienced by the participant offering the example.

If, however, the experience of the group members is too similar, then the interaction may be limited. One former student and director of a folk high school in Denmark has observed the risk where 'everybody lives in a small milieu with a constricted attitude: 'We know it all. We come together with people of our own class... We do not know much how other people live'. (Ingberg 1998:29) Through *vekselvirkning* in which people across societal differences engage with one another might be a 'bridge... over the yawning abyss ...which if it is not bridged, then ... all possibilities for peaceful, historic progressive development should soon fall into its precipice'. (Skolen

The use of philosophical inquiry in child education also utilises stories rich in philosophical potential cf Fisher 1996 and Murriss 1992

for Livet 1838, paraphrased in English at Borish 1991). This is not to suggest that a dialogue is illegitimate where the participants are drawn from a narrow group⁴⁵⁶. Nonetheless, there is a tension that Grundtvig endeavours to hold together. (Borish 1996:128) On one hand, he recognises and affirms the importance of cultural difference and of respecting these differences. On the other hand, he believes that society has to be a *hele folket* (an entire people) and has to be coherent with a sense of common belonging. (*Folkelighed*) This indeed is the goal too of Socratic dialogue. It does not assume that there is a pre-existing commonality, from shared characteristics or common beliefs and values. Rather, the initial bond comes from their shared commitment to the process. From there, the task is to work towards that sense of community, shared world and common understanding that they create together in and through the dialogue.

The demand for concreteness has value in that it roots the dialogue in an actual situation. Yet, does this requirement limit the scope of the dialogue to the actual rather than the potential? In some respects it does, for its deliberate focus is on where human community actually is, in reality, for it is that reality

⁴⁵⁶ My reading of the literature on dialogues included examples of dialogues with managers in a commercial company (Bolten 2001) and with careers advisers (Morrell 2004)

with all its frailty and error with which we must contend. This approach might however nonetheless be seen as inhibiting our imagination. 'A powerful feature of human thinking is the ability to reflect on how the world might have otherwise been, or how it might be under different circumstances rather than how it is immediately presented to us. We often want to answer questions about things which are not immediately accessible: situations in the future, situations in the past, situations that do not exist, inaccessible places or even other people's minds.' (Riggs and Peterson 2000:87)

Yet Grundtvig had and gave a wider meaning to the term 'experience'. Bugge (1998:44) suggests that 'Personal experience was just a small segment of a very long process which, to a large extent, decided the outcome of this experience.' Grundtvig's perception of experience is longer in its view. He refers to the 'testimony of the past' as being one of 'two blazing torches'⁴⁵⁷. (Preface to Nyaars Aften⁴⁵⁸) That recognition of the historical is one of the key insights of Grundtvig⁴⁵⁹. Not that Grundtvig's focus is backward-looking: 'We

⁴⁵⁷ The other being 'The Word of the Lord'

⁴⁵⁸ Nyaarsnat eller Blik paa Kristendom og Historie 1810 (New Year's Eve or a Brief Glance at Christianity and History)

⁴⁵⁹ Rørdam observes however that Grundtvig's emphasis on the historical-poetical was soon lost in Kold's school at Ryslinge where teaching moved more towards 'edifying, everyday, moralizing examples from daily life' (Rørdam 1980:40)

need to have the living word be the principal tool we use, because what is important is **what is happening now.**' (my emphasis) (Bugge 1998:45) It is one of the strengths of Grundtvig's overall vision that he holds together and insists on the interaction, the *vekselvirkning*, of past, present and future.

Before the group turns to discussion of the example, it is important that they arrive at a consensus on the ground rules that will be followed. These may be matters of procedure (the 'strategic dialogue') or issues around members' behaviour and feelings (the 'meta dialogue') and are the subject of separate discussion from the 'content dialogue' in order that they might not interfere with the discussion of the agreed question and example. These process-oriented discussions ought not however simply to be thought of as incidental. It is important that each member of the group not only understands but is committed to implementing the agreed rules. Further, while there are recurrent elements, the deliberation on ground rules may involve a shared search for what will best enable the group to engage in a healthy and profitable dialogue.

A limited survey of reports of dialogues suggests that the ground rules are an important element in the governance and dynamic of the

process. Table ?? is a drawing together of some key recurrent element:

Table 18: Ground rules for a Socratic dialogue

- Seek to enter personally into the example
- Respect must be shown to other members and their views
- Postpone your judgements and endeavour to suspend your pre-judgements
- Offer opinions that are rooted in your own direct experience not 'third hand' experiences of others
- Express yourself with clarity
- Be concise
- Relate your contribution to those preceding yours
- Think for yourself
- Do not seek to legitimise a contribution by appeal to external authorities
- Endeavour to remain concrete rather than abstract
- Endeavour to move towards consensus

Again, from these, we might discern certain key principles: The dialogue is to be 'non-coercive dialogue' (Habermas 1984,1987) There is an emphasis on personal freedom and responsibility - one must arrive at one's own judgement, not by appeal to some external authority, and one ought to express authentically and with integrity one's views. There has to be an interaction between

participants, members contribute within a lively and honest exchange of ideas and opinions and relate their comments to one another's. There has to be openness to the thoughts and experiences of others and to the developing conversation and consensus.

In terms of reasoning, the process followed is one of regressive abstraction. It begins with a concrete example, examining the assumptions underlying the reasoning and judgement involved. That examination may at first be factual in character in order that all participants are able to be involved fully and knowledgeably. Any example is likely to be capable of being viewed from a variety of perspectives of each player in the story; however, the view of the example-giver is the relevant one as it is immediately available to the group rather than through third party account or mere speculation. It is important too that the group takes seriously the intuition of the example-offering member that the example is indeed a relevant example speaking to the question.⁴⁶⁰

As the participants interact in agreeing and disagreeing with one another's points of view, they are endeavouring to move from the concrete example towards a general statement. This

⁴⁶⁰ For example, someone offering a story about justice is implicitly taking the view that the story illustrates justice.

movement from the actual real-life problem through an inquiring process to a conclusion has parallel in Grundtvig's own working internal working method, through which he 'wrote himself to clarity'⁴⁶¹, through a dialogue between his writing and experience. The emphasis is on an extended process through which one moves from uncertainty or false certainty to a clearer (and one believes) more truthful position. Bugge identifies this quality in Grundtvig: '... until his very last breath, so to say, he had the ability and will to revise his own standpoint, to think through a question once again and try somehow to adjust it or his viewpoint'. (Bugge 1998:60)

It is in one sense problematical that there could be seen to be an implication that the general statement is both universally valid and would be arrived at whatever example the group had initially chosen. This is self-evidently improbable. (Van Hooft 1998) This is not to say however that the conclusion is merely example-specific (otherwise it would not be a general conclusion at all); nor does it exclude that the general conclusion may have something useful to contribute to consideration of a different example or the conclusion that emerges from that example. Nelson (1993:151) observes that claims to universality have often

⁴⁶¹ Grundtvig's diary entry for 9 September 1806 cited in Lundgreen-Nielsen (1997:75)

been partial in that they reflect the experience of the dominant groups in society.

This relationship of the particular to the universal, indeed a movement from the particular to the universal was also a principle and a method of Grundtvig's. While we are concerned in this thesis to emphasize the validity and the importance of the contextual (as Grundtvig did constantly as in his concentration on the folk life of the Danish), this was never without an affirmation also of the universal. Indeed, it is one of the distinctions that Grundtvig draws between the national/Danish and Christianity, that the former is temporal and local whereas the latter, as he understands it, is also eternal and universal. (Knudsen 1976: 37ff and 44ff). Grundtvig is strong in his assertion that he does not confuse the two, but his rejection (for example in Om Folkelighed og Dr Rudelbach 1848 in Knudsen 1976: 44ff) of the criticism that he does, neither denies that the particular, local experience of a people is a pre-requisite for the universal nor fails to glimpse that there is an interaction between the temporal and the eternal, the local and the universal. (Allchin 1989-90:109) For all of his concern for the folk-life of his nation and its people, Grundtvig cannot be thought to lose

sight of the universal or of the relationship of the particular to the universal⁴⁶².

This was also a concern of Kold's: Engberg (1985) refers to the focus of Kold's folk high school: 'let teaching unfold as lectures and conversations about **universal human topics**' (1985:337) While a relevant education will begin with the particular, that which is rooted in the experience of the participants, it does not remain there, but broadens out into the universal.

Socratic Dialogue seeks to be a non-specialist way of doing philosophy, not requiring knowledge of books or ability to cite authors. It honours the thoughts of ordinary people, their capacity for reasoning and their ability to reflect meaningfully about their own and others' experience of life. Barr (1991), writing of the broader use of dialogue within adult education, affirms that 'the basic starting point for any democratic education is a deep respect for learners' life experiences - to 'start from where they are' and to discover with them 'where it's worth going'. (1991:46) Grundtvig struggled with the multiple meanings of 'enlightenment' but he averred that 'first and foremost I think of their own (ie the

⁴⁶² Barr 1993:15 reminds us however that there is a problem 'with such abstract universalised...notion of humanization (in) that it fails to address the different forms of oppression experienced by different groups...'

people's) enlightenment.' (Korsgaard 2003:13) Enlightenment had to be enlightenment of the people by the people themselves. 'For the main assumption behind a Socratic Dialogue, the philosophical bottom line, is that deep inside ourselves we have knowledge about the most important things which should concern human beings, namely how we ought to live.' (Leal 2004:123) To pursue a dialogue is assuredly not to assume that each individual in the group or even the group as a whole has already a clear or deep understanding of the question; otherwise, what would be the point of the dialogue? The journey is useful and worthwhile because the participants are not already where they would wish to be in terms of their understanding. Indeed, if any participant were to enter into a dialogue on the basis that they already were at 'the finishing line', this would be likely to preclude their open participation in the dialogue.

Nonetheless, there has to be an affirmation of confidence in the members of the group and their experience⁴⁶³. At its most fundamental, this is an affirmation of humanity. Grundtvig comes to recognise humanity as a 'matchless creation' which, despite the Fall, remains in

⁴⁶³ Barr (1993:157) alerts us to the twin risk even in more radical forms of education not really to take seriously the life experience of participants or to subject them to the categories and interpretations of the educated

the image of God and retains some capacity for sharing in the wisdom of God. His is a strongly optimistic view of the human condition. 'A human being is not a kind of monkey, condemned to imitate first the other animals and then itself until the world's end, but a matchless miraculous creation, in whom divine forces shall proclaim, develop and survive... a divine experiment that shows how spirit and dust can interpenetrate and be exemplified in a common divine consciousness.' (Nordens Mytologi 1832, cited in Skovmand 1978:15) '... Common sense philosophy begins ... in an act of trust in human experience and in the common language that supports it.' (Long 2005:605 reporting the thinking of Campbell Fraser 1898/1993:111) There is in a Grundtvigian pedagogy a conviction that the story of all, their experience and the thoughts that experience has influenced, is valid and indeed powerful. If we are to develop education that is truly *folkelig*, then one dimension of that must be that there is *folkelighed*, in the sense of 'equality within the people'. (Thaning 1972:100) It is a commonplace that Grundtvig would often begin talks by addressing those present as *Mine Herrer* ('Gentlemen' and 'My Masters') as a mark of both respect and openness to learn from his students. (Bugge 1993:273)⁴⁶⁴ His declared

⁴⁶⁴ Philippians 2:7 is alluded to by his suggestion that the teacher renounce mastery and take on the place of a servant

expectation was that *vekselvirkning* was a process in which teachers and students learned from one another and in which there was reciprocal learning amongst the students.' (Bugge 1998:50) Freire (1989:67) uses very similar terms: 'Through dialogue, the teacher-of-the-students and the students-of-the-teacher cease to exist and a new term emerges: teacher-student with student-teachers. The teacher is no longer merely the-one-who-teaches, but one who is himself taught in dialogue with students, who in turn while being taught also teaches. They become jointly responsible for a process in which all grow.' And this principle and expectation was carried on into the folk high school movement. 'For Kold, all education is centred around the act of narration: everybody has something to tell which is worth listening to.' (Bjerg 1994:23)

The conditions in which the dialogue are conducted have to create the optimum process to facilitate the full and free participation of all. Barr (1991:148)⁴⁶⁵ warns that, for example, 'Women can only engage in a mutual dialogue, equally, if the cards are not already stacked against some, for example, by opaque and esoteric language and scholarly and culturally specific discourse'.

(Bugge 1993:273)

⁴⁶⁵ Citing Lugones and Spelman 1983

There is an emphasis on independent thought and the responsibility of each to form their beliefs and ideas, rather than by reference to external authorities and sources. There is a strong tendency towards an introspective inquiry, reflecting the Socratic emphasis on the deepening of self-knowledge⁴⁶⁶ (Editors of The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1992:1711). The learner offers an example from their experience or at least seeks to enter personally into the experience that has been shared by the group and engages in an internal personal search for meaning and truth. S/he does not rely upon the qualities or competence of others but endeavours to gain independent growth and cognitive and emotional capacity. Grundtvig was conscious of the double-edged sword of this. He recognises the strong link between enlightenment and individualisation - there is no substitute for personal decision-making, but an overemphasis on the individual can be fragmentary in social terms. This balance we consider further in the next paragraph. In Socratic dialogue, autonomy becomes not only a right but a responsibility, breaking free from the traditional epistemological authorities, catching and

⁴⁶⁶ For example, the entry for Socrates in The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language: 'Greek philosopher who initiated a question-and-answer method of teaching as a means of (our underlining) achieving self-knowledge'

destroying 'the vermin of received opinions'.
(Abbs 1994:19)

The participant is a 'moral agent... who has to think about how he or she is to live well with others in social harmony'. (Saran and Neisser 2004 at 4) We may view the commitment to seeking consensus in this light. While it is true that each must form their own view of the question and advocate that view, there is a fundamental provisionality rooted in an openness to learn and to change and in a commitment to build community in which there is shared understanding. It affirms the contribution of the individual but within a context of a shared search.

This communality extends beyond the confines of the dialogue group itself. It is part of a wider seeking after meaning and truth. It is offered as a skilling of participants in the group to be participants in civic society as a whole⁴⁶⁷. In this regard, we should acknowledge that a major impetus to Grundtvig's interest in popular education was constitutional change in Denmark⁴⁶⁸ and a growing awareness of the need

⁴⁶⁷ Indeed, Saran and Neisser note that after 1933, the German Nazi regime banned the *Walkemühle* and the Philosophisch-Politische Akademie founded by Leonard Nelson in 1922 to foster such dialogues and Miller [2000] has reflected on the significance of these dialogues in those times of suppression of free thought.

⁴⁶⁸ The ending of the absolute monarch, the establishment of consultative provincial assemblies and the struggle of Danes in the Slesvig-Holsten situation (Bugge 1983a:214-5)

to equip the new participants with the knowledge and skills to engage in the fledgling 'democratic' institutions. As Nussbaum (1997:19) suggests, if a democracy is to be more than simply a 'marketplace of competing interest groups... (it) must produce citizens who have the Socratic capacity to reason about their beliefs'.

It is an inclusive context and does not seek to keep out those who have different opinions; rather these are to be welcomed. There is no pre-requisite knowledge or skill. Rather, what it does demand is commitment - to engage in collaborative thought, to be prepared to engage in open dialogue and to pursue the question. One should not in any way underestimate the degree of demand that is being sought from each group member. It is not enough to follow on simply in the judgements of others (within the group or external), or to call on well-established personal opinions, but instead the participants must each do their own work of inquiry. The dialogue has to be honest and authentic, it must be rooted in real life not in the abstract, it must foster a true understanding each of the others' thoughts, it must endeavour to dig beneath superficialities to engage with the complexities and perplexities of human life. There is commitment of effort, for the task is a focused one and all are agreed to pursue consistently

and with rigour the question in hand. '(F)inding the truth requires not only the courage to use one's own intellect but also - since the truth often lies hidden behind a veil of conventions, prejudice and illusions - a certain deliberate effort of the will to overcome mental laziness and conformity.' (Birnbacher and Krohn 2004 at 10) Indeed, there may be significant commitment of time, as dialogues may reach over several hours or days, as the searching endeavours to be comprehensive and thorough and to work to a conclusion that has integrity for all the participants and is true to the problem. One must not underestimate the demand that this makes on participants and indeed the cost may be higher than participants are, at that stage, prepared to pay and the dialogue is aporetic.

The method is an essentially oral one⁴⁶⁹. It is a structured conversation. Reflection and speech interact with one another. Though we may tend to locate cognitive skills as internal (happening in the head), it is core to the Socratic dialogue approach that they are developed in conversation with others. Grundtvig too recognised the power of the oral, the living word. (Thaning 1972:77)

⁴⁶⁹ Most commonly this is true, and it is the basis of our further consideration in this section, although there is some evidence of so-called 'silent Socratic dialogue' where the communication is in written or email form. For example, see <http://www.oncourseworkshop.com/Learning010.htm>

'Socrates wrote no books, published no articles, and gave no lectures. They can provide only second-hand knowledge, book learning, knowledge of words.' (Kessels 2001) This preference for the oral over the written, the direct over the mediated, is firmly the view of Grundtvig also. This was rooted in his conviction that education must be concerned primarily with life and life experience. Books, though good friends⁴⁷⁰, had a tendency to become a substitute from life, from experiential living, from personal learning that was tested against experience. In *Skolen for Livet* (The School for Life 1838), Grundtvig argues that 'All book knowledge is dead that is not unified with a corresponding life in the reader' (Broadbridge and Jensen 1984:74) The 'living' questions would be those that had been generated by the contemporary lives and circumstances of the learner. (Spicer 1998:177-8) Life is most keenly the life of feeling and experience (*følelivesliv*). 'Life itself must always take priority over planning, textbooks, systems and theories.' (Lundgreen-Nielsen 1997:77)

There is a direct engagement between participants. They are in dialogue within each other. Bugge, the scholar in Grundtvigian

⁴⁷⁰ A phrase of Grundtvig quoted for example in Bugge 1998:42

educational ideas, likens Buber to Grundtvig in distinction to Søren Kierkegaard, commenting that the difference is between the dialectical (SK) and the dialogical (NFSG and MB). (Bugge 1998:40) The dialectical had a tendency to shape life to fit the logic. The weakness in the dialogical was that it often failed to connect with either what had gone before or what would follow. (Bugge: 1983b) The contribution of Grundtvig was, from his perspective of the historical, to give a humanity to dialectics and a developmental dimension to the dialogical. (Bugge 1983b:9) It is through meeting, through encounter, through reciprocal interaction (*vekselvirkning*) that the learning takes place. Yet, it is fundamental both to Grundtvig and to the Socratic dialogue that the encounter is not oppositional, rather it is centred on a shared and mutual engagement.

The exchange has to be a sincere one, with each participant offering her/his candid views, not misrepresenting the experiences from which the opinions come, hearing as honestly as possible what the other is saying, avoiding behaviour that inhibits open dialogue (such as over-cleverness, arrogance or hostility), and endeavouring to share in the common pursuit with integrity. In Freire's words (Freire 1989), 'To be an act of knowing, learning demands among teachers and students a

relationship of *authentic dialogue* (our italics) .It is a highly interactive process, for there is a fundamental to-ing and fro-ing in the dialogue, as it passes between participants. Each participant is required to listen to care and attention to the contribution of each other, with a keen intent to discover what the other is saying and to find the truth within that contribution. This requires an active listening that takes into oneself the insights of the other member. It is a respectful but not unchallenging dialogue, for the group owes to each member a responsibility to test his or her thinking. This is very much in keeping with Grundtvig's insistence upon a living oral communication as being at the core of interaction and learning. The initial step into the learning must be such that it animates all the participants to share in the dialogue. (Bugge 1983a:219)

Bakhtin suggests that dialogue is one of the most fundamental of life activities, writing of 'the dialogic nature of consciousness, the dialogic nature of human life itself. The single adequate form for verbally expressing authentic human life is the open-ended dialogue. Life by its very nature is dialogic. To live means to participate in dialogue: to ask questions, to heed, to respond, to agree, and so forth. In this dialogue a person participates wholly and throughout his whole

life: with his eyes, lips, hands, soul, spirit, with his whole body and deeds. He invests his entire self in discourse, and this discourse enters into the dialogic fabric of human life, into the world symposium.' (Bakhtin 1984b:293)

In similar vein, much of what Grundtvig wrote was produced in reaction to historical events or circumstances in his situation. As Lundgreen-Nielsen (1997:75) observes, Grundtvig's writing was very much a continuous process of interaction with everyday life.' His thoughts were the outcome of interaction between the context of national life and his fertile imagination.

It is important to distinguish this kind of exchange from others. Grundtvig's concept of *levende Samtale* (literally, 'talking together') may be helpful. Davies 1944:47 wrestles with the difficulty of finding corresponding English terms. She writes, 'conversation' is too reminiscent of the atmosphere of afternoon tea-parties, and 'discussion' smacks too much of intellectualism, the scoring of debating points, and that 'eternal criticising' which Grundtvig deplored... there is something of the warmth and intimacy of the Welsh *Seiat* about the real Danish *Samtale*, each contributing something genuine from his own experience.' The dialogue is not a verbal 'fencing match'. It is not concerned with 'winning the argument', of defeating the opinions of others.

The process is intended to be non-hierarchical in nature. All members are equal, no matter their prior experience or their status outwith the group (though one has immediately to acknowledge the considerable difficulties that human groups, however well-intentioned, have in living out that value).

One person in the dialogue has a distinct function, quite different from that of the other members, and that is the facilitator, who nurtures the group's developing understanding. 'Maieutics'⁴⁷² refers to the skill of the

⁴⁷¹ Socrates: *Gorgias* 495b (Huntington Cairns and Edith Hamilton (eds) *The Collected Dialogues* Princeton: Princeton UP (1961)

⁴⁷² The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary 1964 defines 'maieutic' as from Gk *μαιευτικός* (literally 'obstetric') used figuratively by Socrates. 'Pertaining to (intellectual) midwifery, ie to the Socratic process of helping a person to bring into full consciousness conceptions previously latent in his mind'.

midwife⁴⁷³: the teacher⁴⁷⁴ then is the midwife supporting the student's own efforts to illuminate the truth.' (Birnbacher and Krohn 2004 at 9) It ought to be acknowledged however that there is a sense in which each participant is a midwife and not merely the facilitator, for it is the duty of each and all to help the group members (again each and all) to develop their thinking. In this regard, Splitter and Sharp (1995) expresses the ideal that 'the part of Socrates is taken by students as well as by the (teacher or facilitator).(at 59) Nonetheless, a particular role and set of responsibilities is usually entrusted to a person designated the facilitator. That person's duty is to ensure that

- the group works effectively and in accordance with its agreed process and ground rules
- helping the group members to assess the potential of each example
- the group does not move away from a consideration of the agreed question
- a range of ideas and hypotheses are recognised and tested

⁴⁷³ This maternal language resonates with the pedagogy and indeed the experience of Grundtvig in which discovery of fresh truth often came from women (eg his mother and nursemaid)

⁴⁷⁴ Raupach-Strey (2004) however writes of the difference in the role of teacher (in that instance in a school setting) and Socratic facilitator, in particular the level of restraint on the part of the facilitator - and observes that in the case concerned the students were themselves 'profoundly aware' of the difference in the two roles.

- the group does not stray from its road of sequential logical thought
- there is fairness and participation across the group
- there is full consideration and the group does not move on prematurely on the basis of insufficient discussion or inadequate reflection
- keeping the discussion rooted in experience rather than speculative
- there is movement towards clarification and clarity; where appropriately through questioning
- there is support towards the development of consensus

but the facilitator is not permitted to move from managing the process to commenting on the content⁴⁷⁵. One facilitator⁴⁷⁶ has commented on this content neutrality linked to active listening and process management. 'With me as listener, the students are free to interact with each other. That's exactly what I want them to do. I want them to forget that I'm there. The important thing is for them to express their opinion and give a reason for their point of view.' (Berrian 1985:44) This more minimalist view is mirrored in the image sometimes used of the facilitator as a sporting referee, whose job it is to ensure that the

⁴⁷⁵ Nelson's unambiguous view on this was modified by Heckmann who allowed the facilitator to move to member where it was clear that the group was experienced and largely self-regulating and did not require facilitation.

rules are followed allied to a commitment to keep the game going. (Wojtas 1994:iv) but perhaps this is an over-non-interventionist approach. The facilitator is not merely an umpire in the proceedings but has a positive role to aid the group in their shaping questions, noticing the unobserved and channelling the dialogue.

It is a more contested issue as to whether or not s/he may be or is a philosophical consultant drawn in for her/his knowledge or authority. Murriss (nd (b)) for example⁴⁷⁶ suggests that the facilitator ought to be 'familiar with the discipline of philosophy, its questions, its problems, its procedures. Without this background the facilitator would not know how, when and where to intervene in order to **make the discussion philosophical**'⁴⁷⁷. It is interesting that Murriss herself (in Murriss 1999) warns that if intervention is not used sparingly⁴⁷⁶ it may interfere with the (children's) 'imaginative and affective way of making meaning'. This assertion does beg the question of whether or not adults might also be inhibited rather than enabled in the exercise of imaginative and affective ways of making meaning. S/he must be careful not to allow the steering to encroach on the participants' 'own emerging judgement'. (Heckmann 2004 at 113)

⁴⁷⁶ In the context of philosophical inquiry with children

⁴⁷⁷ (my emphasis)

This quite fundamental affirmation however would seem to be compromised by the suggestion (Murrin and (b)) that 'it is worth bearing in mind that this is the philosopher's 'hidden agenda' ie to focus on classical philosophical topics. Knowledge and awareness of the history of philosophical ideas and the attitude and skills to ask the relevant questions is crucial here.'⁴⁷⁸ This tension reflects again a quite fundamental issue of what we are understanding of the relationship between the corpus of philosophical knowledge and the pedagogical method, 'between substance and process' (Reich 1998:1). Reich suggests that 'To overstate only slightly, for Socrates, and for our understanding of him, method is all'. (1998:1)

In the circumstances in which the facilitator does in fact have significant knowledge of philosophy as a discipline and not processes of philosophising or even of facilitating group discussion, this does imply that the facilitator (who is capable also of being teacher) has to engage in a level of

⁴⁷⁸ The context is philosophical inquiry with children but there is no reason to assume that adults, unless especially trained or otherwise experienced in these dialogues, have significant understanding of philosophy. Participation more frequently in dialogues themselves however might be regarded as building capacity to ask relevant questions. One wonders however whether the use of the expression 'relevant' is a code word for being regarded as significant questions by philosophers.

withholding of their knowledge expertise or 'feigned ignorance'.

In some dialogues, particularly in the earlier stages of participants' development in skills of expression, the facilitator might offer some assistance to the group in formulating the expression of its ideas. It is perhaps startling that this is the role that Grundtvig identifies for the poet. 'To give a precise and concise expression of folk ideas - that is the poet's duty.' (Bugge 1998:51) In observing this, Bugge also clarifies what Grundtvig means by the poetic, an understanding that touches also on our thinking about the universal. 'The poet's primary gift is his ability to look at everyday things, everyday words, and then see a perspective beyond that. In this missionary way, so to say, he is able to see beyond everyday factors. He helps to give the aspirations of a people a direction beyond the here and now, into the future.' (Bugge 1998:52)

This separation of process and content is further recognised in the interpolation of *meta-dialogues* which are pauses with a process-orientation. They may be used to enable the group to reflect and comment on the course of the dialogue, on how it is being

facilitated⁴⁷⁹, and on what ought to be changed to enhance the content dialogue.

Quite clearly, there are assumptions being made about the nature of truth. If we turn to the originator, Leonard Nelson⁴⁸⁰, we find an affirmation of the 'self-confidence of reason' which Birnbacher and Krohn 2004 declare to be 'nothing less than the claim that human reflection is capable of discovering such universal truths'. (at 11) There are however fundamental questions about the extent to which truth is a value-laden commodity and at times a context-specific one. (Bosch 1999) Birnbacher and Krohn (2004) observe however that in the development of the Socratic Dialogue as a method (in particular by Heckmann⁴⁸¹), the link between the philosophical assumptions and the process is loosened to some degree. Truth is then used as a 'regulative idea' without the necessary implication that a universal truth is arrived at through the consensus. It is seriously over-optimistic to imagine that a consensus is always available or that the consensus is truth (rather than, for example,

⁴⁷⁹ Birnbacher and Krohn 2004 at 13 note that for that reason it is common for meta-dialogues to be chaired by a participant rather than the facilitator.

⁴⁸⁰ Leonard Nelson (1882-1927) was a philosopher, political activist and educationalist whose writings and activities gave rise to the Socratic Dialogue.

⁴⁸¹ Gustav Heckmann (1898-1996) was a follower of Nelson who applied further the thinking of Nelson but who also in practice detached 'the method from the specific neo-Kantian background assumptions... providing Socratic Dialogue with a broader basis'. (Birnbacher and Krohn 2004 at 11)

compromise), for "even citizens who reason in good faith cannot agree on the truth or validity of any fundamental issues of political morality". (Seglow 1998:964) 'Socrates believed that (his) method was sound, provided that all participants cooperated in having the truth as their objective'. (Ross 1993:11) Perhaps, in this sense, truth becomes not the goal but the operating principle. Truth is the criterion for contributions which are offered in an honest search for 'truth' though not necessarily 'the truth'.⁴⁸² As Heckmann himself suggests, 'When we speak about truth nowadays we are no longer so confident. Striving after truth and claims to have recognised truth in respect of a particular question are often considered presumptuous...' (Heckmann 2004 at 109) and (at 111) 'Socratic Dialogue does not in fact presuppose the concept of truth 'free from error'. It does presuppose that we can recognise a statement as being false or insufficiently grounded in reason.'

The 'requirement' that the dialogue should move towards truth as its conclusion⁴⁸³ may seem to

⁴⁸² This may not least be the case in those dialogues which are primarily about developing the members' dialogic skills rather than concerned principally with the question under discussion.

⁴⁸³ in Socratic dialogue there is no guarantee of resolution and consensus. Indeed, many of the original Socratic dialogues of Plato end in general disarray and confusion (e.g., Lysis). The participants may consider that they have arrived at a truthful conclusion when they have secured an outcome that is a working truth.

conflict with the tendency in a post-modernist culture (in particular) to a generally relativist position. Leal (2004:124) acknowledges both the moral case for relativism (not least its tolerance) and the theoretical weakness of relativism, but does not regard this as the fundamental issue. In life, where we are faced with real life dilemmas, we are not primarily third-person observers but first-person actors, requiring to take action or at least decide for inaction. Further, if dialogue is about an engaged conversation, then 'this is where, from being a force for good, tolerance comes to be an obstacle to dialogue. If everything is relative and everyone is entitled to their own opinion, because after all there are only opinions, then why should we bother to talk or to listen?' (Leal 2004:124) We may recall here the thinking of Isaiah Berlin who was a severe critic of relativism but acknowledged the human world to be a pluralist one, where not all values were of equal validity and where one ought to remain open to fresh understanding while at the same time holding firmly to one's beliefs and values. As Berlin argues: 'I can enter into a value-system which is not my own, but which is nevertheless something I can conceive of men pursuing while remaining human, while remaining creatures with whom I can communicate, with whom I have some common values - for all human beings must have some common values or they

cease to be human, and also some different values else they cease to differ, as in fact they do.' and 'Denial of universal values... is a dangerous moment in European history, and has led to a great deal that has been destructive and sinister in modern times.' (Hardy 2000:10-11) As an example of this view, there is the affirmation of Tønnessen (1990) that 'Jesus' command that we love one another and do so unconditionally is at the heart of human rights and as a core value in educational theory.' The proposition that we should love one another is, it is suggested, true in these terms because it rests upon something at the core of our human existence, life itself. Is the truth simply *quod ubique, quod semper, quod ab omnibus creditum est*⁴⁸⁴? Even Herder is ultimately no relativist, acknowledging that there were fundamental human goals and norms of conduct, though they took significantly different forms in different cultures. (Suphan 1877-1913) '...Unless there is a universally available enlightenment of life that is given with life itself, then no further enlightenment will be possible, Christian or otherwise... both love and truth are universal phenomena in the everyday life of man and not narrowly linked to particular religions or philosophies of life'. (Henningsen 1993:287) This accords with Reich's view of the Socratic: 'If the Socratic

⁴⁸⁴ 'What is believed everywhere, always, by everyone' Vincent of Lérins in his *Commonitorium*, translated in Heurtley (nd, cIII)

method cannot ascertain the truth of any claim, we need not abjure the very idea of truth'. (1998:8) With this perhaps Grundtvig would agree, while attaching the caveat that this clarification of human life (*menneskelivets forklaring*) occurs within human history and anticipates and awaits that final, eternal clarification eschatologically. (Bugge 1993:273)

There are those practitioners in Socratic dialogue who conclude therefore that 'a Socratic method that *detaches* (his italics) truth as the desire goal or outcome serves contemporary students best. I choose 'the moral Socrates', the Socrates who is eternal sceptical of any claim to possessing absolute and eternal truths. The Socrates and Socratic method I invoke is characterized by a deep epistemic uncertainty; it is Socrates doubtful that knowledge can ever be infallible'. (Reich 1998:7)

In one version of the process, the dialogue moves towards a consensus, a shared perception of having reached truth. In practice, a dialogue may be aporetic⁴⁸⁵, ending at the stage of remaining doubt. This might result from practical factors, such as a lack of time to progress further; but it might also be that,

⁴⁸⁵ ἄπορος: doubt

for the participants, the dialogue has gone as far as it can (at least for that time) go.

Inquiry lies at the heart of this form of dialogue. The participants engage in it because there is some question that they wish to explore. This emphasis here on the question is not to suggest that the process of inquiry is not in itself one that can motivate and satisfy and give pleasure. People might engage in dialogue because they enjoy dialogue and derive some satisfaction from it. The dialogue has a training function in that it seeks to improve our intellectual skills in developing more rational⁴⁸⁶, more coherent and better expressed argumentation. These considerations are neither unworthy nor irrelevant. If we take the concept of Socratic dialogue seriously then we may see inquiry as penetrating the whole of the learning. Inquiry is the basis of what education is; it is a quality that we seek to foster in the learner; it is the spirit that motivates engagement with the question; it is the value that informs the pedagogy; it is the process through which learning takes place; it is the factor that binds the learning group together; it is the tool by which we sharpen a range of related intellectual skills. These

⁴⁸⁶ I am using the expression 'rational' here and elsewhere but recognise that 'struggles over what will count as rational accounts of the world are struggles over *how* to see' (Haraway 1991:194)

propositions do not stand in isolation from one another. They are in some reciprocal interaction with one another. Lipman points to such interconnectedness: 'We cannot educate for inquiry unless we have education as inquiry - unless, that is, the qualitative character we desire to have in the end is loaded into the means.' (Lipman 1991 at p245 fn3)

Inquiry involves both question and questioning. It is perhaps rooted in a spirit, a longing, 'a restless questioning' (Bernstein 1991:3). There has to be that enquiring mind, one that wants to journey on from the position that has already been arrived at, believing (in the words of the pilgrim's hymn) that there is 'yet more light and truth to break forth...'.⁴⁸⁷ The question too is important, for why should one engage in pursuit of questioning around a question about which one cares little or nothing? In this sense, it might be suggested that the heart also is involved, for it requires a sense of commitment to the task and to the question that lies at its core. In Grundtvig's words, 'Just as a man is outwardly dead when his heart stops beating, so is he

⁴⁸⁷ 'We limit not the truth of God' a hymn by George Rawson, published in the *Leeds Hymn Book*, 1853, where it was headed with the following extract on which it was based: 'He charged us before God, and His blessed angels, if God should reveal anything to us by any other instrument of His, to be as ready to receive it as any truth by his ministry; for he was very confident the Lord had more light and truth yet to break forth out of His holy word.' *Narrative of Pastor Robinson's Address to the Pilgrim Fathers 1620*

inwardly dead when his heart does not beat for anything, when nothing is dear to him; and it is impossible for a man who loves nothing to be able to take the trouble to understand anything'. (Thyssen 1983a:113) Further, if learning is concerned for societal change, then there has to be a longing, a desire, for change. (Berlak 1989)

Quite central to the notion of Socratic dialogue is a commitment to reasoning. The interaction is fundamentally concerned with laying bear the strengths and weaknesses of propositions. 'It is only through the discipline of having one's claims tested in ongoing debate, in the light of standards on the rational justification of which, and on the rational justification afforded by which, the participants in debate are able to agree, that the reasoning of any particular individual is rescued from the vagaries of passion and interest.' (MacIntyre 1987:24) It is through a process of examination and indeed refutation that true and false belief are seen for what they are. Grundtvig is concerned for 'truth' too - to sense is to see what is true. (Grundtvig is perhaps employing a word play on the similarity of *sans* sense and *sand* true.⁴⁸⁸) He employs a wider definition which includes 'the power of fancy or imaginative ability',

⁴⁸⁸ Anders Pontoppidan Thyssen (1983) identifies this possibility

the capacity for discerning higher, eternal truth and the heart's spiritual sensing. (Thyssen 1983a:112) Grundtvig was concerned that without corresponding emotional development and commitment of the will, intellectual enlightenment might be barren. 'The spring of life is the heart, not the head'. (Davies 1931:30-1) So, Grundtvig was critical of those whose commitment to rationalism precluded the admission of other aspects to enlightenment. 'True enlightenment brings not only light but also warmth'. (Henningsen 1993:284) One may notice that the *also*. As is so often the case, Grundtvig does not invite us to choose between, he encourages us to anticipate the interaction between. He holds 'together feeling and thinking. Here again there needs to be interaction and reciprocity.' (Allchin 1997:164) While Socratic Dialogue might appear to be more 'head' than 'heart', the practice often is not so exclusively 'cerebral'. In truth, as Lourde (1984) affirms, there is a real 'power of deeper feeling to challenge dominant stereotypes and notions of truth...' (Barr 1993:114) The arriving at insights, points of breakthrough, can be sensed by participants in something of a spiritual sense, something that is intuited as much as it is reasoned. It has parallel to Grundtvig's biography, for in it there are points of turning, of glimpsing

something radically new, when something dawned, even 'as if by miracle'. (Borish 1998:249)

The process remains substantially a rational and logical one. Yet, there are elements of the affective. In that the process is one of 'regressive abstraction', this is not only a logical progression, there is something also of regression - it is a process of getting back to where the present thinking comes from. In practice, participants may report that their speaking is not purely dispassionate. In Delgehausen (2004), however, one child participant in a philosophical inquiry reports: 'It all comes straight from the heart and not only from the head' (at 44) If the engagement with the question leads from sense of previous understanding to a fresh, and perhaps radically different one, it is likely that there will be some emotional as well as rational wrestling, for attachment to our views and opinions, our ideologies and understanding is part of our human condition . (Scheffler 1983:20) Abbs (1994:17) argues that, in the original Socratic approach, 'emotionally, the *elenchus* began with smug ease... that dissolved into unease, then into anguish, then into concern and finally, into collaborative and reflective curiosity'.

That this questioning can be a difficult task to undertake is acknowledged where dialogue or inquiry is in fact employed as a training tool,

to sharpen our skills of thought and argument. Indeed, Bielfeldt (1998) suggests that oral interaction is not the natural form of learning for many in a more visual age. It is implicit that, by practising these arts, we become more skilled in their use.

Yet, some of the real challenge lies not in pursuing the questions on a path towards answers but the prior work of deciding to question, focusing the question and asking the question. In this sense, where we have often considered questioning as being concerned with problem-**solving**, the more challenging aspect may be in problem-**creation**. As Bernstein (1991) asserts, 'The cliché is that it is easy to ask questions but hard to give answers. But the truth is that it is the art of questioning that is difficult and fragile. Serious questioning requires knowing what to question and how. That which has always distinguished the greatest philosophers is their ability to question what no one else had thought to question, and thereby to challenge the pre-judgements and prejudices of which most of are unaware, even though we hold them.' (1991:4)

Recognising the power of 'the living word' as means of influencing people's thought towards inhumanity just as readily as towards humanity, Grundtvig believed that learners' critical sense had to be sharpened in order that they

might discern what is true, what is for life enlightenment, for life rather than death. (Prenter 1973:224) He had a concern however that the Danish educational system of his time focused too much on the critical faculties at the expense of other dimensions: 'We are all educated to be critics instead of creators'. (Davies 1931:71) He sensed that this imbalance would ultimately 'exhaust our human life-force', (1931:71 leaving us 'rich in knowledge...but poor in vital force'. (1931:81)

The method has contextuality to it. It is not necessary that all come from a shared context, indeed there may be value in that diversity that a breadth in the group can bring. Nor is the question one that is confined to a particular situation (though there may in fact be a particular stimulus context). The commencement point however is not some theoretical issue but a concrete question which participants are invited to enter through the living experiences of their own and other group members. This is important not only at the initial stage of the example, but throughout the process of dialogue. This rootedness in experience is in some measure a check against reality. A proposition may be assessed as true or false or requiring refinement against lived experience.

Indeed, the proposition has to emerge from and be forged in the untidy world of human life. '...Thinking is just that, meaning making, nothing less and any attempt to teach thinking in some disembodied, decontextualised way when knowledge makers are isolated from the messy processes of knowledge making is inevitably doomed to failure.' (Kirby and Kuykendall 1991:18) In one of Grundtvig's trenchant condemnations of the Danish⁴⁸⁹ educational system of his day, he declared, 'It is a high German notion that life is explainable even before it is experienced.' * He was strongly critical of educational processes 'where the old people torment the young with questions which they cannot possibly answer out of their own experience of life, and can only answer by repeating the words of others.' (Davies 1931:84) These criticisms reflect a twin emphasis within Socratic dialogue. The focus is life and the explanation of life comes most directly and truthfully from engagement with life as it is lived and experienced. In this collaborative search for understanding, the individual cannot delegate his/her responsibility, not least can it be abdicated in favour of the received wisdom of books or teachers.

⁴⁸⁹ Though he did not think that the education was in truth Danish but rather 'German' and 'Latin'

For some learners too, to launch into abstract conceptualisation, divorced from concrete experience, is demanding in a way that alienates, frightens and obscures rather than enlightens. As Splitter and Sharp argue, 'Generally speaking, we can say that to find meaning in something... is to locate that item in a framework which is connected to something in our own experience, something which already makes sense to us.' (1995: 68) 'We learn by making connections between what we know and what is new to us'. (Burbules and Rice 1991:412-3) Indeed, an element in the disempowerment of learners and inquirers can be that their own lived experience is marginalised and the practical wisdom hewn from reflective living is at the least undervalued. (Bernstein 1991:3). Instead, they are herded into frameworks and interpretations and constructions of experience that are offered to them. In moving from the experiences of the participants, the dialogue affirms the significance and status of that experience and how it is perceived and recognises its power to take the community of inquiry into serious and meaningful exploration of fundamental concerns, through the 'creative ability of humans to see and recognise themselves in the world and the world in themselves.' (Ende 1993:286)

This focus on a lived example affirms too that the fundamental focus of the Dialogue is on

life itself. '... In this perspective, it reflects the fundamental Socratic focus on the responsibility of each to live an examined life. (It) is worth our while to talk about the most important things, about how we ought to live.' (Leal 2004:123) Though the search may be for something akin to universal truths⁴⁹⁰, they are sought for the purpose of actual living. Writing of the idea of a high school at Sorø, Grundtvig argued that rather than 'purely intellectual activity', the new school should give priority to 'the task of helping to solve life's problems'. (Bugge 1998:43) The task is of *livoplysning* - life enlightenment. At the heart of Grundtvig's educational writings, we find affirmed that *lærdom* - learnedness - results from learning meeting with real life. (Hansen 2003)

In the Dialogue, only once the particular has been acknowledged and respected is there movement towards the general or even the universal.

There has to be freedom of participation. Members must want to be involved and to make their contribution and so be motivated to participate. They must not feel that their contribution is or is considered by others to

⁴⁹⁰ While, for the purposes of this paper, we use terms such as 'universals', it should be noted that dialogues in practice do not make use of such technical language with participants.

be inadequate or unworthy. Provided the participants remain within the agreed ground rules, there ought not to be repercussions.⁴⁹¹ They should be enabled and encouraged to offer and share their genuinely held views. This is not simply a matter of human rights, the right of freedom of speech, but the right of the whole group to have access to the ideas of each participant as an element in the thought treasury of that group.⁴⁹²

Of course, there can be no true freedom where the goal of the learning is indoctrination, however benign. Grundtvig regarded freedom as the element of the Spirit. (Bugge 1993:277) He was conscious of the negative forms of freedom⁴⁹³ which he diagnosed as being rooted in an individualism that was not balanced by reciprocity. (Henningesen 1993:285)

There could be no true freedom where the conclusion of the inquiry was predetermined. This excludes such 'learning' where the participants 'merely play the game of

⁴⁹¹ Delgehausen 2004 notes the observation of a child participant: 'It's great that I don't have to be afraid of saying something wrong and then get a poor grade.' (at 44) On a rather different scale of potential repercussions, Grundtvig asserted that one necessary freedom for education was a freedom from an obligation to 'the other life' (life in everlasting salvation) (Bugge 1983a:218)

⁴⁹² Grundtvig argued too that Christianity could only flourish where its opponents had the same freedom as Christianity (Davies 1931:40)

⁴⁹³ Not least from the French Revolution of 1789 but also British ideas of economic freedom.

'guessing-what-the-answer-is-in-the-teacher's-head''. (Murriss nd (a) p3) The Socratic dialogue is rooted in an assumption that the answer to the question is yet to be found, even if others have already for themselves found an answer to the question. 'If the traditional classroom praises the accumulation of information, the community of inquiry must prize its own ignorance. The very recognition that there is something we do not know, that there is something important to be gained by the process, is what gives the community its existence.' (Reed 1992 at 150)

Nor could there be true freedom in Grundtvig's view if it was freedom for oneself and one's own position rather than for those with whom one differed. 'I know from my own personal experience that it can be very difficult indeed... to be satisfied with the amount of freedom that leaves some freedom also to my neighbour'. (Bugge 1993:277)

In the context of learning where one of the participants is in some way recognised as having prior knowledge of the discipline (whether that person be teacher or philosopher or clergy), then that participant is liable to be looked to for authoritative answers to the questions before the group or at least expected to have a more advanced insight. In the world of the academy (and even beyond), 'expert

knowledge' always wins.' (Barr 1993:112) If the dialogue is to be an open one and the other participants are to have ownership of the thinking, it is necessary for the specialist participant to set aside any view of themselves and discourage any suggestion (in word or deed) that they are 'all-knowing and infallible' and for them to adopt an 'attitude to epistemology in general, one which is aware of its tentativeness and change able nature, is tolerant of criticism, is open-minded, and aware of its fallibility'. (Bottery 1990:238-9) Long (2005) suggests that such a position is consistent with the roots of Socratic dialogue. 'The irony of having philosophical expertise becomes evident when one recalls Socrates' impression⁴⁹⁴ that he knew nothing, and this is especially relevant to those who want to claim philosophical expertise for themselves or others.' (2005:602)⁴⁹⁵

If the Socratic dialogue or inquiry is concerned to engage participants in autonomous though shared search, free from received truths, there is also an internal freedom to be pursued. Socratic learning is an 'onslaught on those internalised opinions, internalised ideologies, internalised half truths, around

⁴⁹⁴ For example, 'in respect of wisdom (I am) really worthless' *Apology* 23b 'Critias, you come to me as though I professed to know about the questions which I ask' *Charmides* 165b

⁴⁹⁵ Reich 1998 and Versenyi (1979:121) for example, question however whether or not Socrates' claims of ignorance were sincere or a ruse operated to draw others into dialogue.

which the human ego, and all the defensive emotions of the ego, has crystallised.' (Abbs 1994:19)

Why should we want to encourage this Socratic form of philosophical learning? Lipman was a pioneer in this field in relation to working with children and it is interesting to hear the rationale he had in that context. He was concerned first of all that children should be as capable as they can be of quality thinking, not least because the existence and flourishing of a democratic society required this. He believed too that there were positive qualities in children, such as curiosity, wonder and enthusiasm for enquiry that significantly diminished as they progressed through education. (Reed 1992:147) Without confusing adults in education with children, we can nonetheless take the view that these concerns have their parallels in relation to the education of adults. It is equally tenable as Lipman's view that adults also, for the thriving of democratic society, ought to be encouraged and enabled to hone their intellectual skills. If the diminishing of curiosity, wonder and enthusiasm is well under way during the child's primary school years, we have no good reason to imagine that they will have been somehow re-instated in adult years

without some intervening process.⁴⁹⁶ (Schreier
nd)

There is a significant *conflictual*⁴⁹⁷ dynamic to Socratic dialogue. John Daly and Catherine McCall, for example, argue that this is (in McCall's terms) the 'engine' that drives the dialogue. (Murriss nd (a) on p1) One of the key responsibilities of the facilitator is to manage that conflict. The contesting around ideas is the dynamic that channels each participant into a process of deepening of his/her reasoning. As each contributor responds to and challenges the previous contribution, the to-and fro-ing uncovers for each their own and others' basis of thought. It is made more explicit, it is opened up to examination, its underlying assumptions and evidence are brought out. It is the process of agreeing and (perhaps more) of disagreeing that each idea is tested through being contested.

In identifying this as a conflictual process, however, we may distinguish it nonetheless from other common forms of conflict. If it is a **community** of inquiry that comes together in a Socratic dialogue, then the participants are engaged in a fundamentally **cooperative** task

⁴⁹⁶ The restoration of this lost capacity may be one gift that children who still have it can offer to adults.

⁴⁹⁷ This does not imply any sense of enmity

which is facilitated through conflict. Conflict is not the purpose. The desired outcome is greater understanding towards a more shared appreciation of truth. The participants are therefore not opponents, but collaborators in a common effort of inquiry. The purpose of disagreement and challenge is not to overcome or defeat the argument of another but rather to help that person (and the other participants) to work towards a better thought out position. Still less, then ought it to be a process that is designed to achieve personal victory and defeat. This might lead to a change of mind or to a strengthening of belief, confident in the reasoning that has been strengthened by well-constructed and presented argument.

Bolten (2001) summarises what he regards as the different orientation of those who are partners in dialogue from those who engage in traditional discussion

Table 19: Dialogue and discussion

Partners in dialogue	Discussants
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Investigate a matter ▪ Give each other room to speak ▪ Pose questions in order to understand one another ▪ Reflect back each other's words ▪ Say only what they really mean ▪ Strive for mutual understanding 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Seek to convince each other that they are right ▪ Demand speaking time ▪ Look upon each other's speaking time as lost time ▪ Undermine each other's standpoints ▪ Attack each other's arguments ▪ Try to make each

<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Have a common understanding of the matter ▪ Make their viewpoint as clear as possible to the other ▪ Are willing to give arguments that support their viewpoints ▪ Investigate differences of opinion ▪ Strive for consensus 	<p>other's viewpoints seem unintelligible</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Strive for approval of their own viewpoint
--	--

Barr (1999:42) draws a further distinction. 'People involved in discussion share knowledge they already have; often this in a series of monologues where each person expresses their views. Those involved in dialogue help each other examine their understandings of the world, develop more complex understandings and, through identifying and clarifying problems and new questions to be asked, thereby create knowledge.' This is wholly consistent with a Grundtvigian ethos of mutuality and reciprocity in the cause of a common search for clarification and enlightenment.

Grundtvig's idea of *vekselvirkning* arises from his capacity to recognise and indeed build

connections. He draws too on a fertile imagination that often used imagery not merely to explain but to explore. He utilises (Allchin 1997:164) a triad of the heart, the mouth and the hand,⁴⁹⁸ images of thought, speech and action. If we view the process of Socratic dialogue in the light of those images, we can recognise the interconnectedness of it all. 'The inner work of the heart must be expressed outwardly in words and thus become articulate and clear. What is dark and unclear though deeply felt, come to light and is clarified in thought and in speech. Then what is spoken and expressed in words must become embodied, made practically real in the work of the hands, in skilful deeds.' (Allchin 1997:164) The domains of thinking, of dialogue and of action come together in *vekselvirkning*.

⁴⁹⁸ In theological terms, we may hear in this the words of the apostle Paul concerning the interconnectedness or mutuality and reciprocity of all the parts of the human body. 1 Corinthians 12:12ff

Chapter 13
FORTÆLLING:
STORY, STORYMAKING AND STORYTELLING

INTRODUCTION

**Story, storymaking and storytelling
matter**

Whilst it would be my contention⁴⁹⁹ that
stories⁵⁰⁰ are a perennial aspect of the human

⁴⁹⁹ See below, in particular, the section in this chapter on *Menneskelighed*

⁵⁰⁰ While there are points at which I have drawn distinctions because I have considered them of significance at that point, I have worked here across these, preferring the reality that 'Scottish storytellers have formed narratives and narrative traditions with little regard to academic distinctions between myths, legends, folklore and history'. [Donald Smith 2001:5] This approach is consistent with the judgement that 'Neither Grundtvig nor Kold theorised over storytelling as a genre'. [Pedersen 2003:281] There were however distinctions to be drawn in Grundtvig's view: Bradley 1993:57 refers to Grundtvig's concern where 'fable and history are mixed together'. [*Bjowulfs Drape. Et Gotisk Helte-Digt fra forrige Aar-Tusinde af Engel-Saxisk paa Danske Riim* 1820 Copenhagen *Indeledning* pLI] See Bradley's article for clarification as to the particular issue in that instance.

condition⁵⁰¹, it is also true that there has been a contemporary renewal and resurgence of interest in the use of story, not least within a pedagogical context.

Bugge (1999:55) has used the Danish term *saltvandsindsprøjtning*⁵⁰², or what we might call 'a shot in the arm', to describe the revival in the use of storytelling as an educational approach and method. In Scotland, this expansion of interest and activity is reflected in, for example, the founding and the growth of the Scottish Storytelling Centre⁵⁰³. The growth of similar organisations across the world, the increased interest in its use in schools⁵⁰⁴ and its adoption in such diverse fields as psychological therapy, cultural celebration and organisational development are all pointers to

⁵⁰¹ Bugge 1999 uses the Danish term *livselement* in relation to storytelling

⁵⁰² literally, a salt water or saline injection

⁵⁰³ 'The Scottish Storytelling Forum is Scotland's national charity for storytelling. It was founded in 1992 to encourage and support the telling and sharing of stories across all ages and all sectors of society in particular those who, for reasons of poverty or disability, were excluded from artistic experiences. At first the Scottish Storytelling Forum was a volunteer run organisation but, with a steady growth in membership and an increase of professional storytellers across Scotland from 17 to 47, in 1997 it established a resource and training centre. This was named the Scottish Storytelling Centre... Since then the storytelling network has continued to multiply across Scotland with over 80 professional storytellers and 230,000 people participating in events and workshops in 2002.' [Extract from the centre's website:
http://www.scottishstorytellingcentre.co.uk/about_us/about_us_stories_for_all.html]

⁵⁰⁴ See, for example, in the Scottish context, National Priorities In Education Performance Reports (Scottish Executive)

this renaissance of storymaking and storytelling.

It is beyond the scope of this thesis to trace this development but I want to identify briefly some of the factors that have contributed to the creation and growth of this revival against a background of an enduring presence and in that way to sketch some aspects that I propose to deal with in more detail subsequently:

It is rooted in a basic human orality⁵⁰⁵ (Ong 1982), a 'living word', which has a persistent significance even in a context of print and other forms of literature and communication.

'Storytelling is one of the oldest, if not *the* oldest method of communicating ideas and images. Story performance honed our mythologies long before they were written and edited by scribes, poets and scholars.' (Mello 2001:1) While we live and work in the world of modernity in an age of literacy, of electronic media and of visual representation (and each of these media offer their own forms of story communication), as Donald Smith argues, 'Perhaps, in an age of information overload, oral storytelling remains as important as even before in human culture'. (D Smith 2001:2) Grundtvig's assertion of the importance, even the primacy, of 'the living

⁵⁰⁵ corresponding to the significance in Grundtvig's writing and thinking of 'the living word' (*det levende ord*)

word' affirms that our speaking and hearing and imagining in story is in its oral form, not least because there is a more direct and natural communication which brings human beings into relationship and engagement with one another and thus affirms (against other depersonalising trends in societies) the humanness of the participants and the humanity of humankind. The oral tale has remained a feature of social encounter long after its demise might have been predicted on grounds of obsolescence.

There is a recurrent realisation in human community of the capacity of storytelling to act as an effective tool in shaping human enlightenment, thought and commitment.⁵⁰⁶ Speaking to our intellects, our emotions and our imaginations, story can serve powerfully as a means of education and of persuasion.

Associated with other revivals in 'folk' interest, such cultural 'renaissances' have encouraged and supported the re-discovery and utilisation and traditional stories and legends.⁵⁰⁷

⁵⁰⁶ In the context of this study, around the idea of the promoting political and cultural national identity, AD Smith, Schöpflin *et al* have identified the power of myths in constructing and advancing popular belief and commitment

⁵⁰⁷ This process encompasses a range from 'genuine' re-appropriation through to the 'fraudulent'. Again, it has to be recognised that such processes are generally undertaken with a particular motivation, such as the promotion of a nationalist case or the marketing of touristic heritage.

In an age of apparent individualism, the power of storytelling to draw people together, to fire imagination, to foster empathy, strengthen human connection, to facilitate shared understandings and to build community is a counter to that strong tendency. Grundtvig's belief was in a holding together of the personal and the communal, neither to be without the other, the two to be held in balance and in interaction. Storymaking and storytelling do have the potential not merely to keep these two dimensions together but to enrich them both. 'The personal feeds the collective while the storytelling collective nourishes the personal.' (D Smith 2001:3)

Feminist and other perspectives have asserted that, alongside or against the dominant narratives in a society, there are other stories to be heard.⁵⁰⁸ While other forms of discourse have been the modes of the powerful, it is often to story, and story in their own voice, that the less powerful and powerless have turned to effect their participation in community. It can be in narrative that marginalised and powerless peoples name their experience and so name themselves. (Chopp 1995:32)

⁵⁰⁸ I consider below in the section in this chapter on *Folkelighed* the suppression of stories but also their use as forms of resistance and contest

Against more 'positivist' readings, and perhaps particularly from a post-modernist perspective, there has been an affirmation of narrative as a source and form of knowledge and therefore of educational significance (eg Eisner 1998) As Lynch and Willows suggest, 'the trend towards narrative-based studies... is undoubtedly symptomatic of a growing awareness of the crucial role that stories play in human interaction and **the generation of knowledge**'. (1998:3)

Narrative in storytelling reflects a major form in which we human beings 'organise our experience and our memory of human happenings' (Bruner 1991:4) While we do use the term 'memory' to refer to a cognitive capacity we have to store and recall information, it has a deeper meaning, as 'the human faculty which works constantly to instil emotion, meaning and value into the sequence of happenings... In this way, memory ... is seen in a very pure and concentrated form in oral storytelling.' (D Smith 2001:1) 'The stories we tell, whether human or divine, mythic or parabolic, order experience, construct meaning, and build community'. (Anderson and Foley 1998)

Memory is important to us as human beings and not merely in the functionalist sense of remembering facts that we need to operate effectively and efficiently in the world.

Narrative is a key means by which memory is preserved and transmitted or handed on. In periods of major change, however, such as when societies become less based on religion, then, according to Hervieu-Léger, they are unable to keep the collective memory. She refers to such societies as 'amnesic societies', societies with amnesia. (Hervieu-Léger 1998). 'We are forgetful people. We need storytellers.' (White 1982:118) The absence of collective memory has potential consequences in terms of sense of rootlessness, alienation, isolation and loss of common cultural nourishment and commitment.

Storytelling has a performance dimension, serving *inter alia* a purpose of entertainment. (Vernant 1990:207-8) Grundtvig's suggestion that pedagogical methods should include the lively, spirited⁵⁰⁹ lecture, the singing of cheerful and imaginative song⁵¹⁰ and the use of storytelling was a recognition that people respond to being stimulated and part of being stimulated is being entertained in its broadest sense. As Kearney suggests, 'People will always enjoy going into a story trance and allowing

⁵⁰⁹ I use the term 'spirited' not only as synonymous with 'lively' but also in the sense that the speaking had to come not only from the mind but from the spirit of the speaker, be addressed to and make connection with the spirit of the hearer and be related to and directed at building up the spirit of the people (the folkeånd)

⁵¹⁰ Though they are largely hidden from a non-Danish speaking world, despite the recent efforts of a number of translators, it is important to acknowledge that song was and remains a significant form of telling of story in Grundtvig's works.

themselves to be led through a tale by a masterful story weaver'. (Kearney 2002:18) 'One fundamental characteristic of myth is its capacity to give pleasure and to involve the emotional participation of the audience. Good myths have entertainment value, and the magic of their poetry delights the audience.' (Overing 1997:2, citing Vernant 1990:206-7,220)

Though we acknowledge the potential of story to entertain, we are suspicious of the stories that belong to the realm of 'entertainment' as unworthy to be sources of meaning. In the context of religious education, Detweiler and Taylor comment: 'We want to 'look closer' to examine where God might be lurking in the songs, shows, and films kids continually return to for solace and meaning. We celebrate the rise of pop culture, as among the most profound, provocative, exciting expressions of legitimate spiritual yearning in at least one hundred years.' (Detweiler and Taylor 2003:0)

In either oral or written forms, it has a communicative and dialogical capacity, allowing human beings to engage with one another⁵¹¹ around their understanding and thoughts in ways that

⁵¹¹ We might, in grundtvigian language, refer to this process as a form of lively interaction and exchange (*levende vekselvirkning*)

hold out a possibility of mutual comprehension and negotiation.⁵¹² (Egan 1995, 1999)

It bridges the individual and the communal in that personal experiences are narrated and enter into a shared space where they become accessible to others. (Bruner 1986)

Through the immediacy of the oral encounter in storytelling that heightens the sense of human engagement, the hearer and watcher is drawn into relationship and into interaction (whether vocalised or silent) with the teller.

Though story often contains information - such as concerning characters, dates, location - nonetheless a key focus in our story-hearing is concerned with *meaning*. (Freedman and Combs 1996:33) If the most fundamental goal of learning is *livoplysning*, or enlightenment of the meaning of life, then storytelling can contribute to that process. 'Our genius lies in our capacity to make meaning through the creation of narratives that give point to our labors, exalt our history, elucidate the present and give direction to our future.' (Postman 1996:7)

⁵¹² This aspect is pursued further below in the section on *vekselvirkning*. It resonates also with the concerns of the chapters on Socratic dialogue and on interaction in the public space in which I suggest that one of the more important approaches for adult community education is to enable people from diverse backgrounds and positions to enter dialogically into a critical yet empathetic understanding of one another's stories and understanding of their stories.

'Narratives are not conveyed in neutral and bloodless language.' The engagement is not merely with our intellects but also with our emotions; stories speak to 'head' and 'heart'⁵¹³. Storytelling is 'a way of speaking from below the culture-bound, logical part of me'. (Bailey 1996:15)

'Myth, the knowledge embodied in stories and traditions, connects us to the past and future humanity, thereby situating practical knowledge within the stock of knowledge that is our collective heritage'. (Gherardi 2004:33) It may also be the resonances of stories with tales and meanings that have entered the collective consciousness that give them a particular power. (Jung 1969)

In this chapter, some attention has to be given to the theoretical dimensions of story and storytelling, to analytical questions. Yet, as an educator and a storyteller, I express some concern at my own task here, for it seems to me that such an approach can rob - as Rosaldo (1986) would have it - 'lived experience ... of its vital significance'. (1986:103) Similarly, Lynch and Willows (1998) recognised: 'One of the dangers about writing *about* (my italics) narrative, as anyone who has attempted to engage

⁵¹³ It is of course one of Grundtvig's key criticisms of education of his own day that it failed utterly to speak to the heart

with the corpus of literature on this subject will appreciate, is that it can quickly turn into a highly abstract or theoretical discussion... then such discussions seem a long way removed from the spirit of their subject.' (1998:4-5) It is my earnest hope that offering the reader of this thesis some reflection on storytelling in the light of what seem to me key 'grundtvigian' ideas does not take from the chapter that vitality which makes narrative and storytelling a 'living word'.

MENNESKELIGHED

Our common humanity

The universality of storytelling

'A need to tell and hear stories is essential to the species Homo sapiens - second in necessity apparently after nourishment and before love and shelter. Millions survive without love or home, almost none in silence; the opposite of silence leads quickly to narrative, and the sound of story is the dominant sound of our lives...'. (Price 1978) Price is inviting us to see the ubiquitous presence of story in the lives of human beings. '(I)t becomes clear that we are in the midst of stories'. (Brueggemann 1990:22) Sharing story is a universal element in the experience of humankind.

It is more however than a ubiquity. There is truth in the assertion of Crites that there is a fundamentally narrative quality to human existence. (Crites 1989:65-88) 'There will always be someone there to say, 'Tell me a story' and someone there to respond. Were this not so, we would no longer be fully human.' (Kearney 2002:156)

'Every life is in search of a narrative.'
(Kearney 2002:4) In this sense, story is not merely an activity within human living and is not only concerned with human life, it is a fundamental component of what it is to be human and to live a human life: 'The most compelling reason why stories have such power to engage us is the narrative form of human existence itself. Human experience is structured in time and narrative. We comprehend our lives not as disconnected actions or isolated events but in terms of narrative. We conceive our lives as a web of stories... We think in stories in order to weave together into a coherent whole the unending succession of people, dates, and facts that fill our lives... In that sense, the narrative framework is a human necessity' (Anderson and Foley 1998:4)

'... Life is a matter of telling ourselves stories about life; and of savoring stories about life told by others, and of living our lives

according to such stories, and of creating ever-new and more complex stories about stories - ...this story making is not just about human life, but *is* human life'. (Anderson 1990:102) 'It is because we all live out narratives in our lives and because we understand our own lives in terms of the narratives that we live out that the form of narrative is appropriate for understanding the actions of others. Stories are lived out before they are told...'. (MacIntyre 1985:208)

Universality and the human story

Grundtvig was deeply and even aggressively concerned to defend the national and to affirm the community of a nation⁵¹⁴, but he did not lose sight of the commonality and sharedness of humankind. As the personal ought not to be thought of without reference to the communal, so the national was not to be divorced from our affirmation and understanding of our universal community, our humanity.

This was true in respect of his offering of story. It is perhaps characteristic of this understanding and belief that Grundtvig did not write any history of the Danish people⁵¹⁵ but did compose a major works on world history (whatever

⁵¹⁴ ie the 'folk' rather than the state

⁵¹⁵ He did however translate Saxo's Chronicle of Denmark (Saxos Danmarks Krønike) 1818-22 and writes significantly about Nordens Mytologi

their 'shortcomings'⁵¹⁶ from a modern scholarly perspective), for example in his handbook of world history⁵¹⁷. To Grundtvig, it was of vital importance that humanity has an understanding of history, not simply as a record of the past but as a source for the present and the future.

That a people knew their own history, the history of their own nation was important, not simply in itself but so that they could be aware of what was common and what was distinctive and so that they could empathise with the experience of others from their own experience. This is a recurrent understanding in Grundtvig's thinking: How are a people to be open to the Christian faith?⁵¹⁸ They are first to be open to life through their own folk life. How are a people to discern what 'foreign influences' ought to be adopted/adapted to enter the folk life? They are first to know and appreciate their own national character⁵¹⁹. (Jørgensen 1993a:94) In

⁵¹⁶ Grundtvig's 'double entry accounting' system of history with world and religious history on 'simultaneously separate and parallel tracks, aiming towards the same perfect and clarified final goal' [Vind 1999:617] imports a teleological and eschatological dimension to history that would now by most historians been thought to be inappropriate.

⁵¹⁷ Handbook on World History. According to the Best Sources. An attempt by NFS Grundtvig. I-III (Haandbog I Verdens-Historien. Efter de bedste Kilder. Et forsøg af NFS Grundtvig. I-III) 1833-43

⁵¹⁸ Grundtvig does not of course assume that there is an automatic movement. He recognises that, as with the 'naturalists' of the world who share a common spirit of life with people of faith, not all people of life will adopt religious faith.

⁵¹⁹ The notion of 'national character' is perhaps one to which we are more resistant for its stereotyping connotations, its assumptions of heterogeneity and its potential for self-congratulation. It is however critical to Grundtvig's

the same way, how are a people to have a true universal historical sense? By gaining 'an understanding of the place and significance which one's own people has enjoyed in the context of world history.' (1993a:96) As Overing suggests, 'we find that myths of identity are equally myths of alterity, or significant otherness, for to state identity is also to speak of difference'. (1997:16) Yet that distinctiveness need not, though can be, the source of division and disruption of our common humanity.

The contribution of myth

A particularly strong contribution of Grundtvig's scholarship⁵²⁰ was his revival of old Norse mythology⁵²¹.

It is beyond the scope of my study⁵²² to explore more broadly and deeply the concept of myth⁵²³.

understanding of and commitment to the notion of Danishness. See below, in the section in this chapter on 'Folkelighed and Folkeoplysning', for further discussion of myths of national character

⁵²⁰ This is particularly so of his younger period

⁵²¹ Haarder (1983:72) for example, asserts: 'for a Dane, 'Grundtvig' and 'the Old Norse cultural heritage' are so inseparable that one cannot really talk about one without mentioning the other.'

⁵²² I have excluded greater and deeper consideration on two principal grounds: 1 it seems to me to be too extensive a subject to treat here, within what is a broad educationally-focused study and 2 my initial reading in the field suggests that a useful and competent exploration would require a degree of specialist scholarly knowledge which I do not possess and is beyond the scope of my present attention.

The term 'myth' is in itself a difficult, ambiguous and complex one and to some of the different usages I shall return later. For the moment, I use the term in the sense of a story which is held to manifest some aspect of the cosmic order and the place of humankind within it. Used in that sense, it is a form of story and storytelling that purports to speak of the universal and indeed to bring the universal and historical into interaction. (Balling 1993:75)

In keeping with his understanding of fundamental 'contradictions'⁵²⁴, he saw in myths 'the most wonderful victory drama' (Nordens Mytologi 1808) in which there was struggle between life and death⁵²⁵, truth and lie, good and evil, light and darkness.⁵²⁶ The battles of the gods were the battles of life's conflict, of human struggle. The struggle portrayed in the myths was 'a struggle that embraces the whole of history'

⁵²³ I should acknowledge however that in my reading I found Segal (1999) of particular help in setting out a major part of the territory of myth theory.

⁵²⁴ Grundtvig strongly held to the absolute inherent gulf between fundamental opposites which could not be combined or mediated (eg life and death). It is also true however that in other aspects of thinking he acknowledged the potential for dialogue and friendly interaction (so with history and nature).

⁵²⁵ 'When pressed by the German Hegelian theologian Marheinecke to state his position on the distinction between being and thought, Grundtvig replied, 'My antithesis is life and death'.' (Broadbridge and Jensen 1984:30)

⁵²⁶ This utter distinction between these forces in life marked the language that Grundtvig used in writing, for example, of the School of Life and the deadness of the Black school. Today, we are perhaps less confident of our ability to allocate so absolutely to opposite extremes or indeed sure about the validity of concepts of Good and Evil in an absolute, abstract sense.

(Thyssen 1983:98) Yet, the universal touched and was also personal⁵²⁷.

Mythic story undoubtedly has huge power and powerful story carries with it risk of manipulation and even abuse. When President George Bush declared, "We're fighting evil" (quoted in Jewett and Lawrence 2005:2), the phrase shifts the deeds of human beings from their political context and thus from a context in which we ought to engage critically, analytically, rationally and with balance to a mythic realm in which the political action is framed (however inappropriately) as an element within a universal moral struggle. Such a use of myth in order to close down questions conclusively is at odds with Grundtvig's belief that 'human life in the world is to be understood as a continuous struggle.' Thyssen and Allchin (1993:20)

'A mythology crystallises sediments accumulated over great stretches of time. It gathers into conventional form the primal memories and historical experience of the race. Being the speech of the mind when it is in a state of wonder and perception, the great myths are elaborated as slowly as language itself.'

(Steiner 1961:323)

⁵²⁷ Thyssen (1983:97) relates the annoyance of Grundtvig at an adaptation of the Edda poem on the god Freyr, who had sacrificed his sword for love. 'Grundtvig himself knew from bitter experience what falling in love could involve, but he could not sacrifice his 'sword' and he 'turned to the glorious days of the heroes to forget myself and my bleeding heart''.

This capacity of myth to bring together the universal, the communal and the personal inside a world-view allows us to order our experience within a structure of reality. In the hearing of myths, we bring them into our immediate lifeworld. (Jackson 2002:139) 'In telling our stories, we connect them with a greater story of existence. In this sense, life is not without meaning, but what we are doing is connecting our story to this wider meaning.' (Hauerwas 1981) In this way, our 'personal stories are held within a wider narrative frame, relating our experience to the kaleidoscope of humanity. Individuality is part of a universal patchwork.' (Donald Smith 2001:5) This possibility that we find our own story (whether as individuals, communities or nations) within mythic story lies in its power to contain 'true, existential subject matter'. (Segal 1999:24) Through 'demythologization'⁵²⁸ 'myth ceases to be an explanation'⁵²⁹ at all and becomes an expression, an expression not of the nature of the world but of the nature of the human experience of the world. Myth ceases to be merely primitive and becomes universal. It ceases to be false and becomes true. It becomes a statement of the human condition.' (Segal 1999:24) This is possible because 'The real

⁵²⁸ a term of Bultmann's that Segal finds 'excruciatingly confusing' (1999:24)

⁵²⁹ Bultmann in this way adopts the view of the 'explanatory' purpose and role of myth but in arguing for demythologising he is proposing that modern scientific humanity has no need and no receptivity for such explanation but must treat myth existentially.

purpose of myth is not to present an objective picture of the world as it is, but to express man's understanding of himself⁵³⁰ in the world in which he lives. 'The measure of a narrative's 'truth' or 'falsity' is in its consequences: Does it provide people with a sense of personal identity, a sense of community life, a basis for moral conduct, explanations of that which cannot be known?' (Postman 1996:7) '...Even the most absurd of happenings has a moral and ontological implication for what it means to be a human being alive today on this earth'. (Overing 1997:12)

Myth should be interpreted not as cosmological explanation, but anthropologically, or better still, existentially. (Bultmann 1953:10) Such a focus was already in Grundtvig's study of Nordens Mytologi: 'Grundtvig tried to explain mythology not as a primitive and heathen teaching about the gods as it was hitherto considered by the clergy, but as a Nordic way of symbolic explanation of human existence.' (Tefe 1997) We must, Grundtvig asserts, 'seek light where the wisdom of the ages shows you it can be found, and walk and work in that light: then you can become its children, discover its secrets

⁵³⁰ While I suspect that Bultmann's employment of the term 'man' is the use of the false generic expression for 'humanmind', as we might expect at his time of writing, but its use does prompt me to observe that myth is often a gendered form. The realm of mythology however is replete with female myth, though societies and institutions of power have not infrequently marginalised, hidden or suppressed these.

and inherit its glory'. (Introduction to Nordens Mytologi 1832 in Broadbridge and Jensen 1984:37-8) It was necessary not only to save the Nordic past, but to use it to advantage.

As Lynch and Willows propose: 'Can it not be the case that some stories go all the way down to the way things really are? (1998:22) Or, in the light of Bultmann, these stories go all the way down to the way we as human beings really find things to be. There is some fundamental correspondence between the universal account and our own existential experience. 'We are to fit our own life into this world, feel ourselves to be elements in its structure of universal history.' (Auerbach 1953:15) There is however a constant interaction. Our search for the meaning and direction of our own lives draws upon the universal (including, from the faith perspective, the sacred) story. 'Let us give the child a vision of the whole universe...for all things are part of the universe, and are connected with each other to form one whole unity' (Montessori 1946/1989:2). We connect with subterranean narratives which lie 'deep in the consciousness'. (Crites 1989:69) '...(E)verything that has happened in sacred story is relevant for the self-understanding of the now-living individual by being, so to speak, summed up and actualised in him or her.' (Allchin 2000:17)

'The people⁵³¹... are not the object of the stories of salvation but participants and even co-authors in the work of (constructing) a new narrative from human and divine stories.'

(Anderson and Foley 1998:163) Research in child education and story would suggest that there is in us an impetus in hearing story (such as mythic or folk story) to connect our own life experiences to them. (Applebee 1978; Favat 1977) 'The skill of the storyteller is always on hand to make the kind of sense for which our mythic awareness reaches out'. (Grainger 2004:355)

It is important then not to allow the layered dimensions of the mythic story to become or appear too separate from one another. There is a fundamental *vekselvirkning*. Indeed, Allchin affirms a 'coherence and mutual illumination between a cosmic, an anthropological and an historical order'. (Allchin 2000:17)

Yet, there has to be an 'existential fit'. (Lynch and Willows 19989:14) For us to appropriate the mythic story not simply as human story but each as **our** story, it must provide a good 'narrative home' for our experience. (Spence 1982)

This test of existential authenticity has its problematical side, however. The question, 'Is

⁵³¹ The original context of this quotation is a 'worshipping assembly'

the story compatible with my/our experience or does it deny that experience?' is a form of test, but, on the other hand, there is a risk of over-privileging the personal and the current and of not attaching sufficient authority to the wider and more enduring story. (Thiselton 1992:57)

The stories that for us personally and in community are enabling in terms of allowing us to connect our experience into a wider narrative are likely to alter. 'Is it not the case that, as our perspectives change over time, our experiences continually need to be moving house?' (Lynch and Willows 1998:14)

Grundtvig did not underestimate the differences that existed between different communities of thought. Where such differences existed, they were to be recognised and even sharply maintained. For example, the old Norse and the Christian, the folk-life and the Christian life, people of faith and others, were not to be confused, but there were possibilities for sharing and for collaboration in thinking and action. Those who were of spirit, who shared a 'life-warmth', could be in dialogue. They could 'go to school together'. (Bøger og Ideer 1830-31) Though different communities hold, treasure and use different myths, if they approach myths with a desire to find within the myth what corresponds to universal human

experience and what speaks of human life, then they have the possibility of engaging in useful dialogue and cooperation. So, as a key example, those who have a vision of salvation as eternal life in Christ and those who do not have this vision may nonetheless have common cause in the struggle for life against the deadening hand of all that denies life. They may find shared story and enter into a common story. There is not however a bland imagining that all are amenable to such a common task. He was severely critical of those in Church, in community, in education whose (he believed) dead minds and dead spirits were closed to the life spirit.⁵³² As a matter as much of experience as principle, Grundtvig believed that 'it is possible for people of good will to work together in society and in education despite differences of belief.' (Allchin 1995:23) Within this understanding, when we meet around story, we are able more fully to recognise the commonality in our story and therefore the sharedness of our humanity and of the journey of life that we take together. 'Surely no other discipline is more concerned with linking us to the cultural heritage from the past than is folklore; no other discipline is more concerned with revealing the interrelationships of different cultural

⁵³² So, then, although Grundtvig was concerned to promote an education which had vocational and training significance, he believed this had to be balanced with and could not do without a learning that was about enlightenment for life, was aimed at spirited life.

expressions than is folklore; and no other discipline is so concerned ...with discovering what it is to be human. It is this attempt to discover the basis of our common humanity, the imperatives of our human existence, that puts folklore study at the very center of humanistic study.' (Wilson 1998:400)

Though myths are generally 'set' in the time of creation, or in some primordial era, or in a golden age or time of crisis, or sometimes outside of time, they invite us to regard them as of enduring and contemporary significance, as of universal application. They do this, though there may be archaic aspects to the myth, by addressing and inviting us to address perennial human issues. In opening us up to the struggle to bring the actual condition of humankind closer to the 'ideal' state, the myth not only alerts us to our separation from the ideal but acts as a prototype for the new order⁵³³. Myth calls us to that 'imagination which enables us to be totally open and receptive both to what is going on around us and also to what the sequel to that present situation might be.' (MacIntyre

⁵³³ It is perhaps in this sense that we evaluate whether or not a myth is 'true'.

1987:75) In its poetic⁵³⁴ qualities, it has transformative potential⁵³⁵.

I am not entering into discussion here of whether or not, or, if so, in what ways, myths have or have had in primitive times an **explanatory** function⁵³⁶, for my interest in them is in their capacity to help us envisage and have our imagination opened to explore *what might be*. What role myth may or may not have had as explanation, it seems to me that its contemporary role ought to be more prophetic than explanatory⁵³⁷. I share MacIntyre's assertion that a myth is either living or dead, more than true or false. (MacIntyre 1985) It is its potential to be a 'living word' to the present that is its contemporary significance. 'The reader is reminded that it makes little or no difference to us what the intention of the mythmaker originally had, when only our interpretation ... is worth saving...'. (Grundtvig in Udvaglt Skrifter 5:636)

There is of course a potential for 'hearing' myth in a falsely idealistic way with an over-

⁵³⁴ See below in this section on the role of the skjald or poet and in particular the idea of 'poiesis' as creative and transformative

⁵³⁵ I am conscious equally that myths can be and are employed to a more conservative purpose of fixing moral behaviour through sanctioning norms with mythic and eternal authority

⁵³⁶ Cf EB Tylor (1871) writing on *Primitive Culture* I note however that Grundtvig's position or at least use of the Nordic myths is not to treat them as primitive explanation but as symbolic treatment.

⁵³⁷ See below the section on The Skjald

optimistic ear. 'Mythic narrations comfort us and assure us that everything is going to be all right; parables challenge and dispute the reconciliation that our myths have created. Myths allow us to dream and to believe in a better future than the present; parables disallow us from living in a dream world, call us to confront the present, and deter us from trusting in any hope that does not face the hard reality of the present. The irony, of course, is that these are complementary narrative forms, and human beings need both of them.' (Anderson and Foley 1998:15) Myth or mythologically based story can however be used in order to summon the hearer from supposed error or unawareness or apathy to action. We find this, for example, in Grundtvig's Maskaradeballet⁵³⁸ (1808). It was not that Grundtvig found the old Norse heroes to be perfect; indeed their distinctly non-pacifist inclinations signalled no dedication to the cause of universal peace and harmony, but rather that it was better to struggle however imperfectly than to withdraw from the struggle. 'The... *Nordic View of Life* was 'as a constant battle which it is man's sole purpose to wage as nobly, as powerfully and as wisely as possible''. (Thyssen 1983:263) 'Grundtvig saw in the legends of the conflict... a

⁵³⁸ The context is Grundtvig's agitation at the complacency and self-indulgence of Danes while faced with danger. Thyssen 1983:100 offers a quotation in translation:

*O rise up now, you wasted fallen race /To heaven from indulgence's foul couch/
Recall your birth as heroes of the NorthFor action, not for southern mawkish
lust.*

mighty allegory foreshadowing 'the great battle for eternity', the conflict between good and evil which gives meaning to the whole of history.' (Davies 1944:16) While no doubt Grundtvig found inherent qualities in the old Norse myths, it was for their capacity to rouse the people of his time to the ongoing struggle that they were to be learned.

Indeed, Tandrup (1980), in arguing for the artist role of the historian, asserts that 'In practice the historian must point his searchlight at the human being fighting for a better world... Whether the persons in this history are victorious or not isn't the matter because the audience will learn that in the battle for a better world the human being will gain her/his identity as human.' (Nielsen 1999:10)

To the extent to which myths are indeed rooted in more universal dimensions of human experience, they have value as stories for interaction. Though there may be different forms of a myth (or of the struggle which it exemplifies), there may be at the core a common analysis and vision. Where our own stories may distinguish and divide, the mythic story may bring together. As story, the meeting point holds fewer barriers than our conceptualisation, our principles and our practices. The extent to which many myths tap into the universal, draw

upon common and often shared material, affirm a common humanity, point beyond present realities of separation and disharmony to an ideal state, and invite the hearer to imagine a renewed order is not without relevance in the contemporary world of division, misunderstanding and conflict.

LIVOPLYSNING

The enlightenment of life

The contribution of story to learning is very closely related to our fundamental perceptions of and presumptions as to what education is and what ends it serves. This is discussed in earlier chapters, but it is perhaps helpful briefly to reiterate something of the essentials here before turning to the contribution of storytelling to life enlightenment.

Life enlightenment

*Therefore every man on this earth
Must strive to be a true person*

(Menneske først og Christen saa⁵³⁹)

Grundtvig's desire for education was that it would be concerned with nothing less than 'the wonderful riddle of life'. (Thyssen 1983:94) Education should be 'a school for life' (*skolen for livet*) dedicated to the 'clarification of the meaning of human life' (*menneskelivets forklaring*). (Bugge 1994:273)

The story of the significance of life had to be personal. As we have observed elsewhere, however, this was emphatically not a commitment to individualism. The awareness came from dialogue and interaction with others (*vekselvirkning*) and even from living in community with them (*fælleskab*).

Life enlightenment had, in Grundtvig's view to be informed by life experience, by the story of each of our lives. There was no substitute for discovery that was rooted in life itself. Life enlightenment could not be acquired indirectly or by detached study for 'dead is all knowledge which does not find response in the life of the reader.' (Grundtvig quoted in Manniche 1978:115) Such an understanding was taken up by the folk high school movement: 'The (folk high) school was in a way like a large narrative, in which

⁵³⁹ 'Man first and then Christian' Prose translation by Johannes Knudsen at Knudsen 1976:141

each individual had his part, and into which he was narrated.' (Eriksen 1989:73)

While Grundtvig believed that education could provide a space, framework and process, he himself not infrequently found enlightenment through less institutional and accidental processes⁵⁴⁰ and the educator should not ignore the capacity of life itself, what we call experience, the stories of our living, to be a resource for learning. Rather, there should be an interaction between the experiences within and without the 'classroom'.

Story as a way of contributing to knowledge of life

Only in more recent times has story been restored, at least in part and not without some continuing resistance, to having a significant role within the sphere of knowledge. Rather, it was 'assigned to the private domain, a modality of leisure, a discourse of the uneducated, an artefact of childhood...' (Jackson 202:101) It was a mode not thought worthy of the public sphere of intellectual discourse, confined to the recreational side of life, assumed to be the mode of those who were incapable of achieving and expressing themselves in more abstract forms and the preserve of the nursery. Barr (1993),

⁵⁴⁰ For example, falling in love in Langeland

citing Modjeska (1990:151) writes of the 'built in preference for systematic, rational thought, a preference which can lead to the dismissal of more conversational, story-telling modes.'

In the later part of the 20C, however, there has been challenge to the claims of exclusive rationalism. Mair (1987) argues that the empirical/ scientific is in fact an attempt to create a 'story to end all stories (or a story trying its hardest to pretend that it is not a story at all)'. The world is not self-interpreting: as Ian Barbour argues, we only 'see as'. (Barbour 1974) Reality is mediated by meaning.⁵⁴¹

Now, 'Metaphor, symbol, ritual, sign, and myth, long maligned by those interested only in 'exact' expressions of rationality, are today being rehabilitated.' (Bosch 1991:353) As Brueggemann argues, imagination (a fundamental aspect of story) has made an important return as 'a reliable mode of knowledge'. (Brueggemann 1997:32) Haarder is perhaps somewhat poetic but there is truth in his anticipation that 'Imagination and intellect will finally ride together in a gold wedding carriage' (Haarder 1983:83).

⁵⁴¹ 'Knowledge is not neutral but socially situated'. (Barr 1993:79) 'There is no such thing as a value-free, neutral, direct route to reality...' (McFague 1983:99) We are 'encumbered selves'. (Sandel 1982:179-83)

It is not then that narrative or story-led ways of knowing are an abandonment of rationality; they are neither irrational nor anti-rational. In particular, it is a recognition that imagination is not in opposition to our intellectual operation, nor distinct from it, nor an 'optional intellectual extra, peripheral to the main business of knowing, living and working...'. (Tomlinson 2001) A key locus for the exercise of that imaginative capacity is in the living out, constructing, reflecting upon, relating and sharing of story.

Story, imagination and life enlightenment

Storytelling and story-hearing are acts of imagination in which enlightenment concerning life is created and shared.

They shape disparate parts of experience into a narrative and endow that narrative with pattern and meaning. (D Smith 2001:1) Both as individuals and as communities, we seek to achieve some coherence to our existence, a coming-together-of-a-life (Ger. *Zusammenhang des Lebens*). (Kearney 2002:4) I would want to affirm a distinction between pattern and coherence on one side and order on the other. Story has indeed the capacity to tidy up the edges, but only at the cost of truth. 'For in telling stories we testify to the very diversity,

ambiguity, and interconnectedness of experiences that abstract thought seeks to reduce, tease apart, regulate and contain.' (Jackson 2002:253)

We seek to invest our life stories with meaning, not least as a defence against the anxiety that existence has no fundamental significance. (Cupitt 1991) 'It is through such (their own) stories that people seek to make sense of events, personal and social, to turn inchoate, senseless experiences into experiences infused with meaning and significance.' (Gabriel 2004:2)

Being is never some fixed or intrinsic attribute (Hage 1998:20) but rather always a 'becoming' (Jackson 2002:13). Narrative imagination, then, does not reveal essential meaning that is already in being, but rather creates fresh understanding through social interaction (Benhabib 1996:125-6) Story expresses but also shapes our understanding of ourselves and others. (Eslinger 1995:68-9)

Through the exchange of stories, people share perceptions of themselves and others and invite the hearers to interact with those perceptions.

Storytelling is revelatory. What we choose to tell⁵⁴², what we remember and select to tell, how

⁵⁴² I am reminded of the title of Alison Prince's biography of Hans Christian Andersen *The Fan Dancer*. She uses that image to

we tell are intimations of our self (personal or collective). Story can allow us to enter into the world of meaning of the other person or the other group. Observation is of the external dimensions, those which are directly open to us. Observation carries the shortcomings of a phenomenological approach. In offer a 'descriptive' account, it is likely either to be silent on the question of meaning (when meaning is perhaps what is most significant) and, if not silent, to depend heavily upon the intuitive and the subjective. Narrative can be an entry into at least the personal world of construction. '...Narrative can provide a particularly rich source of knowledge about the significance people find in their workaday lives. Such narratives often reveal more about what can make life worth living than about how it is routinely lived.' (Rosaldo 1986:98)

Stories are related from a standpoint. The narrator is always located, whether ostensibly within or outwith the story, and that position significantly influences the story. James Dunn, writing of New Testament interpretation, but I think with a wider relevance, argues:

'No one is surprised when Roman Catholic and Protestant exegetes come to different conclusions, for everyone knows that they have come to the text from different starting points.' This is precisely why

reflect the skill of Andersen in his stories to allow us to glimpse but never to see fully aspects of his character. (Prince 1998)

Rudolf Bultmann asked his famous question:
Is presuppositionless exegesis possible?
His answer is clear and obvious No!
Exegesis without presuppositions is an
impossibility. We *all*, whoever we are,
bring to the text our own 'pre-
understanding' - [...] not just of what its
words mean but also of what we expect it
to say... what we see in a text is limited
by the horizon of our own understanding;
when we read the text we see only what
lies within the horizon which bounds our
understanding; we can 'cash' the language
of the text only in the currency of our
linguistic heritage and world.' (Dunn
1987:6-7)

As Dunn goes on to suggest, however, it is
through processes of 'dialogue' we can escape
going round in a 'hermeneutical circle' for we
can correct, alter and expand our horizons and
refocus our understanding. Indeed, the story is
itself not passive, the interaction not one-way;
it too may ask its questions of our
understandings. (Dunn 1987:8-9)

'Instead of a spectator's standpoint⁵⁴³, that
seeks conclusions after an action has taken
place, the storyteller's point of view remains
within the world, moving from one particular
place or person to another, and resisting all
claims to ultimate Truth by reminding us that
truth is relative to where we situate ourselves,
to where we stand.' (Arendt 1965:52)

Stories draw people into connection with one
another through imagination's 'active combining

⁵⁴³ the position of supposed objectivity

power'. (Warnock 1976:84) As we share story, we become engaged in a common and collaborative engagement.

They enable bridges of empathy to be constructed as we are able to imagine the stories they tell us, to identify the sharedness with our own stories and to imagine ourselves within their story. They restore 'our ability to see ourselves and each other as characters in connected narratives' (D Smith 2001:3) It would be naïve to imagine that understanding is created merely by overcoming our phenomenological ignorance of others, particularly of those who seem to us unlike us. We may be fed or may choose stories that are negative and divisive and even evil. We may construe the story in ways that lead to division and enmity. As Loughlin argues (citing Cupitt 1991), 'Stories produce desire. They manipulate and channel our emotions, directing them towards objects we might otherwise find unexciting. Stories produce reality, establishing certain orders and relations between things and people and other people. They establish the significance of age and gender, of skin colour, class and accent: of all things that matter and **that could be otherwise, if told in a different story.**⁵⁴⁴' (Loughlin 1996:15) If we listen, and particularly if we

⁵⁴⁴ my emphasis

listen with empathetic minds, to the stories of others as they tell them to us, then we have better the possibility of positive interaction and fuller community.

Storytelling brings our thoughts into public space, not only for others but for ourselves 'the passions of the heart, the thoughts of the mind, the delights of the senses (which otherwise dwell in) an uncertain, shadowy kind of existence unless and until they are transformed, deprivatized and deindividualised'. (Arendt 1958:50)⁵⁴⁵

Story invites conversation. There is something within storytelling that does not bring the speaking to a halt but rather calls the parties into *vekselvirkning*, interaction with the story and with one another.

Story is evocative of story. Hearing story sparks imagination, draws out parallel or extending or contrary story, motivates us to share in the storytelling process. We do not always interact with one another as a matter of course. There has to be some predisposing factor that motivates us to engagement. For many, the inherent enjoyment in telling and hearing story can be that encouragement.

⁵⁴⁵ Arendt was not unaware that this process of transfer out of the private into the public realms could be costly, not least when the personal experience is appropriated and exploited by others. (Finkelstein 2000)

Story then releases us from isolation. As we share story, we can come to recognise that we are not alone in our story; we do not belong together only with those who have seemed to inhabit the same story as ourselves; others have stories that are similar; some have stories that illuminate in some way our story; some may have story that embraces our story within a larger one.

Oppression often works through isolating its victims and fragmenting their community⁵⁴⁶. As we learn to depersonalize our story, we can see and set our story within a wider story of repression and struggle.

Story is heuristic. It draws us into a process of creating something new. It is a means by which we focus on problems and issues. In the making and telling of some forms of story, of a more fictive nature, there is a setting-aside of, or at least permission to set-aside, the rules of 'reality'; they enable us to access possibilities that are beyond our experience. In such story, our imaginations are not constrained by the normal 'rules' of conformity to 'reality'. 'In fantasy, as it were, the

⁵⁴⁶ I construe, for example, the former statutory provisions against the 'the promotion of homosexuality' as in part at least a discouragement of material that would encourage gay people to see themselves as part of a valid community with its own story and an exclusion of that story from the public stories of civic life.

guards are down, the censors gone on holiday, and all kinds of suppressed and silenced material can find its way into language.. The imaginary liberates the prisoners of our lived experience into possible worlds where they may roam and express themselves, articulating things that generally dare not say their names and giving to our inexperienced experience the chance to be experienced at last.' (Kearney 2002:24f)

In revisiting a narrative, there is potential for us to look at the story differently. 'The voyage of discovery lies not in finding new landscapes, but in having new eyes.' (Marcel Proust, quoted in Gherardi 2004:45) As we bring different stories of our own into interaction with one another, as we listen to the stories of others and allow them to interact with our own, the story is changed or at least our hearing of the story may be changed. Not least is this true in the context of understanding ourselves: 'the experience of self exists in the ongoing interchange with others... the self continually creates itself through narratives that include other people who are reciprocally woven into these narratives'. (Weingarten 1991:289)

Stories are anticipatory - we look beyond the past and present into the future by producing scenarios of anticipation (Loughlin 1996:65), by framing stories of how things might be (of which

there may of course be a range of alternative versions). (Crites 1989:77) 'We are always moving toward which is not yet known' (Anderson and Gollishan 1990:159), but we seek in that 'not yet known' the possibilities for a future which is not merely gifted to us but shaped by us. Mair (1987), recalling George Kelly's theory⁵⁴⁷ that 'a person's processes are psychologically channelised by the way in which he anticipates events', reminds us of the essentially anticipatory nature of human life. Insofar as we are continually engaged in the 'writing' of our story, in a life journey, it is an exploratory process of continual 'improvising, retelling, embroidering, making it up as we go along'. (Loughlin 1996:15)

Stories have transformative potential. They have capacity to help us together to see ourselves and the world differently, both as we understand it to be and as how we desire it to be. 'In our stories, we extend ourselves towards becoming other than we are; we learn to experiment with possible futures as well as gain perspective on where we have been.' Doty 1975:94 There is a *vekselvirkning* between experience and story. 'Our collective life experiences are interpreted through a personal narrative framework and shaped into a master story that,

⁵⁴⁷ the 'fundamental postulate' in personal construct psychology [Kelly 1970]

in turn, influences subsequent interpretations.'
(Anderson and Foley 1998:9)

Some of the problems with story

Though I assert the view that story has validity and worth as a means of producing, expressing and sharing knowledge, it is clear nonetheless that it is not unproblematical.⁵⁴⁸ I note some of these reservations as caveats that we have to bear in our minds in turning to story as an ingredient in learning about ourselves, personally and in community.

We must be careful not accord them an undeserved and exaggerated authority. There is a danger of treating personal experience as a peculiarly authentic form of knowledge. This is not to deny the importance of narratives emerging, particularly from marginalised groups, as they have not infrequently been silenced or mediated primarily through the voices of outside advocates or have been not **their** story but a story **about** them⁵⁴⁹. The risk, however, is that the appeal to personal experience becomes an absolute one, where only the teller's perspective is valid and where 'it cannot be gainsaid'.⁵⁵⁰ (Eagleton 1996:67))

⁵⁴⁸ To affirm that is not, however, to suggest that other forms of knowledge are somehow problem-free.

⁵⁴⁹ I consider the question of suppressed and silenced stories further in the section in this chapter on 'Folkelighed and folkeoplysning'.

⁵⁵⁰ Gabriel sets out the argument more fully:

'A result of this has been an argument, implicit or explicit, that *only* he or she who has lived through a certain experience can speak authoritatively about it - thus, only black people can speak authoritatively about race, only women about gender minoritization, only gay people about secular marginalization,

This said, there is also a skepticism of stories from the 'edge', rooted in a suggestion that such stories are somehow **more** tinged with subjectivity, special pleading and political partiality than those which are traditionally more readily received and imagined to be authoritative.

This form of particularity has potentially undermining consequences for interaction and dialogue. If that position were to be sustained, then we shall first of all have to conclude that only those with a defined experience (and even then there would be issues of defining the shared identity, determining its boundaries and criteria and assessing the degree of homogeneity) have legitimate participation within the narrative-making. Secondly, there would be grounds for questioning the right and ability of those outside the defined circle to bring meaningful interpretation to the story. Against such a proposition comes the idea of 'narrative imagination', 'an essential preparation for moral interaction'. (Nussbaum 1997:90) Through capacity for empathy, for imagination and for compassion, the other is

and only black women about the combined effects of racism and sexism. In this way, in a generally contested environment where most fragments of discourse are criticized, undermined, and subverted, stories of personal experience offer a shelter from criticism, an oasis of trust, an island of tranquility, where a person can speak with uncontested authority and expect, if not being respected, at the very least being believed.' (2004:23)

able to embrace the unfamiliar in the experience of the one narrating their story.

Perhaps most fundamentally, this exclusive particularity undermines the notion that, despite our differences and our uniqueness, there is nonetheless a universality in human experience that allows us to be part of the same story and to connect to one another's stories. Watson distinguishes the proposition that we 'experience the same reality differently' from the belief that 'we are so locked into our separate narrative worlds that we experience different realities'. Only insofar as 'our common humanity give us as basis for a dialogue in which we might attain a consensus...' is there meaningful potential for *vekselvirkning*, for interaction. (Watson 1994:151)

Stories are accounts. 'A tale or anecdote, that is, a replaying, is not merely any reporting of a past event.' (Goffman 1974:504) 'There is... the experience and a discourse about it. For experiences must be put forward ... in discourse, and quite apart from providing the possibility of lying, discourse is also a translation ... of experiences. Putting an experience into words is an inevitable alteration of that experience.' (Tonkins 1992:41)

Stories are **partial** accounts - they involve drawing selectively on the past and on the

present which is in the process of becoming the past⁵⁵¹. New stories are rarely as new as we imagine. 'We make our stories out of the rubble of old narratives we find lying about.'

(Loughlin 1996:9)

Readily, we form and repeat those stories which are dear to us, which belong to those elements of community which we most strongly inhabit, which reflect our own cultural preferences, and which appear best to serve our purposes to the exclusion of other stories.⁵⁵² Stories are 'tribal'. We are predisposed to certain narratives because they emanate from or reflect the norms of our community⁵⁵³. (Mair 1987)

⁵⁵¹ AD Smith's work on nationalism and particularly on ethno-symbolism draws our attention to the process by which national myths are formed and utilised and in which nationalists do not create myths *ex nihilo* but rather out of historical and cultural material that is already available to them ('usable pasts', he calls themj). (AD Smith 1997:37) Similarly, it seems to me we create our own stories, our own identity, not in a vacuum but through a process of selective building up of personal myth from a stock of earlier stories. There is a reciprocal interaction between past and present, for the past influences our present view but our reading of the past is also influenced by our contemporary modes and preferences.

⁵⁵² Barr, for example, writing of professional colleagues, comments: 'colleagues -otherwise kind, thoughtful and insightful men- fail to see the gendering of their own favourite stories about adult education's past and present: a boys' own tale of brotherhood and heroes which through repetition... shuts out the possibility of other more complicated (and collective) stories'. (Barr 1999:159)

⁵⁵³ Mair refers to the tribal communities of the psychology profession, each with their own stories and preferred narratives. Bruggemann (1982:10-11) observes this in another setting that 'educators in the community of faith - by personal inclination and conviction, by church tradition, by social setting, and for various other reasons - are drawn toward one part of the canon or another to the relative neglect of the others.' He points not only to our bias in selection but also to how we differently deploy the stories concerned.

Similarly, what people see (and hear) is, in part at least, the result of what they have been taught to see and hear. (Hope Nicolson 1959)

Stories are constructs. (Barr 1999:79) They are not neutral; they are a perspective on the world and they are lens through which we view the world. We do not tell our stories from nowhere; we offer them from where we stand. (Volf 1996:207) 'One thing we can be sure of is that there can be no uniquely true story, nor any uniquely right interpretation.' (Barr 1999:80, citing Code 1989) 'There is no single, definitive way of articulating our experience, and the way we tell our stories is constrained by the symbols and concepts available to us in our particular cultural context. The language that we use when narrating our experience thus highlights certain aspects of that experience, but also casts a shadow in which other aspects are hidden or obscured.' (Lynch and Willows 1998:15) They are shaped by the context in which they are told. 'It is important to attend to cultural and contextual stories as well as to individual people's stories.' (Freedman and Combs 1996:22)

Though some stories may reveal, they may also, consciously or otherwise, deliberately or otherwise, be a means of concealment. That deception may be of ourselves no less than others. (Anderson and Foley 1998:9) It may

serve that element in our life that is
'illusory, self-protective, self-justifying'.
(Jackson 2002:15)

Stories can erect fences as well as build bridges. If we live within the confines of our own narrative(s), then we close off the possibility that our story may engage with new areas of story. New story may helpfully challenge our existing story but this might be (and should not unconsciously be) at the cost of renouncing our story's legitimate criticism of the alternative story, its assumptions and its consequences or of requiring us to inhabit two separate and contradictory ⁵⁵⁴ worlds concurrently.

⁵⁵⁴ I use the terms 'contradictory' and 'concurrently' to refer to situations in which people appear to maintain stories that may be regarded as incompatible with each other simultaneously. I have in mind as an example a religious scientist who subscribes to values of scientific evidence and yet adopts a literalist view of Biblical stories and so treats them as scientific truths despite the contrary scientific evidence. I recognise however the legitimacy of holding two distinct world views in tension with one another. Paul Ricoeur, writing of his drawing upon both philosophical and religious approaches: 'It seems to me that as far back as I go in the past, I have always walked upon two legs. It is not only for methodological reasons that I do not mix genres, it is because I insist on affirming a twofold reference that is absolutely primary for me.' Ricoeur (1998:139) It is that mixing of genres that perhaps opens the way to misunderstanding. The two genres and their applications may properly speak to one another, be in valid interaction with one another.

FOLKELIGHED and FOLKEOPLYSNING

Story in the making of community

'Creating our future, minding our past'

(The Scottish Executive⁵⁵⁵)

'Historical communities are constituted by the stories they recount to themselves and to others' (Kearney 2002:79)

Minding⁵⁵⁶ our past

'Two blazing torches: the Word of the Lord and the testimony of the past'.

Nyaarsaften⁵⁵⁷

'For that is the mark of the Scot of all classes: that he stands in an attitude towards the past unthinkable to Englishmen, and remembers and cherishes the memory of his forebears, good and bad; and there burns alive in him a sense of identity with the dead even to the twentieth generation.'

(RL Stevenson: *Weir of Hermiston*)

'Nations cannot survive without cultural history... the nation cannot afford to get rid of its past and neglect its origins.' (Gutiérrez 2001:7,10) There is something natural or at least common about a nation contemplating its past. Even with no other motive than curiosity,

⁵⁵⁵ The quotation is the title of Scotland's National Cultural Strategy 2003

⁵⁵⁶ The Scots expression 'to mind' meaning 'to remember' mirrors the Danish *at minde*

⁵⁵⁷ PS I 265-6 (Poetiske Skrifter -Poetic Writings) ed Svend Grundtvig 1880ff) The quotation is from the Preface.

we seek to know the story of past, collective and personal. As ethno-culturalists argue, however, the past is a repository of resources upon which we draw in order to develop myths and meaning. (AD Smith 1999) The past is not only in history (with a backward looking emphasis) but an ideal for the present and an aspiration for the future. (Levy, Mortensen and Nielsen 1994:117) As we identify with the participants in the story (on the basis of our fictive kinship with them), the story becomes a part of the lives of those who hear it and appropriate it. (Beveridge and Turnbull 1989:15-16) The danger rather lies in the possibility that the people forgets that it is a narrative creation and reifies itself. The fact of the narrativity and social construction of our identity can serve to make it 'more difficult to make the mistake of taking oneself *literally*, of assuming that one's inherited identity *goes without saying*.' (Kearney 2002:81) That we have remembered ourselves in a particular way implies that we might also remember ourselves differently. How we choose our stories and how we choose to construe our stories is not a given but open to contest and challenge.

Appropriation however does not exclude the possibility of a critical, and even a repenting, remembering. It does involve a facing up to

the past including 'repugnant legacies'⁵⁵⁸, an acceptance of the past as **our** past, an acknowledgement of error or at least of lessons for reformation. 'Memory in this sense may become a manner of recalling misguided ventures and critically taking leave of less desirable aspects of the past as well as of attempting to honor other aspects or make them the bases of constructive action in the present and future.'⁵⁵⁹ (LaCapra 1998:185; cf Scruton 1999)

History and story

'Why should we decide to use the term 'myth' and not 'history' in describing a particular piece of discourse?' (Overing 1997:1) If it is true that education has a tendency to privilege 'history' over other forms of story of the past, what is the basis for this?

Grundtvig spanned the different elements for he was at the same time a historiographer, a philosopher of history, an historical storyteller, a populariser of historical narrative and a cultural activist using history for educative, political and social purpose.

⁵⁵⁸ Laborde (2001)

⁵⁵⁹ Some nations, through such processes as truth and reconciliation commissions, endeavour (however imperfectly) to confront their pasts. Habermas (1989:262) notes the controversy in German historical studies over the response of German scholarship to the era of World War II.

History people and story people do have elements in common. 'Historians are like storytellers inasmuch as they hand on and construct narratives.' (D Smith 2001:17; see also White 1978) It would be naïve to imagine that there is a firm line of distinction between storytellers and historians around their attachment or otherwise to historical accuracy⁵⁶⁰, though historians and other storymakers do have different emphases.

There can be a tendency to be dismissive or marginalizing of the role of folk myths and memories⁵⁶¹ where formal education has privileged the teaching of 'history'. Yet they linger deep within the consciousness of a people, nurtured for good or ill, well or badly, by storytelling, by literature, by film and by the heritage industry. They continue on even in less conscious forms, often waiting to be resurrected and made contemporary by nationalists. (Gutiérrez 2001:30)

Story does not rely upon the empirical veracity of the account. Story perhaps most requires to be good story; in other words, to be a narrative that we are interested in telling/hearing and

⁵⁶⁰ Historical accuracy might be defined as 'the extent to which a narrative is or is not based upon objectively determinable facts'. (Littleton 1965:21)

⁵⁶¹ Though there is some scholarly disdain for such culture and its icons, McCrone comments from his research that 'there was precious little evidence to support a view that (they) were held in low esteem, that people saw them as tainted in some way.' (McCrone 2001:147)

enjoy telling/hearing. 'The historian must share the novelist's ability to make a story followable, plausible and acceptable'. (Watson 1997:59)

Yet, we have other expectations too. A story is unlikely to linger on in the community's memory and repertoire if does not embody some form of truth, but 'truth' in the story may lie not so much in its accurate description of facts but in its meaning.⁵⁶² (Reason and Hawkins 1988)

Overing points out that over centuries there have been 'similar'⁵⁶³ arguments over the potency of the participatory versus the disengaged, the absurd versus the logical, the affective versus the intellectual, the contextual versus the universal, are continuing today. One reason for this is that it becomes difficult to reconcile our own great thirst for *the really real* with the fact that most of our existence is expressed through '*the really made up*'. (1997:3)

Both historian and storyteller operate selectively. 'We cannot tell a story without eliminating or dropping some important event according to the plot we intend to build'. (Ricoeur 1999:8-9) History is not self-writing. 'Historical situations do not have built into

⁵⁶² Grundtvig's view was that truth was not a matter of verifiability. *Danne-Virke* II.280

⁵⁶³ to those in ancient Greece

them intrinsic meanings...' (White 1978:85)

'Historians do not 'find' the truths of past events; they create events from a seamless flow, and invent meanings that produce patterns within that flow'. (Kellner 1989:24) 'The process of interpretation is not necessarily conscious, but interpretations there must be.' (Tonkin 1992:51, drawing on Hirsch 1967) Indeed, even the scholar is not free of the problem of finding in their research something of what they thought they would find. It is one of the tasks of historians to make sense of the fragmented, yet 'There is no a more dangerous tendency in history than that of representing the past as if it were a rational whole...'. (Mali 1992:210, quoting Johan Huizinga (1924) As narrators, we engage with our subject. In some measure, we inhabit our subject. To use an anthropological expression, we are (even in relation to the distant past) a 'participant observer'. (Bloch 1954) We cannot remain outside the story, we become part of it.

Historical narratives, however, generally purport to be based on diligent scrutiny of documentary and other forms of evidence. (D Smith 2001:17) The public's trust, as well as the historian's scholarly credibility, depend upon it. (Erslev 1911) This is their strength, but it is also their limitation. 'The past is their tyrant. It forbids them to know anything

which has not itself, consciously or otherwise, yielded to them.' (Bloch 1954:59)

Historians are not merely technicians, digging out of the archeological or historical record what has been hidden. They shape, give mean to and fashion into narrative what they have discovered. 'Considered as accounts of events already established as facts, 'competing narratives'⁵⁶⁴ can be assessed, criticized, and ranked on the basis of their fidelity to the factual record, their comprehensiveness, and the coherence of whatever arguments they contain. But narrative accounts do not consist only of factual statements (singular existential propositions) and arguments; they consist as well of poetic and rhetorical elements by which what would otherwise be a list of facts is transformed into a story.' (White 1992:38)

Story gives pattern and pattern meaning. 'To the Grundtvigian teacher, history is not a meaningless mass of details but a living continuity. He perceives in history the cares of Mankind, the strife and struggles, failures and conquests'. (Manniche 1926:161) Donald Smith suggests that 'This overarching dimension of the historian's art (to create an overall master narrative) is more akin to the embracing vision of an epic poet than a teller of tales,

⁵⁶⁴ 'Nations do not typically have a single history, but there are competing tales to be told.' [Billig 1995:71]

and reveals a dominant bias or mode of interpretation... which is not so readily seen in the writer's detailed treatment of each era or period.' (2001:17)

The output of the historian or the teacher of history has not always enabled us to take a coherent and critically informed look at our national history.

Not only was our history largely suppressed but those parts of it which were acknowledged were often taught in such a way that they seemed to appear suddenly out of nowhere. A sense of continuity was difficult to grasp. This was the pop-up picture school of history... Moments of history isolated in this way from the qualifying details of context can be made to mean whatever we want them to mean. Our relationship to them remains impulsive and emotional rather than rational, since there is little for rationality to feed on... It's like looking in a massively cracked mirror. We identify our Scottishness in wilful fragments.

(McIlvaney 1999, quoted in McCrone 2001:128)

Critical history is focused on the past and the accuracy of our narration of it. Of Thomas Jefferson as an autobiographer, Cox claims, 'The present from which he writes is not so much a point from which to renew the past as it is point of vantage from which to stabilize it, to reinforce it as the fixed source and foundation of the present'. (Cox 1980; quoted in Tonkin 1992:57) Whereas, speculative history has a future-orientation, utilising the patterns and lessons of the past to lend a perspective to the

consideration of the future of humanity.
(Gardiner 1995:364)

The situation of history, shared between the academy and the public arena (including the world of entertainment)⁵⁶⁵ reflects a wider interest in matters historical⁵⁶⁶ than only within its own scholarly and professional circles. This dual orientation possibility is reflected a tension in terms of focus, methodology and language. On one hand, we have a concentration on the scientific method of investigation and scholarly language of reporting, aimed at a specialist, informed audience; on the other, a focus on public accessibility, concern for socially relevant research, a desire to contribute to wider understandings and a commitment to write intelligibly for a wider forum. (Nielsen 1999:1-2) Nielsen acknowledges that this recognition of a tension may be turned into a false polarity. 'It isn't so that history in the first case is understood without any public function, but this is more indirectly and not at the fore of academic activity. On the other hand, it isn't so that history in the second case is understood without any scientific bonds at all, but these are more perceived as an ethic

⁵⁶⁵ In referring to the public arena, I acknowledge that this embraces a range of media and genres

⁵⁶⁶ I have used the term 'history' for the whole spectrum of activity, but am conscious that at times some forms are distinguished by such devices as a qualifier, so 'popular history' or allocation to another category, eg 'heritage'.

and moral obligation than a scientific *a priori*, which can't be altered or discussed.' (1999:3)

Narratives of nation-building are generally not so much concerned with historical accuracy, for their goal is somewhat different from either chronicling or analysis. Nationalism is interested in finding 'the story within history'. (Zulaika 1992:10) This of course generally means what is 'usable' within history. It may involve even what Ernest Renan called 'getting history wrong'. (AD Smith 2001:222) Nielsen (1999) attributes the same viewpoint to popular historians in Denmark: 'They surely still believe in the vitality of the imagined community... They want to remind Danes about their national and cultural heritage. It doesn't matter whether the heritage is said to be invented or genuine as long as the heritage is meaningful and significant for the imagined community they address.' (1999:9)

It is the capacity of story to speak to our imaginations that is one of its more forceful dimensions, for it is only through imagination that we can build connections with what is otherwise remote.

'At a Viking fair in the orchard of a farmhouse near in the inland town of Åkirkeby⁵⁶⁷, the smell of grilling beef and charcoal smoke wafts between the apple trees. A blacksmith pounding on

⁵⁶⁷ Åkirkeby is on the Danish island of Bornholm

the blade of the battleaxe says, 'Northumberland?' when we tell him where in England we are from. I mention Lindisfarne and his eyes light up, 'Yes, I know it. We raided it in 793AD.' After delivering a few more powerful blows to the glowing axe head, he adds that 'I have never been there myself'.' (Pearson 2006:87)

Tandrup (1980) from within the university history sector nonetheless has argued for a more committed and holistic view of history, criticising academic historians as 'not interested in using history as a means to change the present or to develop themselves as humans and as fellows'. (Tandrup 1980 quoted in Nielsen 1999:10)

Some historians have been critical of what they regard as a trend to match history to a political or social agenda. Michael Fry, author of a controversial history of the Highland clearances (Fry 2006) has argued that history in schools is now little more than an (ill-conceived) attempt 'to inculcate a sense of fellowship with people who lived in the past' (Education Guardian Weekly 2006) History is rarely simply a matter of factual and analytical material, it is often overlaid with affective elements which 'far from being mere embellishments for the sake of entertainment or formal elegance have a specific function as the agents by which the power of the experience is transmitted.' (Rothstein 1986:371)

Writing of the period of Romanticism, Allen comments that 'History came into its own again and men showed

a capacity to enter sympathetically into the life of past generations...' (1949:14) 'The historian tries to re-experience what was once experienced by men like ourselves....The true study of history involves our imagination and conjures up conceptions, pictures, visions.' (Huizinga 1968) This view echoes the 'living word' perspective of Grundtvig. We turn to the past not to turn over the dead but discerning what was alive in the experience of those who have lived and thought before us and can live for us.

Myths of how we became who and what we are

In this context, I use the term 'myth' to refer to narratives which 'bring together in a single potent vision elements of historical fact and legendary elaboration to create an overriding commitment and bond for the community'. (AD Smith 1999:57)

'Myth is one of the ways in which collectivities - in this context, more especially nations - establish and determine the foundations of their own being, their own systems of morality and values. In this sense, therefore, myth is a set of beliefs, usually put forth in narrative, held by a community about itself.' (Schöpflin 1997:19)

The range of myths is considerable and some sense of this may be seen from the following taxonomies:

Schöpflin 1997: Territory, Redemption and
Suffering, Unjust treatment, Election and
Mission, Valour, Rebirth and renewal,
Foundation, Ethnogenesis and antiquity, Kinship
and shared descent
AD Smith 1999: Temporal origins, Location and
Migration, Ancestry, Heroic Age, Decline,
Regeneration.

While it may be assumed sometimes in the popular
imagination that the myths of heroic past are to
the fore, nonetheless 'Nations remember
admirable and awesome experience, but they also
recall moments of humiliation and suffering.'
(Guibernau 2004:137) Such 'times' of misfortune
are employed for a range of purposes. The
defeat and suffering may be proposed as a period
from which the people had been able, often
through solidarity and strength of character, to
restore their fortunes. The external defeat was
to become moral strength.⁵⁶⁸ (Hedetoft 1995:212-
3) It may be suggested that there is moral
judgement, possible divine judgement, in the
misfortune (the prophetic perspective. (Aberbach
2003)

The nature of the myth is not to invite the
'hearer' into an analytical or reflective mode;
rather it is concerned with evoking a re-action

⁵⁶⁸ This perspective is reflected in one of the significances of
the then Danish expression from Grundtvig's time concerning
territorial loss: 'Hvad udadtil er tabt skal indadtil vindes' -
outer loss shall be inner gain. (Østergaard 1992:40)

in which the recipient is drawn into the group and its understanding of itself and others. And the 'members of the community may be aware that the myth they accept is not strictly accurate⁵⁶⁹, but, because the myth is not history, this does not matter. It is the content of the myth that is important, not its accuracy as a historical account.' Schöpflin 1997:19-20 Giradet argues that 'myths, as explanatory stories, are also a mobilizing force', but it really true that they are heard and understood in the former sense? Do we really look to such myths as **explanations** of how we are the way we have come to be?

It is sometimes assumed that the modern-ness of myths, their inventedness and even their fallacious dimensions are perpetrated as a fraud on the populace; this somewhat underestimates the extent to which people may already be aware of the issues. They are conscious that society's relationship with myth is not 'built on truth but on use'. (Barthes 1957:144)

'In order to appeal even to some of the population that the élites wish to mobilize, they had to select elements that possessed some meaning and significance ('resonance') for that particular population.' (AD Smith 2003:362)

⁵⁶⁹ It is not in fact even necessary that the myth be originally their own, as in the Danish case of *Holger Danske*, which comes from French mediaeval literature.

'Myths and legends... could not be sustained if they had no connection whatsoever with what people recognised as reality ...unless they connect with the realities of life'. (McCrone 2001:92,95) So, for example, Haesley concludes that 'All types of Scottish identity are proud of Scotland and to be Scottish, but they believe there are good, tangible, uncontested reasons (or myths) for their pride'.⁵⁷⁰ (2005:258)

Hearers are not generally unaware of the role of poetic licence in storytelling, 'a vital feature is the storyteller's unique voice; it forms part of a *psychological* contract between the storyteller and his or her audience, which allows a storyteller to twist the material for effect, to exaggerate, to omit, to draw connections where none are apparent, to silence events that interfere with the storyline, to embellish, to elaborate, to display emotion, to comment, to interpret, even as he or she claimed to be representing reality.' (Gabriel 2004:19) The use of familiar introductory phrases may signal to the audience the nature of the story: so 'Once upon a time' is in fact a signalling

⁵⁷⁰ The interview with the Scots woman reported in chapter 8 is an example of this. Her sense of national pride is in her view based upon a rational, historical experience (the work of factory 'girls' in munitions factories during the Second World War). For her, this makes her identity soundly based. There is however nothing to assure her or her hearer that the story is (other than in her experience and for these purposes) typical or that her account is a fair one. She draws on a single set of experiences, but is she proposing them as consistent with her experience as a whole? Clearly, she is making a choice of recollection.

that the story is outside of real chronology. Fabrication is not in itself a falsehood in storytelling, some are benign, others exploitative. (Goffman 1974:87,103) No such contract can exist however where the teller is acting fraudulently with intent to deceive. (Gabriel 2004:23)

The audiences for nationalist narratives are active too as interpreters of the stories, construing these messages in idiosyncratic ways. The multivocalic nature of nation means that commonality of meaning is not necessary, however. The myth may mean different things to different people, yet, at the same time, lend a sense of unified identity. (Cohen 1996) This is more broadly true of national identity. Different members of a community may believe and be held by others to belong to the community, to be part of its story, but they may belong to that story in different ways, by different criteria. It is their participation in the story and the story itself that binds the community together.

To acknowledge how nationalists use and therefore sometimes misuse and abuse myths of national identity does not however wholly eliminate their potential as educational tools in the legitimate task of creating community within a nation. Writing of the context of the relationship between folklore and Basque nationalism, Zulaika observes

concerning a storyteller to children: 'she was skilfully articulating for us in the form of *kontuak* (stories) the mythical imagination of former generations... stories (that) transcend the distinction between the real and imaginary.' (Zulaika 1988:4-5) They transcend also the space between the past, present and future. As we hear and absorb these stories of national myth, we learn to 'remember forward', to link the past with the present and the future, to inhabit a cultural system that we not only inherit but make our own and live in. (White 1984:13-14)

Amongst the most common of 'national myths' are the myths of the Heroic Age, of Decay and of Restoration⁵⁷¹. 'For Grundtvig... the ancient sagas of his native land were as a mirror in which the essential qualities of the Danish people could be observed. They belonged to their unspoilt childhood, before they were contaminated by alien and injurious influences, to those spacious days when life was lived in freedom, a heroism and a faith which put to shame the weakness of our degenerate days.' (Allen 1949:40)

A key role for myths of nationhood, perhaps particularly those of heroic or golden ages, is their inspirational qualities. (AD Smith 19979:56) They have qualities that engage us and enable us to envisage a future that is

⁵⁷¹ In a Welsh context, Jones writes of 'A view of history was cherished, the story of a people with a glorious past who had fallen on bad days and waited hopefully for a deliverer.' (Jones 1993:30)

different from the present. Paradoxically, this requires us to believe that it is not only our future but a rediscovery of and a recapturing of our past. Of Grundtvig himself, it has been said, 'When he now buried himself in reminiscences of the great past of his people, it was not to look despondently on the miserable present, but in order to get a happy invigoration for contemporary life.' (Manniche 1978:111)

'It is not even true to say that nationalists as *such* wanted to return to the past⁵⁷². Perhaps a few did, but for most of them it was a question of the past serving as a model and an inspiration for national revival in which they were active.' (AD Smith 2003:366) They must be capable however of being in some way reinterpreted as a model for the future. (AD Smith 1997:57-8) As Roesdahl observes in the context of Denmark, "the past was not only to be explored, but also utilized and the Vikings were to prove particularly serviceable". (Roesdahl 1994:165)

Myth and history have an important part to play in affirming for the people of a nation a sense

⁵⁷² Though nationalists and others refer often to the idea of a 'golden age', what AD Smith calls the myths of Heroic Age or *How We Were Freed and Became Glorious*, of Decline or *How We Fell into a State of Decay* and of Regeneration or *How to Restore the Golden Age and Renew Our Community as 'in the Days of Old'* (AD Smith 1999: 65-67), it is questionable how many nationalist or others who identify a past age as 'golden' actually are suggesting that the nation should or would benefit from a return to the past.

of 'belief in themselves'. (Withers 2000:37)
Retention or recovery of a sense of continuing worth, even despite misfortune (particularly where this misfortune can be attributed to some moral character or where that character can still be discerned despite the misfortune).

There are 'myths' however, commonly in the form of sayings and beliefs, that are not affirming. Carol Craig has in recent years set out what she argues are negative and destructive 'myths' that Scots hold about themselves and which inhibit their healthy functioning. (Craig 2003) There is a danger that these myths become self-reinforcing. As we believe them about ourselves, we behave in accordance with them. It is a self-imposed stereotyping. 'The Romantic image of the Highlands became indelibly stamped on the wider cultural imagination and the temptation ever since has been for Scots - including Highland Scots - to play to the stereotype rather than the reality.' (D Smith 2001:48-9)

At other times, the myth becomes a proxy for performance. McCrone (2001) suggests that Scottish⁵⁷³ myths of egalitarianism⁵⁷⁴ are deeply

⁵⁷³ Other nations have their own egalitarian myths, eg Pessen (1971) on American myths and reality.

⁵⁷⁴ For example, the assertion that we are 'all Jock Tamson's bairns', ie of equal social standing, or the myth that (in the days of scarce university places) youngsters from villages ('the lad o'pairts) across the land became undergraduates, simply on

engrained in our psyche but they consequently persuade us that they are representations of how things actually are. We do not therefore have to attend to the lack of equality in society. They become a substitute for proper analysis and reflection.

Though some myths or other stories will be dominant, it is rarely true that they are the only myths in circulation. Control is never total. There will be alternative and conflicting stories, particularly in times of political and cultural tension.⁵⁷⁵

Nor should we underestimate the capacity of publics to engage critically with stories and contest their meanings. Stories are not routinely learnt; they can also be an invitation to engagement and dialogue where alternative readings are heard and explored.

Nor should we exaggerate the extent to which people interact with myths about themselves with sober seriousness. '(Muriel Gray) was producing and emceeing a short-lived, half-serious, half-satirical game show on Scottish Television called *The Golden Cagoule*... On the show, celebrity guests would compete to answer questions pertaining to Scotland's culture,

merit. [McCrone notes also the apparent absence of lasses o'pairs.]

⁵⁷⁵ For instance, the concurrent promotion of 'Spanish' and 'Catalan' myths

history and natural environment - the winner mounting a platform at the back of the set to don the golden cagoule and be little drizzled upon from a shower nozzle.' (Hearn 2000:83)

At the outset of this section, I noted Gutiérrez's observation that nations have need of story. I have argued that nations do use story for purposes of creating and affirming identity, of dealing with the difficult past and of shaping the future. It is also true however that society can become forgetful of its story. It can become disconnected from its past and lose any sense of continuity, any feeling of rootedness. It can fail to honour its past.

Sipho took up the story-telling thread from Rosandra. It was a good thread, he said, but maybe he could bring it down to earth. He told a story of his grandmother, an upstanding fierce old woman who was a devout Catholic and yet went about the amulets of her ancestors' faith sewn into the hems of her church dresses. This woman, Lindiswe Frances Nyembe, lived in a township close to the place where the old Indian prophet, the man who believed in justice and peace, what was his name, Gandhi, once set up a communal centre.

She used to tell the children in that area - there were many children, many houses in all directions - about this old prophet. She would tell them that his spirit still lived there in that place and they should honour it. But as the years went by the pressure on that land grew very great. There were so many people, so little land, and so much anger in the people that it became more and more difficult to tell them to show respect for that special piece of earth and the spirit of the man who once lived there. And so the day came, Sipho said, that the people

were so severely pressed against the walls of their shacks and - even though their bellies looked like balloons - so hungry, that they moved and built their tin-can homes and cardboard-box shacks even where the prophet's house had been. And so they forgot about him.

And then the grandmother, feeling the anger and distress of the people but also the distress and sadness of the spirit of the place, asked why in this land must everything that was good and strong and long-lasting be trampled into the earth? Why could the prophet's place not be preserved while at the same time giving room to the people? She asked her children and her grandchildren this question, over and over again, and she went also to the city authorities and asked it there. People could not completely ignore her because she was an old woman and demanded respect.

Every so often - to this day, Siphso imagined - she went into town to visit the municipal offices and ask these difficult questions, and every day she prayed, and so she tried to keep a piece of history surviving on the land.

(Boehmer 1993:205)

Imagining the future

Grundtvig: 'Some regard me as a conservative, because I adhere to the bridge (between past and present), and others call me revolutionary, because in fact I want to cross the bridge to a brand-new civic order.' (quoted in Møller 1950)

In maintaining some sense of continuity with the past, we have also to accommodate within that self-understanding room for changes and

challenges in the present and future. (Feldman 2002) A fixation with the past stunts growth. (Maier 1993) We are linked and in measure shaped by the past but we are a new creation. I think Stroup is right in his view that communities are significantly constituted by acts of shared remembering where those narratives and what these narratives preserve are 'appropriated and extended into the future'. (Stroup 1984:133)

There are times however when the past's stories, for the sake of the present and the future, have to be acknowledged and made explicit and faced. This has been a truth for nations whose relations with Nazi Germany have been subject to competing interpretative accounts, such as Austria (Wodak et al 1999:194ff), Switzerland (Zimmer 2003:239) and Denmark (Lundbak 2003). More recently, in South Africa and Eastern Europe, it has been apparent how deep is the need for story to be told and acknowledged if the nation is to move forward. 'Recent, officially sanctioned efforts at Truth and Reconciliation in post-conflict scenarios across the world have reiterated the fundamental nature of this relationship between 'narrative' and change in the political domain. After 1945 story-telling became an acknowledged aid to progress, with the high demand for explanation, debate and answers.' (Flanagan 2004:112)

When myths are deployed, whether they be grand narratives or everyday sayings, they may be utilised for the purposes of maintenance of the present or for change. They can be statements of 'how things are' or of 'how they might be'. Through storymaking and telling, competing narratives are constructed of 'why the world is as it is' (Morales 1998:5), but it is also true that through storymaking and telling, competing narratives are created and offered of 'how the world might be'.

In reality, an ostensible concern for the past is relatively rarely focused primarily on the past; it has a present or future intention.

'All memories, whether 'individual', 'collective' or 'historical' are memories **for** something and this political aim (in the broadest sense of that term) cannot be ignored.'⁵⁷⁶ (Geary 1996:31)

This aspirational dimension is an important element in the storytelling of nation.

'I do think that to a very great extent we dream our worlds into being... an optimistic course might be charted if only we could imagine it.' (Williams 1997:16) As Brueggemann maintains concerning biblical text the narrative 'has generative power to summon and evoke new life'

⁵⁷⁶ my emphasis

and holds out an eschatological vision that
'anticipates and summons realities that live
beyond the conventions of our day-to-day, take-
for-granted world.' (Brueggemann 1989: 4-5)
'It (the text) displays a possible world, a
reality in which my human reality can find
itself, and in inviting me into its world the
text breaks open and extends my possibilities.'
(Williams 1986:199) It is an invitation to
imagination: to enter the past with
understanding, to see the present in a deeper
light and to envisage a future with a lively
creativity. 'The purpose of Gaelic tradition...
is to highlight the land in which we live, to
imaginatively deepen and extend every aspect of
human experience and to tell a story which is
more, not less, than the sum of what history, in
its more limited sense, can convey.' (D Smith
2001:49)

Of folk high schools, It has been suggested that
'... they endeavour at the same time to enable
every man and woman, ... to share in our common
cultural heritage, and to awaken in them a
feeling of responsibility for the development of
this heritage'. (Rørdam 1965:1887) 'Students ...
should not be made passive, analytical observers
of history, but active participants who found a
basis for the future in the experience of the
past and could themselves create history.'
(Manniche 1969:116)

Whose stories?

'For every story that sees the light of day, untold others remain in the shadows, censored or oppressed.' (Jackson 2002:11)

Not all within a society however are equally included within the national story nor enabled to contribute their story. We tell those stories which are 'culturally available for our telling', (Ewick and Silbey 1995) but no story is told without purpose and not every story is admitted to the publicly recognised repertoire.

Scott (1990) argues that dominant discourse constitutes a 'public transcript' which reinforces and legitimizes the position of the dominant group, offering a 'self-portrait of dominant elites as they would have themselves seen' in a light which both flatters and benefits them (1990:18).

Authority is maintained is through stories. Indeed, the resilience of hegemonic ideology is in part attributable to their articulation within personal stories. Stories not only reiterate dominant meanings or power relations, but through retelling also contribute to the reproduction of these relations (Ewick & Silbey, 1995; van Djik, 1999). How we portray the past, ourselves and our fellow can defend or contest the social and political position. (Roy 1999:9)

This makes stories 'particularly dangerous devices in the hands of image-makers, hoaxers, spin doctors and fantasists'. (Gabriel 2004:19)

Narrative accounts of reality are often partial and inadequate in the extent to which they suppress the experience of the oppressed.

(Schüssler Fiorenza 1992:93) If the story is to be a more whole one, then it is required that 'people of different life styles, social backgrounds, and personal experiences become involved in the interpretation of Scripture'.

(Schüssler Fiorenza 1995:38)

Some forms of the national story are legitimized with the status of being shared public accounts but there is also room for alternative discourses.

Scott observes also that 'there is also 'a hidden transcript,' one that offers 'a critique of power spoken behind the back of the dominant' (Scott 1990:xii). Through this hidden transcript, members of socially subordinated groups create counter-narratives to contradict and challenge the public transcript. They may, depending on the relative degree of safety or threat, collude in the public transcript while carrying on a hidden transcript out of range of the dominant group's hearing' (Bell 2003:05; See also Scott, 1990). There is a parallel in organisational studies: 'such stories remain

stubbornly indifferent to the official stories, or alternatively, explicitly challenge, ridicule, or subvert official...texts, celebrate resistance and recalcitrance, castigate injustices and hypocrisies, and extol comradeship and solidarity.' (Gabriel 2004:4)

Barr (1999:15) reminds us that one of the key aspects of critical pedagogy is the supporting of 'the oppressed to overcome a 'culture of silence' in which they cannot see that their situation could be different and that they could intervene in their social world to transform it.' Storytelling and imaginative story-making can be a contribution to that anticipation and envisioning. Anthropology, commonly focused on ethnographical accounts of others **by** professionals, is (according to Sawin 2001) beginning a shift away from merely asking people their stories to offering an advocacy role in assisting people to identify to whom, for what purpose and how their stories might be told.

An outgroup may create its own stories to circulate within the group as a kind of counter-reality. (Delgado, 1995: 64) Oral storytelling has been a significant means by which communities have survived and resisted dehumanizing experiences. (Lofton 1991:127) Story reinforces 'our capacity to see ourselves as human when we are treated inhumanely'. (Morales 1998:4; see also Jackson 2002:16 and

Povrzanovic 1997:57) Cultiaux 2001:130ff
evidences the conscious utilization of history
in Catalonia as a form of resistance to
'Spanish' nationalism and promotion of 'Catalan'
national status and identity.

The extent to which our stories are welcomed,
heard, received, affirmed or repelled, refused,
ignored, rejected, not only impacts on our sense
of connectedness to the other but also can
undermine the excluded's confidence in their
story and in its implications and meaning.

The within-community suppression of stories may
come from a belief that the old story is now
incompatible with present identity and values.
'When I asked them (older black women) why their
grandchildren were not familiar with these
sayings, the response from one woman was, "I
didn't tell him, because I thought he wouldn't
be interested. He's an English man now, so
what good is dat old fashioned talk to him?".
Conversations with other women confirmed this
situation. The desire not to speak about their
experiences that emanate from the Caribbean is
symptomatic of a collective belief that
successful adaptation and integration into
British life requires a negation of self and a
suppression of those cultural forms that seem
incompatible with being British.' (Reddie
1998:20)

As stories are brought into the shared space, there is potential for entering into 'other' worlds. 'Telling stories from one's cultural legacy allows for entrée into the world and the lives of learners... By telling stories of one's cultural heritage, a teacher has the potential to crack open the doors and make contact with significant aspects of the learner's existence.'

(Crockett 1991:22)

As a form of knowledge and communication, story can be a route into dialogue where rules and conventions otherwise tend to be discriminatory and excluding. There can be a silencing or marginalisation where knowledge is formulated in traditional scholarly terms or in the language of the educated or where some forms of experience are dismissed as in some way trivial or where reflections are judged to be insufficiently reflective.

VEKSELVIRKNING

Interaction around narrative

Community

'Stories inform life. They hold us together and keep us apart.' (Mair 1998:127) The stories we learn, the stories we live, the stories we tell ourselves and one another, and what we do with these stories have the capacity for building community and for causing isolation and even enmity.

As Gee (1999:17) observes, through storytelling, in our use of language, in our forms of thinking, in what we value, in how we live out our story and how we interact with one another with the narrative of our shared life, we identify ourselves as members of a 'socially meaningful group'. Narrative clearly performs a major role in the internal consolidation of our sense of identity and in affirming our sense of difference from the 'other'.

The nature of a national imagination... is an unending series of **interactions** between different strands of tradition, between influences within and without, between the impact of new experiences and the reinterpretation of past experiences: the nation is a series of ongoing debates, founded in institutions and patterns of life, whose elements are continuously changing but which constitute, by the nature of the issues which they foreground, and by their reiteration of elements of the past, a **dialogue** which is unique to that

particular place. The national imagination is not some transcendental identity which either survives or is erased; it is a space in which a dialogue is in processes between the various pressures and inheritances which constitute the particularity of human experience in a territory...' (Craig 1991:31, quoted in D Smith 2001:138)

'The telling, receiving and shaping of stories contributes towards people finding their place in the world: through narrative the variety of human experience can be explore and people come to see the world in different ways. By storytelling, people become engaged in finding their own story and voice, but also in seeking how this is related to the sum of human lives.'

(ibid 2001:168)

The stories that different sections of community tell, even ostensibly around the same theme and possibly even proposed as the same story, will differ significantly from one another and indeed may be rooted in radically different meta-narratives:

'Whites, for example, frequently tell stories that convey a sense of history as progressive, depict a US society that is basically fair and meritocratic, and assume a trajectory of forward progress in which injustices are eventually recognized and rectified over time. This story is appealing to many White Americans because it positions them as

good and fair and reassures them that, despite problems, ongoing social progress is being made'. (Bell 2003:04⁵⁷⁷).

'In contrast, People of Color more often understand their experience through an awareness of past and continuing discrimination that affects every aspect of their lives in this society. They see history continually repeating through oscillating cycles of progress and retreat on racial issues'. (Bell 2003:04⁵⁷⁸)

In bringing our stories, our accounts, into shared space, we open up the possibility of experiencing insight and challenge. We are offered the possibility of seeing that the other's story or version of a shared story is different from our own.

As we hear and are open to the stories of others, we may interact also with what we regard as our own stories, stories of our own class or ethnicity or sexuality and can engage with them critically to recognise and take responsibility for our conditioning and position. (Bell 2003:23) If we assume that the dialogue following on from storytelling explicitly or implicitly involves the question 'What does the

⁵⁷⁷ See also Cose, 1997; Lipsitz, 1998; Feagin, 2001

⁵⁷⁸ See also Bell, 1992; Hacker, 1992; Sniderman & Piazza, 1993; Feagin & Sikes, 1994; Hochschild, 1995; Cose, 1997; Shipler, 1998; Feagin, 2001

story mean?' or 'What was going on there?'
(Bauman 1986:6) then there is for the teller and the hearer a re-telling through which the tellers themselves can clarify what it is the story means to them and deepen and broaden that understanding. This may be enriched further by hearing how the listener too has interprets the story and responds to our interpretations.

The potential for different understandings of a story requires us to explore together the story dialogically. Different groups, for example, will make different assumptions and interpretations related to their familiar cultural patterns. (Katz & Liebes 1985: 191)
The words and expressions that are used have a wide range of cognitive and emotional associations and resonances. (Vygotsky 1986)
The focus of hearers may differ - on the story itself as narrative which moves to a particular outcome, on the characters and their motivation, feelings and relationships, on discovering the story's message. (Liebes 1988: 281) As we share and explore stories, we seek to find their meanings. We may be enabled to view the familiar with a fresh distance and therefore a new eye.

Listening to one another's stories allow us to engage our curiosity concerning those who appear culturally different to ourselves. 'It is hardly surprising that in a racially diverse society, different groups think and talk about

each other a great deal.' (Bell 2003:4⁵⁷⁹) It is not then that we are uninterested but we often observe and construe the lived narrative of the 'other' (often in a very partial way) from a distance that can be both geographical and psychological. Storytelling and listening enables us to access to these other narratives and therefore to those who live and tell them.

Story invites us to see the other not as utterly different from us, but *ourselves in other circumstances*. (Jackson 2002:259; see also Nussbaum 1997) We have to hear story with what Arendt calls 'an enlarged way of thinking'. (Arendt 1968:221) Our shared humanity and the personal are brought into relationship. As we are able empathetically, but with distance, to enter into the world of the other person or community, while not presumptuously believing that we can ever fully enter into that different experience, we occupy a shared world and have a basis for shared concerned living.

Further, a deeper engagement with our own story may be the way in which we can have a more profound interaction with and understanding of the stories of others.

Let me illustrate the need for a broadened, empathetic imagination with story:

⁵⁷⁹ who cites also Smitherman-Donaldson and van Dijk 1988; van Dijk 1984 and 1993; and Shipler 1998.

Gobodo-Madikizela⁵⁸⁰ began by wondering whether forgiveness might be wasted on such a man⁵⁸¹. Yet as she hears his story her attitude begins to change, though she initially feels guilty for experiencing any sympathy towards him. She writes that she 'wondered if my hearty had actually crossed that moral line from compassion, which allows one to maintain a measure of distance, to actually identifying with De Kock'... 'There were real moments that drew me into community with him - for instance, when he said our sons were the same age. I felt a little shaken, that my world was actually the same world as this man. But those moments helped me to deepen the understanding of what happens when human beings turn the other way, into becoming what we call monsters. It gave me insight into the dangers of being drawn into these situations.'

(McKay 2006:6)

Coming together in conversation

Through storytelling, we discover that we have a 'shareable world'. (Kearney 2002:3) This is true in the usual sense that, whatever the obstacles to communication, in story of past and present experience we can find commonalities and build bridges across difference. Toni Morrison however writes of 'the imagination that produces work which bears and invites re-readings, which motions to future readings as well as contemporary ones, implies a shareable world ...'. (1992:xii)

⁵⁸⁰ Gobodo-Madikizela [2006]

⁵⁸¹ Eugene De Lock imprisoned in South Africa for crimes against humanity during the apartheid era

It is the potential of storytelling to occasion shared conversation that is one of its fundamental strengths. Northrop Frye argues that, to an extent unparalleled in any other literature, it is biblical texts that call the readers to bring their own experiences into a conversation with them resulting in an ongoing interpretation of each in the light of the other. (Frye 1982: 225) Yet, without judging his evaluation of the biblical, it seems to me entirely true of story and storytelling at its best. It is story's capacity to evoke further story, in clarification, in extension, in contradiction, in echoing and affirmation that makes story a creative first step into dialogue and interaction.

By contrast, the written text may tempt us 'to take its words as authoritative and final, because of its illusory quality of seeming to be explicit, clear, complete, closed, and self-sufficient, that, is unanswerable.'⁵⁸² Beyond what it has said, it remains silent. It cannot

⁵⁸² The notion that text does have a meaning of its own is problematical. 'The word 'exegesis'... is misleading if we see meaning as a fixed and objectives string of data which we have to coax out of the text. In reality, a text only speaks when a listener comes along. A text becomes alive and starts to speak only from the moment when we start to listen, and in proportion to how well we are listening. As loyal readers, we, of course, want to respect and adhere to the words and structures of the text, but our action of reading, understanding and making connections is essential to these words and structures. Reading is certainly not passive, nor a form of easy consumption...' [Fokkelman 1999:20]

respond to interrogation other than by representing itself. (Gee 1996:27⁵⁸³)

Of oral interactions, story is one of the forms that tends towards a less assertive mode. It less often seeks to be the final word, for it requires interpretation. Though it can be used for propaganda or persuasion, storytelling is pedagogically more often 'an invitation to mulling over rather than argument'. (Barr 1993:3) It calls us into shared conversation and deliberation, not into debate, but into discussion.

.
The offering and receiving of story is a partnership in learning. This, however, can quite readily become a one-sided enterprise. In the field of learning for a pluralistic society, it can become either a form of citizenship training in which cultural minorities are urged or required to know the main cultural stories of the nation⁵⁸⁴ or a genuine desire on the part of sections of the majority culture to learn more of the stories of cultural minorities which may

⁵⁸³ Gee quotes the lines of Plato: *Socrates* - 'I think writing has this strange feature, which makes it like painting. The offspring of painting stand there as if alive, but if you ask them something, they preserve a quite solemn silence. Similarly with written words, you might think that they spoke as if they had some thought in their heads, but if you every ask them about any of the things they say out of desire to learn, they point to just one thing, the same thing each time.' [Rowe 1986: 275 d4-e1]

⁵⁸⁴ Home Office - Life in the United Kingdom Advisory Group (2005) *Life in the United Kingdom: A Journey to Citizenship* London: The Stationery Office

be met with a degree of puzzlement as to why this is thought desirable or necessary.

In engaging in storytelling with other communities or sections within community, we begin already the task we seek to accomplish through story-sharing, for 'in requiring the participation of both audience and storyteller in an interactive relationship of call and response, the storytelling ... realises both socially and dialogically an ideal of tolerant solidarity in difference.' {Jackson 2002:140-1)

In the chapter on dialogue in the public space, which follows, I will look further at the question of how cross-community interaction is nurtured, but for the moment I want to mention three aspects in the context of story-sharing.

Freedom

As we have noted in considering Grundtvig's educational thinking, freedom was an essential component in any meaningful enlightenment and engagement. A true interaction is likely to take place only where

- the teller is not inhibited by a perception that their story is unacceptable or requires modification in order to make it acceptable
- participants do not feel under an obligation to offer the 'official' version of a story in the role of

representative (or if they adopt that role, then this should be explicit)

- there are no adverse consequences attached to telling the story in the way the teller thinks is right
- the conditions under which the storytelling is occurring are not 'policed' or perceived as being policed by those who are official guardians of the community's stories.

Respect

Respect is reciprocal. (Dialog 2006:115-6) There has to be a genuine mutuality:

- The participants have to come with a significant measure of openness. If we do not listen to and are not open to the stories of others or are dismissive or judgemental of these narratives, then those with whom we interact are seen as 'missiological objects' whom we approach with evangelistical intent and method rather than genuine partners in dialogue. (Kwok Pui-Lan 1994)
- This is not to suggest that in mutual storytelling, we abandon or lose confidence in our stories, our values, our experience and our knowledge. To the contrary, we come into *vekselvirkning*, believing that the stories we have to tell, the ones we are offering, are worthy of sharing. As Davies comments, *samtale* in

- If, however, we assume our culture's stories to be dominant or master narratives that position all other stories, then that 'is the violence of the last word'. (Loughlin 1996:24)
- The storytelling should not be combined with moralizing, with preaching. Kvan's list of points for good storytelling⁵⁸⁵ warns against the (metaphorical) 'raised index finger' (en løftet pegefinger) wagged at the audience. (Kvan 1999:77) Story can be used in argument and persuasion, but I think storytelling cannot.
- There has to be an attentive listening, rooted in a sense of expectancy and empathetic imagination. 'A sensitivity to hear their voice is paramount'. (Benhabib 1992:8)
- In responding positively to story, we are invited to adopt 'reverse perspectives, that is, a willingness to reason from the other's point of view'. (Benhabib 1992:8)

⁵⁸⁵ En god historiefortælling

Between Scylla and Charybdis

There are twin dangers that would render storytelling irrelevant as a tool of interaction. 'Both relativism and dogmatism exclude all argumentation, all authentic dialogue, by making it either unnecessary (relativism) or impossible (dogmatism).'

(Bakhtin in Morson 1986:vii) Relativism renders story little more than an entertainment, for your story remains your story, valid for you, but belonging to your world not mine. Dogmatism insists that, insofar as your story contradicts mine, it is wrong. Neither holds out any serious prospect of significant dialogue.

In the telling of story in a different setting, in a context of reciprocity and in exchange with other story, that story, or our understanding of it, is itself altered. '... At every telling the story has to be introduced uniquely into a unique situation.' (Ong 1982:41) In its new context, it becomes a new story, a shared story, a story that will go on to encounter other stories and be transformed again. What Fokkelman says of text is true also of the spoken story: 'its umbilical cord is cut; from then on, it is on its own'. (Fokkelman 1999:22)

Not only the past and present story may be changed, however, and encounter with other story may change the direction of our own story. 'The

fact is that whenever we endeavour to accommodate any kind of radical otherness, the habits and dispositions that define our own sense of who we are, are placed in jeopardy.' (Jackson 2002:257) The role of storytelling however is not to convert but rather to bring about 'a balance between two things that remain different, but that should fertilize each other in their differences'. (Borish 1991:169)

'The telling of stories is a social event involving an interactive relationship between the narrator and those hearing the story... Not only does it give us the possibility of a sense of connection with our experience, but it also provides the possibility of a sense of connection with other people' (Lynch and Willows 1998:16) The extent to which are stories are welcomed, heard, received, affirmed or repelled, refused, ignored, rejected - not only impacts on our connectedness to the other but also can undermine our confidence in our story and in its implications and meaning.

Connecting to 'sacred' story

The relationship of 'human and divine' or 'sacred and secular' stories is a major territory and one that we cannot explore here in sufficient depth. The development of faith communities is closely related to story - the stories of their founding, the primordial myths,

parables and much more lie in the common life of religions. 'The lives of Abraham, Isaac, Jacob and the other patriarchs, together with the vicissitudes of the growth of the Israelite nation, are all clothed in narrative' from the Judaeo-Christian tradition (Platten 2000a:2) would have its parallels in other faiths.

In seeking a more 'folkelig' religious life and relationship of members of faith communities to each and to the wider community, it is necessary to develop a livelier interaction between the stories of people's experience and the sacred texts. 'The future of faith communities depends upon their capacity to foster an environment in which human and divine stories regularly interact' (Anderson and Foley 1998:40)

Bausch asserts similarly, 'Nor must we suppose that it is just the certified 'sacred' stories of a particular canon like the Bible that we must tap, although the biblical stories remain normative, but all human stories have meaning underneath the meaning⁵⁸⁶...'. (2002:19) I do not seek here to enter into debate on the extent or nature of the authority of scripture, even within the Christian Church and its various traditions but my concern as an educator is

⁵⁸⁶ Balling 1993:77 refers to this multi-layeredness as *polysemia*. 'Things and events are real and unambiguous enough in themselves and in immediate encounter, but 'in' them, 'behind' them, 'beneath' them a world of collateral meanings are hidden, until revealed by the poet-prophet's word as in a deeper sense determining their nature.'

this. In setting out this prior settling of the question of what is authoritative, it may effectively curtail the extent of true freedom within the interaction. It is a force for discouraging any participant who considers that there is other story that is in some sense 'truer' to human experience.

'It's best to start where we are - not where we might imagine New Testament people were...'
(Davies and Vincent 1986:12) It seems to me a problematical, however, if we are to assume that all our stories have to be read through the lens of biblical story. I am minded of the phrase of Grundtvig which I have presumed to borrow for my own thesis title: *Menneske først og Christen saa*, first a human then a Christian. Quite fundamental to this is the understanding that 'Man can only endorse what he can recognize as truth from his inner conviction.' (Jørgensen 1993b:172) No-one can be expected to apprehend the life and vitality to be found in the scriptures if they have no experience of life's meaning through life itself. Karl Rahner poses the same question: 'How does the Word of God prepare us for faith?' We are able to hear the word of scripture and of its preaching through the word that works through the whole of human existence. (Rahner 1966)

I am uncertain what the assertion that the biblical stories 'remain normative' might mean in a context where there is rarely, if ever, a normative version of how the story is to be understood. Such a position is somewhat undermined by the reality of historical-critical and literary scholarship⁵⁸⁷ and of different modes of reading⁵⁸⁸. This need not be viewed as a weakness. I concur in Jørgensen's assertion that 'the task of theology... can only be accomplished in freedom, and must necessarily hold diversities that may also be at variance with one another.' (Jørgensen 1993b:188) 'The pluralism of possible interpretations allows scripture to illuminate the great diversity of human experience.' (Morgan and Barton 1989:198)

This interaction between human and 'sacred' stories (and I would extend this beyond biblical to theological narratives) at times may be doing little more than offering the role of servant to our human narratives. Graham, Walton and Ward (2005) write critically of the utilisation of narratives from literature as a kind of cooperative, collaborative and compliant assistant. 'It should not only serve as a supplement to theology supplying what is lacking or decoratively illuminating theological texts. It must be allowed to challenge theology,

⁵⁸⁷ For example, in relation to the New Testament, see Sanders and Davies [1989]

⁵⁸⁸ See SE Gillingham [1998]

deconstructing its authoritative status and 'unmaking' theological narratives.' (2005:72) A similar criticism is levelled at narrative illustrations in preaching: 'to use poetry, art and films simply as sermon fodder is a kind of homiletical prostitution' (Holloway 1996:135)

If, as Driver suggests, 'theology originates in stories (and should tell itself more of them) ... (then) all knowledge comes from a mode of understanding that is dramatic. Far from merely illustrating truths we already know some other way, the dramatic imagination is the means whereby we get started in any knowledge whatsoever.' (1997: xxiii) Story is 'fecundating material for theological reflection'. (Scott 1985:171,n50)

If we are made in the image of God, then our understanding of the divine, however seriously partial, approximate and provisional, has to be discerned through our experience of what it is to be fully human and therefore to participate in the divine life. Certainly, we have no other language in which to speak of the divine that comes from our human experience. 'In the community encounter between our own stories and the Story (the Christian Story), between our visions and the Vision, we can come to 'know God' in an experiential/ reflective manner' (Groome 1980:193)

Our own authentic stories, personal and communal, have to be allowed their space, have to be brought into engagement and cannot remain hidden or untold. (Lynch and Willows 1998:34)
If this is taken seriously and openly, then 'the richness of this intersection cannot be exaggerated.' (Platten 2000a:3)

DET LEVENDE ORD and MODERSMÅL

'Is not the word in our mouth a light for all souls?'
(Enlightenment)

From a grundtvigian perspective, the primary form of story is an oral one: '... the oral word is both the first and the most natural'.
(Nordens Mytologi 1832) - it is story shared through speaking and hearing and thus a form of 'the living word'. (See chapter 9 above)

In this section, then, I am concerned primarily with the aspect of story that is story-telling and indeed in telling as a pedagogical tool.

Grundtvig was principally concerned, as we have seen, with the stories of the past, with stories that have been transmitted through generations orally. 'Only those words that pass in story and song/ from mouth to mouth where people throng/ sustain the life of the people;/ only in their own and ancient words/ is education to be found/ given by the spirit of the people'

(Grundtvig quoted in Haarder 1983:77) 'Old friends and folk ways never fail' folk say and that which is passed with many voices from generation to generation, that has reason and gravity and must never be forgotten.'⁵⁸⁹
(Danskeren II, 1849, s550-2)

Story was not, for him, so much contemporary invention as the revealing and sharing of narratives that were part of the heritage of the people, that had become 'old friends' in the sense both of being familiar and of serving the people well. Their expression was in the mother tongue (*modersmaal*), in their native language, but also in the forms of expression that belonged most to the ordinary people.

The oral/aural form also reflected the nature of the learning. For Grundtvig, the educational purpose and the pedagogy were closely linked. Where the purpose of the learning is *livoplysning*, the method has to be an inspirational one, because it is addressed as much to the heart as to the head. It is to create learning but also to inspire action. 'We can easily find how our children⁵⁹⁰ want to be

⁵⁸⁹ 'Gammelven og gammelvej'
siger folket, 'sviger ej'
og hvad man fra slægt til slægt
Siger højt med alle munde
Det har grund og det har vægt
Maa forglemmes ingenlunde.

⁵⁹⁰ Grundtvig's perception was that different stages of learning were appropriate to youth, to middle age and to later life. My

enlightened; we only have to ask them. The answer is 'Tell us a story!'... Bible teaching⁵⁹¹, however, and the history of the fatherland and everything else that has the purpose of elevating human beings into living members of the spiritual as well as the civic community, is, in my view and from my experience, most certainly and most easily facilitated through *story-telling.*' (Kold 1850/2003:48) Where the subject is human life itself, stories of human life have a vital role in stimulating and facilitating and resourcing that learning.

A grundtvigian approach takes seriously the need at the very outset to engage the learner. It must spark the imagination. Story in books, though clearly with potential to engage, does have less of the immediacy of the oral telling of story. 'Text... does not require an audience to read it and most often when the author was composing the text, he or she did so as a solitary being, removed from the potential audience which might read the text in question.' (Reddie 1998:17; Berryman 1991) In addressing

view is that this reflects a rather different and more strongly demarcated approach to life than the experience of the contemporary Western world. Similarly, while there are distinctive features in adult pedagogy, not least in valuing and utilising the life experience of the participant, in other respects adults share with children such things as a love of and openness to story.

⁵⁹¹ Kold, unlike Grundtvig, saw the school as a Christian institution with scriptural reading and knowledge a component of the curriculum. Consequently, he attached significant importance to the role of biblical stories.

the hearer in a very direct manner, the invitation to engage is very clear.

The 'Reddie' quotation in the previous paragraph refers to 'audience', but there is a connotation in that term which perhaps ill-fits storytelling in the context of learning. Though storytelling can be a form of entertainment with 'an audience', even then there is usually an assumption of engagement, participation, response. It is aimed at producing a response and not merely an internal reaction. Not infrequently, in storytelling, there will be an invitation and encouragement to contribute to the story or to extend the story with other stories or additional elements to the story that has been told or to comment on how the story has been told differently. In this respect, it is often very conversational. It invites into dialogue⁵⁹².

The telling must be inspirational. It was insufficient simply to expect the story to speak for itself. The teller had a responsibility to offer the story in a way that engaged the listener. In a basic sense, this means that the story has to be told 'well' - skilfully, drawing

⁵⁹² 'Tellers must intersect with a palpable audience at a particular moment in time and space... Just as narrators may monitor the audience's reactions, and take account of them to adjust their tone and presentation, so the audience may play an energetic part in the proceedings, ask questions, answer back, or perhaps just walk away.' [Tonkin 1992:38]

pictures of colour, making the story come alive, inviting the hearer in. 'When he sees a twinkle in their eyes, he knows that they are listening...'. (Langley 1997)

The storyteller is not in a dispassionate role, but rather must have a strong commitment to what is being told, and to giving of him/her self, even to be burning inside with the cause of the story! (Kvan 1999:77) This surely echoes Grundtvig's words: 'Just as a man is outwardly dead when his heart stops beating, so is he inwardly dead when his heart does not beat for anything...'. (Thyssen 1983:113) Storytellers must convey passion for the narrative and its value for them as well as the content of the narrative itself.

Similarly, the story seeks to draw the listener out of impartiality and detachment to engagement with the business of the story.

Closely associated in Grundtvig's thinking with the idea of 'the living word' was 'the mother tongue'. As I have acknowledged in the chapter *Det Levende Ord* in Part Two, the native tongue does not play in contemporary Scotland the role that it did in nineteenth century Denmark, when it was the point of division between the élite and the people, between the supporters of Germanised culture and the Danish language supporters and, for Grundtvig. It cannot perform

the unifying role that is often suggested⁵⁹³ as an element in nation-building, for there are at least three 'indigenous' languages ((Scottish-)English, Scottish Gaelic and Scots⁵⁹⁴) as well as community languages. This is not to say, however, that it is culturally irrelevant to the practice of storytelling.

Something of the power of traditional story lies in its link to the folk language. In Grundtvig's understanding, the mother tongue was both symbolic, as an expression of the distinctive identity and culture of a people⁵⁹⁵, but also had significance in its particular modes of expression, its proverbs and metaphors, its aphorisms. 'Quite naturally our ballads, our proverbs and maxims with all their Danish imagery, their wisdom and innocent just must first of all be revived, dusted off, launched and promoted, if we are to master them or if we can discover their valuable property in hidden corners.' (Lyksøskning til Danmark 1847)

⁵⁹³ 'The notion that nations are really language groups, and therefore that nationalism is a linguistic movement, derives from Herder's influence'. (AD Smith 1971:182) There is no doubt that language is sometimes a key tool in affirming national or cultural identity, eg, in the United Kingdom, the Welsh language has been an important factor in the maintenance or recovery of cultural identity as a distinct nation; and, in the 'Spanish' context alone, Basque, Catalan and Galician as languages have a political significance. I am not suggesting that Scots Gaelic is unimportant either to speakers or to the nation of Scotland, even as a national icon.

⁵⁹⁴ Macleod and Mac Neacail (1995) refer to the latter two as the 'double helix'

⁵⁹⁵ We might recognise this in the context of the Scottish nation where 'vernacular expression' had a particular role in the 'rediscovery or reconstruction of national identity after the Union of 1707'. (Watson 1993:100)

There is no doubt that the language of ordinary people ('Servants' hall Danish') in everyday life warmed Grundtvig's heart.⁵⁹⁶ Though it can be tinged with and even undermined by an excessive sentimentalism, there is an appeal to the heart that comes from the use of the vernacular. For those who belong to a language tradition, it can somehow say things more powerfully and truly⁵⁹⁷: 'you wanted... Scots words to tell to your heart how they wrung it and held it ...And the next minute that passed from you, you were English, back to the English words so sharp and clean and true ...till they slid so smooth from your throat you knew they could never say anything that was worth the saying at all.' (Gibbon 1932:32)

The story spoken in the vernacular, though it may be of tremendous power, is nonetheless softer, for it comes as a friend. The work of Ursula Guin (Le Guin 1989:147-60) throws an interesting light on the distinction between 'the father tongue' and 'the mother tongue' that I think has some relevance to the place of story in learning. 'The 'father tongue' ... is the discourse of power - not necessarily (though

⁵⁹⁶ This may have been particularly so because it was his childhood language, taught to him by his nurse, Malene. There is, with Grundtvig and also with us, always the possibility of nostalgia and even a false nostalgia operating.

⁵⁹⁷ This power may be linked to the phonaesthetic qualities of many Scots words, including those used in Scottish-English, eg 'dreich'.

frequently) authoritarian and oppressive, but a language designed to get things done, and, with a view to getting things done, to offer 'disinterested' analyses of situations. Thus it is inevitably a language that distances the speaker from what is spoken of; it is most itself when written rather than spoken; it does not expect an answer, 'It goes one way'...'. (Williams 2000:73) This kind of speech, however we may name it, is not the language of storytelling.

Storytelling calls us to build community (to create *folkelighed*), to share in memories, beliefs and values (through *vekselvirkning*), to seek for meaning in life and in community (*oplysning*) and to imagine the clarification (or *forklaring*, transfiguration) of the future.

Chapter 14

CONCLUSION

A conclusion must inevitably start back at the beginning.

At the outset, I identified what I believe to be a critical issue facing adult lay theological education. It has become too introspective. Academy and church have collaborated in developing a form of adult lay formation that is focused on either the celestial or the congregational, transcendence or training. It has neglected what I believe to be the primary vocation of the laity, to live out their humanity (formed in the image of God) in human community. It has disabled lay people from full engagement in community by confining their understanding within conceptual and communicative frameworks that carry little or no currency in secular society. When it has had a concern for matters missiological, this has taken an evangelistic rather than a dialogical form, seeking to persuade rather than to forge partnership. Faith for living in community requires both to find expression in a shared language suitable for the public space and to be able to engage openly and rigorously with alternative perspectives.

In Part Two, I have endeavoured to set out four concepts or ideas of Grundtvig which I believe assist

us in exploring some key educational questions. Each is related to a further concept, *vekselvirkning* or interaction.

Opløsning What is this education for? It is for enlightenment, for a journey of exploration of life's meaning, meeting and interacting with the circumstances of human living, both personal and communal. Its goal is not simply understanding but insightful engagement towards a fuller expression of life in all its abundance. Its form of *vekselvirkning* is both an interplay of perspectives as we learn from the exchange and cross-fertilisation of ideas and a learning for community as the capacity for positive human interaction is developed.

Menneskelighed As what do we come to this education for enlightenment? Traditionally, lay theological education has regarded its participants as 'Christian first', their faith commitment lying at the heart of their learning. Mindful of Grundtvig's declaration *First a human being, then a Christian* and taking seriously the Incarnational nature of Christian theology, I have argued that it is first and foremost as human beings amongst other human beings that we enter into conversation and collaboration. *Vekselvirkning* becomes possible as we come together on the basis of our common humanity, some sense of universal values (however contested they may be in the application) and in mutual respect and reciprocity of care.

Folkelighed In what context does this learning occur? Its natural setting is not church but community. By this, I am not referring to its physical location but to the primary forms of experience that inform and focus the learning. In the light of Grundtvig's thinking, I have argued for holding together, in interaction as much as in tension, the local and the universal, nation and the humanity. An authentic form of meaningful being will draw both upon universal human values and commitments and upon the historical-cultural particularities of a people and place, seeking both to give expression to these and to find new contemporary forms of them. I have acknowledged and responded to issues arising from an increasingly pluralistic society and a consciousness of the negative attributes of some forms of national identity. I have suggested that, despite the difficulties inherent in maintaining a cultural dimension to such identity, the thinness of civic forms of nationalism requires some attention to cultural questions. *Vekselvirkning* here involves a constant awareness-in-living of a unity that embraces diversity and a diversity that is consistent with and contributes to the universal.

Det levende ord By what means do we learn together? Drawing on Grundtvig's affirmation of the Living Word, the centrality of an oral word coming from experience and speaking to both head and heart should form the principal pedagogy for lay formation. As far as possible in the speech of everyday, there should be dialogue on the basis of freedom and

In Part Three, I have taken these ideas forward into educational practice in relation to three topics:

- Creating dialogue in the public space
- Developing Socratic dialogues as a form of shared enquiry
- The role of story and storytelling.

Arguing for greater involvement in civil society by Christians and people from other faith communities - and in this I distinguish the contribution of ordinary people of faith from the participation of institutional religion - I affirm what I believe to be some of the ground rules which would make such engagement possible and purposeful. I have suggested that these would include a setting aside of special pleading forms of argument that seeks to take a controlling stance, a preparedness to engage in discussion using the language, images and concepts of secular discourse, an openness to and with others, a capacity to conduct discussion on the basis of reasoned argumentation. I have distinguished this from simple secularisation as it involves people of faith, not in abandoning their faith beliefs and

values, but in distilling these so that what lies at the core, humanly, is discerned and is capable of being a basis for shared discourse.

More particularly, I have reviewed one form of shared discussion aimed at developing a structured oral dialogue around life questions, the Socratic Dialogue. Amongst its strengths, I have recognised its open dialogical qualities, its reliance upon enlightenment values of thinking and reasoning, its drawing of people together in a shared process, its focus on agreed common concerns in concrete form and its intention to deepen and clarify understanding with a view of political or social action. Again, I have sought to identify what ground rules there might appropriately be.

Finally, in relation to storytelling, I have suggested that pedagogy might rely more strongly on narrative approaches, both for their motivational and inspirational qualities and for their capacity to help us into a range of ways of knowing, relating and being. I suggest that story, as memory and as imagination, contributes in ways that affirm and inform, engage and enlighten.

Having thus concluded the exploratory part of this research, taking in conceptual, contextual and concrete application aspects, I propose to

move into a second stage with itself two components.

The first task will be to distil the principal ideas of the research thus far into a form that can be shared with others as a stimulus to and basis for conversation around the thinking. Although this conversation properly will be other theological educators, it will be important also to engage with those for whom the programme would be intended: for lay people within the churches, including those who do not traditionally engagement in adult formational activities.

The second task would be the design, delivery and piloting of materials that might contribute to such a programme of lay learning. I am minded to bring together the research's interest in exploring issues of national identity, using storytelling and Socratic dialogue in the context of an interaction that brought together people of different faiths and of a 'secular' orientation. This would require to be supported by training of facilitators and indeed of participants though a significant aspect of the learning would be in the experience itself.

It is to that work that I shall shortly turn.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

NOTES

1 *Words of Scandinavian origin using the letters Æ, Ø or Å/Aa are located in accordance with the convention that they follow the letter Z. Words of other origin may use in sequence the letters Aa and Ae and these will be found in the usual English language alphabetical order.*

2 *Mac and Mc are treated here in their strict alphabetical order not taken together*

3 *In the citation of journals, I have used the form, where given, proposed by the publishers themselves*

4 *In published educational work and in (often informally published) results of practitioner research, information normally give for the purposes of citation (eg date of publication) may be lacking but I have endeavoured to access as full information as possible and to give this.*

5 *I have cited the writings of Grundtvig separately in a list of primary sources, by Danish title in full or in abbreviated form. The table in that section sets out its Danish title, an English translation of this (which may be somewhat approximate and is provided only to aid the understanding of non-Danish reading users), the date of original publication, one or more sources of current reference in Danish and an indication of where it may be found (wholly or partly) in English.*

PRIMARY SOURCES OF GRUNDTVIG'S WRITINGS CITED

Danish title ⁵⁹⁸	English title ⁵⁹⁹	Date	Danish publication in ⁶⁰⁰	English publication in ⁶⁰¹
Akadamiet I Soer. En søde drøm	The Academy at Soer. A sweet dream		Fasc 343.2	
Bjowulfs Drape	Beowulf	1820		
Bøn og Begreb om en dansk højskole i Soer	Prayer and view for a Danish high school in Soer	1840	VU 4:385- 401	K 160-5
Christenheden s Syvstjerne	The Pleiades of Christendom	1854	VU 6: 274-390	
Den Dansk Fiir-Kløver	The Danish Four-leafed clover	1836	VU 4:145- 85	
Dansk Svane Sang	Danish Swansong	1848	VU 8:274- 5	
Den Christelige Børnelærdom	Basic Christian teachings	1868	VU 7:1- 273	K 49-82
Folkelighed og Christendom	Folk Life and Christianity	1847	VU 5:242- 51	K 37-43
Folkelighed	Folk Life	1848	VU 8: 289-92 Danskeren Nr 24	
Gylden-Aaret	The Year of Gold	1834	US 8:18ff VU 8:3-68	

⁵⁹⁸ There is greater consistency in the use of the Danish titles and for that reason it is shown first; there are however occasional deviations in published works. Longer titles have been abbreviated here.

⁵⁹⁹ The English title is the one by which it is most usually known in English language publications. This may not be closely related to the literal translation of the Danish title.

⁶⁰⁰ The abbreviations here are those used in Chapter 5, viz **US**: Udvaglte Skrifter (ed Begtrup 1904-09) volumes I-X and **VU**: Værker I Udvalg (ed Christensen and Koch 1940-49) volumes I-X.

Danskeren (The Dane) was published by Grundtvig on a weekly basis from 1848 to 1851. Fasc refers to a holding in the Grundtvig collection at Det Kgl Bibliotek (The Royal Library, Copenhagen) No entry in this column indicates that the item is not published in a collection but separately.

⁶⁰¹ The two English anthologies referred to here and in chapter 5 are Broadbridge and Jensen (1984) and Knudsen (1976), abbreviated in respectively as B&J and K

Haandbog i Verdens- Historie	Handbook of World History	1833 -43	VU 5:1- 232	
Imod den lille Anklager	Against the little Accuser	1815		
Kongerit Danmark og Hertugdømmet Slesvig eller Sonderjylland	The kingdom of Denmark and the duchy of Schleswig or South Jutland	1848	VU 5:267- 76 Danskeren Nr 12	
Kort Begreb af Verdens Krønike i Sammenhæng	Brief view of world chronicle in context	1812	VU 1:335- 480	
Lykøskning til Danmark med det danske dummerhoved og den danske høiskole	Congratulation s to Denmark on the Danish blockhead and the Danish high school	1847	VU 5:423- 70	K160-5
Mands Minde	In Living Memory	1838	VU 4:234- 352	B&J 85-124 (selection)
Maskarade- ballet i Dannemark	The Maskarade Ball in Denmark	1808	VU 1:140- 7	
Menneske først	First a human	1837	VU 8:113- 5	K 140-1
Nordens Mytologi	Nordens Mytologi	1808	VU 1:148- 249	
Nordens Mytologi eller Sind- billed-sprog historisk- poetisk udviklet og plyst	Nordens Mytologi	1832	VU 5:1- 126	Introducti on in B&J 31-62 K 20-36
Nyaars-Morgen	New Year's Morning	1824	VU 7:366- 480	
Nyaars-natten	New Year's Night	1810	VU 7:313- 5	
Om Religions Friheden	On Religion's Freedom	1827	US 5:97ff	
Om folkeligheden og Dr Rudelbach	On folk life and Dr Rudelbach	1848	VU 5:252- 9	K 44

Om Videnskabelighed	On Scholarship	1807	US 1:174- 202	
Saxos Danmarks Krønike	Saxo's Chronicle of Denmark	1818 -22		
Skolen for Livet	The School for Life	1838	VU 5:199- 213	B&J 63-84
Skribenten Nik Fred Sev Grundtvigs Literaire Testamente	Grundtvig's literary testament	1827		
Somme andres og mit Tyskerhad	My antipathy towards the Germans	1848	VU 5:276- 8	Danskeren Nr 22
Statsmæssig Oplysning	Education in state affairs	1834	Bugge og Nielsen (1983)	
Taler paa Marielyst Højskole	Speaking of Marielyst High school	1871	Johansen (1956)	
Tidens strøm	The stream of time	1839	6th edition 1933	
Aabent Brev til mine Børn	A plain and joyful life on earth	1839	VU 8:145- 9	B&J 192 K 141-2

SECONDARY LITERATURE

- Abbs P (1994) *The Educational Imperative: A Defence of Socratic and Aesthetic Learning* London: Falmer Press
- Abbs P (ed) (2004) *Socratic Education* Hull: University of Hull Press
- Aberbach D (2003) 'The poetry of nationalism' *Nations and Nationalism* 9(2):255-75
- Aberbach D (2005) 'Nationalism and the Hebrew Bible' *Nations and Nationalism* 11(2):232-42
- Adriansen I (1990) *Fædrelandet, folkeminderne, og modersmålet*, Sønderborg, Denmark: Museumsområdet for Sønderjyllands Amt
- Agnew J, Livingstone D and Rogers A (eds) (1996) *Human Geography: An Essential Anthology* Oxford: Blackwell
- Agyeman J and Spooner R (1997) 'Ethnicity and the Rural Environment' in P Cloke and J Little (ed) (1997)
- Ahonen S and Rantala J (2001) *Nordic Lights: Education for Nation and Civic Society in the Nordic Countries 1850-2000* (Studia Fennica Historica 1) Helsinki: Finnish Literature Society
- Alexander J (ed) (1998) *Real Civil Societies* London: Routledge
- Alibhai-Brown Y (2000) *Who do we think we are? Imagining the New Britain* Harmondsworth: Penguin
- Allchin AM (1979) 'NFS Grundtvig : the Spirit as Life-Giver' in *The Kingdom of Love and Knowledge: The Encounter between Orthodoxy and the West* London: Darton, Longman & Todd Ltd
- Allchin AM (1990) 'Grundtvig Seen in Ecumenical Perspective' *Grundtvig Studier* 1989-90: 105ff
- Allchin AM (1992) 'The Outer Loss Shall Be The Inner Gain' in Davies and Bowie (eds) 1992)
- Allchin AM (1993) 'Grundtvig and England' pp3ff in Allchin et al (1993)
- Allchin AM (1995) 'We know what we love: Feeling and Thinking in Grundtvig's Understanding of Human Life' in Zøllner and Andersen (eds) (1995)
- Allchin AM (1997) *NFS Grundtvig. An Introduction to his Life and Work* London: Darton, Longman and Todd
- Allchin AM (2000) 'The Holy Spirit in the Teaching of NFS Grundtvig' in Allchin et al (eds) *Grundtvig in International Perspective* Aarhus: Aarhus UP
- Allchin AM and Thyssen AP (1993) 'Grundtvig's Relationship to England' pp19ff in Allchin AM, Jasper D, Schjørring JH and Stevenson K (eds) *Heritage and Prophecy* Aarhus University Press
- Allchin AM, Bradley SAJ, Hjelm NA, and Schjørring JH (eds) (2000) *Grundtvig in International Perspective* Aarhus: Aarhus University Press

- Allchin AM, Jasper D, Schjørring JH and Stevenson K (eds) (1993) *Heritage and Prophecy* Aarhus University Press
- Allen EL (1949) *Bishop Grundtvig: A Prophet of the North* London: James Clarke and Co
- Almond G and Verba S (1989) *The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes And Democracy In Five Nations* London: Sage
- Altbach PG and Kelly GP (eds) (1986) *New Approaches to Comparative Education*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press
- Andersen BM (2003) 'Grundtvigs folkelighedsbegreb' (Grundtvig's Concept of 'Folkelighed') pp65-87 *Grundtvig Studier* (2003)
- Andersen HT and Engelstoft S (2004) 'The End of Urbanisation? Transformation of the Urban Concept' *Dela 21*: 53-67 E-version at http://www.ff.unilj.si/oddelki/geo/publikacije/dela/files/dela_21/008%20a (Last viewed 15 September 2006)
- Anderson H and Foley E (1998) *Mighty Stories, Dangerous Rituals* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
- Anderson H and Goolishian H (1990) 'Beyond cybernetics: comments on Atkinson and Heath's "Further thoughts on second-order family therapy"' *Family Process* 29:157-163
- Andresén A (1968) interview with Clay Warren pp84ff in Warren (ed) (1998) *Democracy is Born in Conversations* NY: Circumstantial Productions
- Andrews G (ed) (1991) *Citizenship* London: Lawrence and Wishart
- Anthony of Sourozh (Metropolitan) (1987) 'Body and Matter in Spiritual Life' pp36-46 In AM Allchin (ed) *Sacrament and Image: Essays in the Christian understanding of man* 2nd edition (Article published also online at http://www.metropolit-anthony.orc.ru/eng/eng_02.htm (last accessed 11 September 2006)
- Anzaldúa G (1987) *Borderlands/ La Frontera: The new mestiza* San Francisco: Spinsters/ Aunt Lute Book Co
- Applebee A (1978) *The child's concept of story* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press
- Arendt H (1958) *The Human Condition* Chicago: Chicago UP
- Arendt H (1965) *On Revolution* Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
- Arendt H (1968) *Between Past and Future: Eight Exercises in Political Thought* New York: Viking
- Asian Human Rights Commission (2001a) 'Grundtvig's Views on Education' *Asia Folk School Online* Posted 19 September 2001 <http://afs.ahrchk.net/mainfile.php/background/8/> (Last accessed on 27 September 2006)
- Asian Human Rights Commission (2001b) 'The Concept of Folkelighed' *Asia Folk School Online* (Online) Posted 19 September 2001 <http://afs.ahrchk.net/mainfile.php/background/11/> (Last accessed on 27 September 2006)
- Askonas P and Stewart A (eds) (2000) *Social Inclusion: Possibilities and Tensions* Basingstoke: Palgrave

- Astley J (2002) 'In Defence of "Ordinary Theology"' *British Journal of Theological Education* 13.1: 21-35
- Auerbach E (1953) *Mimesis: The Representation of Reality in Western Literature* Princeton: Princeton U
- Audi R and Wolterstoff N (1997) *Religion in the Public Sphere*. New York: Rowman and Littlefield
- Auken S (2004) 'Spor af Grundtvig (og Kierkegaard) i dansk politik' pp107-117 in Mikkelsen og Thomsen (red) (2004)
- Bagø CC, Grønvald-Nielsen C and Nutzhorn H (1894) *Sangbog* Odense
- Bailey S (1996) *The Well within. Parables for Living and Dying* London: Darton, Longman and Todd
- Bakhtin MM (1984) *Problems of Dostoevsky's Poetics* (ed/trans C Emerson) Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press
- Baker W and Carpenter G (2003) *The Complete Word Study Dictionary: The Old Testament* Chattanooga, TN: AMG Publishers
- Balling JL (1993) 'Grundtvig, Dante, Milton' pp73ff Allchin et al (eds) (1993)
- Barber BR (1995) 'The Search for Civil Society' 'The New Citizenship' *The New Democrat* vol7 no2 March/April 1995 pp13-17
- Barbour I (1974) *Myths, Models and Paradigms: A Comparative Study in Science and Religion* New York: Harper and Row
- Barker E and Warburg M (eds) *New Religions and New Religiosity* Aarhus: Aarhus UP
- Barr J (1999) *Liberating Knowledge: Research, feminism and adult education* Leicester: National Institute for Adult Continuing Education (England and Wales)
- Barr J and Steele T (2003) 'Revaluing the Enlightenment: reason and imagination' *Teaching in Higher Education*, Vol 8, No 4, October 2003, pp 505-515
- Barry B (1987) 'Nationalism' pp352-54 in *The Blackwell Encyclopaedia of Political Thought* (ed David Miller) Oxford: Blackwell
- Barth F (1981) 'Ethnic groups and boundaries' in *Process and Form in Social Life: Selected Essays of Frederik Barth* voll pp198-227 London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
- Barthes R (1957) 'Myth today' (trans Annette Lavers) New York: Hill and Wang
- Battail J-F (2000) *The Nordic Identity - an external view* Copenhagen: The Danish Ministry of Culture
- Baudelaire C (1857/2005) 'L'homme Libre et La Mer' in his *Les Fleurs du Mal* Paris: Diane de Selliers
- Bauman R (1986) *Story, performance and event* In Cambridge Studies in oral and literate culture Cambridge: Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge
- Bausch WJ (2002) *Storytelling Imagination and Faith* Mystic CT: Twenty-Third Publications

- Begtrup H, Lund H and Manniche P (eds) (1926) *The Folk High Schools of Denmark and the Development of the Farming Community* London: Oxford UP
- Beiner R (ed) (1995) *Theorizing Citizenship* New York: SUNY Press
- Beiner R (ed) (1999) *Theorizing Nationalism* Albany NY: State University of New York Press
- Bell LA (2003) 'Telling Tales: what stories can teach us about racism' *Race Ethnicity and Education*, Vol6, No 1
- Benhabib S (1992) *Situating the Self: Gender, Community, and Postmodernism in Contemporary Ethics* New York: Routledge
- Benhabib S (1996) *The Reluctant Modernism of Hannah Arendt* Thousand Oaks and London: Sage Publications
- Benjamin W (1968) 'The storyteller: reflections on the works of Nikolai Leskov' in Arendt (1968)
- Bereday GZF (1964) 'Sir Michael Sadler's "Study of Foreign Systems of Education' *Comparative Education Review*, Vol 7, Nr 3 (Feb 1964), pp. 307-314
- Berlak A (1989) *Angles of Vision on emancipatory pedagogy* (Pre-publication draft quoted in Barr 1999:157)
- Berlin I (1965) 'JG Herder' *Encounter* 25 July 1965
- Berlin I (1978) *Concepts and Categories: Philosophical Essays* ed Henry Hardy London: Hogarth
- Berlin I (2000a) *The Roots of Romanticism* (The AW Mellon Lectures in the Fine Arts 1965 The National Gallery of Art, Washington DC) (ed Henry Hardy) London: Pimlico
- Berlin I (2000b) *Three Critics of the Enlightenment - Vico, Hamann, Herder* (ed Henry Hardy) London: Pimlico
- Berling JA (2004) *Understanding Other Religious Worlds: A Guide for Interreligious Education* Maryknoll: Orbis Books
- Bernstein R (1991) 'Does Philosophy Matter?' *Thinking* Vol 9 Nr4 pp2-4
- Berryman J (1991) *Godly Play* San Francisco: Harper
- Betjeman J (1958/2006) *Collected Poems* London: John Murray
- Bevans SB (1992) *Models of Contextual Theology* Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books
- Beveridge C and Turnbull R (1989) *The Eclipse of Scottish Culture: Inferiorism and the Intellectuals* Edinburgh: Polygon
- Bhabha HK (ed) (1990) *Nation and Narration* London: Routledge
- Bhattacharya A (2000) 'Adult education in India' pp173ff in Allchin et al (2000)
- Bielfeldt D (1998) 'Impediments to the Cultivation of the Folk High School Spirit in a North American Context' in Zöllner and Andersen
- Billig M (1995) *Banal Nationalism* London: Sage
- Birnbacker D and Krohn D (2004) 'Socratic Dialogue and Self-Directed Learning' pp9ff in Saran and Neisser (2004)

- Bjerg J (1994) 'Christen Mikkelsen Kold' *Prospects: the quarterly review of comparative education (UNESCO)* XXIV nr 1/2, 1994 pp21-35
- Björkstrand G (2000) 'Grundtvig's "Education for Life" pp163ff in Allchin et al (eds) (2000)
- Blau J and Christensen MJ (2006) *The Denmark Worth Protecting Denmark : Humanity in Action* Online publication at http://www.humanityinaction.org/docs/Mikkel_Jason_Final.do (Last accessed 28 September 2006)
- Bloch M (1954) *The Historian's Craft* (Trans P Putnam) Manchester: Manchester UP
- Boehmner E (1991) 'Stories of women and mothers: gender and nationalism in the early fiction of Flora Nmapa' In S Nasta (ed) *Motherlands: Black Women's Writings from Africa, The Caribbean and South Asia* London: The Women's Press
- Boff L (1985) *Church: Charism and Power* London: SCM Press
- Bolten H (2001) 'Managers Develop Moral Accountability: The Impact of Socratic Dialogue' in *Reason and Practice, the Journal of Philosophy of Management* Vol 1/3, December 2001 pp21-34
- Bond R (2006) 'Belonging and Becoming: National Identity and Exclusion' *Sociology* 40(4):609-626
- Borgå O (1998) interview with Clay Warren pp150ff in Warren (ed) (1998)
- Borish SM (1991) *The Land of the Living Nevada City, Ca:* Blue Dolphin Publishing
- Borish SM (1998) 'NFS Grundtvig as a Charismatic Prophet: an analysis of his life and work in the light of revitalization movement theory' *Scandinavian Journal of Educational Research* vol 42, no 3 pp237-255
- Bosch DJ (1986) 'Mission - an Attempt at a Definition' *Church Scene*, April 25, 1986
- Bosch DJ (1991) *Transforming Mission* American Society of Missiology Series No 16 Maryhill, NY: Orbis Books
- Bosch DJ (1995) *Believing in the Future* Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press
- Bottery M (1990) *The Morality of the School: The Theory and Practice of Values in Education* London: Cassell Publishing
- Boyte H (1997) 'The meaning of citizenship' *Kettering Review* Winter 1997, pp55-62
- Bradley SAJ (1993) 'Grundtvig's Palm Sunday 1867 and the Anglo Saxon Descent into Hell' pp198ff in *Grundtvig Studier* 1993
- Branner and Kelstrup M (eds) (2000) *Denmark's Policy Towards Europe After 1945: History, Theory and Options*, Odense: Odense University Press
- Braudel F (1989) *The Identity of France* 2 vols London: Fontana Press

- Brennan T (1997) *At Home in the World: Cosmopolitanism Now* Cambridge,MA: Harvard UP
- Breuilly J (1982) *Nationalism and the State* (First Edition) Manchester: Manchester UP
- Brix H (1908) *Fagre Ord*, Copenhagen: Gyldendal
- Broadbridge E and Jensen NL (trans) (1984) *A Grundtvig Anthology* Cambridge: James Clarke and Co
- Brookfield S (1990) *The Skillful Teacher* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
- Brown L (1993) *Shorter Oxford English Dictionary* Oxford: Oxford UP
- Browning D (1984) 'The Revival of Practical Theology' *Christian Century*, February 1-8,1984
- Brueggemann W (1982) *The Creative Word: Canon as a Model for Biblical Education*, Minneapolis: Fortress Press
- Brueggemann W (1989) *Finally Comes the Poet* Minneapolis: Fortress Press
- Brueggemann W (1990) *Power, Providence and Personality* Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press
- Brueggemann W (1997) *Cadences of Home. Preaching among the Exiles* Louisville,KY: Westminster/John Knox Press
- Bruner J (1986) *Actual Minds, Possible Worlds* Cambridge,MA: Harvard UP
- Bruner J (1991) 'The narrative construction of reality' *Critical Inquiry* 18:1-21
- Buckser AS (1995) 'Tradition, Power and Allegory: Constructions of the Past in Two Danish Religious Movements' *Ethnology* 34:4 Fall 1995 pp257ff
- Buckser AS (1996) *Communities of faith - sectarianism, identity and social change on a Danish island* Providence, Rhode Island: Berghahn Books
- Bugge KE (1965) *Skolen for livet : Studier over NFS Grundtvigs pædagogisk tanker* København: Institut for Dansk Kirkehistorie/GEC Gads Forlag
- Bugge KE (1983) 'Grundtvig's Educational Ideas' in Christian Thodberg and Anders Pontoppidan Thyssen (eds) *NFS Grundtvig: Tradition and Renewal* Copenhagen: Det Danske Selskab
- Bugge KE (1983a) 'Grundtvig on Man and Society' in *Church and Life* vol XXXII no 7 July 15, 1983
- Bugge KE (1983b) 'The Basic Ideas of Grundtvig's Educational Thought' Part I *Church and Life* vol XXXII no 8 August 15, 1983 pp7-9
- Bugge KE (1993)'The School for Life: the Basic Ideas of Grundtvig's Educational Thinking' pp271ff in Allchin et al (eds) *Heritage and Prophecy* Aarhus: Aarhus UP
- Bugge KE (1998) interview with Clay Warren pp38ff in Warren (ed)(1998) *Democracy is Born in Conversations* NY: Circumstantial Productions
- Bugge KE (1999a) *Canada and Grundtvig* (tr David Stoner) Vejle,Dk: Kroghs Forlag A/S

- Bugge KE (2000) 'Some International Varieties of Grundtvig Inspiration' pp185ff in Allchin et al (eds) (2000)
- Bugge KE (2001) 'First a Man - then a Christian, Grundtvig and Missionary Activity' (English summary) *Grundtvig Studier* 299ff
- Bugge KE (2003) 'Education and Development: Future, Past and Present in NFS Grundtvig's Educational Thinking' in T Mitra, A Bhattacharya and J Alan (eds) *Education and Development: Proceedings of the Grundtvig International Conference at Jadavpur University January 1999 Kolkata, India: Jadavpur University*
- Bultmann R (1953) 'New Testament and Mythology' in Hans-Werner Bartsch (ed) *Kerygma and Myth* London: SPCK
- Bundesministerium des Innern (Germany) (2005) *Nationality law* Online publication at http://www.zuwanderung.de/english/2_Staatsangehoerigkeit.html (Last accessed 27 September 2006)
- Burbules NC and Rice S (1991) 'Dialogue across Differences: Continuing the Conversation' *Harvard Educational Review* Vol 61, Nr 4, pp393-41
- Burr V (1995) *An Introduction to Social Constructivism* London: Routledge
- Byczkowski M, Malszewski T and Przybylska E (eds) (2003) *Folk High School- School for Life* Wieżyca: Kaszubski Uniwersytet Ludowy
- Calhoun C (1999) 'Nationalism, Political Community and the Representation of Society' *European Journal of Social Theory* 2:217-31
- Campbell JC (1921). *The southern highlander and his homeland*. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
- Canfield AT (1965) 'Folk High Schools in Denmark and Sweden: a comparative analysis' *Comparative Education Review* vol 9, nr 1, February 1965
- Chopp R (1995) *Saving Work: Feminist Practices of Theological Education* Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Knox Press
- Christensen B (1998) *Omkring Grundtvigs Vidskab* Copenhagen: GadsForlag
- Church of England (2003) 'Formation for Ministry Within a Learning Church. The Structure and Funding Of Ordination Training. The report of a working party set up by the Archbishops' Council' (commonly known as "The Hind Report") London: Church House Publishing
- Church of Scotland (1991) *Church without walls* (The report of the General Assembly's Special Commission anent Review and Reform) Edinburgh: The Church of Scotland
- Clack BR (1999) *An Introduction to Wittgenstein's Philosophy of Religion* Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP
- Clausen HP (1963) *Hvad er historie? Den historiske videnskabs metodiske grundspørgsmål og nyere synspunkter på historieforskningens teoretiske problemer* Copenhagen: Berlingske Forlag

- Cloke P and Little J(ed) (1997) *Contested Countryside Cultures* London: Routledge
- Code L (1989) 'Experience, knowledge and responsibility' in A Garry and M Pearsall (eds) *Women, Knowledge and Reality* London: Unwin Hyman
- Cohen A (1996) 'Personal Nationalism: A Scottish View of Some Rites, Rights, and Wrongs' *American Ethnologist* 23(4):802-15
- Colley L (1992) *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707-1837* New Haven CT and London: Yale UP
- Condor S, Gibson S and Abell J (2006) 'English identity and ethnic diversity in the context of UK constitutional change' *Ethnicities* Vol6(2):123-158
- Condor S and Abell J (2006) 'Vernacular constructions of "national identity" in post-devolution Scotland and England' Online publication at <http://www.psych.lancs.ac.uk/people/uploads/SusanCondor20051118T143236.pdf> (to which citations in the thesis here refer) but since published in J Wilson and K Stapleton (eds) *DeVolution and Identity* Aldershot: Aldgate (Online publication last accessed 4 October 2006)
- Confiant R (1993/2006) *Aimé Césaire : Une traversée paradoxale du siècle* 1993 edition - Paris: Stock; 2006 edition - Paris: Écriture
- Connell L (2004) 'Scottish Nationalism and the Colonial Vision of Scotland' *Interventions* 6:2:252-263
- Connor W (1973) 'The politics of ethno-nationalism' *Journal of International Affairs* 27(1):1-21
- Connor W (1978) 'A Nation is a Nation, is a State, is an Ethnic Group, is a... ' *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 1:377:400
- Connor W (1994) *Ethnonationalism. The Quest for Understanding* Princeton NJ: Princeton UP
- Conversi D (1997) *The Basques, the Catalans and Spain: Alternative Routes to Nationalist Mobilisation* London: C Hurst & Co
- Conversi D (2001) 'Cosmopolitanism and Nationalism' pp35ff in Leoussi (ed)
- Cook R (2001) 'British Identity'. Speech given at the Centre for the Open Society, Social Market Foundation, London, 19 April 2001
- Cooke A (2006) *From popular enlightenment to lifelong learning* Leicester: National Institute for Adult Continuing Education
- Courtney S (1989) *Handbook of Adult and Continuing Education* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
- Cowan EJ (1993) *The Peoples Past*. Edinburgh: Polygon
- Cowen R (2002) 'Moments of time: a comparative note' *History of Education* 31(5), 413-424
- Cox JM (1980) 'Recovering literature's lost ground through autobiography' in Olney (ed) (1980)

- Craig C (1996) *Out of History: Narrative Paradigms in Scottish and British Culture* Edinburgh: Polygon
- Craig C (2003) *The Scots' Crisis of Confidence'* Edinburgh: Big Thinking
- Crawford R (1993) *Identifying Poets: Self and Territory in Twentieth-Century Poetry* Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP
- Crites S (1989) 'The narrative quality of experience' pp65-88 in Hauerwas and Jones (eds) (1989)
- Crockett JV (1991) *Teaching Scripture from an African-American Perspective* Nashville, Tennessee: Discipleship Resources
- Crossley M and Jarvis P (eds) (2000) 'Comparative education for the twenty-first century' *Comparative Education*, 36(3)
- Crystal D (2006) *The Fight for English* Oxford: Oxford UP
- Cultiaux Y (2001) 'The Shaping of the Nation: Catalan History and Historicity in Post-Franco Spain' in Dieckhoff and Gutiérrez (2001) *Dieckhoff and Gutiérrez (2001) Modern Roots* Aldershot: Ashgate *Modern Roots* Aldershot: Ashgate
- Cupitt D (1991) *What is a Story?* SCM Press
- Cupitt D (1999) *The Meaning of It All in Everyday Speech* London: SCM Press
- Czettler J (1921) 'The Hungarian folk high school' *Néptanítók lapja* No 1/1920-21
- D'Costa G (2005) *Theology in the Public Square: Church, Academy and Nation* Oxford: Blackwell Publishing
- Dahrendorf R (1990) *Reflection on the Revolution in Europe* London: Chatto and Windus
- Daly M (1990) *Gyn/ecology: The Metaethics of Radical Feminism*. Boston, MA: Beacon Press
- Daly M (1992) *Pure Lust: Elemental Feminist Philosophy*. London: Women's Press
- Dam P (1983) 'Grundtvig's Vision of Mankind and His Ideas on *Folklighed*' pp31-42 in *Education for Life - International conference on the occasion of the Bicentenary of NFS Grundtvig, 10-14 September 1983* Copenhagen: Det Danske Selskab
- Danish Internal Affairs and Health Ministry (*Indenrigs- og Sundhedsministeriet*) (2006) *Danish Election Results* Available at <http://www.im.dk/valg/> (Last accessed 28 September 2006)
- Danske Folkeparti (2006) 'Principprogram' Online publication at http://www.danskfolkeparti.dk/sw/frontend/show.asp?parent=19185&menu_parent=22669&layout=0 (Last accessed 28 September 2006)
- Darwin C (1859) *On the Origin of Species by Means of Natural Selection* London: John Murray
- Davies J D and Vincent JJ 1986 *Mark at Work* London: Bible Reading Fellowship

- Davies N (1931) *Education for Life: A Danish Pioneer*
London: Williams and Norgate
- Davies N (1944) *Grundtvig of Denmark - a Guide to small nations* Caenarfon: Swyddfa'r Blarid
- Davies N (1965) 'Summary' in Bugge (1965)
- Davies O and Bowie F(eds) (1992) *Discovering Welshness*
Llandysul: Gomer
- Delanty G (1995) *Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality*
New York: St Martin's Press
- Delgado R (1995) *Legal Storytelling: Storytelling For Oppositionists And Others: A Plea For Narrative*, In R. Delgado ed.) *Critical Race Theory: The Cutting Edge*, Pp. 64-74 Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press
- Delgehausen I (2004) 'Experiences with Socratic Dialogue in Primary Schools' pp41ff in Saran and Neissen
- Den Danske Salmebog (1997) Copenhagen: Det Kgl Vajsenhus' Forlag
- Den Danske Salmebog (2003) Copenhagen: Det Kgl Vajsenhus' Forlag
- Denmark.dk (2006) 'Cultural Denmark - History - Overview'
Online publication at
http://denmark.dk/portal/page?_pageid=374,477807&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL (Last accessed 28 September 2006)
- Det Danske Selskab (1983) *Grundtvig's Ideas in North America* Report of workshop sponsored by the Scandinavian Seminar College, Holte, Denmark.
Copenhagen: Det Danske Selskab
- Detweiler C and Taylor B (2003) *A Matrix of Meanings: Finding God in Pop Culture* Grand Rapids, MI: Baker Academic
- Deutsch E (1997) Preface (xii-xiv) in E Deutsch and R Bontekoe (Eds) *A companion to world philosophies*
Oxford, Blackwell
- Dialog (2006) 'Respecting Muslims' *Dialog: A Journal of Theology* 45 (2), 115-116.
- Dieckhoff A and Gutiérrez N (2001) *Modern Roots* Aldershot: Ashgate
- Doty W (1975) 'Stories of our times' in Wiggins (ed) (1975) *Religion as Story* New York: Harper and Row
- Driver T (1977) *Patterns of Grace: Human Experience as Word of God* San Francisco: Harper and Row
- Drummond P and Patterson R (eds) (1985) *Television in Transition*. London: British Film Institute
- Dunn JDG (1987) *The Living Word* London: SCM Press
- Dunn J (1999) 'Nationalism' pp27ff in Beiner (ed) (1999)
- Durrell L (1969) *Spirit of place: letters and papers on travel* London: Faber
- Editors of the American Heritage Dictionaries (2000) *The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language*
Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin

- Education Guardian Weekly (2006) 9 May 2006 (Online)
<http://education.guardian.co.uk/egweekly/story/0,,1770234,00.html> (Last accessed 16 May 2006)
- Edwards BH (2003) *The Practice of Diaspora* Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP
- Edwards M (2004) *Civil Society* Cambridge: Polity
- Egan K (1995) 'Narrative and learning: A voyage of implications' pp116-125 in H McEwan and K Egan (eds) *Narrative in teaching, learning and research* New York: Teachers College Press
- Egan K (1999) *Children's minds: talking rabbits and clockwork oranges* New York: Teachers College Press
- Eisner E (1998) *The Kind of Schools we need* Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann
- Eliade M (1958) *Patterns in Comparative Religion* London: Sheed and Ward
- Ende M (1993) 'Literature for Children' pp281-6 in Lipman (1993)
- Engels F (1850) 'Letter from Germany. The War in Schleswig Holstein' *The Democratic Review* July 21, 1850 Cologne
- Erdall J (2004) *Ghosting* Edinburgh: Canongate
- Eriksen M (1989) 'A Plain and Active, Joyful Life on Earth. A Holistic Cultural Perspective' *Ethnologica Scandinavica* Vol 19 pp64-82
- Eriksen TH (nd) 'Norway - a multi-ethnic country' *Odin* Online publication by the Utriksministeret/ Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs at <http://odin.dep.no/odin/engelsk/norway/social/032091-990909/index-dok000-b-n-a.html> (Last accessed 29 September 2006)
- Erslev K (1911) 'Historieskrivning. Grundlinier til nogle Kapitler af Historiens Theori' *Historisk Tidsskrift* No 10, vol V, pp355-84
- Esken M (1948) 'Minder og Udsigter fra 40 Aars Skoleliv' pp238-43 in Johansen og Højrup (1948)
- Eslinger RL (1995) *Narrative and Imagination. Preaching the Worlds that Shape Us* Fortress Press
- Etzioni A (1995) *The Spirit of Community* Fontana Press
- Ewick P & Silbey S (1995) Subversive stories and hegemonic tales: toward a sociology of narrative, *Law and Society Review*, 29, pp. 197-226
- Fain EF (1971) 'Nationalist Origins of the Folk High School: The Romantic Visions of N.F.S. Grundtvig' *British Journal of Educational Studies* 19:1:70ff
- Fairclough N (1989) *Language and Power* London: Longman
- Fallon M and Mahon D (eds) (1990) *The Penguin Book of Contemporary Irish Poetry* Harmondsworth: Penguin
- Fanon F (1959) 'Reciprocal Bases of National Culture and the Fight for Freedom' (Speech at the Congress of Black African Writers, 1959) reproduced in F Fanon *Wretched of the Earth* The version used here is available electronically at

- <http://www.marxists.org/subject/africa/fanon/national-culture.htm> (Last accessed 16 October 2006)
- Farley E (1983) *Theologia: The Fragmentation and Unity of Theological Education* Philadelphia: Fortress Press
- Farley E (1998) 'Toward Theological Understanding: An Interview with Edward Farley' *The Christian Century*, February 4/11/98, pp. 113-115 & 149
- Farnell R, Furbey R, Hills S, Macey M and Smith G (2003) '*Faith*' in urban regeneration? *Engaging faith communities in urban regeneration* Bristol: The Policy Press
- Favat AF (1977) *Child and tale: the origins of interest* Urbana, IL: National Council of Teachers of English
- Feldbæk O (1992) *Dansk Identitetshistorie* København: CA Reitzels Forlag
- Feldman RM (2003) 'German By Virtue Of Others: The Search For Identity In Three Debates' *Cultural Studies* 17(2) 2003, 250-274
- Fergusson D (2005) Contribution at *Can Judaism, Christianity and Islam speak the same civic language?* New College, The University of Edinburgh 8 March 2006 unpublished (my notes)
- Ferry J-M. and Thibaud P (1992) *Discussion sur l'Europe*. Paris: Calmann-Lévy
- Fetzer JS and Soper JC (2005) *Muslims and the State in Britain, France and Germany* Cambridge: Cambridge UP
- Field J (2003) *Social capital* London: Routledge
- Fisher R (1996) *Stories for Thinking* Oxford: Nash Pollock
- Flanagan C (2004) 'Political Myth and Germany 1945-1949' *German Life and Letters* 57:1 January 2004
- Flint J and Kearns A (2004) *The role of Church of Scotland congregations in developing social capital in Scottish Communities: Enabling and cohesive or irrelevant and divisive?*, Glasgow: ESRC Centre for Neighbourhood Research, Centre for Neighbourhood Research Paper Nr 16
- Fokkelman JP (1999) *Reading Biblical Narrative* Leiderdorp, The Netherlands: Deo Publishing
- Forst R (1994) *Kontexte der Gerechtigkeit* Frankfurt/Main: Suhrkamp
- Foster M (2001) 'Johann Gottfried von Herder' *The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* Online at www.plato.stanford.edu/entries/herder (Last accessed 12 July 2006)
- Fowler HE (1914) (trans) *Plato* Volume I Euthyphro. Apology. Crito. Phaedo. Phaedrus Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP
- Frandsen SB (1993) 'Jylland og Denmark' in Østergård (ed) (2002)
- Frankl V (1985) *Man's Search for Meaning*, New York: Washington Square Press
- Fraser AC (1993) *Thomas Reid* Bristol: Thoemmes

- Fraser GM (1971) *The Steel Bonnets* London: HarperCollins Publishing
- Fraser N (2003) 'Rethinking Recognition: Overcoming Displacement and Reification in Cultural Politics' pp21-32 in Hobson (ed) (2003)
- Freedman J and Combs G (1996) *Narrative Therapy* New York: WW Norton and Company
- Freire P (1973) 'By learning they can teach' *Convergence* 6(1)
- Freire P (1989) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* New York: Continuum Press
- Freire P (1998) *Teachers as cultural workers: Letters to those who dare teach*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press
- Freire P and Shor I (1987) *A Pedagogy for Liberation: Dialogues in Transforming Education* London: Macmillan
- Fried MH (1975) *The Notion of Tribe* Menlo Park: Cummings Publishing Company
- Friedenthal-Haase M, Hake BJ and Marriott S (eds) (1991) *British-Dutch-German Relationships in Adult Education 1880-1930 Studies in the theory and history of cross-cultural communication in adult education* Leeds Studies in Continuing Education, Cross Cultural Studies in the Education of Adults No1 Leeds: Study of Continuing Education Unit, School of Education, University of Leeds
- Friedland L and Siriani C (1995) *Critical concepts in the new citizenship* A report prepared for the Pew Charitable Trusts, December 1995
- Friedlander S (ed) (1992) *Probing the limits of representation: Nazism and 'The Final Solution'* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard UP
- Fry M (2006) *Wild Scots: Four Hundred Years of Highland History* Edinburgh: John Murray
- Frye N (1963) 'The Drunken Boat: The Revolutionary Element in Romanticism' in Northrop Frye (ed) *Romanticism Reconsidered: Selected Papers from the English Institute* New York and London: Columbia UP
- Fukuyama F (1995) *Trust: The Social Virtues and the Creation of Prosperity* New York: Free Press
- Fukuyama F (2006) 'Identity, Immigration and Liberal Democracy' *Journal of Democracy* vol17, no2, April 2006, pp5-20
- Fullinwider R (ed) (1996) *Public Education in a Multicultural Society* New York: Cambridge University Press
- Fullinwider R (ed) (1999) *Civil society, Democracy and Civil Renewal* New York: Rowman and Littlefield Publishers
- Furbey R, Dinham A, Farnell R, Finneron D, Wilkinson G (2006) *Faith as social capital* Joseph Rowntree Foundation/ The Policy Press

- Gabriel Y(ed) (2004) *Myths, Stories and Organizations*
Oxford: Oxford UP
- Galal LP and Liengaard I (2003) *At være muslim i Danmark*
Copenhagen: Forlaget ANIS
- Galston W (1991) *Liberal Purposes: Goods, Virtues and Duties in the Liberal State* Cambridge: Cambridge UP
- Gardiner P (1995) 'History, history of the philosophy of'
In T Honderich (ed) (1995)
- Geary PJ (1996) *La Mémoire and l'Oubli à la Fin du Premier Millénaire* Paris: Auber
- Gee JP (1999) *An Introduction to Discourse Analysis: theory and method* New York: Routledge
- Geertz C (1993) *The Interpretation of Cultures* London: Fontana
- Gellner E (1994) *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals* London: Hamish Hamilton
- Gellner E (1997) *Nationalism* London: Orion Books
- General Register Office for Scotland (2006) Scottish Census results on line Online version at
<http://www.scrol.gov.uk> (Last accessed 18 October 2006)
- Gherardi S (2004) 'Knowing as Desire: Dante's *Ulysses* at the End of the Known World' pp32-48 in Gabriel (ed) (2004)
- Gibbon LG (1932/1995) 'Sunset Song' In Tom Crawford (ed) *A Scots Quair* Edinburgh: Canongate Press
- Giesen B (2003) 'The Collective Identity of Europe: Constitutional Practice or Community of Memory?' pp21-35 in Spohn and Triandafyllidou (eds) (2003)
- Gilchrist A (2004) *The well-connected community: A networking approach to community development* Bristol: The Policy Press
- Gillingham SE (1998) *One Bible, Many Voices* London:SPCK
- Giradet R (1986) *Mythes et Mythologies Politiques* Paris: Editions de Seuil
- Giroux, H. and Purpel, D. (Eds.) *The Hidden Curriculum and Moral Education* Berkely C.A., McCutcheon
- Glistrup M (1991) *De fremmede i landet* Copenhagen: Nordisk Bogforlag
- Gobodo-Madikizela P (2006) *A Human Being Died That Night* London: Portobello Books
- Goffman E (1974) *Frame Analysis* New York: Harper and Row
- Goldschmidt D (2003) 'Tolerance' pp251ff in Galal and Liengaard (2003)
- Goodburn D (2001) 'Mapping Church-Related Education' *British Journal of Theological Education* 11.2:39-47
- Gosse EW (1879) *Studies in the Literature of Northern Europe* London: C Kegan Paul and Co
- Graham E, Walton H and Ward F (2005) *Theological Reflection: Methods* London: SCM Press
- Grainger R (2004) *Myth and the Possibility of Meaning* Oxford: The Dominican Council/Blackwell Publishing Ltd

- Green A (1997) *Education, globalization, and the nation state* Basingstoke: Macmillan
- Grieve M and Aitken WR (eds) (1978) *Hugh MacDiarmid : Complete Poems 1920-1976* vol 2 pp737-890 London: Martin, Brian and O'Keefe
- Griffiths T (1991) *Scandinavia* Kent Town, Wakefield Press
- Groome T (1980) *Christian Religious Education: Sharing our Story and Vision* New York: Harper and Row
- Grundtvig NFS / udg. af Christian Thodberg *NFS Grundtvigs Prædikener 1822-26 og 1832-39* (1983-86) Copenhagen: GEC Gad (12bd)
- Grundtvig NFS / udg. af George Christensen og Stener Grundtvig (1924-26) *Breve fra og til NFS Grundtvig* Copenhagen: Gyldendals Boghandel (10bd)
- Grundtvig NFS / udg. ved Georg Christensen og Hal Koch (1935-36) *NFS Grundtvig. Værker i Udvalg* Copenhagen: Gyldendal (12bd)
- Grundtvig NFS / ved Holger Begtrup (1904-09) *Nik.Fred.Sev. Grundtvigs Udvalgte Skrifter* Copenhagen: Gyldendals Boghandel (10bd)
- Grundtvig NFS /udg. af S Grundtvig (1880-1930) *NFS Grundtvigs Poetiske Skrifter* Copenhagen: Karl Schönbergs Forlag (9bd)
- Grundtvig NFS *Grundtvigs Sang-Værk* (1944-56) Copenhagen: Det Danske Forlag (6bd)
- Guibernau M (2004) 'Nations and national identity' *Nations and Nationalism* 10(1/2), 2004, 125-141
- Gutiérrez N (2001) 'Interpretations of National Identity' in Dieckhoff and Gutiérrez (2001)
- Habermas J (1984-87) *Theory of Communicative Action* Boston, MA: Beacon Press
- Habermas J (1989) *The New Conservatism. Cultural Criticism and the Historians' Debate.* Cambridge: Polity
- Habermas J (1996) 'Civil Society and the Political Public Sphere' In Rehg(1996)
- Habermas J (2001) 'Faith and Knowledge - An Opening' (Speech in accepting the Peace Prize of the German Publishers and Booksellers Association at Paulskirche, Frankfurt, 14 October 2001 Published in *Sueddeutsche Zeitung*, 15 October 2001 (Online version)
<http://www.sueddeutsche.de/aktuell/sz/artikel86740.php>
 Translated into English at
<http://www.nettime.org/Lists-Archives/nettime-1-0111/msg00100.html> (Last accessed 27 October 2006)
- Habermas J (2005) 'Religion in the Public Sphere' (Online publication)
http://www.sandiego.edu/pdf/pdf_library/habermaslecture031105_c939cceb2ab087bdfc6df291ec0fc3fa.pdf (Last accessed 24 October 2006)
- Habermas J (2006) *Between Naturalism and Religion* Cambridge, UK: Polity Press (Originally published as

- Zurischen Naturalismus und Religion (2005) Frankfurt: Suhrkamp Verlag)
- Haesly R (2005) 'Identifying Scotland and Wales: types of Scottish and Welsh national identities' *Nations and Nationalism* 112, 2005, 243-63
- Hage G (1998) 'The Spatial Imagery of National Practices: Dwelling-Domesticating/Being-Exterminating' *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space* 14:63-485
- Haitjema TL (1925) 'De Deensche Volkhoogescholen' *Stemmen des Tijds* 3:134
- Hake BJ and Both H (1991) 'Cross-cultural Influences and the Origins of Residential Adult Education in the Netherlands: the British and Scandinavian Connections' pp177ff Friedenthal-Haase et al (eds) (1991)
- Hall DJ (1989) *Thinking the Faith: Christian Theology in a North American Context* Minneapolis, Minn: Augsburg
- Hammersley M And Gomm R (1997) 'Bias In Social Research', *Sociological Research Online*, Vol. 2, no. 1 Online publication at <http://www.socresonline.org.uk/socresonline/2/1/2.html> (Last accessed 14 June 2006)
- Hansard (1998) *House of Commons Select Committee on Scottish Affairs Examination of Witnesses*, 24 June 1998
- Hansen D (1988) 'Was Socrates a "Socratic Teacher"?' *Educational Theory* 38 nr2 pp213-24
- Hansen HLK (2003) 'Classroom Dialogues and Reflections in Southeast Asia inspired by Grundtvig's educational Ideas' pp166ff *Grundtvig Studier* 2003
- Haraway D (1991) *Simians, Cyborgs and Women* London: Free Association Books
- Harbsmeier G (1973) 'Grundtvig and Germany' pp 128-38 *Grundtvig Studier* 1973
- Hardy H (ed) (2000) *The Power of Ideas* London: Chatto and Windus
- Harris R (2006) 'New Ethnicities and Diaspora Identities' in European Research Group *The State and Ethnic Definition* Online publication of report of workshop report 11 February 2006 at http://erg.politics.ox.ac.uk/materials/state_and_ethnic_definition/final_workshop_report_july06.pdf (Last accessed 29 September 2006)
- Hauerwas S (1981) *A Community of Character* University of Notre Dame Press
- Hauerwas S and Jones LG (eds) (1989) *Why Narrative? Readings in Narrative Theology* Eerdmans
- Haydon G (ed) (1987) *Education and Values, the Richard Peters Lectures* London: University of London Institute of Education)
- Hearn J (2000) *Claiming Scotland: National Identity and Liberal Culture* Edinburgh: Polygon
- Heckman G (2004) 'Six Pedagogical Measures and Socratic Facilitation' pp107ff in Saran and Neisser (eds) (2004)

- Hedetoft U (1995) *Signs of Nations* Aldershot: Dartmouth
- Held D, McGrew A, Goldblatt D and Perraton J (1999) *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics and Culture*. Cambridge: Polity
- Hendrichvoh L von (1998) 'interview with Clay Warren' in C Warren (ed) *Democracy is Born in Conversations* New York: Circumstantial Productions
- Henningsen H (1993a) 'The Danish Folk High School' in Allchin at al (eds) (1993)
- Henningsen H (1993b) 'The Nordic and the Baltic States in Europe Today' in Schjørring (red) (1993)
- Henningsen H (1995) 'Brief Outline of the Development of the Danish Folk High School with the Emphasis on Its Early History' in Zöllner and Andersen (eds) (1995)
- Herder JG (1777-1804) *Sämmtliche Werke* (ed Bernard Suphan) Berlin: Weidmann
- Hervieu-Léger D (1998) 'Secularization, Tradition and New Forms of Religiosity: Some Theoretical Proposals' In Barker and Warburg (eds) (1998) Barker E and Warburg M (eds) *New Religions and New Religiosity* Aarhus: Aarhus UP
- Heurtley CA (nd) *The Commonitory of St. Vincent of Lerins* (Online)
<http://www.westernorthodox.com/commonitory#general-rule>
 (Last accessed 29 October 2006)
- Higginson JH (ed) (1900) *Selections From Michael Sadler* Liverpool: DeJall & Meyorre)
- Higginson JH (ed) (1979) *Selections from Michael Sadler: Studies in World Citizenship* Liverpool: DeJall and Meyorre
- Hill D (1994) *Citizens and cities: Urban policy in the 1990s*, London: Harvester Wheatsheaf
- Himmelstrup P (1998) interview with Clay Warren pp9ff in Warren (ed) (1998)
- Hirsch ED (1967) *Validity in Interpretation* New Haven and London: Yale UP
- Hobsbawm E J 1990, *Nations and Nationalism since 1780: Programme, Myth, Reality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
- Hobson B (ed) (2003) *Recognition Struggles and Social Movements* Cambridge: Cambridge UP
- Hodes A (1972) *Encounter with Martin Buber* London: Allen Lane/ Penguin
- Högnäs S (2001) 'The Concept of *Bildung* and the Education of the Citizen' pp29ff In Ahonen S and Rantala J (2001)
- Holberg L (1743) *Moraliske Tanker. Med efterskrift ved F. J. Billeskov Jansen*. Copenhagen: Rosenkilde og Bagger (After Ludwig Holbergs *Moralische Gedanken*, 1744)
 Leipzig: EC Reichard
- Holberg L (1769-71) *Værker, I-XII* (ed FJ Billeskov Jansen) Copenhagen: Rosenkilde og Bagger

- Holloway RF (1996) *Limping Towards the Sunrise* Edinburgh: St Andrew Press
- Holm A (2001) *Historie og Efterklang: En studie I NFS Gruntvigs tidsskrift Danne-Virke* Odense: Odense Universitetsforlag
- Home Office (2006) *Life in the UK Test* Online publication: home page at <http://www.lifeintheuktest.gov.uk/textsite/index.html> (Last accessed 24 September 2006)
- Honderich T (ed) (1995) *The Oxford Companion to Philosophy* pp364-6 Oxford: Oxford UP
- Honigmann JJ (1959) *The world of man* New York: Harper
- Hope Nicolson M (1959) *Mountain Gloom and Mountain Glory* New York: Cornell UP
- Horton M (1978) Highlander Folk School. *Option: Newsletter of the Folk-College Association of America* pp 73-81, Spring
- Hosking G and Schöpflin G (1997) *Myths and Nationhood* London, Hurst and Co
- Houle C (1980) *Continuing Learning in the Professions* San Francisco: Jossey-Bass
- Howe S (2002) 'Afterword. Transnationalisms Good, Bad, Real, Imagined, Thick and Thin' *Interventions* 4(1):79-88
- Huizinga J (1968) 'The Aesthetic Element in Historical Thought' In *Dutch civilisation in the seventeenth century, and other essays*. (Selected by Pieter Geyl and FWN Hugenholtz. Translated by Arnold J. Pomerans) London/Glasgow: Collins
- Humes W (1986) *The Leadership Class in Scottish Education* Edinburgh: John Donald Publishers
- Huntingdon S (1993) 'The Clash of Civilizations' *Foreign Affairs* 72.3 (1993) 22-49
- Huntingdon S (1996) *The Clash of Civilizations* New York: Simon and Schuster
- Hussain A and Miller W (2004) 'Multiculturalism and Scottish nationalism' *Connections, Spring 2004* Online version at www.cre.gov.uk/publs/connections/04sp_scotland.html (last accessed on 14 September 2006)
- Hutchinson J (1987) *The Dynamics of Cultural Nationalism*, London: Allan and Unwin
- Hutchinson J (2004) 'The nation as ethnic overlay' *Nations and Nationalism* 10(1/2), 2004:109-123
- Hæstrup J (1976) *Secret Alliance: A Study of the Danish Resistance Movement 1940-45* (Odense University Studies in History and Social Sciences No 35). Odense: Odense UP
- Haarder A (1983) 'Grundtvig and the Old Norse Cultural Heritage' in Thodberg C and Thyssen AP (eds) (1983)

- Ichijo A and Uzelac G(eds) (2005) *When is the Nation?*
London: Routledge
- Ignatieff M (1994) *Blood and Belonging* London: Vintage
- Ignatieff M (1999) 'Nationalism and the Narcissism of Minor Differences' in Beiner (ed) (1999)
- Institute of Governance (2006) 'Identity claims in post-devolution Scotland: Birth, blood and belonging'
Briefing Paper No1, January 2006 Edinburgh: Institute of Governance, The University of Edinburgh
- Jackson E-R and Maley W (2002) 'Celtic Connections: Colonialism and Culture in Irish-Scottish Modernism'
Interventions 4(1):68-78
- Jackson M (2002) *The Politics of Storytelling* Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, University of Copenhagen
- Jarvis P (2002) 'Expanding the Horizons of Research into Adult Christian Education' *British Journal of Theological Education* 13:1
- Jasper D (1993) 'NFS Grundtvig, ST Coleridge: The Hymnwriter and the Poet' in Allchin et al(eds) (1993)
- Jaworski A & Coupland N (eds) (!999) *The Discourse Reader*
London: Routledge
- Jensen J og Nielsen E (red) (1983) *Efterklang - en Grundtvig-seminar* Centrum
- Jensen O (2003) 'Phenomenological Analyses of Quite a Different Kind' *KE Løgstrup Newsletter* Spring 2003, No2
- Jespersen KJV (2004) *A History of Denmark* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Online at
<http://www.palgrave.com/pdfs/0333659171.pdf>
(References in the thesis are to the online publication pagination) (Last accessed 20 September 2006)
- Jespersen L (2002) 'Court and Nobility in early Modern Denmark' *Scandinavian Journal of History* 23(3):129-142
- Jewett R and Lawrence JS (2003) *Captain America and the Crusade against Evil. The Dilemma of Zealous Nationalism* Grand Rapids, Michigan/ Cambridge,UK: William B Eerdmans Publishing Company
- Johansen og Højrup (eds)(1948) *Grundtvigs Erindringer of Erindringer om Grundtvig* Copenhagen
- Johansen S(ed) (1956) *NFS Grundtvig Taler paa Marielyst Højskole 1856-1871*
Journal of World Education (2002)'Grundtvig's concept of Folkelighed and Livingstone's concept of Civilization'
32:2 autumn 2002 pp20-23
- Journal of World Education* (2003) Vol 33, 2 (summer) - 'Grundtvig's Ideas on Enlightenment'
- June LN (ed) (1991) *The Black Family: Past Present and Future* Grand Rapids,Michigan: Zondervan Publishing
- Jung C (1969) *Four Archetypes* Princeton,NJ: Princeton UP
- Jørgensen, Theodor (1993a) 'Reflections on Grundtvig and Germany' *Grundtvig Studier* 1993

- Jørgensen Th (1993b) 'Grundtvig's The Church Retort' p171ff
in Allchin AM et al (eds) *Heritage and Prophecy*
Aarhus: Aarhus UP
- Jørgensen Th (1996) 'Grundtvig's Ideas on the Character of
the People and Christianity' *Grundtvig Studier* 1986
pp71-83 English summary p103
- Kalinowski W (2003) 'Donner une âme à l'Europe'
(typescript) cited in Schlesinger and Foret (2006)
- Kandel I L (1933) *Studies in comparative education* (Boston,
MA, Houghton & Mifflin)
- Kasting H (1969) *Die Anfänge der urchristlichen Mission*
Munich: Chr. Kaiser Verlag
- Katz E & Tamar L (1985): 'Mutual Aid in the Decoding of
Dallas: Preliminary Notes from a Cross-Cultural Study'
pp. 187-198 in: Drummond and Patterson (eds) (1985)
- Kay B (1993) *The Mither Tongue* Darvel: Alloway Publishing
Ltd
- Keane J (2003) *Global Civil Society* Cambridge: Cambridge UP
- Kearney C (2004) 'Inventing Mythologies: The Construction
of Complex Cross-Cultural Identities' *European
Educational Research Journal, Volume 3, Number 3, 2004,*
603ff
- Kearney R (2002) *On Stories* London: Routledge
- Kearney R and Dooley M (eds) (1999) 'Imagination,
Testimony, and Trust: A Dialogue with Paul Ricoeur' in
Questioning Ethics: Debates in Contemporary Philosophy
London and New York: Routledge
- Kearton A (2005) 'Imagining the "Mongrel Nation": Political
Uses of History in the Recent Scottish Nationalist
Movement' *National Identities* Vol7, no1, March 2005,
pp23-50
- Keating M (2001) *Nations against the State* 2nd ed
Basingstoke: Palgrave
- Kellner H (1989) *Language and Historical Representation:
Getting the Story Crooked*. Madison: The University of
Wisconsin Press
- Kellas James G (1998) *The Politics of Nationalism and
Ethnicity* 2nd edition Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan
- Kessels J (2001) 'Socrates comes to market' *Reason in
Practice: The Journal of Philosophy of Management*
March 2001 Vol 1/1
- Key EKM (1909) *The Century of the Child* New York: Putnam's
(See also the Danish version, Key EKM (1902) *Barnets
århundrade* Copenhagen: Gyldendalske Boghandels Forlag)
- Kiely R, Bechhofer F and McCrone D (2005) 'Birth, blood and
belonging: identity claims in post-devolution Scotland'
The Sociological Review Vol 53 Issue 1 February 2005
pp150ff
- Kiely R, McCrone D and Bechhofer F (2005) 'Whither
Britishness? English and Scottish people in Scotland'

- Nations and Nationalism* Vol 11, issue 1, January 2005
pp65ff
- Kildegaard AC (2000) 'Danish Grundtvigians in the United States: Challenges Past and Present' in Allchin, Bradley, Hjelm and Schørring (eds) (2000)
- Killen and de Beer J(1994) *The Art of Theological Reflection* New York: The Crossroad Publishing Company
- Kirkby D and Kuykendall C (1991) *Mind Matters: Teaching for Thinking* Portsmouth, NH: Boynton Cook
- Klotz N D (2005) Contribution at *Can Judaism, Christianity and Islam speak the same civic language?* New College, The University of Edinburgh 8 March 2006 unpublished (my notes)
- Knudsen J (1955) *Danish Rebel* Philadelphia: Muhlenberg Press
- Knudsen J (ed)(1976) *NFS Grundtvig: selected writings* Philadelphia: Fortress Press
- Koch H (1943/1952) *Grundtvig* (trans Llewellyn Jones) Copenhagen: Gyldendal/ Nordisk Forlag
- Kohn H (1945) *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of its Origins and Background* New York: The Macmillan Co
- Kold Ch (2003) 'Thoughts on the Primary School' (edited and abridged by Lars Skriver Svendsen, translated by Jindra Kulich in Forlaget Vartov *Freedom in Thought and Action. Kold's Ideas on Teaching Children* Ollerup/Copenhagen: Centre for Research on Free School in collaboration with Forlaget Vartov
- Korsgaard O (1997) *Kampen om Lyset* Copenhagen: Gyldenhal
- Korsgaard O (1998) *The Struggle for Enlightenment* Copenhagen: Danish AWE
- Korsgaard O (2000) 'Grundtvig's Educational Ideas' pp237-253 In Tosse, Sigvart *Reforms and Policy: Adult Education Research in Nordic Countries* Trondheim: Tapir Academic Press
- Korsgaard O (2002) 'A European Demos? The Nordic adult education tradition - *folkeoplysning* - faces a challenge' *Comparative Education* Vol38 nr1 2002 pp7-16
- Korsgaard O (2003) '*Folkelighed versus Multikulturalisme*' pp231ff in Lise Paulsen Galal and Inge Liengaard *At være muslim i Danmark* Copenhagen: Forlaget ANIS
- Korsgaard O (2004) *Kampen om folket : et dannelsesperspektiv på dansk historie gennem 500 år* Copenhagen: Gyldendal
- Korsgaard O (2006) 'Giving the Spirit a National Form: From Rousseau's advice to Poland to Habermas' advice to the European Union' *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 38 (2): 231-246
- Kraemer H (1961) *Religion and the Christian Faith* London: Lutterworth

- Kulich J (1991) 'Reflections on adult education and reconstruction in Eastern Europe in the 1990s' *IS journal* no 11, pp49-53
- Kulich J (1997) 'Christian Kold, founder of the Danish folk high school: myth and reality' *International Journal of Lifelong Learning* Vol 16 nr 5 September/ October 1997 pp439-453
- Kulich J (2002) *Grundtvig's Educational Ideas in Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltic States in the Twentieth Century* Copenhagen:Forlaget Vartov
- Kumar K (1993) Civil Society: An inquiry into the usefulness of an historical term *British Journal of Sociology* 44(3), 375-395
- Kung H (1996) *Yes to a Global Ethic* trans J Bowden London: SCM Press
- Kuper L (1981) *Genocide* Harmondsworth: Penguin
- Kvan (1999) 'Livoplysning' November 1999 *Kvan* 55 Århus: Århus Dag- og Aftenseminarium
- Kvist M (1995) 'Grundtvig as a Christian Thinker - or the Trinity of the Senses' in Zøllner and Andersen (eds) (1995)
- Kwok P-K (1994) 'The Future of Feminist Theology: An Asian Perspective' pp63-75 in U King (ed) *Feminist Theology from the Third World: A Reader* London: SPCK
- Kymlicka W (1995) *Multicultural Citizenship* Oxford: Clarendon Press
- Kymlicka W (1999) 'Misunderstanding Nationalism' in Beiner (ed) (1999)
- Kymlicka W (2001) *Politics in the Vernacular* Oxford:Oxford UP
- Kymlicka W and Norman W (1995) 'Return of the Citizen: A Survey of Recent Work on Citizenship Theory' in Beiner (ed) (1995)
- Laborde C (2001) 'From constitutional to civic patriotism', *British Journal of Political Science* Vol 32,4 October pp591-612
- LaCapra D (1998) *History and Memory after Auschwitz*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press.
- Lamb WRM (trans) (1927) *Plato* Vol XII Charmides. Alcibiades 1 & 2. Hipparchus. The Lovers. Theages. Minos. Epinomis Cambridge,MA: Harvard UP
- Langley B (1997) transcription of a speech on his experiences as a storyteller at the American Folklore Society annual meeting at <http://www.lpb.org/programs/swappingstories/perspective.html> (Last accessed 18 August 2006)
- Laurie N (1999) 'What is autonomy? A Socratic Dialogue in Practice' *Practical Philosophy* November 1999 2:3 pp2-29
- Lawson M (1991) *NFS Grundtvig. Selected Educational Writings* Helsingør: International People's College
- Lawson M (1995) 'Extending the Grundtvigian Vision: Peter Manniche (1889-1981) and International People's

- College, Helsingør, Denmark' pp65ff Zøllner and Andersen (1995)
- Lawson M (2000) 'NFS Grundtvig' *Prospects: the quarterly review of comparative education* Paris: UNESCO: International Bureau of Education Vol XXIII, no 3/4, 1993, pp. 613-23
- Lawson M (compiler) (1991) *NFS Grundtvig: Selected Educational Writings* International People's College/ Association of Folk High Schools in Denmark
- Leal F (2004) 'The Socratic Method. An Introduction to the Essay of Nelson' in Saran and Neisser (eds) (2004)
- Le Conseil d'État (2006) Ordonnance du juge des référés du 6 mars 2006 No 289947 Association UNITED SIKHS et M. Shingara MANN SINGH Reported at http://www.conseil-etat.fr/ce/jurisprd/index_ac_ld0609.shtml (Last accessed 27 September 2006)
- Lebovics H (1992) *True France: The Wars over Cultural Identity 1900-45* Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP
- Lefebure LD (2006) 'Catholic Theological Education in a Religiously Pluralistic Age' *Teaching Theology and Religion* Vol9, no2, pp85-90
- Le Guin U (1989) *Dancing at the Edge of the World. Thoughts on Words, Women, Places* London: Grove Press
- Leonard T (1973) *The Proof of the Mince Pie* (Online version) <http://www.tomleonard.co.uk/sixoclock.shtml> (Last accessed 24 August 2006)
- Leonard T (1984/2003) 'this is thi six a clock news' in *Intimate Voices 1965-1983* Buckfastleigh: Eruscan Books
- Leoussi A (ed) (2001) *Encyclopaedia of Nationalism* New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers
- Lessing D (1990) 'A note' *British Journalism Review* 1,2
- Levy JL, Mortensen KP and Nielsen E (1994 *Litteratur-Historier*) Copenhagen: Danmarks Radio Forlaget
- Lewis P (1985) 'Beyond description' *Annals, Association of American Geographers* 75:465-77
- Liebes T (1988): 'Cultural Differences in the Retelling of Television Fiction', *Critical Studies in Mass Communication* 5(4): 277-92
- Liep J and Olwig KF (1994) *Komplekse liv. Kulturel mangfoldighed i Danmark*. Copenhagen: Akademisk Forlag
- Lijphart A (2002) 'The Evolution of Consociational Theory and Consociational Practices 1965-2000' *Acta Politica* 37 Spring/Summer 2002: 11-22
- Lind M (1995) *The Next American: The New Nationalism and the Fourth American Revolution* New York: Free Press
- Lindhart PG (1951) *Grundtvig. An Introduction* London:SPCK
- Linklater M (2002) 'Them and Us: Freedom Songs' August 2002 Centre for Political Song, Glasgow Caledonian University Online publication at <http://www.gcal.ac.uk/politicalsong/research/linklater.html> (Last accessed 15 October 2006)

- Lipman M (1991) *Thinking in Education* Cambridge: Cambridge UP
- Lipman M (ed) (1993) *Thinking, Children and Education* Montclair: Kendall/Hunt
- Littleton CS (1965) 'A Two-dimensional Scheme for the Classification of Narratives' *Journal of American Folklore* 78:21-7
- Lochhead L (2003) *The Colour of Black & White: poems 1984-2003* Edinburgh: Polygon
- Lofton F (1991) 'Teaching Christian Values within the Family' In Lee N June (ed) (1991) *The Black Family: Past Present and Future* Grand Rapids, Michigan: Zondervan Publishing
- Long F (2005) 'Thomas Reid and Philosophy with Children' *Journal of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain* Vol 39, nr4, pp599-614
- Lorde A (1984) *Sister Outsider* New York: Crossing Press
- Loughlin G (1996) *Telling God's Story* Cambridge: Cambridge UP
- Lovatt R, Lyall-Grant F, Morris Z and Whitehead C (2005) *Faith in the East of England*, Cambridge: East of England Development Agency/East of England Faiths Council/ University of Cambridge
- Lugones M and Spelman E (1983) '"Have we got a theory for you?" Feminist Theory, cultural imperialism and the demand for the woman's voice' *Women's Studies International Forum* 6, 573-81
- Lundbak H (2003) *Danish Unity* Copenhagen: Museum Tusulanum Press, University of Copenhagen
- Lundgreen-Nielsen F (1983) 'Grundtvig and Romanticism' in C Thodberg and AP Thyssen (eds) *NFS Grundtvig - Tradition and Renewal* Copenhagen: Den Sanske Selskab
- Lundgreen-Nielsen F (1992) 'Grundtvig og dansked' in Feldbæk (red) (1992) pp 9-187
- Lundgreen-Nielsen F (1993) 'Grundtvig's Poetics' in Allchin et al *Heritage and Prophecy* Aarhus: Aarhus University Press
- Lundgreen-Nielsen F (1997) 'Grundtvig as a Danish Contribution to World Culture' *Grundtvig Studier* pp72ff
- Lyck L (ed) (1992) *Denmark and EC membership evaluated* London: Pinter
- Lynch G and Willows D (1998) *Telling Tales A Contact Pastoral Monograph No8* Edinburgh: Contact Pastoral Trust
- Løgstrup KE (1956) *Den etiske fordring* Copenhagen: Gyldendal (For edition in English translation: see MacIntyre and Fink 1997)
- Løgstrup KE (1961) *Kunst og etik* Copenhagen: Gyldendal
- MacCormick N (1999) 'Nation and Nationalism' pp189ff in Beiner (1999)
- MacDiarmid H (1931) 'English Ascendancy in British Literature' *The Criterion* 10:593-613

- MacDiarmid H (1978) 'In memoriam James Joyce' in M Grieve and WR Aitken (eds) (1978)
- Macedo S (1990) *Liberal Virtues: citizenship, virtue and community* Oxford: Oxford UP
- MacIntyre A (1985) *After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theology* (2nd ed) London: Duckworth
- Macintyre A (1987) The idea of an educated public, in Hirsute (1987)
- MacIntyre A (1998) 'Aquinas's critique of education: against his own age, against ours' In Rorty AO(ed) (1998)
- MacIntyre A and Fink H (1997) *The Ethical Demand* Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press (English translation, with introduction, of KE Løgstrup (1956) *Den etiske fordring* Copenhagen: Gyldendal)
- Macleod I and Mac Neacaill (1995) *Scotland, a Linguistic Double Helix* Dublin/Brussels: European Bureau for Lesser Used Languages
- Macquarrie J (1967) *God-Talk: An Examination of the Language and Logic of Theology* London: SCM Press
- Magee B (2000) *The Story of Philosophy* London: DK ADULT
- Maier CS (1993) 'A surfeit of memory? Reflecting on history, melancholy, and denial' *History and Memory*, 5: 136-51.
- Mair M (1987) *Kelly, Bannister and a Story Telling Psychology* Paper presented at the 7th International Congress on Personal Construct Psychology Rhodes College, Memphis, Tennessee August 1987
- Mair M 1988 'Psychology as storytelling' *International Journal of Personal Construct Psychology* 1:125-137
- Maitles H, Cowan P and Butler E (2006) *Never Again! Does Holocaust Education Have an Effect on Pupils' Citizenship Values and Attitudes?* Web only publication of the Scottish Executive Education Department at <http://www.scotland.gov.uk/Publications/2006/09/06133626/0> (Last accessed 15 October 2006)
- Major J (2004) *The Guardian* 5 June 2004
- Mann M (1986) *The Sources of Social Power* Vol 1: 'A History of Power from the Beginning to AD1760' Cambridge,UK: Cambridge UP
- Mann M (2004) *Fascists* Cambridge,UK: Cambridge UP
- Manniche, P (1926) 'The International People's College' in Holger Begtrup, Hans Lund and Peter Manniche (eds) (1926)
- Manniche P (1969) *Living Democracy in Denmark*. Copenhagen: GEC Gad
- Manniche P (1971) *The International People's College 1921-1971* Helsingør: The International People's College
- Manniche P (1973) *The International People's College, 1921-1971* Helsingør: International People's College
- Manniche P (1978) *Rural development and the Changing Countries of the World* (2nd ed) London: Pergamon Press

- Marcussen M and Zølner M (2003) 'Monetarism and the Masses. Denmark and Economic Integration in Europe' *Cooperation and Conflict: Journal of the Nordic International Studies Association* Vol 38(2): 101-123
- Margalit A (2002) *The Ethics of Memory* Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP
- Markham I (2003) *Theology of Engagement* Oxford: Blackwell Publishing
- Marshall W (1995) 'The New Citizenship' *The New Democrat* Vol 7 nr2, March/April 1995 pp10-12
- Marwick A (1986) *British Society since 1945* Harmondsworth: Penguin
- Marx K and Engels F (1848) *The Communist Manifesto* London
- Massie A (2006) 'Bitter Feelings only service to harm our nation' *The Scotsman* 22 June 2006
- McClintock A (1997) '"No longer in heaven": Gender, Race and Nationalism' pp89ff in McClintock et al (1997)
- McClintock A, Mufti A, Shohat E (eds) (1997) *Dangerous Liaisons: Gender, Nation and Postcolonial Perspectives* Minneapolis, Minnesota/ London: University of Minnesota Press
- McClure JD (1997) *Why Scots Matters* Edinburgh: The Saltire Society
- McCrone D (1998) *The Sociology of Nationalism* London and New York: Routledge
- McCrone D (2001) *Understanding Scotland. The Sociology of a Nation* 2nd ed London: Routledge
- McCrone D (2002) 'Who do you say that you are?' *Ethnicities* 2:301-20
- McCrone D and Kiely R (2000) 'Nationalism and Citizenship' *Sociology* 34:19-34
- McFague S (1982) *Metaphorical Theology* Philadelphia: Fortress Press
- McGuigan J (2005) 'The cultural public sphere' *European Journal of Cultural Studies* 8(4) 427ff
- McIlvaney W (1999) Article in *The Herald* (Glasgow newspaper) 6 March 1999 Excerpt in McCrone 2001:128
- McIntosh A (2001) *Soil and Soul* London: Aurum Press
- McKay A (2006) 'When evil tips into empathy', 16 September 2006 'The Guide' in *The Herald* (Glasgow)
- McNeill W (1986) *Polyethnicity and National Unity in World History* Toronto: University of Toronto Press
- McTernan O (2003) *Violence in God's name: Religion in an age of conflict*, London: Darton, Longman and Todd.
- Mello R (2001) 'The Power of Storytelling: How Oral Narrative Influences Children's Relationships in Classrooms' *International Journal of Education and the Arts* vol 2 nol February 2, 2001
- Mellon J (1992) *Og gamle Danmark: En beskrivelse af Danmark i det Herrens år 1992* Centrum
- Merrifield J (1997) 'Finding our lodestone again: democracy, the civil society and adult education' 27th

- Annual SCUTREA conference proceedings 1997 'Crossing borders, breaking boundaries: Research in the education of adults'* Online record of papers at www.leeds.ac.uk/educol/documents/000000264.htm
- Michelsen W (1983) 'Grundtvig's Christian Breakthrough 1810-12' in Thodberg and Thyssen (eds) (1983)
- Mikkelsen HV og Thomsen N (red) (2004) *Hvor blev det grundtvigske af?* Frederiksberg, Denmark: Aros Forlag
- Miller D (1995) *On Nationality* Oxford: Clarendon Press
- Miller S (2000) 'Critical Philosophy as a demand for resistance against National Socialism' pp5-12 in Shipley (2000)
- Mitchell P and Riggs K (2000) *Children's Reasoning and the Mind* Hove: Psychology Press
- Mitra T Bhattacharya A and Alan J (eds) (2003) *Education and Development: Proceedings of the Grundtvig International Conference at Jadavpur University January 1999 Kolkata, India: Jadavpur University*
- Modjeska D (1990) *Poppy* Ringwood, Australia: Penguin
- Modood T (2005) 'Multiculturalism or Britishness: a false debate' *Connections* Winter 2004-05
- Montesquieu (1758/1995) *De l'esprit des lois* (Texte de 1758, dernier état du texte revu par Montesquieu. Édition établie par Laurent Versini, professeur à la Sorbonne. Paris: Éditions Gallimard, 1995 (2 Volumes: Vol I: pp 1-604; Vol II: pp 605-1628. Collection folio, Essais.)
- Montessori M (1989) *Education for a New World* Oxford: Clio Press
- Morales AL (1998) *Medicine Stories: history, culture and the politics of integrity* Cambridge, MA: South End Press
- Morgan R and Barton J 1989 *Biblical Interpretation* Oxford: Oxford UP
- Morrell K (2004) 'Scoratic Dialogue and Careers' *Loughborough University Business School Research Series Paper* 2004 nr2
- Morrison T (1992) *Playing in the Dark: Whiteness and the Literary Imagination* Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press
- Morson GS (1986) 'Introduction' in GS Morson (ed) *Bakhtin: Essays and Dialogues on his Work* Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press
- Mortensen V (ed) (2003) *Theology and the Religious: A Dialogue* Cambridge, UK: William B Eerdmans Publishing Co
- Mosher L A (2006) 'Models and Methods of Continuing Education for Christian Ministry in the Religiously Plural Context' *Teaching Theology and Religion* vol9 no 2 pp121-6

- Mosse G (1964) *The Crisis of Ideology: Intellectual Origins of the Third Reich* interest in Germany, *Comparative Education*, 36 (3), pp 297-307
- Müller KB (2006) 'The Civil Society-State Relationship in Contemporary Discourse: A Complementary Account from Giddens' Perspective' *British Journal of Politics and International Relations* vol8 pp311-30
- Munch P (1959-67) *Erindringer 1914-1918* Copenhagen: Nyt Nordisk Forlag/ Arnold Busck
- Murdoch I (1985) *The Sovereignty of Good* London: Ark Paperbacks
- Murphy D (2003) *Life after the French Empire: some case studies from Senegalese culture* Galway: National University of Ireland
- Murphy M (2001) 'The political economy of civil society: Implications for adult and community education' *AERC Proceedings* Online at www.edst.educ.ubc.ca/aerc/2001/2001Murphy.htm (Last accessed 16 October 2006)
- Murris K (1992) *Teaching Philosophy with Picture Books* London: Infonet Publications
- Murris K (nd a) *Philosophy with Children: More Basic than the Basics* (Online) www.dialogueworks.co.uk/dw/wr/kmurris/pwcl.doc (Last accessed 29 October 2006)
- Murris K (nd b) *The Role of the Facilitator in Philosophical Inquiry* www.dialogueworks.co.uk/dw/wr/kmurris/trfl.doc
- Møller E (1950) Grundtvig 1848-50 (English summary by Dr Noelle Davies pp103-7) *Grundtvig Studier* 1950
- Møller PM (1820) 'Glæde over Danmark' in *Tilskueren. Et Ugeskrift* (1823)
- Nabudere DW (2003) 'Grundtvig's Folkelighed in the Age of Globalisation' *Journal of World Education* Vol33,2 Summer 2003:17-23
- Nairn T (1977/2003) *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism* London: New Left Books (1st ed 1977); London: Verso (2nd ed 2003)
- Nairn T (1997) *Faces of Nationalism: Janus Revisited*. London: Verso
- Nakajima N (1916) Comparative study of national education in Germany, France, Britain and the USA Tokyo: Kyouiko-Shichko Kenkyukai
- National Statistics (2003) *Census 2001 - Ethnicity and Religion in England and Wales* Online at <http://www.statistics.gov.uk/census2001/profiles/commentaries/ethnicity.asp> (Last accessed 15 October 2006)
- Nelson L (1949) *Socratic Method and Critical Philosophy* New Haven: Yale UP
- Nelson LH (1993) 'Epistemological communities' in L Alcott and W Potter (eds) *Feminist Epistemologies* New York and London: Routledge

- Newbigin L (1969) *The Finality of Christ* London: SCM Press
- Nielsen E (1951) *NFS Grundtvig's Conception of the Development of the History of the Christian Church*
Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Chicago, Illinois
- Nielsen ED (1976) 'The School for Life' pp34-39
(translation of Grundtvig's *Skolen for Livet* 1838) In
Knudsen NFS *Grundtvig: selected writings*
Philadelphia: Fortress Press
- Nielsen K (1999) 'Cultural Nationalism, Neither Ethnic nor Civic' in Beiner (ed) (1999)
- Noack B (1993) 'Grundtvig and Anglo-Saxon Poetry' in Allchin et al (1993)
- Noah H (1986) The Use And Abuse Of Comparative Education,
In: Altbach and Kelly (eds) (1986)
- Nordhaug O (1986) 'Adult education in the welfare state : institutionalization of social commitment'
International Journal of Lifelong Education Vol 5 No 1
Jan-Mar 1986 (45-57)
- Northwest Development Agency (2003) *Faith in England's Northwest: The contribution made by faith communities to civil society in the region* Warrington: Northwest Development Agency
- Nóvoa A & Yariv-Mashal T (2003) 'Comparative research in education: a mode of governance or a historical journey?' *Comparative Education*, 39(4), 423-438
- Nussbaum B and Glover J (eds) (1995) *Women, Culture and Development* Oxford: Oxford University Press
- Nussbaum M (1997) *Cultivating Humanity* Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP
- Nussbaum M (1999) *Sex and Social Justice* Oxford: Oxford UP
- Nussbaum M and Rorty AO (eds) (1992) *Essays on Aristotle's De Anima* Oxford: Clarendon Press
- Nuttall S (1998) 'History and Identity in Contemporary Australian Women's Autobiography' *Women's Writing*, Vol 5, No 2
- Nygård F og Schrøder L (1891) *Danskeren. Tidsskrift for Land og By* Bind V; October 1890-April 1891
- Oakes PJ (1987) 'The salience of social categories' pp117-141 in Turner et al (1987)
- Oldfield A (1990) 'Citizenship: an unnatural practice?', *Political Quarterly*, vol 61, no 2, pp 177-87
- Olney J (ed) (1980) *Autobiography* Princeton: Princeton UP
- On Course Workshop (nd) (Online)
www.oncourseworkshop.com/Learning010.htm (Last accessed 14 October 2006)
- One Scotland (nd) 'Attitudes today' Online publication at
http://www.onescotland.com/onescotland/osmc_display_leveldown.jsp;jsessionid=8E186946E879BE9660D737323B3A92D1?pContentID=83&p_applic=CCC&p_service=Content.show&
(Last accessed 17 October 2006)
- Ong W (1982) *Orality and Literacy* London: Methuen

- Orr CC (1988) 'Romanticism in Switzerland' pp134ff in Roy Porter and Mikuláš Teich (1988)
- Ostergård U (1992) 'Denmark's Identity: European, Nordic or Peasant?' in Lyck (ed) (1992)
- Overing J (1997) 'The Role of Myth: an anthropological perspective, or "The Reality of the Really Made-Up" pp1-18 in Hosking G and Schöpflin (1997)
- Ozumbah K (1990) *Education for Life : A Proposal for a Cooperation between the Grundtvig Institute Movement Nigeria and the Danish Folk High School Movement Denmark*
- Parekh B (1991) 'Britain and the Social Logic of Pluralism' in Andrews (ed) (1991)
- Parekh B (1997) 'Dilemmas of Multicultural Theory of Citizenship' *Constellations* 4/1:54-62
- Parker W and Jarolimek J (1984) *Citizenship And The Critical Role Of The Social Studies*. National Council For The Social Studies Bulletin No. 72. Boulder, CO: ERIC Clearinghouse for Social Studies/Social Science Education and Social Science Education Consortium, Inc. and Washington, DC: National Council for the Social Studies
- Pateman T (1991) *Key Concepts. A Guide to Aesthetics, Criticism and the Arts in Education* London: Falmer Press
- Patton J (1990) *From ministry to theology: Pastoral action and reflection* Nashville: Abingdon Press
- Pearson H (2006) 'Days like this' August 2006 edition *Condé Nast Traveller* (popular travel magazine) London: Condé Nast Publications
- Pecknold, CC (2003) 'The Readable City and the Rhetoric of Excess' *CrossCurrents* 52, no4:516-20
- Pedersen (2003) *Den Levende Vekselvirkning: Grundtvig, Kold og undervisningen idag* Århus: Kvan
- Pedersen FS (1998) 'The Politician Grundtvig (1783- 1872): A Liberal in the Danish Constituent Assembly of 1849' *Scandinavian-Canadian Studies* XI (1998): 55-74
- Pedersen O (2003) *Den Levende Vekselvirkning: Grundtvig, Kold og undervisningen idag* Århus: Kvan
- Pessen E (1971) 'The Egalitarian Myth and the American Social Reality' *American Historical Review* Vol 76, Nr4, (Oct 1971) pp989-1034
- Phan PC (1985) *Culture and Eschatology: The Iconographical Vision of Paul Evdokimov* New York: Peter Lang
- Phillips D and Ochs K(2003) 'Processes of Policy Borrowing in Education: some explanatory and analytical devices' *Comparative Education* Volume 39 No. 4 November 2003 pp. 451-461
- Pizer J (1996) 'Review of Clifford Albrecht Bernd: *Poetic Realism in Scandinavia and Western Europe 1820-1895*' *South Central Review* Vol 13 nr 1 pp74-76

- Platten, Stephen (2000) 'Introduction: Ink Tempered with Love pp2-25 In Stephen Platten (ed) (2000) *Ink and Spirit. Literature and Spirituality* Norwich: Canterbury Press
- Poliakov L (1974) *The Aryan Myth* New York: Basic Books
- Popper K (1962) *The Open Society and Its Enemies* Vol II, 4th (rev) (ed) London: Routledge and Kegan Paul
- Porter R and Teich M (1988) *Romanticism in National Context* Cambridge: Cambridge UP
- Postman N (1996), *The End of Education*, New York: Alfred A. Knopf
- Povrzanović M (1997) 'Identities in War: Embodiments of Violence and Places of Belonging' *Ethnologica Europaea* 27:153-62
- Prenter R (1950) 'Grundtvigs Ansicht vom Menschen' in *Evangelische Theologie* Vol 9 p395 (translated in Michael Root (2000) 'Generous Orthodoxy: Regin Prenter's Appropriation of Grundtvig' pp45ff in Allchin et al (eds) *Grundtvig in International Perspective* Aarhus: Aarhus University Press
- Prenter R (1967) *Skabelse og Gømløsning* 4ed Copenhagen (translated in Root (2000))
- Prenter R (1973) 'Grundtvigs udfordring til moderne theology' *Grundtvig Studier* 1973:11-29
- Price R (1978) *A Palpable God* New York: Akadine Press
- Prince A (1998) *The Fan Dancer* London: Allison and Busby
- Prospect (2005) 'Britain Rediscovered' (transcript of a roundtable conversation) *Prospect* April 2005:20ff
- Putnam RD (1995) 'Bowling alone: America's declining social capital' *Journal of Democracy* 6(1)65-78
- Putnam R and Feldstein LM (2003) *Better together: Restoring the American community*, London: Simon and Schuster
- Putterman E (2001) 'Realism and Reform in Rousseau's Constitutional Projects for Poland and Corsica' *Political Studies* 49 (3):481-494
- Quiller-Couch A (1918) 'On the terms Classical and Romantic' *Studies in Literature* (first series) Cambridge, UK: Cambridge UP
- Qvortrup L (2003) 'Dannelse' pp189ff in Galal and Liengaard (2003)
- Rahner K (1966) 'Poetry and the Christian', pp357-367 In *Theological Investigations IV* Baltimore: Helicon
- Raupach-Strey G (2004) 'The Socratic Approach at School Level: Four Models' pp93ff in Saran and Neisser (eds) (2004)
- Rawls J (1993) *Political Liberalism* New York: Columbia UP
- Reason P and Hawkins P (1998) 'Storytelling as inquiry' pp71-101 in P Reason (ed) *Human Inquiry in Action: Developments in New Paradigm Research* London: Sage

- Reddie A (1998) 'The Oral Tradition of African-Caribbean People as a Resource for Black Christian Formation' *British Journal of Theological Education* vol 10, no 1, Summer 1998
- Reddy P (1991) *Sådan er danskerne! Mørke: Grevas*
- Reed R (1992) 'On the Art and Craft of Dialogue' pp147-158 in Sharp and Reed (eds) (1992)
- Rehg W (1996) (trans) *Between Facts and Norms* Cambridge Mass. and Cambridge UK: MIT Press and Polity Press pp329-387
- Reich R (1998) 'Confusion about the Socratic Method: Socratic Paradoxes and Contemporary Invocations of Socrates' *Philosophy of Education Society Yearbook* 1998 (Online) www.ed.uic.edu/eps/pes-yearbook/1998.reich.html (Last accessed 29 October 2006)
- Reicher S and Hopkins N (2001) *Self and Nation* London: Saga Publications
- Reinvalds S (1999) *Green light to the Danish "folkehøjskole" in Latvia* Unpublished paper
- Rerup L (1993) 'Grundtvig and 19th Century Nationalism' in Schjørring (red) (1993)
- Reuther RR (1983) *Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology* Boston: Beacon Press, 1983
- Ricoeur P (1998) *Critique and Convictions* (trans K Blamey) New York: Columbia UP
- Rifberg K (2003) 'Oh! to be Danish. An Essay' in The Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs in cooperation with the editors of the Danish National Encyclopedia Online publication at <http://www.um.dk/Publikationer/UM/English/Denmark/kap8/8.asp> (Last accessed 2 October 2006)
- Riggs KL and Peterson DM (2000) 'Counterfactual thinking in pre-school children: mental state and causal inferences' in Mitchell and Riggs (eds) (2000)
- Rise Hansen C (1959) *Aktstykker og Oplysninger til Rigsrådets og Stændermødernes Historie i Frederik III's Tid,, Vol I* Copenhagen
- Rosedahl E (1994) 'Vikingerne i dansk kultur' *Fortid og Nutid* 1994:2:158-172
- Röhrig P (1995) 'The Origins and Development of the German Residential Folk High School as a Response to Grundtvig's Inspiration and to Political Challenges' pp130ff in Zöllner and Andersen (1995)
- Root M (2000) 'Generous Orthodoxy' pp45ff in Allchin et al (eds) (2000)
- Rorty AO (ed) (1998) *Philosophers on education. New historical perspectives* pp95-108 London, Routledge
- Rosaldo R (1986) 'Ilongot hunting as story and experience' in V Turner and E Bruner (eds) *The anthropology of experience* Chicago: University of Chicago Press

- Ross GM (1993) 'Socrates versus Plato': The Origins and Development of Socratic Thinking' in Abbs (ed) (2004)
- Rothstein M (1986) 'When fiction is fact: perceptions in sixteenth-century France' *Studies in Philology* 83, 3: 359-75
- Rowe CJ (1986) *Plato: Phaedrus*, translation and commentary Warminster: Aris and Philips
- Roy O (2004) *Globalized Islam: The Search for a New Ummah* New York: Columbia UP
- Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1993) *The Danish Folkehøjskole* Copenhagen: Royal Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Secretariat for Cultural Relations) (Online)
<http://www.um.dk/Publikationer/UM/English/TheDanishFolkehoejskole/hojsk.doc> (last accessed 19 September 2006)
- Russell M (2002) 'The most dangerous case of name dropping' *The Herald*, 24 June 2002: 15
- Rørdam T (1980) *The Danish Folk High Schools* 2nd edition Copenhagen: Den Danske Selskab
- Sacks J (2002) 'The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations' 7th Annual Templeton Lecture on Religion and World Affairs May 21, 2002 Philadelphia, PA: Foreign Policy Research Unit
- Sacks J (2003) *The Dignity of Difference: How to Avoid the Clash of Civilizations* London: Continuum International Publishing Group
- Sadler M (1900) 'How Far Can We Learn Anything of Practical Value From The Study Of Foreign Systems Of Education?' Address Of 20 October, In J H Higginson (ed) (1900)
- Sajoo AB (2001) 'The Ethics of the Public Square' polylog: Forum for Intercultural Philosophy 3 (2001) (Online)
<http://them.polylog.org/3/asa-en.htm>
- Salling Olesen H (2004) *Lifelong Learning in Colombia and Denmark Inspiration by Comparison* World Bank Project:Lifelong Learning in Columbia
- Salomon A (1901) 'Soziale Hilfsarbeit und soziale Frauenbildung in Deutschland' *Frauenberuf* Jg4, H29,181
- Sandel M (1982) *Liberalism and the Limits of Justice* Cambridge: Cambridge UP
- Sandemose A (1933/2005) *En flyktning krysser sitt spor* Oslo:Aschehoug
- Saran R and Neisser (2004) *Enquiring Minds* Stoke-on-Trent: Trentham Books
- Sawin P (2001) 'Vernacular Narrative' in *Anarchaey Notes* (UNC Chapel Hill Department of Anthropology) Volume 6 No. 1 Spring 2001
- Schama S (1996) *Landscape and Memory* London: Fontana Press
- Scheffler I (1983) 'The moral content of American public education' in Giroux H and Purpel (1983)
- Schierup C (1993) *På kulturens slagmark* Odense: Sydjysk Universitetsforlag

- Schjørring JH (red) *National Identity and International Community* pp16-26 Copenhagen: Danish Cultural Institute
- Schlesinger P (1998) 'Scotland's Quiet Revolution' *Le Monde diplomatique* April 1998
- Schlesinger P and Foret F (2006) 'Political Roof and Sacred Canopy?: Religion and the EU Constitution' *European Journal of Social Theory*.2006; 9: 59-81
- Schlesinger P and Foret F (2006) 'Political Roof and Sacred Canopy?' *European Journal of Social Theory* 9(1):59-81
- Schlez JF (1817) *Geschichte des Dörfleins Traubenheim* Geissen
- Schüssler F (1992) *But she said: Feminist practices of biblical interpretation* Boston: Beacon Press
- Schüssler F (1995) *Bread not stone: The challenge of feminist biblical interpretation* 2nd edition Edinburgh: T & T Clark
- Schnapper D (1994) *La communauté des citoyens. Sur l'idée moderne de nation* Paris: Gallimard
- Schöpflin G (1997) 'The functions of myth and a taxonomy of myths' In Geoffrey Hosking and George Schöpflin *Myths and Nationhood* London: Hurst and Company
- Schöpflin G (2000) *Nations, Identity and Power* London: Hurst and Company
- Schwarz M (1987) *Der Spielende Manager* Mainz: Namokel und Tosch KG
- Schreier H (1993) 'The Role of Stories in Philosophising with Children' *Critical and Creative Thinking: The Australasian Journal of Philosophy in Education* Vol 1 Nr 2 pp
- Scofield DM (1995) *Thought, Talk and Autonomy: Shifts in Thinking about Philosophy with Children* Unpublished Bed honours dissertation, College of St Mark and St John, Plymouth Cited in Murriss (nd b)
- Scott JC (1990) *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: hidden transcripts* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
- Scott N (1985) *The Poetics of Belief: Studies in Coleridge, Arnold, Pater, Satayana, Stevens and Heidegger* Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press
- Scottish Executive (2004) *New Scots: Attracting Fresh Talent to Meet the Challenge of Growth*
- Scruton R (1990) *The Philosopher on Dover Beach* Manchester: Carcanet
- Segal RA (1999) *Theorizing about Myth* Amherst,MA: University of Massachusetts Press
- Seglow J (1998) 'Universals and Particulars: the Case of Liberal Cultural Nationalism' *Political Studies* XLVI, 963-977
- Seligman A (1992) *The Idea of Civil Society* Princeton: Princeton UP
- Sexson L (1982) *Ordinarily Sacred* New York: Crossroad

- Shanks A (1995) *Civil Society, Civil Religion* Oxford: Blackwell
- Sharp AM and Reed RF (eds) (1992) *Studies in Philosophy for Children* Philadelphia: Temple UP
- Shaver JP (ed) (1991) *Handbook of Research on Social Studies Teaching and Learning* New York: Macmillan
- Shipley P (2000) *Occasional Working Papers in Ethics and Critical Philosophy* Nr2 London: Society for the Furtherance of Critical Philosophy (UK)
- Skov N A (2000) 'The Use of Historical Myth - Denmark's World War II Experience Made to Serve Practical Goals' *Scandinavian Studies* Spring 2000 Vol 72 No 1 pp89-110 Proto, UT: Society for the Advancement of Scandinavian Study
- Skovmand R (1951) *De folkelige bevægelser i Danmark* Copenhagen: Schultz-Statsradiofoniens Grundbøger
- Skovmand R (1978) *Danmarks Historie* Vol 11 'Folkestyrets Fødsel 1830-1870' Copenhagen: Gyldendal
- Slagstad R (2004) 'Shifting Knowledge Regimes: The Metamorphoses of Norwegian Reformism' *Thesis Eleven* No 77, May 2004:65-83
- Smelser N (1968) *Essays in Sociological Explanation* Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall
- Smith AD (1991) *National Identity* London: Penguin
- Smith AD (1993) 'A Europe of Nations - Or the Nation of Europe' *Journal of Peace Research* 30(2):129-35
- Smith AD (1995) 'Gastronomy or geology? The role of nationalism in the reconstruction of nationalism' *Nations and Nationalism* 1(1), 3-23
- Smith AD (1997) 'The 'Golden Age' and National Renewal' in: Hosking and Schöpflin (1997)
- Smith AD (1998) *Nationalism and Modernism* London: Routledge
- Smith AD (1999) *Myths and Memories of the Nation* Oxford, Oxford UP
- Smith AD 2001 *Nationalism: Theory, Ideology, History* Cambridge: Polity
- Smith AD (2003) *Chosen Peoples* Oxford: OUP
- Smith D (2001) *Storytelling Scotland* Edinburgh: Polygon
- Smith MK (2000) 'Martin Buber on Education', *The encyclopedia of informal education*
www.infed.org/thinkers/et-buber.htm (last accessed 14 June 2006)
- Smitherman-Donaldson G and Van Dijk TA (eds) (1988) *Discourse and Discrimination* Detroit, MI: Wayne State University Press
- Smout TC (1994) "Perspective on Scottish Identity" *Scottish Affairs* Nr 6, Winter 1994.
- Solzhenitsyn A (1970) 'Nobel lecture in Literature 1970' (Online) at
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/literature/laureates/1970/solzhenitsyn-lecture.html (Last accessed 26 July 2006)

- Spence D (1982) *Narrative Truth and Historical Truth* New York: Norton
- Spicer C (1998) 'Afterword' in Warren (ed) (1998)
- Spinner J (1994) *The Boundaries of Citizenship: Race, Ethnicity and Nationalism in the Liberal State* Baltimore: John Hopkins UP
- Splitter LJ and Sharp AM (1995) *Teaching for Better Thinking: The classroom community of enquiry* Melbourne: Acer
- Spohn W and A Triandafyllidou (eds) (2003) *Europeanisation, National Identities and Migration: Changes in Boundary Constructions between Western and Eastern Europe*
- Steele T (1991) 'Metropolitan Extensions: Comparison of two moments of the export of British University Adult Education, Europe 1890-1910 and Africa 1945-1955' pp73ff in Friedenthal-Haase et al (eds) (1991)
- Steiner G (1961) *The Death of Tragedy* London: Faber and Faber
- Steiner-Khamsi G & Stolpe I (2006) *Educational Import in Mongolia: Local Encounters with Global Forces*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan
- Stevenson RL *Weir of Hermiston* <http://robert-louis-stevenson.classic-literature.co.uk/weir-of-hermiston/> (Last accessed 18 June 2006)
- Stewart A (2000) 'Social Inclusion: an introduction' pp1-16 in Askonas P and Stewart A (2000)
- Stewart DW (1987) *Adult learning in America: Eduard Lindeman and his agenda for lifelong education*. Malabar, FL: Robert E Krieger
- Storrar W (1990) *Scottish Identity. A Christian Vision* Edinburgh: The Handsel Press
- Stroup G (1984) *The Promise of narrative theology* London: SCM Press
- Sykes SW (1983) 'Theology' pp566-7 in Alan Richardson and John Bowden (eds) *A New Dictionary of Christian Theology* London: SCM Press
- Tamir Y (1993) *Liberal Nationalism* Princeton: Princeton UP
- Tamir Y (1999) 'Theoretical Difficulties in the Study of Nationalism' pp67ff in Beiner (ed) (1999)
- Tandrup L (1980) 'Hjertet kræver handling. Et manifest om historikeren som formidler af oprøret' In *Noter om historie og undervisning* No 66, 1980, pp5-11
- Tanner NP (ed) (1990) *Decrees of the Ecumenical Councils* Vol Two: Trent to Vatican II London and Washington DC: Sheed and Ward and Georgetown UP
- Taylor C (1992) *Multiculturalism and "The Politics of Recognition"* Princeton, NJ: Princeton UP
- Taylor C (1995) *Philosophical Arguments* Cambridge, MA: Harvard UP

- Taylor M (2000) 'Communities in the lead: power, organisational capacity and social capital' *Urban Studies*, Vol 37, no 5-6, pp 1019-1035
- Taylor-Thompson K (nd) *The Power of Socratic Dialogue* (Online)
<http://www.dukece.com/spotlight/PowerSocraticDialogue.htm> (Last accessed 29 October 2006)
- Tefe T (1997) *Grundtvig's Enlightenment and Educational Ideas as a Challenge to Ghana's Colonial Legacy* PhD dissertation, Royal Danish School for Educational Studies, Copenhagen
- Testrup Højskole (nd) *Who is Grundtvig?* Website at <http://www.testrup.dk/index.php?id=73,0,0,1,0,0> (Last accessed 13 May 2006)
- Thaning K (1972) *Grundtvig* Copenhagen: Det Danske Selskab
- The Estonian Folk High School Association (1999) *Golden Riches: Nordic adult learning* No 1
- The Guardian (2003) 'France to ban pupils' religious dress' article by John Henley, Friday December 12, 2003
- The Hymns of NFS Grundtvig in *The Eastern Churches Quarterly* (1959) Vol XIII no3&4
- The New Democrat (1995) *Rebuilding Civil Society* Symposium report reproduced in *The New Democrat* Vol 7 nr 2 March/April 1995 Online at www.cpn.org/parties/rebuilding.html
- Thiselton A (1992) *New Horizons in Hermeneutics* Harper Collins
- Thodberg C (1983) 'Grundtvig the hymn-writer' pp160-196 at p170 in Thodberg and Thyssen (eds) (1983)
- Thodberg C and Thyssen AP (1983) *NFS Grundtvig. Tradition and Renewal* Copenhagen: Det Danske Selskab
- Thomas ER (2002) 'Who Belongs? Competing Conceptions of Political Membership' *European Journal of Social Theory* 5:323-49
- Thomsen N (1983) 'Grundtvig in the Mirror of the Early Church' pp197ff in C Thodberg and Thyssen (eds) (1983)
- Thyssen AP (1983) 'Grundtvig's Ideas on the Church and the People up to 1824' in Thodberg and Thyssen (1983)
- Thyssen AP (1999) 'Nationality and Church in Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein with special reference to the importance of NFS Grundtvig' *Grundtvig Studier* pp27-64, English summary pp246-56
- Thøgersen S (1995) 'Grundtvig in China' *Grundtvig Studier* 1995:319 English summary
- Tibi B (1998) *Europa ohne Identität? Die Krise der multikulturellen Gesellschaft* Munich: Bertelsmann
- Tilly C (ed) (1975) *The Formation of National States in Western Europe* Princeton: Princeton UP
- Titmus C (1991) 'Cultural Borrowing and Imposition' pp13ff in Friedenthal-Haase et al (eds) (1991)
- Tivey L (ed) (1980) *The Nation-State*. Oxford: Martin Robertson

- Toftdahl H (1973) 'Grundtvig and Søren Kierkegaard' (English summary) *Grundtvig Studier* 1973
- Tolstoy LN (2006) *Anna Karenina* Harmondsworth: Penguin Books
- Tomlinson AL (2001) *Training God's spies: developing the imagination in theological formation* Contact Pastoral Monograph 11
- Tonkin E (1992) *Narrating our Pasts* Cambridge Studies in Oral and Literate Culture Cambridge: Cambridge UP
- Trier W (1890) *Femogtyve Års Skolevirksomhed i Vallekilde* Copenhagen: August Bangs Boghandel
- Tuan Y-F (1974) 'Space and place: a humanistic perspective' *Progress in Geography* 6:233-46 in Agnew, Livingstone and Rogers (eds) (1996)
- Turner JC, Hogg MA, Oakes PJ, Reicher SD and Wetherell MS (eds) (1987) *Rediscovering the Social Group: a self-categorization theory* Oxford: Blackwell
- Tylor EB (1871) *Primitive Culture* London: Murray
- Tønnensen R (1990) 'Menneskerettigenetene som Verdigrunnlag' *Norsk Pedagogisk Tidsskrift* 1990 nr1
- Undervisnings Ministeriet (1997) *Principles and Issues in Education* Copenhagen: The Ministry of Education
- UNESCO (2001) *UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity* Adopted by the 31st Session of the General Conference of UNESCO, Paris, 2 November 2001
- United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2004) 'Committee On Economic, Social And Cultural Rights Concludes Thirty-Third Session. Issues Concluding Observations on Reports of Malta, Denmark, Italy, Azerbaijan and Chile' Online press document at <http://www2.unog.ch/news2/documents/newsen/esc04021e.htm> (Last accessed 27 September 2006)
- United Reformed Church (1991) *Rejoice and Sing*
- Van den Berghe P (1967) *Race and Racism* New York: John Wiley
- Van den Berghe P (2005) 'Ethnies and Nations. Genealogy indeed.' in Ichijo and Uzelac (eds) (2005)
- Van Dijk TA (1984) *Prejudice in Discourse: an analysis of ethnic prejudice in cognition and conversation* Amsterdam: John Benjamins
- Van Dijk TA (1993) *Elite Discourse and Racism* Newbury Park: CA, Sage
- Van Dijk TA (1999) 'Discourse and The Denial of Racism' pp541-558 In Jaworski & Coupland (eds) (1999)
- Van Hooft S (1999) 'Socratic Dialogue as Collegial Reasoning' (Paper read at the 5th National Conference on Reasoning and Decision Making, held at Charles Stuart University, Riverina, 2-5 December 1998) *Practical Philosophy* 2.2, July 1999 and also published by the author at www.pantaneto.co.uk/issue10/venhooft.htm (Last accessed 29 October 2006)

- Van Setten H (1998) *The Century of the Child* E-version at <http://www.socsci.kun.nl/ped/whp/histeduc/ellenkey/key05.html> In *The History of Education and Childhood* Nijmegen, Netherlands: Nijmegen University (last accessed 15 September 2006)
- Vernant J-P (1990) *Myth and Society in Ancient Greece* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
- Verner C (1968) 'Cultural diffusion and adult education' *Adult leadership* June 1968:49-51, 91-3
- Versenyi L (1979) *Ironist and Moral Philosopher* Ithaca, NY: Cornell UP
- Vygotsky L (1986) *Thought and Language*. Boston: MIT Press
- Vind O (1999) *Grundtvigs Historiefilosofi* Copenhagen: Gyldendal
- Volf M (1996) *Exclusion and Embrace* Nashville, TN: Abingdon Press
- Walby S (2003) 'The Myth of the Nation-state' *Sociology* 37:529-46
- Waldron J (1996) 'Multiculturalism and Mélange' in Fullinwider (ed) (1996)
- Walzer M (1995) 'The Civil Society Argument' in Beiner R (ed) (1995)
- Ward K (1998) *Religion and Human Nature* Oxford: Clarendon Press
- Warnock M (1976) *Imagination* Faber and Faber
- Warren C(ed) (1998) *Democracy is Born in Conversations* New York: Circumstantial Productions
- Washington HA (ed) (1854) *The Writings of Thomas Jefferson: Being His Autobiography, Correspondence, Reports, Messages, Addresses, and Other Writings, Official and Private*
- Watson F (1994) *Text, church and world. Biblical interpretation in theological perspective* Edinburgh: T & T Clark
- Watson M (2003) *Being English in Scotland* Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP
- Weber M (1968) *From Max Weber: Essays in sociology* New York: Oxford UP
- Weiler J (2004) *Un'Europa cristiana* Milan: BUR saggi
- Werpehowski W (1986) 'Ad Hoc Apologetics' *Journal of Religion* Vol 66 pp287
- White H (1978) *Tropics of Discourse: Essays in Cultural Criticism* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press
- White H 1992 'Historical emplotment and the problem of truth' pp37-53 In S Friedlander (ed) (1992)
- White WR (1982) *Speaking in Stories* Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing
- Whitehead JD and Whitehead EE (1995) *Method in Ministry: Theological Reflection and Christian Ministry* (Rev ed) Kansas City, Mo: Sheed and Ward
- Wiggins (ed) (1975) *Religion as Story* New York: Harper and Row

- Wigh-Poulsen H (2004) 'Mit liv som grundtvigianer' in Mikkelsen og Thomsen (2004)
- Williams P (1997) *Seeing a Color-blind Future: the paradox of race* New York: Noonday Press
- Williams R (2000) *Lost Icons* London: Morehouse Publishing
- Wilson WA (1988) 'The Deeper Necessity: Folklore and the Humanities' *Journal of American Folklore* 101:400
- Withers CWJ (2000) 'Knowing one's limits. The geographical making of Scotland' (pp 35-42) *The Edinburgh Review* 103 The End of the Nation Edinburgh: The Centre for the History of Ideas in Scotland, University of Edinburgh
- Wodak R, de Cillia R, Reisigl M and Liebhart K (1999) *The Discursive Construction of National Identity* Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP
- Wojtas O (1994) 'Referees at thinking matches, Scottish philosophers are reaching the community' *The Times Higher Educational Supplement* 15 April 1994
- Wolfe J (1997) 'On Civil Society and the Virtuous Citizen' *The Carleton University Student Journal of Philosophy* vol17 no1 Fall 1997
- Wolff V (1943) *Three Guineas* London: Hogarth Press
- Wren K (2001) 'Cultural racism: something rotten in the state of Denmark?' *Social & Cultural Geography* Vol 2 No 2
- Yack B (1999) 'The Myth of the Civic Nation' pp103ff in Beiner (ed) (1999)
- Yaron K (1993) 'Martin Buber' pp135-46 *Prospects: the quarterly review of comparative education* Vol XXIII no 1/2
- Yorkshire Churches (2002) *Angels and advocates: Church social action in Yorkshire and the Humber*, Leeds: Yorkshire Churches (The Regional Commission for Yorkshire and the Humber)
- Yuval-Davis N and Anthias F (eds) (1989) *Women-Nation-State* London: Macmillan
- Zimmer O (2003) *A Contested Nation. History, Memory and Nationalism in Switzerland, 1761-1891* Cambridge: Cambridge UP
- Zulaika J (1992) 'Primordialist culture and political identity', Paper presented at annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association (cited in Watson 1996)
- Zøllner L (2000) *Education and Enlightenment* (Gymnasiepædagogik, Nr. 16) Odense: University of Southern Denmark
- Zøllner L and Andersen AM (eds) (1995) *Enlightenment in an international perspective* Vejle, Denmark: Nornesalen and Kroghs Forlag

- Ægidius KK (2003) 'Fundamental Ideas and Teaching Methods - Principles in the Folk High School Adult-Education in Denmark' in Byczkowski, Malszewski and Przybylska (eds) *Folk High School- School for Life* Wieżycza: Kaszubski Uniwersytet Ludowy
- Østergård U (2000) 'Danish National Identity: Between Multinational Heritage and Small State Nationalism', pp 139-84 in Branner and Kelstrup (eds) (2000)
- Østergård U (ed) (2002) *Dansk identitet* Århus: Århus Universitetsforlag